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More than words

Approaching a definition of Islamophobia

Edited by Isobel Ingham-Barrow

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Table of Contents

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS.....	3
FOREWORD.....	8
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY	9
PART I: INTRODUCING MEND'S DEFINITION OF ISLAMOPHOBIA	16
A Call for a Definition of "Islamophobia"	17
A Message from our CEO	19
MEND's Definition of Islamophobia	20
Understanding MEND's Definition of Islamophobia	22
Diversity of Terminology: Why use "Islamophobia"?	24
Understanding British Muslim Communities	27
PROFESSOR SOPHIE GILLIAT-RAY, CARDIFF UNIVERSITY THE DEMOGRAPHICS OF MUSLIMS IN BRITAIN	29
PART II: THE MANIFESTATIONS, LOGICS, AND MECHANISMS THAT FUEL ISLAMOPHOBIA.....	32
The Assumptions of Islamophobia.....	33
DR AURELIEN MONDON, UNIVERSITY OF BATH AND DR AARON WINTER, UNIVERSITY OF EAST LONDON LIBERAL AND ILLIBERAL ISLAMOPHOBIAS	36
Islamophobia, Xenophobia, Racism, and Anti-Semitism.....	38
PROFESSOR TARIQ MODOOD, UNIVERSITY OF BRISTOL ISLAMOPHOBIA: A FORM OF CULTURAL RACISM	38
DR YULIA EGOROVA, DURHAM UNIVERSITY ISLAMOPHOBIA IN ITS RELATION TO ANTI-SEMITISM	45
PROFESSOR NASAR MEER FACSS, UNIVERSITY OF EDINBURGH WHAT IS THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ISLAMOPHOBIA AND ANTISEMITISM?.....	46
Driving Islamophobic Narratives: The Islamophobia Industry	49
DR HILARY AKED, PHD UNIVERSITY OF BATH THE 'ISLAMOPHOBIA INDUSTRY'	50
Moral Panic, Media, and Broadcasting	66

NATHAN SPARKES, HACKED OFF CAMPAIGN LEVESON AND THE GOVERNMENT'S FAILURE TO KEEP ITS PROMISES TO THE VICTIMS OF PRESS ABUSE	72
PART III: THE SOCIO-POLITICAL AND PERSONAL CONSEQUENCES OF ISLAMOPHOBIA.....	82
Racial and Religious Hate Crime.....	83
NAZIR AFZAL, OBE CHALLENGING TIMES TO BE A MUSLIM	83
DR SHAZAD AMIN, CONSULTANT PHSYCHIATRIST ISLAMOPHOBIA AND MENTAL HEALTH	90
Youth and Education.....	92
SHEREEN FERNANDEZ, QUEEN MARY UNIVERSITY ISLAMOPHOBIA AND EDUCATION.....	93
DR SADIA HABIB BRITISHNESS, BELONGING AND ISLAMOPHOBIA: REFLECTION AND DIALOGUE.....	95
PROFESSOR JOHN HOLMWOOD, UNIVERSITY OF NOTTINGHAM THE BIRMINGHAM TROJAN HORSE AFFAIR	97
Economic Exclusion: Islamophobia and the Labour Market.....	101
Securitising Muslim Identities: Security and Counter-Terror	104
PROFESSOR TODD GREEN, LUTHER COLLEGE USA ISLAMOPHOBIA AND THE PRESUMPTION OF MUSLIM GUILT IN TERRORISM	106
HAREEM GHANI AND ILYAS NAGDEE, NUS ISLAMOPHOBIA, PREVENT AND UNIVERSITY	117
ROB FAURE WALKER, UNIVERSITY COLLEGE LONDON INSTEAD OF BEING CAST AS A THREAT, MUSLIM SOLIDARITY COULD SHOW US ALL HOW TO LIVE TOGETHER	123
Crime, Policing and the Criminal Justice System	127
Political Representation and Exclusion	135
AMAN ALL, MEND HEAD OF COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT AND DEVELOPMENT DEVELOPING CIVIC SENSIBILITIES	135
DR JOE GREENWOOD, YouGov THE BENEFITS OF PARTICIPATION	140

Public Exclusion, Integration and Minority Rights	142
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DR JAN DOBBERNACK, NEWCASTLE UNIVERSITY ISLAMOPHOBIA AND THE MYTH OF MUSLIM DISTANCE.....	145
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DR LASSE THOMASSEN, QUEEN MARY UNIVERSITY REPRESENTING MUSLIM WOMEN AND ISLAMOPHOBIA	151
---	-----

DR AZEEZAT JOHNSON, QUEEN MARY UNIVERSITY CONTROVERSY AND MUSLIM WOMEN'S CLOTHING PRACTICES	159
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PART IV: APPROACHES TO TACKLING ISLAMOPHOBIA	162
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MEND's Model to Tackling Islamophobia	163
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Acknowledgements

Contributors

Nazir Afzal, OBE

Nazir Afzal, OBE, is an eminent lawyer who has campaigned on issues including child sexual exploitation and violence against women. He has worked extensively within the Crown Prosecution Service and was the first Muslim to be appointed as Chief Prosecutor and was the most senior Muslim lawyer in the organisation. He is the recipient of many awards for his activities including the People's Award which was voted for by readers of a national newspaper. He is Pro Chancellor of Brunel University & Honorary Fellow of UCLAN and has Honorary Doctorates in Law from University of Birmingham & Manchester. In 2005; he was awarded an OBE by the Queen. He has also had the honour of being the only lawyer to ever prosecute a case before the Queen.

Dr Hilary Aked, PhD University of Bath

Hilary Aked is a freelance writer and researcher who holds a PhD from the University of Bath and is currently writing a book about the Israel lobby in the UK. Recent publications include "The Henry Jackson Society and the Degeneration of British Neoconservatism" (Public Interest Investigations, 2015, co-author) and "The Britain Israel Communications and Research Centre: Giving peace a chance?" (Public Interest Investigations, 2013, co-author).

Dr Jan Dobbernack, Newcastle University

Dr Jan Dobbernack is Lecturer in Sociology at Newcastle University. His publications include "The Politics of Social Cohesion in Germany, France and the United Kingdom (Palgrave, 2014), Citizenship, Nationality and Immigration in Germany" (Global Centre for Pluralism, 2017) and "Making a Presence: Images of Polity and Constituency in British Muslim

Representative Politics" (Ethnicities, 2017). He has previously held fellowships at the University of Bristol's Centre for Ethnicity and Citizenship and at the European University Institute's Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies.

Dr Yulia Egorova, Durham University

Dr Yulia Egorova is Reader in Anthropology at Durham University. She is the author of numerous publications exploring issues in the study of inter-community relations, including the forthcoming "Jews and Muslims in South Asia: Reflections on Difference, Religion and Race" (Oxford University Press).

Rob Faure Walker, University College London

Rob Faure Walker is a PhD candidate at UCL Institute of Education where he is investigating the impact of counter-terrorism discourses in educational settings and on the democratic process. He has also worked as a secondary teacher in London since 2005. He manages Prevent Digest, a monthly newsletter related to Prevent (www.preventdigest.co.uk).

Shereen Fernandez, Queen Mary University

Shereen Fernandez is a PhD researcher at Queen Mary University. Prior to this, she worked as a primary school teacher in London.

Hareem Ghani, NUS Women's Officer

Hareem Ghani is the NUS Women's Officer where she has led on work surrounding gendered Islamophobia, institutional responses to sexual violence and student-staff misconduct. She is completing her Undergraduate in History at Kings College London where she also founded It Stops Here, a zero-tolerance campaign against sexual misconduct, bullying and harassment.

Professor Sophie Gilliat-Ray, Cardiff University

Sophie Gilliat-Ray is Professor of Religious Studies at Cardiff University, and the Founding Director of the Islam-UK Centre, established in 2005. She has published numerous books and articles about Islam and Muslims in Britain and has a particular interest in Muslim chaplaincy and religious leadership. Sophie is the incoming Chair of the British Sociological Association 'Study Group' for Religion, and the former Chair of the 'Muslims in Britain Research Network'. Outside the day-job, Sophie is a very keen cyclist, raising money for the charity 'Women V Cancer'.

Professor Todd Green, Luther College USA

Todd Green is associate professor of religion at Luther College and a former advisor on Islamophobia at the US State Department in Washington, DC. He is the author of "Presumed Guilty: Why We Shouldn't Ask Muslims to Condemn Terrorism" (Fortress Press, 2018) and "The Fear of Islam: An Introduction to Islamophobia in the West" (Fortress Press, 2015).

Dr Joe Greenwood, YouGov

Joe Greenwood is a Political Data Analyst at YouGov and recently completed a PhD in Government at the University of Essex. His thesis examined the factors that influence political participation in the United Kingdom, with a focus on economic, social, and cultural capital as well as perceptions of privilege. He is currently working on a chapter exploring authoritarian populism in the UK, and on an article looking at the relationships between capital, perceptions, and vote choice in 2017.

Dr Sadia Habib

Dr Sadia Habib has a decade's teaching experience in UK schools and colleges. She completed both her MA and PhD in Education at Goldsmiths, University of

London. She is author of *Learning and Teaching British Values: Policies and Perspectives on British Identities* (Palgrave, 2017).

Professor John Holmwood, University of Nottingham

John Holmwood is Professor of Sociology at the University of Nottingham and member of the Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton during academic year 2014-15. He is co-author (with Therese O'Toole) of "Countering Extremism in British Schools? The Truth about the Birmingham Trojan Horse Affair" (Policy Press 2018). He was expert witness for the defence in the National College of Teaching and Leadership professional misconduct case against senior teachers at Park View Educational Trust.

Dr Azeezat Johnson, Queen Mary University

Azeezat Johnson is a lecturer in Geography at Queen Mary University of London. She is one of the co-editors for "The Fire Now: anti-racist scholarship in times of explicit racial violence" (to be published by Zed Books in November 2018), as well as co-founding The Critical Race and Ethnicities Network (based across the Universities of Leeds, Sheffield and York). Her research focuses on clothing practices, Blackness, Muslim identities, and Black feminism.

Professor Nasar Meer FAcSS, University of Edinburgh

Professor Nasar Meer is based in the School of Social and Political Sciences at the University of Edinburgh. His publications include: "Islam and Modernity (4 Volumes) (ed, 2017); Interculturalism and multiculturalism: Debating the dividing lines" (co-ed, 2016); "Citizenship, Identity and the Politics of Multiculturalism: The rise of Muslim consciousness" (2015, 2nd Edition); "Racialization and religion" (ed, 2014), "Race and Ethnicity" (2014) and "European Multiculturalism(s)" (co-edited, 2012). In 2016 he was awarded the

Royal Society of Edinburgh (RSE) Thomas Reid Medal for excellence in the social sciences, and in 2017 he was elected as a Fellow of the Academy of Social Sciences. www.nasarmeer.com @NasarMeer

Professor Tariq Modood, University of Bristol

Tariq Modood is Professor of Sociology, Politics and Public Policy and the founding Director of the Centre for the Study of Ethnicity and Citizenship at the University of Bristol. He was awarded a MBE for services to social sciences and ethnic relations in 2001, made a Fellow of the Academy of Social Sciences in 2004 and elected a Fellow of the British Academy in 2017. He served on the Commission on the Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain, the National Equality Panel, and the Commission on Religion and Belief in British Public Life. His website is tariqmodood.com

Dr Aurelien Mondon, University of Bath

Dr Aurelien Mondon is a Senior Lecturer in politics at the University of Bath. His research focuses predominantly on the impact of racism and populism on liberal democracies and the mainstreaming of far-right politics through elite discourse. His first book, "The Mainstreaming of the Extreme Right in France and Australia: A Populist Hegemony?" was published in 2013 and he recently co-edited "After Charlie Hebdo: Terror, racism and free speech". His new book project with Aaron Winter, "Reactionary democracy: populism, liberal and illiberal racisms, the far right and the lack of political imagination", will be published in 2019.

Ilyas Nagdee, NUS Black Students Officer

Ilyas Nagdee is the NUS Black Students Officer where he leads work around institutional racism, combatting state violence and challenging the Prevent Duty as part of the #StudentsNotSuspects coalition. He graduated from the

University of Manchester in Middle Eastern Studies where he worked extensively on widening access to education as well as engaging community-based organisations.

Nathan Sparkes, Hacked Off Campaign

Nathan Sparkes is Policy and Parliamentary Manager for the Hacked Off Campaign, which was established in 2011 in response to the phone-hacking revelations. Hacked Off campaigns for a free and accountable press for the public, for implementation of the Leveson Report's recommendations, and for the second part of the Inquiry to take place. The Hacked Off Campaign works with the victims of press abuse to achieve those aims.

Dr Lasse Thomassen, Queen Mary University

Lasse Thomassen is Reader in the School of Politics and International Relations at Queen Mary University of London. He is the author of, among other books, "British Multiculturalism and the Politics of Representation", and he works on identity politics and representation.

Dr Aaron Winter, University of East London

Aaron Winter is Senior Lecturer in Criminology at the University of East London. His research examines racism, anti-Semitism and Islamophobia, the far-right, terrorism and hate crime. Most recently, he has been involved in the project 'Step Up to Stop Hate' in Newham, East London. He is co-editor of "Discourses and Practices of Terrorism: Interrogating Terror, Reflexivity in Criminological Research: experiences with the powerful and powerless and Historical Perspectives on Organised Crime and Terrorism". His most recent article is "Articulations of Islamophobia: from the extreme to the mainstream?" with Aurelien Mondon in "Ethnic and Racial Studies". His new book project with Aurelien Mondon, "Reactionary

democracy: populism, liberal and illiberal racisms, the far right and the lack of political imagination”, will be published in 2019.

MEND Contributors

Isobel Ingham-Barrow, Head of Policy

Isobel received her BA (Hons) in Arabic and Middle Eastern Studies with Persian, an MA in Middle East and Islamic Studies, and an MRes in Middle East Studies from the University of Exeter. Alongside her work with MEND, she lectures at the University of Exeter and is a postgraduate researcher in Area and Development Studies at the Institute of Arab and Islamic Studies. Her PhD research project is an exploration of masculinity within British Muslim communities.

Dr Shazad Amin, CEO & Consultant Psychiatrist

Dr Shazad Amin is Chief Executive of Muslim Engagement & Development. He recently retired as an NHS Consultant in Adult Psychiatry based in Manchester. He works as a Court Expert Witness, mainly in the area of Clinical Negligence. He is also a Chair of the Medical Practitioners Tribunal Service, which makes decisions about a doctors’ fitness to practise. He is a Care Quality Commission Specialist Advisor.

Aman Ali, Head of Community Engagement and Development

Having spent two years as MEND’s Regional Manager for London, Aman Ali is now MEND’s National Community Head. Aman currently is undertaking his master’s studies at UCL’s Institute of Education, having initially graduated from Queen Mary University with a BSc in Biology with Psychology. He has many years of experience working with various Muslim youth organisations, having started out as a Muslim youth worker at the age of 17. He then moved onto various roles including being previously Head of Media at FOSIS and teaching science at secondary level.

Noor-ul-Hassan Sarodia, Senior Policy Analyst

Noor-ul-Hassan holds a first-class degree in Economics and Statistics from University College London. Prior to joining MEND, he worked in the Civil Service as a statistician and data analyst gaining experience across a number of different government departments.

Dr Antonio Perra, Senior Policy Analyst

Dr Antonio Perra studied Politics and International Relations at the University of Cagliari, Italy, before obtaining his PhD from the Department of Middle Eastern Studies at King’s College London. Prior to joining MEND, Antonio worked as Lecturer at Birkbeck, University of London and King’s College London, where he is currently an Associate Lecturer and a Visiting Research Fellow respectively. Antonio has authored several papers on Middle Eastern Affairs, as well as a book titled "Kennedy and the Middle East: The Cold War, Israel and Saudi Arabia" (London, New York: I.B. Tauris, 2017).

Zeeshan Ali, Media and Policy Analyst

Zeeshan holds a first-class degree in MSci Pharmacology from University College London. During his master’s year, he was elected UK National Policy Officer of a student-led NGO, Universities Allied for Essential Medicines, which prompted him to pursue a career in policy analysis. He is passionate about empowering members of the community and tackling discriminatory narratives and policies within the socio-political field. Other causes of interest include access to medicines.

Huma Malik, IRU Hate Crime Caseworker

Huma has completed a Master’s degree in African politics, history, and economic development at the School of Oriental and African Studies. Here, she completed a research project in grassroots peacebuilding initiatives across East Africa. Her interests include international

development, human rights, environmental, and social justice campaigning. Before joining MEND, she worked at the Living Wage Foundation providing advice and support to low wage workers. Huma has developed a passion for the non-profit sector, from her track record of working in many international NGOs and charities.

Zarah Sultana, Parliamentary Officer

Zarah graduated from the University of Birmingham with a first-class BA (Hons) in International Relations with Economics. During her time at University, she was elected onto the National Union of Students' National Executive and the NUS Black Students' Campaign. Prior to joining MEND, Zarah has worked in a variety of roles in marketing, communications and campaigns. She is passionate about promoting greater involvement of marginalised communities with the political process and tackling inequalities in accessing education and employment.

Foreword

Last January, I taught a study abroad course called Islam in Europe. A colleague and I brought twenty-five American students to five European countries to study the political and cultural tensions pertaining to Muslim minority communities and to gain insight into how Muslims were responding to these tensions. The last country on our itinerary was the UK.

While sitting in our hotel lobby in London one morning, a British gentleman, also staying at the hotel, sat across from one of my students and struck up a conversation. Noticing that she was reading a book called *The Fear of Islam*, and assuming it was an anti-Islam book (when in fact it was a book about Islamophobia), he immediately started complaining. “We’re having LOTS of problems with Muslims in Britain,” he said to her, lamenting both the plight of Muslim women forced to wear a hijab and the loss of British values and culture in the wake of Muslim immigration. He said all of this as casually as if he were commenting on the weather outside.

When my student told me about the conversation, I thought to myself, “Baroness Warsi was right. Islamophobia ‘has passed the dinner table test’ in the UK.” Her famous quip from 2011 was a reminder that articulating Islamophobic beliefs was now acceptable in polite British society, whether in the family home or in the Houses of Parliament.

Without a doubt, in the twenty plus years since the Runnymede Report on Islamophobia was released, Islamophobia has gone mainstream and become normalised. It has been used on both sides of the Atlantic to win elections, to justify restrictions on refugees and immigrants, to encourage teachers to “monitor” Muslim students for signs of radicalisation, to validate the surveillance and profiling of

Muslims, and to discriminate against Muslims in the employment and educational sectors. Islamophobia has also translated into increasing levels of violence as anti-Muslim hate crimes have climbed over the past two decades, reaching disturbing levels in the past several years.

Islamophobia poses one of the greatest political and moral challenges of our time precisely because it is so widely accepted. By most metrics, hostility toward Muslims in the UK and other Western nations is only getting worse. Until policymakers develop a better understanding of Islamophobia and prioritize efforts to counter it, we can expect the situation to worsen in the foreseeable future.

Under these circumstances, the MEND report, *More Than Words: Approaching a Definition of Islamophobia*, is both timely and essential. The report offers a nuanced definition of Islamophobia that will help policymakers better to understand and respond to the problem of anti-Muslim prejudice. It also addresses the various cultural, social, and political manifestations of Islamophobia along with the real impact of Islamophobia on the lives and livelihoods of Muslims and those perceived as Muslims. And it does all of this by drawing on the expertise of some of the most prominent scholars and analysts of Islamophobia.

The MEND report goes a long way toward helping policymakers do their part to ensure Islamophobia no longer has a place at the proverbial dinner table, or in the halls of Parliament for that matter.

Professor Todd Green

Luther College, USA

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Executive Summary

Defining Islamophobia

Defining the phenomenon of Islamophobia is important as it will provide much-needed clarity in legislation and policies that are intended to protect vulnerable minorities. However, it is also an act of recognition. For British Muslims, it demonstrates that the Government recognises the hardships they face and has given them a name. It officially validates their experiences and cements these experiences as undeniable facts in need of address. Furthermore, it reassures Muslim communities that these hardships can and will be tackled in a critical and dedicated manner.

Whilst providing a full working definition of Islamophobia on page 22, MEND defines Islamophobia as a prejudice, aversion, hostility, or hatred towards Muslims and encompasses any distinction, exclusion, restriction, discrimination, or preference against Muslims that has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal footing, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural or any other field of public life.

Why “Islamophobia”

Despite longstanding semantical debates and proposals of alternative terms, such as “anti-Muslim hatred”, MEND argues unequivocally that the term “Islamophobia” is the most appropriate terminology to use in this debate for a variety of reasons.

- It is an established terminology in academic, activist, advocacy, and victim vocabularies.
- It is a terminology with an existing broad conceptual understanding. Therefore, it is a holistic descriptor that explicitly identifies the phenomenon in

all its social, economic and political forms.

- Contrary to some claims, it has not historically, nor should it presently, be seen as attempt to stifle free speech and, in particular, an effort to curtail all questioning or criticism of religion.

Assumptions of Islamophobia

While not every instance of Islamophobia may embody all of the underlying assumptions discussed within this report, they are common themes that drive and infiltrate Islamophobic narratives surrounding Muslims and their place in society. Such assumptions include:

- Muslims are a monolithic group with static views, beliefs and practices. Such a stance ignores the huge diversity between Muslims in terms of beliefs, practices, ideologies, ethnicities, cultures, languages and values.
- Muslims are not only different, but this difference also makes them inferior; uncivilised, irrational, violent and sexist. As such, they have no place in the civilised West unless they denounce their barbaric and illogical ways in order to progress to an enlightened Western way of life.
- Racial discrimination is normalised within political and public debate as something deemed necessary due to the perceived threat of Muslims to security. Moreover, prejudiced and racist comments about Muslims have increasingly become normalised. Rather than being considered bigoted and inappropriate, such views are frequently seen as justified and normal.
- Western commentators are justified in criticising Muslim individuals and countries for their beliefs, practices, policies and behaviours, however, the reverse is unjustified and baseless.

Islamophobia, Xenophobia, Racism, and Anti-Semitism

While animosity towards the religion is frequently used as a justification for Islamophobic sentiments, this hostility is also a product of animosity towards race, ethnicity and culture. In this way, Muslims collectively have become racialised through their religious identities. Therefore, rather than viewing Islamophobia in a vacuum, it is important to view it through the lens of racisms. As Runnymede's recent report attests, Islamophobia should be understood as an anti-Muslim racism.

In analysing Islamophobia, critical perspectives are enlightening. Indeed, there needs to be an understanding of the history and the social, political, and economic processes through which the behaviours, practices and identities Muslims have become regulated at a social, political, and legislative level. For example, understanding how institutional racisms within stop and search procedures or integration strategies are used to normalise racisms and regulate Muslim identities.

Xenophobia plays an integral role in the development of Islamophobias. British Muslims, even those whom have been born in the UK and whose parents were born in this country, may be perceived to be as foreign as someone born halfway around the world. The reason for this foreignness is found not only in distinctions of ethnicity, but also in a perceived conflict of views, values, norms, practices, beliefs, and behaviours that all culminate in a threat or an insult to the Western identity and way of life. Furthermore, there is an intimate link between Islamophobia and xenophobia that cannot be dislocated from the perceived decentring of Western power and erosions of Western and White privilege as an existential threat.

Islamophobia in the UK is not an ahistorical phenomenon, rather, it must be contextualised within the history of

Britain's colonial past. Therefore, to fully understand Islamophobia in any meaningful way, there must be an acknowledgement of the relationship between Islamophobia, Orientalism, and empire.

Orientalism is a mechanism through which to gain cultural and civilising power over Muslim populations. Islamophobia thereby becomes the conduit through which Muslims are regulated into hegemonic Western conceptions of modernity. Muslims who resist such Western appropriation are deemed a threat to the stability of the state and are thus placed in the dichotomy between the good "moderate" Muslims (those who unquestioningly adhere to the sensibilities of Western identity constructs) and the bad "extremist" Muslims (those who threaten Western hegemonic notions of modernity through maintaining their religious-cultural identities or through questioning the status quo of this hegemony).

Islamophobia is often portrayed as completely distinct from anti-Semitism. However, this is a misunderstanding of hatred and racisms. Islamophobia, anti-Semitism, racism, xenophobia, sexism, homophobia and other forms of hatred are all mechanisms of social regulation and control of minorities. Therefore, they need to be understood in the interconnectivity of their logics, manifestations, and consequences.

Driving Islamophobic Narratives: The Islamophobia Industry

The term "Islamophobia Industry" (also known as the "Counter-jihad movement") encompasses a largely interconnected and well-funded network of think tanks (for example, the Henry Jackson Society), media outlets (such as Breitbart and Rebel Media), public figures, politicians, and policy-makers that advance, disseminate and perpetuate negative discourses about Muslims and Islam for economic and

political gains. Commonly guided by right-wing and neoconservative ideologies, the Islamophobia Industry employs the rhetoric of an array of “experts” in order to disseminate misinformation and fear about Muslims and Islam, primarily by perpetuating the myth of an Islamic invasion of the Western world. Through this kind of propaganda, the industry is able to influence and hijack political discourses, to influence voting patterns, and even to set the basis for legislative debates and drafting.¹

Grassroots organisations, such as the EDL or Football Lads Alliance, who are often guided by strong nationalistic sentiments, subscribe to the anti-Muslim discourse advanced by these experts and fuelled by the statements of media and political figures, thus giving this divisive rhetoric a voice among broader society.

Moral Panic, Media, and Broadcasting

Considering the overly negative representation of minorities and British Muslims within the British press, the media’s monopoly on public understanding has detrimental impacts which are acutely felt by minority social, ethnic and religious communities, and Muslims in particular. This leads to potentially dangerous repercussions in terms of hate crime, discrimination, and marginalisation.

Furthermore, the level of bias, misinformation and distortion within reporting on British Muslims has fostered a sense of distrust in the media institutions amongst parts of the Muslim community, and for many individuals, has led to a disengagement from traditional media. Meanwhile, this Muslim disengagement is often accompanied by a sense of frustration and insecurity with regards to their perceived place and value in society.

It is, therefore, essential that effective regulation is examined and implemented to hold publishers accountable.

Within broadcasting, the lack of diversity and inclusive images stemming from a lack of minority representation results in a vision which neglects segments of society and thus alienates and marginalises minority communities. Therefore, industry initiatives that promote diversity are of upmost importance in fostering a shared sense of national identity and in order to tackle stereotypes that result from the lack of normalised images of minority groups.

Racial and Religious Hate Crime

Hate crime is in many ways the most overt, visible, and undeniable symptom of the Islamophobia prevalent across certain segments of society. Over recent years, British Muslims have suffered from increasing levels of hate crime in conjunction with seemingly obsessive demonisation in the media and an increasing presence of online hate speech on social media platforms. Major socio-political events, such as terror attacks and the EU referendum, often mobilise acts of hostility towards Muslims and the impacts of these crimes are long-lasting, with many victims left feeling anxious and fearful for their safety.

In tackling anti-Muslim hate crimes, it is important to address the disparity in protections afforded by the Racial and Religious Hate Crime Act, 2006, on grounds of race versus the protections afforded to religious groups. At the same time, effective strategies and primary legislation need to be enacted to tackle online hate speech whilst protecting freedom of speech.

Youth and Education

Islamophobia in the education system is a serious problem which impacts Muslim children and their development in a wide

¹ Nathan Lean, *The Islamophobia Industry: how the right manufactures fear of Muslims*, 2nd Edition, (S.I. : Pluto Press, 2017)

variety of ways. From being bullied explicitly in reference to their faith, to being stigmatised and reported to the PREVENT strategy for views they may hold, and to being interminably questioned on their apparent divergence from (thus far ill-defined) “British Values”, Muslim children are struggling to navigate this complex maze. Meanwhile, controversies such as the apparent “Trojan Horse” affair and Amanda Spielman’s recent proposals to question schoolgirls who wear the hijab highlight the obsessive scrutiny and problematisation of Muslims within the sphere of education. The impacts of these experiences can be long-term, damaging their ability to achieve success in the employment sphere and inhibiting their participation in wider civic society and the political arena.

Economic Exclusion: Islamophobia and the Labour Market

It is necessary to examine Islamophobia in terms of its ability to economically exclude Muslims from the labour market, thereby furthering socio-economic divides. Indeed, numerous studies in recent years have researched the failure of Muslims to progress and reach levels of success in the workplace which their non-Muslim counterparts enjoy. These studies have pointed to a combination of Islamophobia, racism and discrimination as reasons for Muslims to be paid less than their non-Muslim counterparts, less likely to be in work, less likely to be in skilled and professional occupations, and less likely to break through the glass ceiling to access top level executive positions.

Securitising Muslim Identities: Security and Counter-Terror

The lens through which Muslims are repeatedly and forcefully portrayed as security threats is a narrative desperately in need of recalibration. Meanwhile, the damaging consequences that result from

misguided policies predicated upon Islamophobic assumptions and discourses is an area that is in need of immediate address.

Processes of securitising Muslim identities have intersected with vague definitions of “extremism”, “radicalisation”, and “Fundamental British Values” to result in damaging policies such as the PREVENT strategy, which are based on flawed evidence and serve to stigmatise Muslims and marginalise their voices within democratic debates.

Crime, Policing and the Criminal Justice System

Institutional Islamophobia relating to discriminatory practices ingrained within the Criminal Justice System is particularly significant because of both its disruption to the lives of many Muslims and for its long-term consequences to their future social engagement as equal members of society.

While noteworthy and commendable steps have been made to improve equalities in the Criminal Justice System since the publication of the Macpherson report in 1999, Muslims and ethnic minorities remain over-represented and demonstrate lower levels of trust in the system. Furthermore, homogeneity within the Criminal Justice system needs to be examined as conduit for potential biases and as a hindrance to understanding the experiences of Muslim offenders, thereby obstructing meaningful strategies to approach Muslim socio-economic mobility and the driving forces behind criminality. As such, Islamophobia must be examined as a mechanism potentially maintaining inequalities at all levels of the Criminal Justice System.

Political Representation and Exclusion

Islamophobia should be understood as a mechanism which marginalises and excludes Muslims from being able to fully participate in social, political and civic life.

While barriers have been broken by individuals such as Mohammad Sarwar, Sayeeda Warsi, Naz Shah, Yasmin Qureshi, Shabana Mahmood and Rushanara Ali, to name but a few, Muslim representation of 2% of the House of Commons still lags far behind what is proportional considering the population of British Muslims, which stands at 4.4% according to the 2011 census.

Furthermore, divisive security strategies such as PREVENT have been utilised by certain groups (such as the Henry Jackson Society and its project Student Rights) to shut down Muslim voices, particularly on university campuses which are intended to be the epicentres of critical debate and engagement of ideas. The result is that young Muslims in particular are actively discouraged from being politically active and engaging with the debates that are integral to a democratic society.

Moreover, it is essential that the Government's policy of disengagement with credible mainstream Muslim organisations and be urgently reversed so that the relationship between Government and Muslim communities may be recalibrated.

Public Exclusion, Integration and Minority Rights

Britain has always claimed to embody a proud history of supporting multiculturalist principles advocating respect and celebration of the multitude of diverse ethnic and religious identities that have led themselves to a British identity built upon pluralism and collaboration. However, recent years have seen simmering resentments and debates surrounding national identity and a perceived "ghettoisation" of minorities.

In line with the development and consequences of moral panic, these fears have culminated in calls for the UK to reassess its policies towards multiculturalist principles. The result is an increasingly restrictive integration

strategy, within which examples of Islamophobic assumptions and institutional racism can be readily witnessed regarding the treatment of Muslim communities.

The Government's current approach towards integration heavily relies on the highly criticised 2016 Casey Review. As a consequence, its analysis and suggested strategies are inherently tainted by the same flawed evidence and lack of understanding. This has resulted in the infiltration of Islamophobic narratives and assumptions which have directed the development of this strategy, and therefore, limit its potential to make a positive difference.

Of particular concern are its overlap with counter-terror strategies, its prescribed views of "acceptable Islam", the de-contextualisation of challenges facing minorities, and an absence of introspection concerning Government strategies such as "hostile environment" policies, austerity, cuts to healthcare and policing, or the cancellation of Leveson Part II.

Furthermore, despite the protections afforded by the ICCPR, the ECHR and the Human Rights Act, 1998, recent years have witnessed numerous controversies, scandals, and vicious public debates that have challenged Muslim religious practice and observance in the UK context. Particular public controversy has surrounded the right to halal meat, the building of mosques, and the right to religious dress, amongst other topics of public interest. Such debates demonstrate how religious practices, whilst protected by national and international legislation, can still be contested and the discourse around them used as a proxy argument to marginalise minority communities and Muslims specifically.

The model to tackle Islamophobia

To solve a society-wide problem, a combination of legislative change,

Government and industry initiatives, Muslim community empowerment, and wider community engagement is required. As such, MEND humbly proposes the following initiatives and policy changes to tackle the causes, driving forces, and impacts of Islamophobia,

Legislative changes

Press regulation: We call on policy makers to ensure the commencement of the second part of the Leveson inquiry. Furthermore, Leveson II should place explicit emphasis on including an investigation of Islamophobia in the press as a mandatory requirement.

Counter-Terror legislation: It is imperative that the Government commits to an independent review of PREVENT and all counter-terrorism legislation enacted since 2000 with a view to curbing the encroachment of counter-terrorism policies on civil liberties.

Incitement to Religious Hatred legislation: Considering the disparities between the protections afforded for racial and religious hatred, it is essential to review the 2006 Racial and Religious Hatred Act with a view to strengthening legal protection afforded to religion and equalise it with those granted to race.

Primary legislation to deal with social media offences and online hate speech: The Government should consider primary legislation to deal with social media offences and work with social media companies to protect free speech while developing an efficient strategy to tackle online hate speech online.

Government and industry initiatives

Racial and religious equality: In the context of current Brexit negotiations, attention needs to be given to supporting the principles of the EU Equal Treatment Directive to advance protection against discrimination on the grounds of religion to education, healthcare, housing, access to goods and services and social protection, within UK law post-Brexit.

Employment: The barriers to Muslim economic empowerment is an area that needs to be tackled by both governmental and industry initiatives designed to address religious, racial and gendered discrimination in the workplace through targeted interventions at all stages of recruitment, retention and promotion, including through the use of name-blind applications.

Media and broadcasting: There needs to be emphasis on promoting positive and normalised images of Muslims within media and broadcasting. It is also essential that support is given to educative and industry initiatives designed to attract Muslim and BAME individuals into the spheres of journalism and broadcasting.

Public exclusion: It is imperative that public figures show greater maturity and responsibility when discussing integration debates and take care not to cause hysteria for the sake of political popularity and agendas. Meanwhile, especially considering the unclear status of human rights commitments within Brexit negotiations, we must ensure that the tenants of the European Convention on Human Rights and the Human Rights Act are preserved within UK law post-Brexit.

Crime and policing: Areas in need of government support include:

- Tackling the high number of Muslim prisoners through schemes to facilitate rehabilitation, cut re-offending and develop pathways for social inclusion.
- Launching research into the underlying reasons for the disproportionately high numbers of Muslim prisoners, including issues of socio-economic deprivation and structural issues within the judicial system.
- Supporting educative and industry initiatives to attract BAME individuals into the police force.

Muslim community empowerment

The Government's current disengagement policy is a clear barrier to British Muslim's participation in social and political life. It is essential that the Government mends its broken relationship with Muslim communities by committing to engaging with and listen to a wider spectrum of representative Muslim grassroots organisations, such as MEND and MCB.

Muslims themselves have a responsibility to ensure that they are engaging with processes of democracy to overcome the challenges they face. As such, there are a number of ways in which British Muslim communities may be empowered to play their full role as civic actors. Strategies to achieve this include:

- Supporting educative and industry initiatives designed to attract Muslims and BAME individuals into the spheres of politics, the civil service, media, and broadcasting.
- Placing greater emphasis on educational programs aimed at empowering minority communities to be actively engaged within politics and media.
- Encouraging grassroots and community-led movements to overcome barriers to reporting hate crime and encourage maximum reporting of Islamophobic incidents to the police.

Wider community engagement

Islamophobia, like all forms of hatred, is an issue of social justice, and therefore, it is inherent upon every member of society to contribute towards ending it. As such, there are certain areas that MEND feels should be addressed:

- Promoting a greater awareness of Islam.
- Promoting greater inter-community engagement.

- Prioritising PSHE and PSRE in the national curriculum to prepare young people for life in a diverse and pluralistic society.
- Developing training programmes and resources for teachers focussed on tackling bullying based on race, religion, disability or sexuality.
- Developing teaching materials to educate young people on the dangers of Islamophobia, racism, anti-Semitism, homophobia and other forms of hatred.
- Supporting community and school-led programmes that encourage cultural exchange between pupils of different racial, religious, ethnic and other backgrounds.
- Supporting academic freedoms and initiatives to decolonise education, whilst giving greater emphasis within the national curriculum to shared histories and the contributions of minority communities in building our society.

Part I: Introducing MEND's Definition of Islamophobia

A Call for a Definition of "Islamophobia"	17
A Message from our CEO	19
MEND's Definition of Islamophobia	20
Understanding MEND's Definition of Islamophobia	22
Diversity of Terminology: Why use "Islamophobia"?	24
Understanding British Muslim Communities	27
PROFESSOR SOPHIE GILLIAT-RAY, CARDIFF UNIVERSITY THE DEMOGRAPHICS OF MUSLIMS IN BRITAIN	29

A Call for a Definition of “Islamophobia”

An important part of the movements to fight anti-Semitism, racism, and homophobia in this country was the development of terminologies to identify these biases. The stigmatization of Jews, African-Americans, and the LGBTQ community existed long before we had words to describe it, but the formulation of these words – anti-Semitism, racism, and homophobia – and their usage by prominent figures, was a critical step in communicating to the public the serious prejudice and discrimination these groups faced.²

The Bridge Initiative, “Islamophobia: The Right Word for a Real Problem”, 2016

In 2018, the All Party Parliamentary Group for British Muslims launched an inquiry into a definition of Islamophobia. Such a development is hugely important and a significant step in tackling the prejudice and discrimination facing British Muslims, and, indeed, many Muslims across the world.

Why is a definition important?

Defining the phenomenon of Islamophobia is important as it will provide much-needed clarity in legislation and policies that are intended to protect vulnerable minorities. As duly observed by Gottschalk and Greenberg, “movements against discrimination do not begin until a commonly understood label evolves that brings together under one banner all forms of that particular prejudice”.³ Once established, terms such as sexism, homophobia, racism and anti-Semitism became important tools to oppose and tackle the various discriminations and prejudices these labels embody; prejudices and discriminations which at one time were considered normal and thus remained unchallenged.

It is now time to afford official recognition to a definition of Islamophobia so that the same progress will be afforded to the efforts to tackle the prejudices, hostilities, discriminations, and barriers faced by Muslims on account of their ethno-religious identities. As such, a working definition is important for the following reasons:

- It is a critical tool for awareness raising in communicating to the public the serious prejudice and discrimination faced by Muslims.
- It is an asset in formulating effective and meaningful legal protections.
- It encourages a full and holistic exploration of the phenomenon, which in turn presents effective methods for approaching and challenging it.
- It is also an act of recognition. For British Muslims, it demonstrates that the Government recognises the hardships they face and has given them a name. It officially validates their experiences and cements these experiences as undeniable facts in need of address. Furthermore, it reassures Muslim communities that these hardships can and will be tackled in a critical and dedicated manner.
- While being an act of recognition for victims of Islamophobia, it also forms a basis for countering the vocal minority in our society who deny Islamophobia’s very existence, despite overwhelming evidence to the contrary.

This report is intended to provide critical analysis to the following:

- **The roots and causes of Islamophobia.**
- **The manifestations of Islamophobia.**
- **The socio-political and personal consequences of Islamophobia.**
- **Potential solutions to tackling Islamophobia.**

² “Islamophobia: The Right Word for a Real Problem,” The Bridge Initiative | A Research Project on Islamophobia, September 08, 2016, accessed June 19, 2018, <http://bridge.georgetown.edu/islamophobia-the-right-word-for-a-real-problem/>.

³ Peter Gottschalk and Gabriel Greenberg, *Islamophobia Making Muslims the Enemy* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2008), p11.

It is our hope that the discussions contained in this report will advance conceptual understandings of Islamophobia that will, in turn, assist policymakers in approaching a holistic appreciation and an all-encompassing working definition of Islamophobia.

A Message from our CEO

Dr Shazad Amin



"When I use a word," Humpty Dumpty said, in rather a scornful tone, "it means just what I choose it to mean – neither more nor less."

"The question is," said Alice, "whether you can make words mean so many different things." "The question is," said Humpty Dumpty, "which is to be master – that's all."

Through the Looking Glass, ChVI, Lewis Carroll, 1872

A couple of centuries on from Lewis Carroll's immortal words, words are even more important than ever. We are now living in an era of globalised instant communication where ideas, emotions, hopes, and tragedies are communicated to others in an instant, and words can indeed mean so many things. The potential for miscommunication, misunderstanding, obfuscation and distortions is enormous. As such, when we are tackling the big ideas of the modern era the importance of precision within definitions is paramount, and the need to define "which is to be master" has never been greater.

As this report shows, Islamophobia is much more than the common perception of a woman with hijab being verbally abused in the street. It has many faces, from the criminal Islamophobia ranging from a few

hateful words to murder, to economic Islamophobia, from the overlooked promotion to the sustained campaigns of bullying and harassment. At a higher level, we see media Islamophobia from vile tweets to an incessant barrage of articles and full-blown documentaries. Finally, we have professional and structural Islamophobia, whereby the apparatus of the state and other institutions conspire to deny Muslims opportunities to play their full part in the political and civic life of this country.

We must call out all of these examples, but to do so we need a definition that captures Islamophobia in its many colours and shades. I believe that in this report from MEND, supported by a variety of excellent contributions from guest authors, we have not only produced a comprehensive definition, but have highlighted the socio-political context in which it sits.

I hope that whatever definition is eventually proposed it captures the essence of this report. We owe it to the next generation and beyond to tackle this scourge of our society in the most robust way possible.

A handwritten signature in dark ink that reads "Shazad Amin". The signature is fluid and cursive.

Dr Shazad Amin

CEO, MEND

MEND's Definition of Islamophobia

Short Definition:

Islamophobia is a prejudice, aversion, hostility, or hatred towards Muslims and encompasses any distinction, exclusion, restriction, discrimination, or preference against Muslims that has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal footing, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural or any other field of public life.

Working Definition:

Islamophobia (in line with anti-Semitism, racism, homophobia, sexism and other forms of hatred and discrimination) is a tool used to gain and maintain power. It is inextricably linked with socio-economic factors, and frequently reflects the underlying inequalities within society.

Islamophobia is a prejudice, aversion, hostility, or hatred towards Muslims and encompasses any distinction, exclusion, restriction, or preference against Muslims that has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal footing, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural or any other field of public life.

As such, Islamophobia is demonstrated in, and articulated through, speech, writing, behaviours, structures, policies, legislation or activities that work to control, regulate or exclude Muslim participation within social, civic, economic and political life, or which embody hatred, vilification, stereotyping, abuse or violence directed at Muslims.

Taking into account the overall context, examples of Islamophobia in public life, the media, schools, the workplace, and in

the religious sphere may include (but are in no way limited to):

- Causing, calling for, aiding, or justifying the killing or harming of Muslims or those perceived to be Muslim due to their religious identity.
- Causing, calling for, aiding, or justifying the killing or harming of individuals due to their perceived or actual connection to or support of Muslims.
- Charging Muslims with conspiring to harm humanity and/or the Western way of life or blaming Muslims for the economic and social ills of society.
- Making mendacious, dehumanising, vilifying, demonising, or stereotypical allegations about Muslims.
- Objectifying and generalising Muslims as different, exotic or underdeveloped, or implying that they are outside of, distinct from, or incompatible with British society and identity.
- Espousing the belief that Muslims are inferior to other social or religious groups.
- Accusing Muslims as a collective of being responsible for real or imagined wrongdoing committed by a single Muslim person, group or nation, or even for acts committed by non-Muslims.
- Applying double standards by requiring of Muslims a behaviour not expected or demanded of any other social, religious or ethnic group.
- Applying ethnocentric approaches to the treatment of Muslims (judging another culture solely by the values and standards of one's own culture). For example, evaluating Muslim women's choice of dress exclusively through the speaker's expectations and without reference to the personal cultural norms and values of the women in question.
- Acts of aggression within which the targets, whether they are people or property – such as buildings, schools, places of worship and cemeteries – are

selected because they are, or are perceived to be, Muslim(s) or linked to Muslims.

While criticism of Islam within legitimate realms of debate and free speech is not in itself Islamophobic, it may become Islamophobic if the arguments presented are used to justify or encourage vilification, stereotyping, dehumanisation, demonisation or exclusion of Muslims. For example, by using criticism of religion to argue that Muslims are collectively evil or violent.

Understanding MEND's Definition of Islamophobia

Deconstructing MEND's Definition

MEND's working definition of Islamophobia is 480 words long, while even our short definition consists of 58 words. This may seem rather long for a definition, however, in order to encompass the full breadth of Islamophobia and its consequences, clarity is required; and such clarity requires a lengthy explanation. While we have attempted to achieve this clarity in our definition, we would like to take this opportunity to introduce the reasoning and multiple layers of understanding contained within this definition. As such, the following discussion seeks to deconstruct our definition and contextualise it within the wider framework of this report.

Islamophobia (in line with anti-Semitism, racism, homophobia, sexism and other forms of hatred and discrimination) is a tool used to gain and maintain power. It is inextricably linked with socio-economic factors, and frequently reflects the underlying inequalities within society.

Hatred and discrimination are used as tools to oppress, restrict, control, regulate, exclude and deprive those against whom they are directed. They are frequently used as mechanisms to distract society from wider socio-economic issues. A glaring example of this is when the Nazi Party used anti-Jewish propaganda to scapegoat innocent Jewish communities and distract from Germany's economic struggles following WWI.

Often, hatred and discrimination may also be a reaction to real or imagined threats to economic, political, social and ideological interests and may stem from a fear of losing one's longstanding privilege or benefits. In response to these threats, the

perceived culprit is assigned responsibility, which frequently escalates to the scapegoating of whole communities.

Part Two of this report explores how and why Islamophobia exists and is manifested. As such, we will analyse themes such as:

- Islamophobia and its relationship to xenophobia, racism, and anti-Semitism.
- Perceptions of collective threat and processes of securitisation.
- The counter-jihad movement and Islamophobia as a mechanism for control.
- Moral panic, the media and broadcasting.

Islamophobia is a prejudice, aversion, hostility, or hatred towards Muslims and encompasses any distinction, exclusion, restriction, or preference against Muslims that has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal footing, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural or any other field of public life.

As this report attests, Islamophobia encompasses far more than simply hostility and hate crime. Islamophobia infiltrates every aspect of public life and creates barriers to Muslims (or those perceived to be Muslim) in overt ways, but also in ways that are subtler, and thus much harder to detect and demonstrate. For example, hatred and physical abuse on the streets is overt and impossible to ignore. However, the CV that is passed over because it boasts a Muslim sounding name; or the British-Pakistani man who is repeatedly assumed a threat at the airport on the basis of his beard; or the child who feels unable to ask questions in class because she is worried she may be swept up into the apparatus of PREVENT, these are examples that may be harder to detect, but which have dire repercussions on British Muslims' daily enjoyment of freedoms.

Part Three of this report thus explores the consequences of Islamophobia on British Muslims. Within this section, we will attempt to highlight the impacts of Islamophobia in terms of:

- Racial and religious hate crime
- Youth and education
- Economic exclusion
- Security and counter-terror
- The criminal justice system
- Political exclusion
- Public exclusion

As such, Islamophobia is demonstrated in, and articulated through, speech, writing, behaviours, structures, policies, legislation or activities that work to control, regulate or exclude Muslim participation within social, civic, economic and political life, or which embody hatred, vilification, stereotyping, abuse or violence directed at Muslims.

In other words, Islamophobia can be found in and may be upheld by a variety of mediums. For example:

- **Speech:** such as political statements or individual verbal abuse.
- **Writing:** such as in opinion articles and online hate speech.
- **Behaviours:** such as aggressive and unreasonable acts, or attitudes towards Muslim employees.
- **Structures:** such as the underrepresentation of Muslims in upper echelons of business, politics, and teaching.
- **Policies:** such as questioning Muslim girls who wear the hijab.
- **Legislation:** such as security legislation that excludes the need for reasonable suspicion in stop and search, and thus relies on ethnic, racial and religious profiling.

While criticism of Islam within legitimate realms of debate and free speech is not in itself Islamophobic, it may become Islamophobic if the arguments presented are used to justify or encourage vilification, stereotyping, dehumanization, demonization or exclusion of Muslims. For example, by using criticism of religion to argue that Muslims are collectively evil or violent.

It is important to note that criticism of religion is excluded from our definition of Islamophobia. “Islamophobia” as a term, is often wrongly accused of being an attempt to stifle legitimate arguments surrounding religion. The 1997 Runnymede report “Islamophobia: A Challenge for Us All”⁴ highlighted the need to recognise the contrast between “open views” of legitimate criticism of Islam, and the “closed” views that constitute Islamophobia. It is these “closed” views that MEND’s definition is attempting to address. Further analysis will be given to this issue in later discussions.

There is also frequently concern that the word “Islamophobia” is being used as a tool to hinder freedom of speech. However, within MEND’s proposed definition as an example, there is no conflict with freedom of speech that extends any further than what already exists. Indeed, the only potential limitations to speech within our definition already have existing legal precedents, for example, legislation that protects racial minorities from abuse, and legislation that restricts calling for the causing of harm.

⁴ *Islamophobia: A Challenge for Us All*, Summary, The Runnymede Trust, 1997, <https://www.runnymedetrust.org/uploads/publications/pdfs/islamophobia.pdf>.

Diversity of Terminology: Why use “Islamophobia”?

Islamophobia is a term that consistently produces a wide range of responses and emotions. For some time, there has been considerable debate as to whether such a term is appropriate, accurate or even counterproductive when it comes to discussing processes of hatred and discrimination facing Muslim individuals and communities. This has led individuals and organisations to propose the use of other terms such as “anti-Muslim hatred” as alternative descriptors.

However, MEND argues unequivocally that the term “Islamophobia” is the most appropriate terminology to use in this debate for a variety of reasons. The following discussion sets out MEND’s arguments for why the term Islamophobia remains the most effective linguistic tool to understand and tackle the roots, manifestations, and consequences of hatred, discrimination, and exclusions facing Muslim communities in the social, economic and political fields.

An established terminology

While Islamophobia is a term around which linguistic debates may centre, there is a great deal of conceptual clarity and understanding. In other words, while there may be a definitional problem, no such problem exists conceptually. As such, what is needed is a label to be attached to this concept.

Islamophobia is a term that already holds currency within public discourse and is well established within public and popular understanding. Consequently, it has an existing legitimacy and emotional power. Many individuals affected by Islamophobia may not have the technical vocabulary nor the theoretical framework to fully articulate the roots, causes or the precise definition of their experiences.

However, the long-standing existence and usage of “Islamophobia” as a descriptive tool for approaching and explaining these experiences means that the term has accepted credibility amongst those whom it affects. Meanwhile, due to this wide and established legitimacy, it has a galvanising and mobilising force within the realms of activism.

Therefore, it is not a term that will be easily replaced within political, activist or victim vocabularies. As such, there is merit in the efficiency of using the most widely recognised and used linguistic tools to challenge urgent socio-political issues.

While others have suggested “anti-Muslim hatred” as a replacement, this would be counter-productive as it would involve forcing a new terminology into the place of a well-established concept. Consequently, at this point, it is far more prudent to devise a strong and comprehensive definition for the word “Islamophobia”, than to attempt to force a new terminology into the language of advocacy and activism.

An all-encompassing terminology

Differences between terms such as Islamophobia and “anti-Muslim hatred” reflect differences in focus and understanding of the phenomenon. Therefore, they produce different approaches and priorities in tackling it.

“Anti-Muslim hatred” does not have the same conceptual understanding attached to Islamophobia. Therefore, while “anti-Muslim hatred” may be used to describe hate crime, verbal abuse, and harassment, it obfuscates the damaging effects of political and media discourses and the dangers of discrimination and socio-political exclusion. Anti-Muslim hatred thus should not be divorced from the roots from which it emanates.

Consequently, understanding the hatred, discrimination, and exclusions facing

Muslim communities as Islamophobia provides a holistic understanding that explicitly identifies the phenomenon in all its social, economic and political forms. Furthermore, because this definition makes it possible to identify Islamophobia in all its forms, it is a useful tool in extrapolating specific areas for address, approaches, and priorities in tackling it.

It is worthy to note that the term “anti-Muslim racism” is a term that could also potentially encompass this full and holistic understanding. However, due to the previously mentioned arguments surrounding Islamophobia as an established and credible linguistic tool, we do not feel that “anti-Muslim racism” can be easily co-opted as an activist concept into the public understanding with the same efficiency as Islamophobia. Furthermore, it risks precipitating distracting semantic and legal arguments that Muslims are not a race, in the same way that Jews and Sikhs have been defined as by UK case law.

Islamophobia is not about prohibiting criticism of religion

Islamophobia, as a term, is often wrongly accused of being an attempt to stifle free speech and, in particular, an effort to curtail all questioning or criticism of religion. However, it has never historically, nor should it presently, be seen in this light.

The historical usage of Islamophobia can be found in colonial communications as far back as the turn of the 20th Century. One of the earliest examples can be found in the writing of French colonialist Maurice Delafosse in his discussion of “*Islamophobie*”⁵ in 1910. Delafosse discusses Islamophobia as “a principle of indigenous administration.”⁶ As such, Islamophobia was a reference to how Muslims living

under colonial rule were perceived and treated by the French colonizers. In this instance, Islamophobia is about people, about Muslims, not about religion.

Islamophobia truly entered mainstream political discourse with the publication of the 1997 Runnymede report “Islamophobia: A Challenge for Us All”.⁷ Within this report, Runnymede unwaveringly defined Islamophobia as being about the believers and not the religion. Indeed, they exerted considerable effort in highlighting the need to mitigate the dangers of Muslim belief and practice becoming beyond the realm of critical inquiry. As such, they stressed the need to recognise the contrast between “open views” of legitimate criticism of Islam and the “closed” views that constitute Islamophobia. It should also be noted that although the term Islamophobia has been used in public discourse for over 20 years it has not hitherto stifled debate or free speech.

Islamophobia should not be understood as a protection against questioning or criticising religion. Nor should it be seen as an attempt to enforce restrictions on freedom of speech beyond what is necessary for civil society to protect individuals from abuse and violence – protections for which there already exists a vast array of legal precedents.

Whilst cherishing the right to freedom of speech in an open democratic society, one must not allow individuals to hide behind the free speech argument to peddle anti-Muslim and racist agendas. There is currently no absolute right to free speech that harms others, and we would support that position.

⁵ Over time, the French “*Islamophobie*” became translated into English as “Islamophobia”. This follows the same pattern set by the term “*Judeophobia*” and “*xenophobia*”, which later became anti-Semitism and xenophobia.

⁶ Abdoolkarim Vakil, “Is the Islam in Islamophobia the same as the Islam in Anti-Islam; Or When is it Islamophobia Time?” in S. Sayyid and Abdoolkarim Vakil, eds., *Thinking Through Islamophobia*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010), 38.

⁷ *Islamophobia: A Challenge for Us All*.

The beauty of lexically non-sensical terms

Another criticism often levied against the use of the term Islamophobia is concern over the use of “phobia” and the idea that it means “a phobia of Islam”. This is clearly not what is meant by Islamophobia as the term has always had the conceptual meaning of hostility and discrimination towards people who embody an identity based on a certain practice or belief (in this case Islam), much the same way as hostilities and discriminations are manifested within homophobia and xenophobia.

Secondly, some have pointed to the use of “phobia” in arguing that the term incorrectly implies some kind of mental illness, thereby causing objections to the idea that it is an “irrational fear of Islam”. It is useful in this regard to remember that Islamophobia shares this suffix with both homophobia and xenophobia, neither of which are intended to imply a mental illness.

However, despite not implying any mental illness, it is worth remembering that a great deal of public discourse surrounding Muslims stemming from certain elements of society serves the explicit purpose of engendering extreme or irrational fears of Islam in others, hence the term is not without some descriptive value in this regard. As such, examples of Islamophobia do include attempts to promote and propagate the spreading of heightened and irrational suspicion, hostility and fear of Islam and its adherents amongst the public imagination.

English is a beautiful and interesting language in its inconsistencies as much as in its logic. It is not uncommon to find words that, at best, take a great deal of effort to understand (the fact that the words “flammable” and “inflammable” mean the same thing, for example), and, at worst, are lexically non-sensical. Anti-Semitism is a good example of this. Indeed,

not all Jews are Semites and not all Semitic people are Jews. However, anti-Semitism is a terminology that is well established and conceptually understood (much in the same way as Islamophobia), and therefore, is considered unproblematic.

Lexically, Islamophobia may not be ideal. However, it is by far the most ideal term we have as a label for a concept that is well understood, and which is popularly called *Islamophobia*.

Understanding British Muslim Communities

Britain has a relationship with Muslims that expands over 1000 years, with British Muslims today comprising of roughly 4.4% of the population. While in no way comprehensive (several volumes could be written on this topic), this section attempts to provide an insight into the history, contributions and vast diversity of British Muslims.⁸

A (very brief) history of British Muslim communities

Britain's relationship with Islam can be seen from Elizabeth I to Elizabeth II; from shops offering sherbets in Shakespeare's London to Muslims holding influential positions as today's Ministers and Mayors.⁹

Indeed, Muslims have played a valuable role in Britain for over 1000 years. In the eighth century, King Offa minted coins bearing the Islamic Arabic inscription "In the name of God, the Most Merciful, the Most Beneficent". Some seven centuries later, Queen Elizabeth I asked Ottoman Sultan Murad for naval assistance against the Spanish Armada,¹⁰ and the Moroccan ambassadors Ahmed Bilqasim and Muhammad An-Nuri both visited London between 1589 and 1600.¹¹

The rise of the British Empire saw a deepening relationship between Britain and Muslims. By 1841, around 3,000 Muslim seaman, or "lascars", visited Britain every year and an increase in trade following the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 led to a number of seaman from Yemen settling in the port cities of Cardiff, Liverpool, South Shields, Hull, and

London. The first mosque in Britain is believed to have been established at Glyn Rhondda Street in Cardiff in 1860.¹²

During the 19th century, Victorian high-society were attracted to the teachings of Islam. George Allanson-Winn, the fifth Baron of Headley and a noted civil engineer who constructed the road between Baramula and Srinagar in the mountainous region of Kashmir converted to the faith; as did William Quilliam, a lawyer and poet who established a mosque and orphanage in Liverpool; and novelist and translator of the Holy Qur'an, Muhammad Marmaduke Pickthall. Britain's first purpose-built mosque was designed by architect Gottlieb Leitner and opened in Woking, Surrey, in 1889.¹³

By the 1950s, Muslims responded to the shortfall in labour and the need to rebuild British infrastructure following the Second World War. This saw large-scale migration largely from South Asia, which still constitutes the large majority of British Muslim communities today. These groups mainly settled in the inner-city areas of London, the industrial towns of the Midlands and the textile towns of Lancashire, Yorkshire and Strathclyde.

Today, Muslims living in Britain originate from a vast range of national and cultural backgrounds. The population also includes a significant number of British and European converts to Islam. Others have come from war-torn countries to find a better life in Britain.

Moroccan Muslims have been present in significant numbers in England since the 1960s. Nigerian Muslims arrived in the 1950s and then again during the 1990s, mainly for economic reasons. Small numbers of Egyptians and Saudi Arabians have also been present in the UK for

⁸ For a more comprehensive insight into the history of British Muslims, see Humayun Ansari, *The "infidel" Within: The History of Muslims in Britain, 1800* (London: C. Hurst, 2004).

⁹ "British Muslims - Working for the Common Good," Muslim Council of Britain, accessed June 19, 2018, <http://www.mcb.org.uk/british-muslims/>.

¹⁰ "Religions - Islam: History of Islam in the UK," BBC, September 07, 2009, http://www.bbc.co.uk/religion/religions/islam/history/uk_1.shtml.

¹¹ "The First Muslims in England," BBC, March 20, 2016, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-35843991>.

¹² "History of Islam in the UK."

¹³ "History of the Mosque - Part 1," Shah Jahan Mosque, accessed June 19, 2018, <http://www.shahjahanmosque.org.uk/history-mosque-part-1>.

decades. The Somali Muslim community, numbering over 100,000, form Britain's largest refugee population. In more recent times, Muslims have arrived in the UK from Iraq, Afghanistan and Syria as a result of war and societal breakdown.¹⁴

Demographics

The 2011 Census provides the most up-to-date and comprehensive data available on the characteristics of the UK's Muslim population, following the introduction of a religion identifier in the 2001 Census. The data revealed that the UK's Muslim population had risen 75% over the intervening period, from 1.6 million in 2001 to 2.8million by 2011.¹⁵

Muslims make up 4.4%, or less than 1 in 20, of the overall UK population. The overwhelming majority of UK Muslims, 95%, live in England. 3% of Muslims live in Scotland, 1.6% in Wales, while just 0.1% reside in Northern Ireland.¹⁶

Despite making up a relatively low proportion of the overall population, Muslims are concentrated in specific areas of the UK. Half of Muslims in England and Wales reside in the cities of London, Birmingham and Bradford¹⁷, while almost 60% of Scottish Muslims live in Glasgow or Edinburgh.¹⁸

Certain council areas such as the London boroughs of Tower Hamlets and Newham, and Blackburn with Darwen in the North West of England, feature Muslim populations above 25%. Just under a quarter of Bradford residents are Muslim, while 22% of the population of Birmingham, the UK's second largest city,

are Muslim. Muslims living in London make up 1 in 8 of the population of the UK's capital, exceeding 1 million.¹⁹

Blackburn with Darwen also contains the most concentrated area of Muslims across the whole of the UK, with the council wards of Bastwell and Shear Brow both having local Muslim populations above 75%.²⁰

The age structure of the Muslim population in the UK is much younger than the general population, with only 4% of Muslims of retirement age compared to 16% of the overall population. Almost half of UK Muslims are under the age of 25, compared to a third of the UK population.²¹

Muslim toddlers under the age of 5 make up 9% of all children in this age range, indicating that young Muslims will have an increasing influence in society as time progresses.²²

This trend is more acutely seen in areas of high Muslim populations, with over 80% of children under 5 in the Birmingham wards of Washwood Heath, Bordesley Green and Sparkbrook being Muslim. More than 50% of children in Tower Hamlets, and 40% in Newham, are Muslim.²³

British Muslims are very diverse in terms of ethnicity, culture, and language. Two-thirds of UK Muslims are of Asian ethnicity, with 10% being of Black ethnicity and 7% being of Arab ethnicity, while White British Muslims comprise 3% of the UK Muslim total.²⁴ The range of languages spoken by British Muslims is also vast, including but not limited to, Arabic,

¹⁴ Jawad Iqbal, "The Diverse Origins of Britain's Muslims," BBC, January 18, 2016, <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-33715473>.

¹⁵ Aisha Gani, "Muslim Population in England and Wales Nearly Doubles in 10 Years," The Guardian, February 11, 2015, accessed May 10, 2018, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/feb/11/muslim-population-england-wales-nearly-doubles-10-years>.

¹⁶ Khadijah Elshayyal, *Scottish Muslims in Numbers: Understanding Scotland's Muslim Population through the 2011 Census*, report, The Alwaleed Centre, The University of Edinburgh, December 2016, accessed May 10, 2018, https://www.ed.ac.uk/files/atoms/files/scottish_muslims_in_numbers_web.pdf.

¹⁷ Sundas Ali, *British Muslims in Numbers: A Demographic, Socio-economic and Health Profile of Muslims in Britain Drawing on the 2011 Census*, report, Muslim Council of

Britain, January 2015, accessed May 10, 2018, https://www.mcb.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/MCBCensusReport_2015.pdf.

¹⁸ *Scottish Muslims in Numbers*.

¹⁹ *British Muslims in Numbers*.

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ Ibid.

²² Ibid.

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ Ibid.

Punjabi, Urdu, Bengali, Gujarati, Turkish, Somali, Kurdish, and Pashto.

Finally, British Muslims are hugely diverse in their ideologies, beliefs and practices. While the majority of Muslims in the UK follow the Sunni schools, an estimated 1 in 10 classify as Shia.²⁵

One of the key features of Islamophobia is to treat Muslims as a homogenous group. However, diversity in the reasons for migration, ideology, culture, background and language all show that Muslims in the UK are a community of communities, and arguably the most diverse religious community of all.

The Demographics of Muslims in Britain

Professor Sophie Gilliat-Ray

Director, Centre for the Study of Islam in the UK

It is difficult to summarise in a few sentences the complex picture that emerges from the most recent demographic/Census data in relation to Muslim communities in Britain. Broadly speaking, however, we are talking about 'communities' that are unevenly distributed around the UK, demographically 'young', suffering disproportionate socio-economic disadvantage compared to other faith groups, and reflecting a wide range of ethnic, racial and linguistic backgrounds. Nearly half the Muslim population in Britain was born here, and about two thirds originate from the Indian subcontinent. Despite this, links with

relatives 'back home' remain strong via transnational marriage and remittances.

Until 2001, statistic information about the demography of Muslim communities in Britain was largely a matter of guesswork. Extrapolation from Census data about ethnicity provided some clues, alongside a number of large-scale quantitative studies that included attention to questions of religion.²⁶ But with the introduction of a question on religion in the 2001 Census, researchers interested in Muslims in Britain could begin to map their socio-economic situation in detail.²⁷ Analysis of the 2001 Census data was conducted by researchers at the University of Bristol, in collaboration with the Muslim Council of Britain.²⁸ This volume provided an invaluable contribution to the field of British Muslim Studies, and complemented extensive qualitative understanding. Since 2001, demographic information about Muslim communities in Britain has been essential for policy-makers, Muslim organisations, and academics. Arguably, the successful campaign for the (voluntary) 'religion' question in the Census was an important driver for the incorporation of 'religion and belief' as one of nine 'protected characteristics' of the Equality Act 2010.

A question on religion was retained in the 2011 Census, thereby enabling the beginning of some longitudinal comparisons. Data has been subject to detailed analysis, with the Muslim Council of Britain again having a significant role in interpretation of the findings.²⁹ There is now a considerable body of research that investigates Muslim demography, both methodologically³⁰ and empirically.³¹ Census data is not the only source of

²⁵ "The Diverse Origins of Britain's Muslims."

²⁶ Tariq Modood et al., *Ethnic Minorities in Britain: Diversity and Disadvantage - Fourth National Survey of Ethnic Minorities*, report, Policy Studies Institute, 1997, http://www.psi.org.uk/pdf/Ethnic%20Minorities%20In%20Britain_small_file.pdf.

²⁷ Jamil Sherif, "A Census Chronicle – Reflections on the Campaign for a Religion Question in the 2001 Census for England and Wales," *Journal of Beliefs & Values* 32, no. 1 (2011): 1-18, doi:10.1080/13617672.2011.549306.

²⁸ Serena Hussain, *Muslims on the Map: A National Survey of Social Trends in Britain* (London: Tauris Academic Studies, 2008).

²⁹ *British Muslims in Numbers*.

³⁰ Clive D. Field, "Measuring Religious Affiliation in Great Britain: The 2011 Census in Historical and Methodological Context," *Religion* 44, no. 3 (2014): 357-382, doi:10.1080/0048721x.2014.903643.

³¹ Abby Day and Lois Lee, "Making Sense of Surveys and Censuses: Issues in Religious Self-identification," *Religion* 44, no. 3 (2014): 345-356, doi:10.1080/0048721x.2014.929833.

Serena Hussain and Jamil Sherif, "Minority Religions in the Census: The Case of British Muslims," *Religion* 44, no. 3 (2014): 414-433, doi:10.1080/0048721x.2014.927049.

demographic information about British Muslims, however. Other large-scale quantitative surveys, such as the Ethnic Minority British Election Survey, provide important information on voting behaviour and attitudes to political issues, for example.

While the 2011 Census data on Muslims is extremely detailed, there have since been demographic developments that will only be enumerated via the next Census in 2021. This means that certain statistical information in the intervening ten-year period can only be estimated using other methods. Where datasets are produced featuring information on ethnicity and not religion, a common method is to extrapolate estimates from ethnic groups with large Muslim representation. For example, with over 90% of Pakistani and Bangladeshi individuals recording their religion as Muslim, these ethnic groups provide insight into Muslim experiences. However, these groups comprise just over 50% of the overall UK Muslim population and, therefore, they often cannot provide a full picture.

Amid the generation of new datasets and qualitative studies of British Muslims, it is essential to critically evaluate methodology, techniques of data analysis, interpretation of findings, and the 'interests' that lie behind the commissioning of new research. Who is engaged in the production of demographic information about Muslim communities, and with what authority, knowledge, power and evidence? Peer-review, triangulation (using more than one method on the same topic), and appropriate ethical scrutiny, are some of the hallmarks of reliable, high-quality, academic research. Through the particular emphasis given to research methodology, students of our MA in Islam in Contemporary Britain at Cardiff University are schooled to question data sources, and the credentials of those

involved in the production of information about Muslim communities.

The production of reliable statistical data about Muslim communities in Britain is crucial for Islamic organisations involved with representing community interests in civil society, and advocating on their behalf. Demographic information about Muslim communities paints a clear picture of disproportionate socio-economic hardship and discrimination, but also the cumulative disadvantage that arises from the intersection of such things as poor housing quality, ill-health, economic inactivity, or low educational attainment. Islamophobia and anti-Muslim hatred may be difficult to measure quantitatively at a national level. But we now have sufficient evidence – both qualitative and quantitative – to suggest that it has a compounding effect on other aspects of British Muslim experience and disadvantage and its effects justify new systematic high-quality research.

Muslim contributions to Britain

The British Muslim community is a vibrant and heterogeneous one, whose contributions to Britain are numerous and multi-layered. Muslim contributions to Britain include but are in no way limited to:

- There are more than 13,400 Muslim-owned businesses in London alone, creating over 70,000 jobs. As such, Muslim owned firms represent a third of small to medium enterprises in the capital.³²
- British Muslims donate more to charity than any other group, donating an average of £371 each.³³ Indeed, during Ramadan 2016, British Muslims

³² *The Muslim Pound: Celebrating the Muslim Contribution to the UK Economy*, report, Muslim Council of Britain, 2013, <http://www.mcb.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/The-Muslim-Pound-FINAL.pdf>

³³ Tom Moseley, "Which Religion Gives The Most To Charity?", HuffPost UK, October 03, 2013, http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/2013/07/21/muslims-give-most_n_3630830.html.

donated £100 million, which is equivalent to £38 per second.³⁴

- British Muslims contribute over £31 billion to the UK economy.³⁵ Meanwhile, the halal food industry in Britain is worth £1 billion, with the global halal food market estimated to be worth £685 billion.³⁶
- The public sector draws heavily on skilled professionals from Muslims-majority countries, with 26% of doctors working in the NHS being Asian or Asian British.³⁷
- Muslims are eager to participate in society and support their communities. In the last month alone, two Muslims have been appointed Mayor: Mayor of Swindon, Junab Ali, was re-elected in May 2018 for a fourth term and Magid Magid was elected in Sheffield.
- There are currently 650 British Muslims soldiers in the British Army.³⁸ In 2006, Jabron Hashmi became the first British Muslim soldier to die in Afghanistan. He was 24 years old. His older brother, Zeeshan, who had also worked in the British Army, said: "Jabron was a committed soldier and a committed Muslim. He was fiercely proud of his Islamic background and he was equally proud of being British and was very proud to live in Britain."³⁹
- A number of high profile Muslims excel in all realms of British public life. One need not look far to witness the contributions of Muslim figures such as Sayeeda Warsi, Naz Shah, Rushanara Ali, Nazir Afzal, Mohammed Farah, Mohammed Salah, Nadiya Hussein, Dr Saleyha Ahsan, Mishal Husain, Dina

Torkia, Rimla Akhtar, and James Caan in all realms of life, be it within sports, media, politics, criminal justice or business.

However, despite their important social, economic, and civic contributions and the fact that 95% of Muslims feel a strong sense of loyalty to the country, as evidenced by a targeted BBC poll,⁴⁰ Muslims are frequently engulfed in a climate of suspicion; are often accused of being a community possessing little interest in being a full part of British society; and face high levels of discrimination and socio-economic barriers to their active participation in social, political, civic, and economic life. It is the role of Islamophobia within these anti-Muslim hostilities, discriminations, and barriers that this report seeks to address.

³⁴ Nick Donaldson, "Ramadan – making a real difference," Charity Commission, July 14, 2016, <https://charitycommission.blog.gov.uk/2016/07/14/ramadan-making-a-real-difference/>.

³⁵ Asa Bennett, "British Muslims Add Over £31 BILLION To UK Economy," The Huffington Post, October 29, 2013, http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/2013/10/29/uk-muslims-economy_n_4170781.html.

³⁶ *The Muslim Pound: Celebrating the Muslim Contribution to the UK Economy*, report, Muslim Council of Britain, 2013, <http://www.mcb.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/The-Muslim-Pound-FINAL.pdf>.

³⁷ Haroon Siddique, "Figures show extent of NHS reliance on foreign nationals," The Guardian, January 26, 2014, <https://www.theguardian.com/society/2014/jan/26/nhs-foreign-nationals-immigration-health-service>.

³⁸ "About Us." Armed Forces Muslim Association. Accessed June 4, 2018. <http://afma.org.uk/about-us/>.

³⁹ "British Muslim soldiers." The Open University. Accessed June 27, 2017. <http://www.open.ac.uk/ccig/blogs/british-muslim-soldiers>.

⁴⁰ "Most British Muslims 'oppose Muhammad cartoons reprisals'," BBC News, accessed 15.05.2018, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-31293196>

Part II: The Manifestations, Logics, and Mechanisms that Fuel Islamophobia

The Assumptions of Islamophobia.....	33
DR AURELIEN MONDON, UNIVERSITY OF BATH AND DR AARON WINTER, UNIVERSITY OF EAST LONDON LIBERAL AND ILLIBERAL ISLAMOPHOBIAS	36
Islamophobia, Xenophobia, Racism, and Anti-Semitism.....	38
PROFESSOR TARIQ MODOOD, UNIVERSITY OF BRISTOL ISLAMOPHOBIA: A FORM OF CULTURAL RACISM	38
DR YULIA EGOROVA, DURHAM UNIVERSITY ISLAMOPHOBIA IN ITS RELATION TO ANTI-SEMITISM	45
PROFESSOR NASAR MEER FACSS, UNIVERSITY OF EDINBURGH WHAT IS THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ISLAMOPHOBIA AND ANTISEMITISM?.....	46
Driving Islamophobic Narratives: The Islamophobia Industry	49
DR HILARY AKED, PHD UNIVERSITY OF BATH THE 'ISLAMOPHOBIA INDUSTRY'	50
Moral Panic, Media, and Broadcasting	66
NATHAN SPARKES, HACKED OFF CAMPAIGN LEVESON AND THE GOVERNMENT'S FAILURE TO KEEP ITS PROMISES TO THE VICTIMS OF PRESS ABUSE	72

The Assumptions of Islamophobia

Part II of this report is intended to explore the manifestations, logics, and mechanisms that fuel Islamophobia. In opening this exploration, it is useful to briefly explore some of the underlying assumptions that underpin the logics of Islamophobia. While not every instance of Islamophobia may embody all of the assumptions discussed below, they are common themes that drive and infiltrate Islamophobic narratives surrounding Muslims and their place in society.

“All Muslims are the same”

One of the key features of Islamophobic narratives is that Muslims are a monolithic group with static views, beliefs and practices. Such a stance ignores the huge diversity between Muslims in terms of beliefs, practices, ideologies, ethnicities, cultures, languages and values.

By ignoring this vast diversity, the result is that the acts and examples of a few are extrapolated to being considered representative of over a billion believers. In other words, the example of a small minority of Muslims is considered applicable to the whole Muslim population. One example of this is when the treatment of women in Saudi Arabia is portrayed as the collective treatment of all Muslim women, ignoring the freedoms the women enjoy in Muslim-majority countries such as Indonesia, or the empowering examples of British Muslim women such as Baroness Sayeeda Warsi, Naz Shah, Rushanara Ali, Nadia Hussein, Dr Saleyha Ahsan, Mishal Husain, Dina Torkia, or Rimla Akhtar, and too many other pioneering British Muslim women to name.

As a consequence of generalisation, Muslims become vulnerable to stereotyping, vilification and dehumanisation. Furthermore, in

assuming that the desires, ideologies, political standpoints and values are universal across Muslims, the guilt of a few is frequently attributed to all Muslims. A case in point is when innocent Muslims are considered culpable and blameworthy for the reprehensible violent actions committed by individuals such as Muhammad Emwazi, Salman Abedi, Michael Adebolajo, or Khalid Masood.

Indeed, following acts of terrorism where the perpetrator is Muslim, there is the invariable suggestion that Muslims should come out in condemnation of the atrocity – as if they do not condemn it in the same way as everyone else. This has culminated in a 712-page Google document and website listing the times that Muslims have condemned violence. The absurdity of this suggestion is strikingly obvious when one makes the parallel suggestion that all White people should apologise for the atrocities committed by white supremacists such as Anders Breivik, Darren Osborne, Thomas Mair, Pavlo Lapshyn, David Copeland, Alexandre Bissonnette, and James Harris Jackson.

This translation of guilt is an issue discussed in Part Three by Todd Green in his article **“Islamophobia and the Presumption of Muslim Guilt in Terrorism”**.

Islamophobia includes:

Making mendacious, dehumanising, vilifying, demonising, or stereotypical allegations about Muslims.

Accusing Muslims as a collective of being responsible for real or imagined wrongdoing committed by a single Muslim person, group or nation, or even for acts committed by non-Muslims.

Muslims are the inferior “Other”

Within the logics of Islamophobia, Muslims are presented as “different” and as sharing none of the core values of Western culture, such as respect for

freedom of belief. This perspective is epitomised in the lauding of “British Values” as something distinct from Muslim values and something that Muslims are reluctant to embody, so must be forced to accept. The issue of “Othering” Muslims within the ongoing debates concerning integration will be discussed in greater depth within “Political and Public Exclusion” of Part Three.

According to Islamophobic assumptions, Muslims are not only different, this difference also makes them inferior; uncivilised, irrational, violent and sexist. As such, they have no place in the civilised West unless they denounce their barbaric and illogical ways in order to progress to an enlightened Western way of life.

Inferiorisation is a time-tested tool of racisms and is a mechanism for controlling and regulating groups whom there is a concern they may disrupt the delicate balance of socio-economic power. This theme of inferiorisation will be returned to in following discussions of Islamophobia, racism and xenophobia.

Islamophobia includes:

Objectifying and generalising Muslims as different, exotic or underdeveloped, or implying that they are outside of, distinct from, or incompatible with British society and identity.

Espousing the belief that Muslims are inferior to other social or religious groups

Muslims are the manipulative enemy and hatred of Muslims is justified

"Islam is above all a totalitarian political ideology, sugar-coated with the trappings of a primitive desert religion to help veil its true nature. The publicly stated goal of Islamic theology and political ideology is to impose the rule of Islam over the entire world, and make it

*part of Dar al-Islam, the 'House of Submission'. Widely accepted Islamic theology based in Koranic doctrine explicitly requires that Islam be spread by any and all means necessary, including by violence and mass slaughter, in a process known as jihad, or holy war. The fact that many Muslims do not support or engage in violent jihad is not germane."*⁴¹

The counter-jihad movement (also known as professional Islamophobia and the Islamophobia Industry) is fuelled by the belief that Islam and Muslims living in Europe are a threat to “Western civilisation”. This logic of the “clash of civilisations” and Muslims as the enemy is narrated through the claim that the West is being subjected to an aggressive and politicised Islamic invasion.

This invasion is exemplified by the apparent removal of Christian or Jewish symbols and the imposition of Islamic traditions, for example the building of mosques, the appearance of Islamic dress in public, and the accessibility of halal meat.

According to those who espouse this fear, European culture is in a state of decline due to infiltration by Muslims who seek to destroy European national identities and values.

Perceptions of collective threat, processes of securitisation and the counter-jihad movement will be discussed further in chapters surrounding the Islamophobia Industry in Part 2 and Counter-Terror in Part 3 of this report

Islamophobia includes:

Charging Muslims with conspiring to harm humanity and/or the Western way of life, or blaming Muslims for the economic and social ills of society.

⁴¹ "The Counterjihad Manifesto," Gates of Vienna, accessed July 05, 2017, <http://gatesofvienna.blogspot.co.uk/2009/11/counterjihad-manifesto.html>

Islamophobia and racial discrimination is normal

As the later chapter on Islamophobia, Racism, Xenophobia and Anti-Semitism attests, Islamophobia is frequently conflated with racism. In Britain, longstanding prejudices against Pakistanis, for example, have become inter-mingled with anti-Muslim sentiment to the point that they are often difficult to separate.

These compounded hostilities are further augmented by heightened fears of security. The consequence of this is that the focus on the apparent threat of Muslims serves to justify suspicion of anyone who could potentially be Muslim – anyone who “looks” Muslim. This results in issues such as racial profiling at airports. In the UK context, profiling is frequently defended on the basis of the statistical probability of a Muslim being of certain ethnicities. Therefore, the security threat justifies increased suspicion of South Asians, for example.

Former UKIP candidate, Raheem Kassam, (who was the first British politician to meet Donald Trump upon his inauguration alongside Nigel Farage and, until recently, was the editor of Breitbart News UK before resigning to challenge Sadiq Khan in the next mayoral election) has repeatedly voiced support for Donald Trump’s anti-Muslim policies and has been an advocate of racial profiling at airports. He has stated that “I get worried when I’m not profiled in an airport”.⁴²

Issues of racial profiling will be explored further in discussions surrounding Schedule 7 in the later Chapter “Muslims and Counter-Terror” in Part Three of this report.

Racial profiling, racial discrimination, and racist exclusionary policies are in direct conflict with the principles of equality. However, this is an example of where racial discrimination has become normalised within political and public debate as something deemed necessary. Moreover, prejudiced and racist comments about Muslims have increasingly become normalised. Rather than being considered bigoted and inappropriate, such views are frequently seen as justified and normal. As Baroness Sayeeda Warsi commented in 2011, “Islamophobia has passed the dinner table test.”⁴³

Muslim criticisms of the West are invalid

There is an attitude amongst certain segments of political and public commentators who appear to perpetuate the view that Western commentators are justified in criticising Muslim individuals and countries for their beliefs, practices, policies and behaviours, however, the reverse is unjustified and baseless.

One area that is a good example of this is the way in which arguments surrounding freedom of speech are applied. Indeed, organisations such as Student Rights, a project of the Henry Jackson Society, claim to protect the freedom of speech when they have expressed opposition to university student unions’ “no-platform” policy for far-right speakers from organisations such as the BNP.⁴⁴ However, it has simultaneously severely criticised Muslim students who criticise the current PREVENT strategy.⁴⁵

⁴² Jim Waterson, “Raheem Kassam: Meet The Right-Wing Ex-Muslim Who Wants To Save UKIP,” BuzzFeed, accessed July 26, 2017, https://www.buzzfeed.com/jimwaterson/raheem-kassam-ukip?utm_term=.roxPV116Q#.tipNk8829.

⁴³ “Lady Warsi claims Islamophobia is now socially acceptable in Britain”, *The Guardian*, January 20, 2011, accessed 20.06.2018, <https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2011/jan/20/lady-warsi-islamophobia-muslims,-prejudice>

⁴⁴ “London Student issue 10 (March 1st 2010),” Yudu - Your Digital editions, accessed July 27, 2017, <http://content.yudu.com/Library/A1nkge/LondonStudentissue10/resources/index.htm>.

⁴⁵ “Salford Student President who opposes Prevent reveals troubling views on social media,” Student Rights, accessed August 08, 2017, <http://www.studentrights.org.uk/article/2466/salford-student-president-who-opposes-prevent-reveals-troubling-views-on-social-media>.

Liberal and Illiberal Islamophobias⁴⁶

Dr Aurelien Mondon

University of Bath

and Dr Aaron Winter

University of East London

In recent years we have seen a rise in suspicion and hate directed at Muslims and Islam across Europe and North America. It has manifested in a wide variety of ways, from hate speech, hate crimes and far-right activism, to more insidious forms of systemic and state racism, such as surveillance, profiling and attempted travel and clothing bans.⁴⁷ Added to these, we have also witnessed a rise of Islamophobic discourse based on the defence of traditionally progressive tropes such as free speech,⁴⁸ secularism and women's rights.⁴⁹ In addition to this, we have seen ongoing difficulties and debates over how to define this phenomenon, as Islamophobia or anti-Muslim racism,⁵⁰ and the evolving nature of racism, which anti-Muslim discourses have in part fed on and utilised.

To make sense of the contemporary landscape of anti-Muslim racisms, and diverse, seemingly contradictory and changing articulations of Islamophobia, we have developed our analytical concepts of liberal and illiberal articulations of Islamophobia.⁵¹ Our aim with these concepts is to provide a more nuanced

conceptual and analytical framework and tool to come to grips with the diversity, contradictions, transformation and slipperiness of Islamophobia(s), and racism itself, in order to combat it more effectively. Currently, the signifiers 'Muslim' and 'Islam' are constructed through different modes of articulations, from the most extreme to the seemingly progressive, but ultimately create an inchoate and yet clear Other used as a template to single out homogenised, suspect communities. We argue that it is only through the dual offer of what we define as illiberal and liberal Islamophobias that this racist discourse can become naturalised and common sense, since it allows for those espousing the liberal position to justify their racist discourse by opposing it to the illiberal articulation, even though both are part of the same exclusionary paradigm. It is worth noting that our distinction between the liberal and illiberal articulation here is not so much based on political and ideology theory, but rather on the perceived quality and level of acceptability of each concept in the mainstream discourse within modern liberal democracies.⁵²

Illiberal Islamophobia commonly emerges from exclusivist ideologies, discourses and identities associated with easily recognisable forms of racisms, typically originating on the far-right and within ultra-conservative circles. This type of Islamophobia is closest to traditional racism and often presents Islam as

⁴⁶ This report is based on and builds upon the previously published article: Aurelien Mondon and Aaron Winter, "Articulations of Islamophobia: From the Extreme to the Mainstream?", *Ethnic and Racial Studies Review*, 40, 13 (Oct. 2017).

⁴⁷ Arun Kundnani, *The Muslims are coming: Islamophobia, Extremism and the domestic war on terror* (London: Verso, 2014); Mondon and Winter, "Articulations of Islamophobia"; Aurelien Mondon and Aaron Winter, "Normalized Hate", *Jacobin* (Aug. 2017); Naaz Rashid, *Veiled Threats: Representing the Muslim woman in public policy discourses* (Bristol: Policy Press, 2016); Runnymede Trust, *Islamophobia: still a challenge for us all* (London: Runnymede Trust, 2017).

⁴⁸ Gavan Titley, Des Freedman, Gholam Khiabany and Aurelien Mondon, *After Charlie Hebdo: Terror, Racism and Free Speech* (London: Zed, 2017).

⁴⁹ Christine Delphy, *Separate and dominate: Feminism and Racism after the War on Terror* (London: Verso, 2015); Sara Farris, *In the Name of Women's Rights: The Rise of Femonationalism* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2017); Mondon and Winter, "Articulations of Islamophobia"; Aurelien Mondon and Aaron Winter, "Charlie Hebdo, Republican Secularism and Islamophobia", *After Charlie Hebdo: Terror, Racism and Free Speech*, eds. G. Titley, D. Freedman, G. Khiabany and A. Mondon. "London: Zed Books, 2017), 31-35; Irene Zempi and Neil Chakraborti, *Islamophobia, Victimisation and the Veil* (London: Palgrave, 2014).

⁵⁰ Claire Alexander, "The Muslim Question(s): Reflections from a Race and Ethnic Studies perspective", *The New Muslims*, eds. C. Alexander, V. Redclift and A. Hussain (London: Runnymede Trust, 2013), 5-7; Chris Allen "Islamophobia: From K.I.S.S. to R.I.P.", *Thinking Through Islamophobia: Global Perspectives*, eds. S. Sayyid and A. Vakil (London: C. Hurst & Co, 2010), 51-64; Nasar Meer and Tariq Modood, "Refutations of racism in the 'Muslim Question'", *Patterns of Prejudice* no. 43, 3-4 (2009), 332-351; Mondon and Winter, "Articulations of Islamophobia"; Runnymede Trust, *Islamophobia: a challenge for us all* (London: Runnymede Trust, 1997); Runnymede Trust, *Islamophobia* (2017);

Raymond Taras, "Islamophobia never stands still": race, religion, and culture", *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 36, 3 (2013), 417-433; Pnina Werbner, "Folk devils and racist imaginaries in a global prism: Islamophobia and anti-Semitism in the twenty-first century", *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 36, 3 (2013), 450-467.

⁵¹ Mondon and Winter, "Articulations of Islamophobia"; Mondon and Winter, *Charlie Hebdo*.

⁵² Mondon and Winter, "Articulations of Islamophobia".

monolithic and innately threatening and inferior (in terms of 'race' if not also culture) and takes the form of open threats, hate attacks, calls for repatriation or ethnic cleansing. Illiberal Islamophobia is thus 'illiberal' inasmuch as it is not only rejected by the liberal norm, but denounced as unacceptable and alien to our post-racial societies,⁵³ thus allowing the legitimisation of other, more insidious and less racialised forms, which also rely on cultural differences.

Contrary to illiberal and more extreme forms of Islamophobia, liberal Islamophobia is anchored in a pseudo-progressive discourse in the defence of the rule of law based on liberal equality, freedom and rights (e.g. liberal versions of freedom of speech, gender and sexual equality). We see its clearest articulations in calls to ban the hijab or burka and the 'Je suis Charlie' phenomenon.⁵⁴ To gain legitimacy, it is thus crucial that liberal Islamophobia goes beyond its attacks on Muslims, and appears to challenge traditional far-right and ultra-conservative discourses and ideologies. In its self-proclaimed yet limited opposition to the reviled 'racists', 'sexists' and 'fundamentalists' of all kinds, it enables far greater mainstream and even progressive acceptance.

Two aspects thus make the liberal articulation of Islamophobia distinct from illiberal forms:

It allows for limited distinctions between 'Islam' as a religion or set of ideas and 'Muslims' as a people, and where people are implicated, as they always are, between 'good' (redeemable) and 'bad' Muslims subject to a loyalty test. The test operates through (demands for) explicit expressions of opposition to ideas and practices projected on to Muslims and apologies from 'moderate' Muslims, even though the

line to satisfy such demands is arbitrary, and always moving out of reach.

It emphasises the apparent and limited inclusion of other ethnic and religious groups typically hated by the far-right and traditional racists. The presentation of criticism of Islam and Muslims as reactionary as a defence of women's and LGBT rights for example provides a veneer of tolerance and progressivism. The victimisation is only partially acknowledged, in order to be diverted onto a particular scapegoat: those racialised and stigmatised groups can join if 'They' decide to integrate through hate.

While it is crucial that liberal Islamophobia posits itself clearly in opposition to the reviled illiberal articulation, the mask slips easily and often. The focus of public debate on Muslim garments and their ban has often led to attacks on Muslim women wearing head coverings. Similarly, the 'Je suis Charlie' moment has not led to the liberalisation of speech for all, but the increased securitization of Muslims and the reinforcing of privileges and whiteness as a norm.⁵⁵ In turn, the tactical and racist use of potentially progressive ideals such as free speech, feminism or secularism against Muslims has allowed the far right to mainstream itself and its discourse further.

We believe that our framework is essential to understand the current dynamics of racism and exclusion. Only with a full picture of these diverse and seemingly contradictory articulations, can we both understand the complex and evolving nature of racism, but also provide progressive movements with the tools to fight racism at a time when mainstream movements, media, policy and discourse is trying to hijack their language and causes for reactionary ends.

⁵³ Alana Lentin and Gavan Titley, *The Crises of Multiculturalism: Racism in a neoliberal age* (London: Zed, 2011).

⁵⁴ Titley et al, *After Charlie Hebdo*.

⁵⁵ Mondon and Winter, *Charlie Hebdo*; Titley et al, *After Charlie Hebdo*.

Islamophobia, Xenophobia, Racism, and Anti-Semitism

Earlier in this report, we laid out our argument of Islamophobia being distinct from criticism of religion – it is not a fear of *Islam*, it is a fear of *Muslims*. This is an important point as a misunderstanding of this magnitude obscures the roots and causes of Islamophobic sentiments, thus inhibiting opportunities to address them.

It would be possible to write many volumes on the interconnectivity and symbiotic relationship between Islamophobias, racisms, anti-Semitism, xenophobia, and other forms of hatred. This is clearly beyond the limits of what is possible in one report. Therefore, this chapter seeks instead to touch upon (albeit very briefly) a non-exhaustive exploration of a number of theories, themes, and approaches that are all useful in fully exploring Islamophobia as a phenomenon.

Cultural Racism

From a policy perspective, Islamophobia is a hostility that is directed at and serves to exclude *people*. While animosity towards the religion is frequently used as a justification for these sentiments, this hostility is also a product of animosity towards race, ethnicity and culture. A case in point is the conflation between ethnic and religious insults (such as the application of “p*ki” when the pejorative term is expressed in hostility towards a Muslim as well as an ethnic identity), or the reality that British Sikhs have frequently been the unfortunate targets of Islamophobic abuse on the basis of their ethnicity and assumed connection to a Muslim identity.

Therefore, rather than viewing Islamophobia in a vacuum, it is important

to view it through the lens of racisms. As Runnymede’s recent report attests, Islamophobia should be understood as an anti-Muslim racism.

In Todd Green’s seminal work “The Fear of Islam”, he states that, “Islamophobia is not racially blind, nor is it simply a manifestation of older forms of racism rooted in biological inferiority. It is an example of what some scholars have labelled “cultural racism”. This form of racism incites hatred and hostility based on religious beliefs, cultural traditions, and ethnic backgrounds.”⁵⁶

In this manner, Muslims collectively have become racialised through their religious identities.

Islamophobia: a form of cultural racism⁵⁷

Tariq Modood, MBE, FBA, FAcSS, FRSA

University of Bristol

Islamophobia is the racialising of Muslims based on physical appearance or descent as members of a community and attributing to them cultural or religious characteristics to vilify, marginalise, discriminate or demand assimilation and thereby treat them as second class citizens.

It was not very long ago that Anglophone scholars of racism understood it in terms of biology, and specifically in terms of the black-white binary. At the same time, other scholars, especially in continental Europe, understood racism in terms of anti-semitism, especially in the recent biologised forms that Europe has manifested. When it began to be clear that these two paradigms were failing to capture some contemporary experiences, such as anti-Asian cultural racism in Britain or anti-Arab cultural racism in France, some scholars began to move away

⁵⁶ Todd H. Green, *The Fear of Islam: an Introduction to Islamophobia in the West* (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2015), 27.

⁵⁷ This is a shortened version of a submission to the All-Party Parliamentary Group on British Muslims, 1 June 2018, in response to the call for evidence on ‘Working Definition of Islamophobia’.

from these paradigms.⁵⁸ Yet, following the assertive Muslim agency triggered off by The Satanic Verses affair and other Muslim controversies, as Muslims responded to such hostilities and articulated their misrecognition, they were constantly told, especially in Britain, that there is no such thing as anti-Muslim racism because Muslims are a religious group and not a race. Hence Muslims could legitimately ask for toleration and religious pluralism but not for inclusion in anti-racist egalitarian analyses and initiatives. While this view continues to be expressed even today, and some deny that there is a racism that could be labelled 'Islamophobia', it no longer has the hegemony it once had.

While a number of Anglophone authors, including myself, started using the concept of Islamophobia in the late 1980s and early 1990s, it was the Runnymede Trust, with its 1997 report, 'Islamophobia: a challenge to us all', which launched the career of the term as a concept of public discourse in Britain and much beyond it. It presented Islamophobia as 'a useful shorthand way of referring to dread or fear of Islam – and therefore to fear or dislike of all or most Muslims'. While the report was groundbreaking and played a crucial role in getting people to think about anti-Muslim prejudice I felt it did not sufficiently locate Islamophobia as a racism, like say, anti-semitism. I continued to write about Islamophobia as a form of cultural racism, which may be built on racism based on physical appearance (e.g. colour-racism) but was a form of racism in its own right – like anti-semitism.⁵⁹ This also became the approach of UNESCO and I am pleased to see that it has been explicitly embraced by the new Runnymede Trust report of November, 2017.

Islamophobia is a form of cultural racism because while the perception and

treatment of Muslims clearly has a religious and cultural dimension it, equally clearly, bears a physical appearance or ancestral component. For while it is true that 'Muslim' is not a (putative) biological category in the way that 'black' or 'south Asian' (aka 'Paki'), or Chinese is, neither was 'Jew'. In that instance it took a long non-linear history of racialisation to turn an ethno-religious group into a race. More precisely, the latter did not so much as replace the former but superimposed itself because even though no one denied that Jews were a religious community, with a distinctive language(s), culture(s) and religion, Jews still came to be seen as a race, and with horrific consequences. Similarly, Bosnian Muslims were 'ethnically cleansed' because they came to be identified as a 'racial' group, that is to say, as having a perceived line of descent by people who actually were phenotypically, linguistically and culturally the same as themselves. The ethnic cleanser, unlike an Inquisitor, wasted no time in finding out what people believed, if and how often they went to a mosque and so on: their victims were racially identified as Muslims in terms of community membership based on a perceived line of descent.

Race, then, as I understand it is not just about biology or even 'colour', for while racialization has to pick on some features of a people related to physical appearance and ancestry (otherwise racism cannot be distinguished from other forms of groupism) it need only be a marker. This is illustrated in the conceptualisation of cultural racism as what I have called a two-step process.⁶⁰ While biological racism is the antipathy, exclusion and unequal treatment of people on the basis of their physical appearance or other imputed physical differences, saliently in Britain their non 'whiteness', cultural racism builds on biological racism a further

⁵⁸ Introduction and Chapter 1 in Modood, T, *Multicultural Politics: Racism, Ethnicity and Muslims in Britain*, Edinburgh, 2005.

⁵⁹ Modood, *Multicultural Politics...*, Intro and chp 1; N. Meer and Modood, 'For "Jewish" Read "Muslim"? Islamophobia as a Form of Racialisation of Ethno-Religious Groups in Britain Today', *Islamophobia Studies Journal*, 1(1), Spring 2012: 36-55.

⁶⁰ Modood, *Multicultural Politics...*, Intro and chp 1

discourse which evokes cultural differences from an alleged British, 'civilised' norm to vilify, marginalise or demand cultural assimilation from groups who may also suffer from biological racism. As white people's interactions with non-white individuals increased, they did not become necessarily less conscious of group differences but they were far more likely to ascribe group differences to upbringing, customs, forms of socialisation and self-identity than to biological heredity.

Cultures and cultural practices are usually internally diverse, containing and omitting various "authentic" elements, and adaptations and mixes. So to racially group all Jews or Muslims together as one cultural 'race' or as one ethnoreligious entity, it follows that the culturalized targeting is expansive, rather than purist, aiming to catch most if not all cultural minorities in that targeted group. For example, a non-religious Muslim might still be targeted as a cultural Muslim or Muslim by community, which of course means Muslim by background, which means birth and ancestry. Hence my point that Muslims, no less than Jews, are identified 'racially' and not simply in terms of religious beliefs or behaviour. Moreover, if we accept that racism does not necessarily involve attributing qualities which inhere in a deterministic law-like way in all members of a group, then we do not have to rule out cultural racism as an example of racism. As such we should guard against the characterisation of racism as a form of biological determinism which leaves little space to conceive the ways in which cultural racism draws upon physical appearance as one marker amongst others.⁶¹

While understanding some contemporary treatment of Muslims and aspects of their societal status in terms of 'racialisation' clearly is an advance, we should beware that the conceptualisation of Muslims in

the West is not reduced to racialisation or any other 'Othering' theoretical frame such as Orientalism. By definition 'othering' sees a minority in terms of how a dominant group negatively and stereotypically imagines that minority as something 'other', as inferior or threatening, and to be excluded. Indeed, the dominant group typically projects its own fears and anxieties on to the minority. Minorities, however, are never merely 'projections' of dominant groups but have their own subjectivity and agency through which they challenge how they are (mis)perceived and seek to not be defined by others but to supplant negative and exclusionary stereotypes with positive and prideful identities. Oppressive misrecognitions, thus, sociologically imply and politically demand recognition. Our analyses therefore should be framed in terms of a struggle for 'recognition' – the recognition of one's own identity.⁶²

The danger of reducing Muslims to racialised identities is particularly high at the moment because the Islamophobic 'othering' of Muslims is acute, and if anything, rising. This can be seen in how aggressive negative portrayals of Muslims is standard in so much right-wing nationalism, whether in President Trump's Muslim bans, Marine Le Pen's Front National, Alternative für Deutschland in Germany or in various parties in central and eastern Europe. I do worry, however, that just as in the 1970s and 1980s some anti-racists, including academics, reduced blackness to a form of anti-racism, anti-Islamophobia activism and studies risks seeing Muslims only in terms of racialisation and anti-racialisation. Because like all ethnic or religious groups Muslims are not merely created by their oppressors but have their own sense of identity too. Multicultural inclusivity means recognising and respecting these identities.

Recognition of course does not mean thinking of Muslims as a group with

⁶¹ Modood, *Multicultural Politics*, Intro and chp 1

⁶² Modood, *Multicultural Politics*, Intro and chp 1

uniform attributes or a single mind-set, all having the same view on religion, personal morality, politics, the international world order and so on. Muslims are just like any other group – they cannot be understood in terms of a single essence. Groups do not have discrete, nor indeed, fixed boundaries as these boundaries may vary across time and place, across social contexts and will be the subject of social construction and social change – and Muslims are no different in this respect. This ‘anti-essentialism’ is rightly deployed in the study of Islamophobia and Muslims. It is a powerful way of handling ascriptive discourses, of showing that various popular or dominant ideas about Muslims, just as in the case of, say, women, gays etc, are not true as such but are aspects of socially constructed images that have been made to stick on to those groups of people because the ascribers are more powerful than the ascribed. Anti-essentialism is an intellectually compelling idea and a powerful resource in the cause of equality.

Islamophobia is the racialising of Muslims based on physical appearance or descent as members of a community and attributing to them cultural or religious characteristics to vilify, marginalise, discriminate or demand assimilation and thereby treat them as second class citizens.

Critical Race Theory

Critical race theories are a useful lens through which to explore Islamophobia. Critical theorists are concerned with how history, political economy, and social processes exert direct and indirect domination over the social, political, cultural, and economic expressions and practices of individuals and groups. This requires a focus on the ways in which gender, sexuality, class, culture, religion, race, ethnicity, nationality, and power intersect to shape inequalities. Of particular interest is the impact of power on minority groups and/or those groups who remain marginalised without power.

As such, critical race theories examine society and culture as they relate to categorisations of race, law, and power. Ultimately, these theories are concerned with how racial inequalities are preserved through social structures that appear normal and inconspicuous. In particular, this involves an exploration of how racial power is maintained over time, and the role of policies and legislation in the process through which racisms become normalised.

In other words, in terms of Islamophobia, there needs to be an understanding of the history and the social, political, and economic processes through which the behaviours, practices and identities of Muslims have become regulated at a social, political, and legislative level. For example, understanding how institutional racisms within stop and search procedures or integration strategies are used to normalise racisms and regulate Muslim identities.

These structures and processes are important because Islamophobia and other forms of racism cannot be examined purely as a matter of personal prejudices. A police officer may not be prejudiced, but the parameters of their role dictate that they must reinforce and replicate institutionally racist policies and procedures.

Likewise, a teacher or academic may not be personally prejudiced, but within their syllabi, they are required to teach the canonical teachings of predominantly White men from a handful of Western countries, thereby continuing an education system predicated upon ethnocentric assumptions and perspectives.

Therefore, a critical examination of history, political economy, and social processes is necessary to fully comprehend the full breadth and consequences of Islamophobia and other forms of racism.

Xenophobia

In his exploration of the Islamophobia Industry (a topic that will be explored in the next chapter of this report), Nathan

Lean observes that, "The arch of prejudice and anti-Other discrimination is a long one. Societies in Europe and North America have, over the course of their histories, grappled with populations that they felt were not truly a part of the essential national fabric in an ugly way. At the root of much or all of this intolerance is xenophobia, the fear or intense dislike of foreigners... The predominant sentiment among many right-wing Americans, for instance, is that they are not welcome in "our" country. Such ferocity and dogged nationalism is predicated on the assumption that Muslims are immigrants and that the religion of Islam is not a fluid or borderless belief system, but rather originates from afar and has, with the relocation of populations from Morocco to Bahrain, invaded the United States."⁶³

It is important to note that being considered "foreign" is not necessarily an attribute limited to those born outside of territorial borders. Rather, someone seen as foreign is anyone who is deemed to be outside the dominant group identity. Therefore, British Muslims, even those whom have been born in the UK and whose parents were born in this country, may be perceived to be as foreign as someone born halfway around the world. The reason for this foreignness is found not only in distinctions of ethnicity, but also in a perceived conflict of views, values, norms, practices, beliefs, and behaviours that all culminate in a threat or an insult to the dominant identity and way of life.

Moreover, there is the divisive assumption that the threat that Muslims pose cannot be overcome through relationship building and inter-community engagement. Rather, Muslims are particularly problematic in comparison to other "foreign" groups as they are uniquely unwilling or incapable of adapting to Western society.

At the same time, this supposed incompatibility with Western culture makes Muslims inferior and, therefore, undeserving of the freedoms and privileges of Western life. As Lean explains it, "capitalist economic values that overlap with social ideals breed suspicions that ethnic, racial, and religious minorities want to take advantage of freedoms and opportunities for prosperity that are thought to be uniquely American or European."⁶⁴

These negative assumptions are channelled into racist expressions directed at Muslims.

Commentators such as Daniel Pipes exemplify this conflation between foreignness and Muslim identities. As far back as 1990, Pipes stated that, "Western societies are unprepared for the massive immigration of brown-skinned peoples cooking strange foods and not exactly maintaining Germanic standards of hygiene... All immigrants bring exotic customs and attitudes, but Muslim customs are more troublesome than most. Also they appear most resistant to assimilation."⁶⁵

White revanchism

As previously discussed, within xenophobic narratives, the rhetoric of Islamophobia is often predicated upon the inferiority of minorities and the desire to "take back" one's country.

Revanchism is usually understood as the political manifestation of a will to reverse territorial losses incurred by a country, often following a war or social movement. Extreme revanchist ideologues often suggest that the desired objectives of reclaiming what has been lost can be achieved through the positive outcome of conflict with whomsoever has been identified as those responsible for the perceived loss.

⁶³ Lean, Nathan *The Islamophobia Industry: How the right manufactures fear of Muslims*. (London: Pluto Press, 2012), p5

⁶⁴ Lean, *The Islamophobia Industry*, p6

⁶⁵ Cited in Lean, Nathan *The Islamophobia Industry*, p5

In this context, White revanchism should be viewed as a largely white supremacist ideology intended to “take back” the privileges and power that its adherents have perceived to have been deprived of. However, this ideology is not limited to White supremacists alone. Indeed, the arguments, grievances, and logics are frequently adopted and/or reinterpreted to represent the loss of Western hegemonic power and also the erosions of male privilege in the face of women’s empowerment.

Global socio-political and economic developments stretching from the decline of the British Empire, the Cold War, global economic recessions, and conflicts in the Middle East have destabilised a previously secure sense of Western hegemonic power. Muslim identities in Western contexts, therefore, represent a physical manifestation of the destabilisation of the supremacy of Western hegemonic notions of identity, culture, norms, and socio-economic and political power.

As such, there is an intimate link between Islamophobia and xenophobia that cannot be dislocated from the perceived decentring of Western power and erosions of Western and White privilege as an existential threat. In other words, the fears and hostility directed at minorities and Muslims in particular should be examined alongside a crisis within White supremacy and Western nation states’ abilities to regulate themselves.

Colonialism, Orientalism, and “Othering”

Islamophobia in the UK is not an ahistorical phenomenon, rather, it must be contextualised within the history of Britain’s colonial past. Therefore, to fully understand Islamophobia in any meaningful way, there must be an acknowledgement of the relationship

between Islamophobia, Orientalism, and empire.

Between the specific forms of medieval xenophobia and prejudices that characterised the Crusades, the Orientalist discourses of colonial powers, and securitisation of Muslim identities in the context of the current threat of ISIS, contemporary anti-Muslim hostilities and racisms are situated within a long history of imperial rivalry and conflict. Perhaps the most significant major development within this trajectory of anti-Muslim animosity is the emergence of the modern nation state and the subsequent ability of governments to successfully institutionalise racist policies and practices to a far greater extent than previously possible.⁶⁶ However, contemporary Islamophobia cannot be divorced from its precursors within its historical lineage, for example, the imagery of the violent and angry Muslim that was so embedded within the rhetoric of the Crusades which has endured to this day.

As a general introduction, Orientalism may roughly be understood as the way in which the West, particularly through the use of colonial and imperial knowledge production and discourses, essentialises non-Western societies as static and undeveloped. This constant depiction of other cultures and peoples fabricates and reinforces a perception of Western society’s inherent nature as developed, rational, flexible, and superior, which is in direct contrast to the “Other” – largely Muslims and previous subjects of colonialism – who remain innately backwards, barbaric, under-developed and in need of Western enlightenment; “the White man’s burden”.

However, the concept of “Orientalism” is not a static and undisputed concept. While first promoted by Edward Said as a discourse through which imperialist knowledge was produced and sustained

⁶⁶ Narzanin Massoumi, Tom Mills, David Miller, eds., *What is Islamophobia?: Racism, Social Movements and the State*, (Pluto Press, 2017), p. 50.

surrounding the Muslim world, many scholars regard it more as an *ideology*. For example, Arun Kundnani refers to it as an ideology which “offers an everyday ‘common sense’ explanatory framework for making sense of mediated crisis events (such as terrorist attacks) in ways that disavow those events’ political meanings (rooted in empire, racism and resistance) and instead explain them as products of a reified ‘Muslimness’”. Thus, Islamophobia involves an ideological displacement of political antagonisms onto the plane of culture, where they can be explained in terms of the fixed nature of the ‘Other’.”⁶⁷

In other words, by essentialising the innate backwardness of the “Other”, Orientalist narratives act as a mechanism for regulating and controlling minorities. Taking the example of reducing terrorism to an issue purely of religion or innate barbarity without reference to other socio-political and economic factors, Orientalist depictions of Muslim populations allow those with power over the narrative to exclude Muslims from critical discussions and representative analysis. As such, this method of obscuring grievances and justifying the regulation of Muslim identities casts Orientalist narratives as a form of structural violence representing the intersection between knowledge, power, and discourse.

Orientalism is thus a mechanism through which to gain cultural and civilising power over Muslim populations. Islamophobia thereby becomes the conduit through which Muslims are regulated into hegemonic Western conceptions of modernity. Muslims who resist such Western appropriation are deemed a threat to the stability of the state and are thus placed in the dichotomy between the good “moderate” Muslims (those who unquestioningly adhere to the sensibilities of Western identity constructs) and the bad “extremist” Muslims (those who threaten

Western hegemonic notions of modernity through maintaining their religious-cultural identities or through questioning the status quo of this hegemony).

The consequences of such a “good vs bad Muslim” distinction can be seen in the political exclusion of Muslims and the British Government’s current disengagement policy regarding mainstream Muslim organisations. This is an issue that will be explored in greater depth throughout this report.

This problematic situating of Muslim identities is also seen in the ways in which states will often emphasise and give prominence to Muslim individuals when they are in a position to be co-opted as agents of the state agenda. Again, this is seen in the Government’s position regarding their engagement with and promotion of only a hand-picked selection of Muslim organisations and individuals who support their established policy positions.

Islamophobia and anti-Semitism

Islamophobia is often portrayed as completely distinct from anti-Semitism. However, this is a misunderstanding of hatred and racisms. Islamophobia, anti-Semitism, racism, xenophobia, sexism, homophobia and other forms of hatred are all mechanisms of social regulation and control of minorities. Therefore, they need to be understood in the interconnectivity of their logics, manifestations, and consequences. Moreover, it is important that all forms of hatred are understood as mechanisms of control and are, therefore, opposed with equal vigour. Failure to do so merely results in allowing hatred to manifest itself differently once one form has been tackled, thus transforming and redirecting itself at other vulnerable groups.

Moreover, in line with the liberal Islamophobias discussed previously by

⁶⁷ Cited in: Narzanin Massoumi, Tom Mills, David Miller, eds., *What is Islamophobia?: Racism, Social Movements and the State*, (Pluto Press, 2017), p. 50.

Aurelien Mondon and Aaron Winter, accusations of Muslim anti-Semitism are often used as a justification to discriminate further against Muslims collectively.

It is imperative that both anti-Semitism and Islamophobia are fully viewed and understood for their consequences and are tackled collaboratively by Muslims, Jews and people of all faiths and none.

Islamophobia in its Relation to Anti-Semitism

Dr Yulia Egorova

Durham University

Scholars have made important interventions into the study of Islamophobia in its relation to anti-Semitism. Edward Said had famously described Orientalism as the 'Islamic branch' of anti-Semitism,⁶⁸ and suggested that 'hostility to Islam in the modern Christian West has historically gone hand in hand with, has stemmed from the same source, has been nourished in the same stream as anti-Semitism, and that a critique of the orthodoxies, dogmas, and disciplinary procedures of orientalism contribute to an enlargement of our understanding of the cultural mechanisms of anti-Semitism'.⁶⁹

More recently, Gil Anidjar has shown how in Europe the figure of the enemy is contingent on the way Europeans had related to both Jews and Arabs, who in contemporary Western imaginary became associated with Muslims, and argued that it is these attitudes that had set up in motion processes which had resulted in current conflicts in Europe, the Middle East and the United States.⁷⁰

Important attempts to explore the relationship between Jewish and Muslim

imageries in the context of contemporary Europe have been made in the past decade by scholars who focused on the diasporic conditions of contemporary Muslims. These contributions come from a wide range of disciplines and have involved drawing parallels between the historical experiences of the Jewish people and the current experiences of Muslims in Europe. For instance, historian Dan Diner has observed that 'Muslims today, like Jews in the past, face the task of transforming their all-encompassing religion into a confessional, an abstract faith community among other faith communities'.⁷¹ Sociologist Sara Farris in her essay *From the Jewish Question to the Muslim Question* argues that nowadays in Europe it is the Muslims, rather than the Jews that are seen as a group allegedly behaving as a separate constituency within Western nations and discriminated against on account of this alleged behaviour.⁷² Finally, philosopher Brian Klug asks the broader question about whether the analogy between the anti-Semitism of the past and the Islamophobia of the present is analytically valid, and concludes that within limits it is worth asserting, because it usefully sheds light on the multiple social and political realities that Europe faces at the moment.

At the same time, Western mass media often portrays Muslims as the main victimisers of European Jews, and presents the attacks on Jewish persons and property where perpetrators were Muslim as further evidence of Muslim immigrants' susceptibility to extremist ideologies and failure to integrate.⁷³ Moreover, in recent decades European right-wing commentators started constructing the Jews and the Muslims as polar opposites with the former being presented as a model minority, and in some cases as the allies of

⁶⁸ Edward W. Said, *Orientalism*, (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1979), 28.

⁶⁹ Edward W. Said, "Orientalism Reconsidered", *Cultural Critique*, 1985, 99.

⁷⁰ Gil Anidjar, *The Jew, the Arab. A History of the Enemy*.

⁷¹ Dan Diner, "Reflections on Anti-Semitism and Islamophobia", in Matti Bunzl "Anti-Semitism and Islamophobia", 52

⁷² Sara Farris, "From the Jewish Question to the Muslim Question. Republican Rigorism, Culturalist Differentialism and Antinomies of Enforced Emancipation", *Constellations* 2017, 21 (2): 296-307.

⁷³ Paul Silverstein, "Immigrant Racialization and the New Savage Slot: Race, Migration, and Immigration in the New Europe", *Annual Review of Anthropology*, 2005, 34: 367

the Christian West⁷⁴ and the latter as inassimilable strangers.⁷⁵ Judaism is thus essentialized and othered, but portrayed as more compatible with life in Europe than Islam.

These tropes show that while in the past, Jews and Muslims in Europe were put together into one category of a threatening other, in recent decades their identities have become polarized in the European public and political discourse, which created a rhetorical dichotomy between the 'well-integrated' and 'law-abiding' Jews and the 'violent' and 'inassimilable' Muslims failing to adjust to the conditions of liberal democracy.

I suggest that though at first glance such discourses construct Jews and Muslims as members of two opposing categories, they still at the same time configure them both as the 'other', even though they associate with them different imageries of alterity. In contemporary European imagination, Jews and Muslims are thus both juxtaposed as social groups allegedly adhering to radically different social and cultural values and religious practices, but at the same time are also conflated as static and unchanging minorities who, no matter how different they may be from each other, are also unmistakably unlike the perceived host society. This phenomenon highlights the porousness of conceptual borders between anti-Jewish, anti-Muslim and other forms of prejudice and problematises attempts at drawing rigid definitional boundaries around terms such as anti-Semitism and Islamophobia.

What is the relationship between Islamophobia and Antisemitism?

Professor Nasar Meer FAcSS

University of Edinburgh

⁷⁴ Matti Bunzl, *Anti-Semitism and Islamophobia: Hatreds Old and New in Europe*. (Chicago: Prickly Paradigm Press, 2007)

⁷⁵ Nasar Meer and Noorani Tehseen "A Sociological Comparison of Anti-Semitism and Anti-Muslim Sentiment", *The Sociological Review* 56 (2): 195-219.

⁷⁶ Meer, N. (ed.) (2013) *Racialization and Religion*. London: Routledge

Islamophobia and antisemitism both involve the suspicion, dislike or hatred of Jewish or Muslim individuals or groups. This can be attitudinal or structural, and proceeds from a real or assumed 'Jewishness' or 'Muslimness' respectively. Both therefore reflect a racial and not just theological character, and can take a number of forms spanning behaviour, discourse and state policy.

For these reasons it is accurate to say that both antisemitism and Islamophobia are similar in drawing upon signs of race, culture and belonging. As such they are not limited to hostility to a religion alone, but are tied up with pressing issues of community identity, stereotyping, socio-economic location, and political conflict amongst other dynamics.⁷⁶

Self-evidently therefore, Muslim and Jewish minorities have a clear and pressing rationale for collaborating further and tackling both together.

What does the comparative data tell us about mass attitudes to both groups?

One of the best available data sets offering a statistical comparison of attitudes towards Jews and Muslims can be found in the Pew Global Attitudes Project (PGAP),⁷⁷ which surveyed almost 25,000 people across 24 countries. Among its findings, it reports:

"A strong relationship between anti-Jewish and anti-Muslim sentiments in the West. Indeed, among the U.S. and the six European countries included in the survey, the correlation between unfavorable opinions of Jews and unfavorable opinions of Muslims is remarkably high."⁷⁸

The expression of anti-Muslim and anti-Jewish attitudes therefore emerges not separately but instead as a conjoined activity. Indeed, and in the most up to date

⁷⁷ Disclosure note: The author is an academic advisor to Pew.

⁷⁸ PRC (Pew Research Center) (2008) *Pew Global Attitudes Project: Unfavorable Views of Jews and Muslims on the Increase in Europe*. Washington DC: PRC. Summary available from: <http://pewglobal.org/reports/display.php?ReportID=262> P. 9.

2018 data, Pew confirms that “those who express negative views of Muslims are also more likely to express negative views of Jews”.⁷⁹ This is a trend first discovered a decade ago where Pew data showed that opinions of Muslims in almost all of the 24 European countries surveyed were more negative than they were of Jews, with more than half of Spaniards and half of Germans stating that they did not like Muslims, while the figures for Poland and France were 46% and 38% for those holding unfavourable opinions of Muslims. Indeed, while Americans and Britons displayed the lowest levels of antisemitism, one in four in both countries was hostile to Muslims. This means that in the USA, France and Germany, unfavourable views of Muslims are roughly at twice the rate of unfavourable views of Jews, while in Poland and Spain the former are only a few percentage points more.

While quantitative surveys do not always provide the best accounts of prejudice and discrimination, they can be useful in discerning trends – alerting us in this case to the widespread prevalence of anti-Muslim feeling. In British Social Attitudes survey data, for example, Voas and Ling reported that one fifth of the total population responds negatively only to Muslims, and that relatively few people feel unfavourable towards any other religious or ethnic group on its own.⁸⁰

The visibility of Muslims, in terms of sometimes distinctive dress and appearance, is frequently the means through which Islamophobic feeling is turned into Islamophobic behaviour.⁸¹

A good European-wide illustration may be found in the summary report on Islamophobia published by the European

Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia shortly after 9/11. Its authors, Chris Allen and Jorgen Nielsen, identified a rise in the number of “physical and verbal threats being made, particularly to those visually identifiable as Muslims, especially towards women wearing the hijab”.⁸² What is of particular note is that despite variations in the number and correlation of physical and verbal threats directed at Muslim populations among the individual nation states, one overarching feature that emerged among the 15 EU countries was the tendency for Muslim women to be attacked because of how the hijab signifies an Islamic identity.⁸³

It is a finding that raises problems for people who want to distinguish between antipathy towards Muslims and antipathy towards Islam. What is common to such findings is that these are overlapping and interacting – rather than distinct.

What are the implications?

Although they are not passive objects of racism, Muslim and Jewish identities are not free of external pressures, objectification and racialization.

What is required therefore are conceptions of Islamophobia and antisemitism that are able to explain how prejudice simultaneously draws upon signs of race, culture and belonging in a way that is by no means reducible to hostility to a religion alone, and compels us to consider how religion has a social and political relevance because of the ways it is tied up with issues of community identity stereotyping, socio-economic location, political conflict and so forth.

⁷⁹ “Being Christian in Western Europe”, PRC, May 29, 2018, accessed 20.06.2018, <http://www.pewforum.org/2018/05/29/being-christian-in-western-europe>

⁸⁰ David Voas and Rodney Ling, “Religion in Britain and the United States”, in *British Social Attitudes: The 26th Report*, 2010 Alison Par ed., 65–86, (London: SAGE), pp. 80, 81.

⁸¹ Nasar Meer, Claire Dwyer and Tariq Modood, “Embodying nationhood? Conceptions of British national identity, citizenship and gender in the ‘veil affair’”, *The Sociological Review*, 2010, 58(1): 84–111.

⁸² Christopher Allen and Jorgen S. Nielsen, *Summary Report on Islamophobia in the EU15 after 11 September 2001*, (Vienna: European Monitoring Centre for Racism and Xenophobia, 2010), p. 16.

⁸³ Ibid p. 35.

This is not an unproblematic cluster of issues to hold together, and good public policy here needs to draw on both the theoretical and empirical materials that are available.

Driving Islamophobic Narratives: The Islamophobia Industry

Xenophobic, racist, Islamophobic and anti-Semitic sentiments do not become activated in a vacuum. While there are many wide-ranging theories surrounding how and why hatred becomes embraced and articulated, the following discussion will focus on one potential avenue through which Islamophobic narratives and attitudes⁸⁴ have become normalised amongst sections of the public; collective prejudice and intergroup threat. Following this discussion, this chapter will then examine how themes of collective prejudice and intergroup threat are utilised by the Islamophobia Industry to manufacture, propagate and maintain Islamophobia across the West.

Collective prejudice and perceived inter-group threat

Intergroup threat theory (or integrated threat theory), is a theory used in sociological and psychological studies exploring perceptions of threat which may lead to hostility, prejudice, and tensions between social groups.

Perceived threats include any threat that members of a group (whether it is the dominant or a minority group) believe they are experiencing, regardless of whether those threats are real or imagined. For example, people may feel their economic well-being is threatened by an outgroup “stealing their jobs” even if, in reality, the outgroup has no effect on their job opportunities. This is often an argument seen in debates surrounding immigration which frequently ignore other factors influencing labour insecurity, such as economic crisis and industry changes. Regardless of other factors, perceptions that the job security of the ingroup is under

threat can increase levels of prejudice against the outgroup.

Perceptions of threat

As previously mentioned, perceived threats may be threats that exist in reality (ie. genuine and real threats), or they may be threats that are imagined. Regardless of whether these threats are real or imagined, perceptions of threat can be broadly understood in two categories:

Realistic threats

Realistic threats are threats that pose a danger to the in-group’s well-being. These may include:

Physical threats: In terms of prejudice against Muslims, an example of this perceived threat is the narrative that presents Muslim men as innately sexually violent and culpable to praying on Western women and girls, thereby creating the impression that “our women” are at risk of sexual violence and exploitation at the hands of Muslim men.

Threats to economic power: For instance, the perception that Muslim refugees and illegal as well as legal Muslim migrants are creating job insecurities; the idea visited earlier that they are “stealing our jobs”.

Threats to political power: This can be found in the idea of “creeping Shariah” which is a prominent theme of counter-jihadist rhetoric. Proponents of the Islamophobia Industry frequently use the argument that Muslims are making political moves to impose “Shariah Law” on Western societies.

Threats to existence: Perhaps the most prominent example of this kind of perceived threat is found in fears surrounding terrorism and threats to national security.

Symbolic threats

Symbolic threats largely arise from a perceived threat to the

⁸⁴ And other forms of hatred.

ingroup's worldview as a consequence of perceived differences between group morals, values, standards, beliefs, practices, and attitudes. These differences can create the impression that the outgroup poses a threat to the ingroup's sense of identity and accepted system of values and customs. This is a significant theme promoted by the Islamophobia Industry, within which those promoting anti-Muslim agendas often promote the perception that Western and European culture is in a state of decline due to infiltration by Muslims who seek to destroy Western identities and values.

Conscious and unconscious bias:

Perceptions of threat are mediated and compounded by both conscious and unconscious bias. As previously mentioned, perceived threats may be threats that exist in reality or they may be threats that are imagined. Regardless of whether these threats are real or imagined, perceptions of threat are often mediated through bias. Bias is defined as inclination or prejudice for or against one person or group, especially in a way considered to be unfair. Bias can be conscious or explicit, or unconscious or implicit.

Conscious biases are well recognised and utilised widely by the Islamophobia industry to influence others. For example, attribution bias explains why people believe that violence perpetrated by Muslims is due to religious factors whereas in reality the causes are largely socio-political. Confirmation bias is the tendency to search for or present information that confirms one's own existing beliefs, and can be seen in the media, where criminal acts by persons of a certain ethnic or religious background are highlighted whilst those same acts by members of the White community are ignored.

Unconscious bias is much more difficult to measure but can be a powerful influence on how we make assumptions about minority groups, for example, that Black people are

more dangerous, or that Muslim women wearing the hijab are oppressed.

In reality of course, perceptions of threat are mediated by a combination of conscious and unconscious biases, that have a complex and symbiotic interaction at an individual level.

Consequences of perceptions of threat

The consequences of perceptions of threat manifest in diverse ways on both the psychological and individual level, as well as on the wider sociological level. However, two concepts are useful for exploration at this point; intergroup anxiety and negative stereotypes.

Intergroup anxiety: One of the consequences of perceptions of threat is the development of anxieties in the face of interacting with members of the outgroup and the expectation that this interaction will result in a negative experience. Intergroup anxiety is, therefore, a fear that intergroup interaction will result in feelings of discomfort, embarrassment, or insecurity, or that those interacting may become judged by members of both the outgroup as well as their own ingroup.

Negative stereotypes: The response to perceived threats often involves the construction of stereotypes depicting the designated enemy outgroup. These stereotypes allow the outgroup to be demonised and dehumanised to further justify prejudicial and discriminatory policies, practices, and attitudes directed towards them. Stereotypes also often allow the causes of a complex situation to be simplified and presented. In this manner, the understanding of overwhelmingly complex issues and social ills are frequently reduced to being the product of one root cause – in this case, Muslims.

The 'Islamophobia Industry'

Dr Hilary Aked

PhD University of Bath

The term 'Islamophobia industry' was popularised in the US context by author Nathan Lean's 2012 book of the same name.⁸⁵ In the UK, the so-called Islamophobia industry consists primarily of a network of think tanks and pressure groups in civil society whose activities contribute to fomenting Islamophobic narratives and putting in place policies which exclude and discriminate against Muslims.

It includes a spectrum of actors affiliated to overlapping movements, incorporating neoconservatives, far-right 'counterjihadists', elements of the Zionist movement and even some left-liberal currents. Such actors often play an important role in feeding xenophobic and racist stories to the media, particularly in debates around immigration, integration, terrorism and 'extremism'. The more 'respectable' wing of the movement also seeks to work through the state and successfully exerts considerable influence within the political elite and on government policy.

Take the Henry Jackson Society, amongst the most influential groups in this category. Its predecessor think tank, the Centre for Social Cohesion, was cited five times in the 2011 Prevent strategy, demonstrating its impact on the coalition government's revised version of this harmful policy which went beyond targeting violence to pursuing so-called 'non-violent extremism'.⁸⁶ Douglas Murray – who was founder of the Centre for Social Cohesion and later became associate director of the Henry Jackson Society when the latter incorporated the former – is infamous for having said that

'conditions for Muslims in Europe must be made harder across the board'.⁸⁷

Despite this and other patently Islamophobic statements, his organisation's influence has continued. In 2015, then Conservative Prime Minister David Cameron made a speech about alleged extremism at UK universities. Sections of the Downing Street press release accompanying the speech appeared to have been copied, virtually verbatim, from a report by Student Rights – the campus-monitory arm of the Henry Jackson Society.⁸⁸ Such manifestations of influence raise serious concerns in part because of the highly questionable nature of much of the research produced by Islamophobia industry groups. A widely-reported Student Rights study on gender segregation on campus, for example, used a biased sample to produce figures which supported its claim that a significant proportion of Islamic societies at UK universities practiced gender segregation.⁸⁹ Another similar think tank, Policy Exchange, was exposed by BBC Newsnight for having partly based a report about alleged extremist material in UK mosques on fabricated evidence.⁹⁰

Also concerning are some of the European and transatlantic links that UK Islamophobia industry groups maintain. The Gatestone Institute, for example, is a deeply Islamophobic New-York based policy institute and website founded by Nina Rosenwald. It publishes numerous 'fake news' articles with titles like 'Islamic cannibalism', 'UK Islamic Takeover Plot' and 'Soon the Muslims will be Kings of the World'.⁹¹ Yet the Henry Jackson Society, together with Conservative Friends of

⁸⁵ Lean, *The Islamophobia Industry*

⁸⁶ HM Government Prevent Strategy, June 2011, p.23. Available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/97976/prevent-strategy-review.pdf.

⁸⁷ Mehdi Hasan 'We mustn't allow Muslims in public life to be silenced', *Guardian*, 8 July 2012. Available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2012/jul/08/muslims-public-life-abuse>.

⁸⁸ Jack Grove, 'Prevent strategy: naming and shaming of universities sparks concern', *Times Higher Education*, 1 October 2015. Available at:

<https://www.timeshighereducation.com/news/prevent-strategy-naming-and-shaming-universities-sparks-concern>.

⁸⁹ Hilary Aked, 'Student Rights "Campus Extremism" Study: Dishonest Pseudo-Science in Support Of a Toxic Narrative', *Huffington Post*, 15 May 2013. Available at: http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/hilary-aked/student-rights-campus-extremism-study_b_327503.html.

⁹⁰ Peter Barron, "Disastrous misjudgement?", *BBC News - The Editors*, December 13, 2007, accessed 20.06.2018, http://www.bbc.co.uk/blogs/theeditors/2007/12/disastrous_misjudgement.html.

⁹¹ "Gatestone Institute", accessed 20.06.2018, http://powerbase.info/index.php/Gatestone_Institute.

Israel, co-hosted an event with the Gatestone Institute in parliament in 2016.⁹² It has received financial donations from Nina Rosenwald's Abstraction Fund, via its US arm, too.⁹³ Among Gatestone's UK contributors are the author of the above-mentioned Policy Exchange report, Denis MacEoin, the Henry Jackson Society's Douglas Murray and Student Rights' former director Raheem Kassam. Kassam also has close ties to the 'alt-right' US-based website Breitbart and to UKIP, which has long harboured Islamophobic sentiments.

In December 2015 at the Home Affairs Select Committee's inquiry into countering extremism, Labour MP Chuka Umunna challenged another UK organisation, the Quilliam Foundation, on its links to Gatestone.⁹⁴ In the past, this self-declared 'counter-extremism' body has received millions in government funding. That it should associate with a body like Gatestone demonstrates the proximity of 'counter-extremism' rhetoric and Islamophobia, suggesting that while discriminatory government programmes like Prevent remain in place, providing a respectable language for racism, the Islamophobia industry – which is product as well as progenitor of such policies – will continue to thrive and grow.

The Islamophobia Industry and the Islamophobia Network

The term "Islamophobia Industry" (also known as the "Counter-jihad movement") encompasses a largely interconnected network of think tanks, media outlets, public figures, politicians, and policy-makers that advance, disseminate and

perpetuate negative discourses about Muslims and Islam for economic and political gains. Commonly guided by right-wing and neoconservative ideologies, the Islamophobia Industry employs the rhetoric of an array of "experts" in order to disseminate misinformation and fear about Muslims and Islam, primarily by perpetuating the myth of an Islamic invasion of the Western world. They frequently claim that the ultimate aim of this Muslim takeover is the implementation of Sharia law across all liberal societies.⁹⁵ Through this kind of propaganda, the industry is able to influence and hijack political discourses, to influence voting patterns, and even to set the basis for legislative debates and drafting.⁹⁶

Grassroots organisations, often guided by strong nationalistic sentiments, subscribe to the anti-Muslim discourse advanced by these experts and fuelled by the statements of media and political figures, thus giving this divisive rhetoric a voice among broader society.

This section explores the many facets of the Islamophobia industry, highlighting the way in which it sustains and spreads hatred against Muslims and Islam.

Neoconservatives at heart

The ideological framework underpinning the logic of the Islamophobia industry can largely be traced back to neoconservatism. Neoconservatism has often been described as "Wilsonianism on steroids"⁹⁷ to indicate a hard-line, Christian crusader-like approach to protect western values and interests, defeat adverse ideologies, and export the American model of liberal democracy

⁹² 'Alan Dershowitz addresses supporters in parliament At CFI-HJS-Gatestone Institute event', Conservative Friends of Israel, 23 September 2016. Available at: <https://cfi.co.uk/alan-dershowitz-address-supporters-in-parliament-at-cfi-hjs-gatestone-event>.

⁹³ David Miller and Tom Mills, 'Misinformed expert of disinformation network?', *OpenDemocracy*, 15 January 2015. Available at: <https://www.opendemocracy.net/ourkingdom/david-miller-tom-mills/misinformed-expert-or-misinformation-network>.

⁹⁴ Tom Griffin, 'The problem with the Quilliam Foundation', *OpenDemocracy*, 7 November 2016. Available at: <https://www.opendemocracy.net/uk/tom-griffin/problem-with-quilliam-foundation>.

⁹⁵ Wajahat Ali et al, "Fear, Inc. The Roots of the Islamophobia Network in America", *Center for American Progress*, August 2011, accessed 01.05.2018, <https://cdn.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/issues/2011/08/pdf/islamophobia.pdf>

⁹⁶ Lean, *The islamophobia Industry*

⁹⁷ Most famously in Walter Russell, *Mead, Power, Terror, Peace, and War: America's Grand Strategy in a World at Risk*, (New York: Knopf, 2004.)

everywhere through an interventionist foreign policy.

In relation to the Arab world specifically, neoconservatives believe in an almost messianic mission to defend the interests of Israel and defeat Islam, which is framed within a Huntington-like view of a “Clash of Civilizations” between liberal democracies and Islamic societies.⁹⁸ Huntington theorised that, with the fall of the Soviet Union, liberal societies would be challenged by different civilisations in wars of cultures and identities, with the Islamic world posing the greatest threat alongside the Asian world.

British neoconservatism does not differ greatly from the American one, yet as pointed out by Lee Jarvis and Michael Lister, British neoconservatives are far more careful in labelling themselves in such a way due to the very negative association of the term, in Europe particularly, with George W. Bush and the “deceptions of the war in Iraq.”⁹⁹ Even so, they fully embrace the concept of the West’s struggle with “the Other”, as well as the domestic mission of protecting society from the perceived threat posed by Islamic ideologies, and the foreign one of ensuring Israel’s interests.¹⁰⁰

Recurrent themes such as “Islamic terrorism”, “Islamic threat”, and “Muslim invasion” are used to legitimise anti-Muslim measures within the realm of both foreign and domestic politics, leading to the marginalisation and containment of Muslims, and to the justification of foreign interventionism in Muslim-majority countries. In this way, the Islamophobia Industry often strategically conflates legitimate concerns of “Islamist” terrorism with issues such as geopolitics, refugees, and economy, resulting in claims that Islam is inherently dangerous and

therefore all European Muslims are a threat.¹⁰¹

Funding and Network

The Islamophobia Industry is sustained by an intricate network of alliances and patronages worth over \$57 million in the United States alone. In the United States, Donors Capital Fund, a non-profit organisation that distributes funds to conservative and often right-wing organisation, contributes with over \$27 million to the Islamophobia network, and is presided by prominent neoconservative figures such as Arthur C. Brooks, the president of the American Enterprise Institute, and John A. Von Kannon, vice president and senior counsellor at the Heritage Foundation.¹⁰² Scaife Foundations, a neoconservative organisation that contributes to, among others, American Foreign Policy Council (a strong advocate of American interventionism abroad), raised nearly \$10.5 million to fund Islamophobic organisations such as Center for Security Policy, and the Counterterrorism & Security Education and Research Foundation. Other organisations, such as Lyne and Harry Bradley Foundation and Rosenwald’s Abstraction Fund also contribute tens of millions of dollars to funding Islamophobic think tanks that spread conspiracy theories against Muslims and Islam.

In the UK, two major think tanks are part of this network, *Policy Exchange* and *The Henry Jackson Society* (HJS), which are renowned for their neoconservative stance on foreign policy, support of military interventionism in the Middle East, rejection of multiculturalism, opposition to Muslim agency, and portrayal of Muslims and Islam as antithetic to the values of neoliberal societies.¹⁰³ As exposed by

⁹⁸G. John Ikenberry et al., *The crisis of American foreign policy: Wilsonianism in the twenty-first century*, (Princeton, N.J.; Oxford: Princeton University Press, cop. 2009).

⁹⁹ Lee Jarvis, Michael Lister, *Critical Perspectives on Counter-terrorism*, (London, New York: Routledge, 2015), p. 192.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid.

¹⁰¹ “Countering the counter-jihad”, *RUSI*, August 15, 2008, accessed 10.05.2018, <https://rusi.org/publication/countering-counter-jihad>

¹⁰² “Donors Capital Fund and Donors Trust”, accessed 29.05.2018, <https://islamophobicnetwork.com/funder/donors-capital-fund-and-donors-trust/>

¹⁰³ Tom Mills, Tom Griffin and David Miller, “The Cold War on British Muslims”, *Spinwatch*, August 2011, accessed 10.05.2018,

Spinwatch, their growth “has been strongly assisted by a number of Conservative and pro-Israel donors”, including a number of American neoconservative groups that have come under scrutiny for falsifying evidence in support of their anti-Muslim literature.¹⁰⁴ HJS receives funds from US organisations such as the Abstraction Fund, presided by Nina Rosenwald. Famously dubbed “the Sugar Mama of anti-Muslim Hate”, Rosenwald is the founder and director of the right-wing Gatestone Institute. Since 2000, Rosenwald has used nearly \$3 million to finance the Gatestone Institute, the Center for Security Policy, Project Ijtihad, the American Islamic Forum for Democracy, the Middle East Forum, the Clarion Fund, *Commentary* magazine and the Hudson Institute. All these institutions have the common goal of fanning “the flames of Islamophobia.”¹⁰⁵

Policy Exchange (rated “E” for funding transparency – the lowest possible score) is strongly associated with the British Conservative Party, and was chaired by Michael Gove, who holds, as a former conservative chairwoman confessed, “crazy” anti-Muslim views and policies.¹⁰⁶ Although not much is known about Policy Exchange funding stream, part of its donors include The Charles Wolfson Charitable Trust, which has funded other right-wing think-tanks including Civitas, the Social Affairs Unit, the Institute of Economic Affairs and the Adam Smith Research Trust.¹⁰⁷ Policy Exchange was exposed by the BBC for fabricating the findings of its report “The Hijacking of

British Islam: How Extremist Literature is Subverting Mosques in the UK”.¹⁰⁸

Through this significant stream of money and network of international alliances and patronages, the Islamophobia Industry reaches out to journalists, politicians, and media outlets to spread and normalise narratives demonising Muslims. Both in the United States and in the UK, a number of individuals who occupy prominent roles in Islamophobic think tanks engage with policy-makers and the public by presenting themselves as “experts”. In the US, these include personalities such as Robert Spencer, co-founder of Stop Islamization of America (SIOA), and director of Jihad Watch, and who is renowned all over the world for his “bigoted”, “hateful” and “disgusting” comments aimed at “relentlessly demonizing all Muslims.”¹⁰⁹ Others include David Horowitz, who has been dubbed the “godfather of the anti-Muslim movement”, and who is the founder and CEO of the David Horowitz Freedom Center.¹¹⁰

In the UK, similar figures include Alan Mendoza, the Director of the Henry Jackson Society. In June 2011, Mendoza addressed AIPAC by raising fears about Muslim demographic growth in Europe. He contended that “The European Muslim population has doubled in the past 30 years and is predicted to double again by 2040” and that “it has been difficult for European countries to absorb immigrants into their society given their failure to integrate newcomers”.¹¹¹ The argument

<http://spinwatch.org/images/The%20Cold%20War%20on%20British%20Muslims.pdf>

¹⁰⁴ David Miller et al., “The Henry Jackson Society And The Degeneration Of British Neoconservatism: Liberal Interventionism, Islamophobia And The ‘War On Terror’”, *Spinwatch*, June 2015, accessed 10.05.2018, http://spinwatch.org/images/Reports/HJS_spinwatch%20report_web_2015.pdf and Eli Clifton and Ali Gharib, ‘Iranium’ or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the ‘Military Option’”, *PBS*, January 26, 2011, accessed 10.05.2018, <https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/tehranbureau/2011/01/iranium.html>

¹⁰⁵ “The Sugar Mama of Anti-Muslim Hate”, *The Nation*, June 14, 2012, accessed 29.05.2018, <https://www.thenation.com/article/sugar-mama-anti-muslim-hate/>

¹⁰⁶ “Michael Gove has same ‘crazy’ anti-Muslim policies as Donald Trump, former Tory chairwoman says”, *The Independent*, March 25, 2017, accessed 29.05.2018, <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/michael-gove-donald-trump-baroness-warsi-anti-muslim-crazy-tory-chairwoman-a7649411.html>

¹⁰⁷ Tom Mills, Tom Griffin, David Miller, “The Cold War on British Muslims: An examination of Policy Exchange and the Centre for Social Cohesion”, *Spinwatch*, September 2011, accessed 29.05.2018, http://opus.bath.ac.uk/30483/1/SpinwatchReport_ColdWar.pdf

¹⁰⁸ Ibid.

¹⁰⁹ Charles Johnson, “Spencer: Teaming Up with Euro-Supremacists Again”, accessed 29.05.2018, http://littlegreenfootballs.com/article/34845_Spencer-Teaming_Up_with_Euro-Supremacists_Again

¹¹⁰ “Robert Spencer”, *Islamophobia Network*, accessed 29.05.2018, <https://islamophobianetwork.com/misinformation-expert/robert-spencer/>, and “David Horowitz”, *Islamophobia Network*, accessed 29.05.2018, <https://islamophobianetwork.com/misinformation-expert/david-horowitz/>

¹¹¹ Tom Griffin Hilary Aled David Miller Sarah Marusek, “The Henry Jackson Society And The Degeneration Of British Neoconservatism: Liberal Interventionism, Islamophobia And The ‘War On Terror’”, *Spinwatch*, June 2015, p. 39, accessed

was later proven to be completely untrue, and nothing more than a “hyperbolic and inflammatory claim” largely based on data manipulation.¹¹² Two years later, in March 2013, he suggested that “the increasing European Muslim population was to blame for Europe's ‘anti-Israel feelings’”,¹¹³ yet again demonstrating a manipulative narrative that distorts facts to aid a highly neoconservative political agenda.

Themes and arguments of the counter-jihad movement

The focal point of the Islamophobia network is the alleged Islamisation of the Western world, intended as an attempt to overturn liberal ideologies and replace them with the Sharia law. Sharia is seen as a “totalitarian ideology committed to destroying western civilization”, and the Islamophobia network contends that its implementation would result in the establishment of “a radical Islamist caliphate that will subordinate and punish all non-Muslim adherents.”¹¹⁴

The Islamic threat is characterised by an alleged ideological incompatibility between the Western world and the Islamic world, whereby the West is seen as liberal, democratic and progressive, while Islam is associated with submission to Allah, totalitarianism and ultra-conservatism.¹¹⁵ In this sense, the Islamophobia network fully embraces the “clash of civilisation” theories proposed by Samuel Huntington.

According to the rhetoric of the Islamophobia Industry/counter-jihad movement, in resisting the further Islamisation of Western countries, it is necessary to eliminate Muslim

immigration, refuse any special accommodations for Islam in public spaces and institutions, and forbid intrusive public displays of Islamic practices.

Furthermore, counter-jihadists have adapted the meaning of “jihad” to convey the idea of being threatened with a “Muslim invasion” that is taking a variety of forms:

Demographic Jihad: threat from a growing Muslim population.

Stealth Jihad: the notion of insidious Islamic influence in society.

Rape Jihad: the imaginary idea that Muslim men are responsible for rape and violent crime in Europe.

Welfare Jihad: the use of state welfare and benefits to fund terrorist activities.

Faecal Jihad: the idea that Muslims are damaging Europe through low hygiene standards.¹¹⁶

Free Speech

A key rallying cry of the global counter-jihad movement is that of “free speech”,¹¹⁷ with organisations such as the International Free Press Society and International Civil Liberties Alliance claiming that free speech is under threat from Islam. Since 2005, when the Danish newspaper *Jyllands-Posten* published derogatory cartoons of the Prophet Mohammad causing a global uproar, defending the perceived “right” to offend (usually by demeaning minorities) has become a favoured pastime of counter-jihadists.

Counter-jihadists present anti-racism campaigners’ attempts to strengthen hate

03.11.2017, http://spinwatch.org/images/Reports/HJS_spinwatch%20report_web_2015.pdf

¹¹² “Why the Muslim ‘No-Go-Zone’ Myth Won’t Die”, *The Atlantic*, January 20, 2015, accessed 10.11.2017, <https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/01/paris-mayor-to-sue-fox-over-no-go-zone-comments/384656/>. See also Doug Saunders, *The Myth of the Muslim Tide: Do immigrants threaten the West?*, (Toronto: Vintage Canada, 2013). See also John Feffer, *Crusade 2.0: The West’s Resurgent War on Islam*, (New York: City Light Books, Open Media Series, 2012).

¹¹³ “Labour should cut its ties with the illiberal Henry Jackson Society”, *The Guardian*, May 20, 2013, accessed 07.11.2017, <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/may/20/labour-cut-ties-henry-jackson-society>

¹¹⁴ “Sharia hysteria”, *Islamophobia Network*, accessed 29.05.2018, <https://islamophobianetwork.com/consequences/#sharia-hysteria/>

¹¹⁵ S. Jonathon O’Donnell, “Islamophobic conspiracism and neoliberal subjectivity: the inassimilable society”, *Patterns of Prejudice*, 52:1, pp. 1-23.

¹¹⁶ “Udo Ulfkotte and Faecal Jihad: Asymmetric Warfare or Crazy Conspiracy Theory?”, June 20, 2018, accessed 20.06.2018, <http://www.islamophobiatoday.com/2011/07/05/udo-ulfkotte-and-faecal-jihad-asymmetric-warfare-or-crazy-conspiracy-theory/>

¹¹⁷ Sindre Bangstad (2014) *Anders Breivik and the Rise of Islamophobia*, London: Zed Books.

speech legislation and laws against Islamophobia as stifling critiques of Islam at best, and apologism for terrorism at worse.¹¹⁸ Thus, the well organised and well-funded Islamophobia Industry has pushed back with financial aid often stemming from the USA.

An example of this is seen in the workings of Student Rights (a project of the Henry Jackson Society, which will be discussed further below). Student Rights have frequently been responsible to obstruct speakers invited to university campuses by Islamic or Palestinian societies on the grounds of accused extremism, whilst simultaneously utilising the arguments of free speech to oppose no-platform policies directed at far-right speakers.¹¹⁹

Complicity from the State

As previously mentioned, European governments do not appear to see members of the Islamophobia Industry as an inherent threat and are thus failing to counter them. Perhaps part of the reason for this is that counter-jihadists are not fundamentally opposed to the state. Their outlook on the “inevitability” of violent civil war is more focused on defending national identity, than on revolution.

Indeed, it has been observed that members of the Islamophobia industry are more likely to engage in what may be considered ‘pro-state violence’.¹²⁰ Far right violence is often deemed to be ‘lone wolf’ violence and is rarely given a media prominence comparative to that of religiously inspired violence.

This tacit leniency towards the Islamophobia Industry may also result from the fact that many right-wing Western governments actually share aspects of the counter-jihadist analysis to some extent. In two major policy areas,

immigration and counter-extremism, there are significant overlaps in approach. While no government has gone as far as the counter-jihad movement would like (indeed, it frequently maintains that political elites are naïve, complacent and failing to address the imminent ‘threat’ that Islam actually poses to the West) it applauds moves by some governments towards limiting immigration and institutionalising Islamophobia. For example, a broad range of counter-jihadists, including Katie Hopkins, Melanie Phillips, Oliver JJ Lane, David Littman, Gerard Batten and Raheem Kassam, have supported Donald Trump and his anti-Muslim policies both throughout his presidential campaign and during his presidency.

The Islamophobia Industry has viciously sought to push the centre of politics to the right. A unique feature of the movement that serves to give it some kind of legitimacy is that, unlike any Islamist or jihadist movement or any neo-Nazi party,¹²¹ it has supporters in influential positions in Western governments and wider circles. In the US, prominent examples include Steve Bannon and Walid Phares, (Donald Trump’s strategist and Middle East policy advisor), as well as Frank Gaffney, (from the Center for Security Policy and a former Reagan administration official, who has links to several Trump administration officials including Attorney General Jeff Sessions).

As Spinwatch points out:

“[h]ere lies the counterjihad movement’s alarming strength: it is a ‘spectrum’ with ‘street-fighting forces at one end’ (such as the English Defence League) and ‘cultural conservatives and neoconservative writers at the other’ (from Daniel Pipes to Douglas Murray). As well as flourishing in the

¹¹⁸ For example: Denis MacEoin, ‘The Impact of Islamic Fundamentalism on Free Speech’, Gatestone Institute, 19 June 2016. <https://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/8280/islamic-fundamentalism-free-speech> - accessed 2 November 2016.

¹¹⁹ “Student Rights Group Claims Media ‘Mistakes’, Conflation with Extremism ‘Not the Fault’ of its Gender Segregation Report”, *The Huffington Post*, July 19, 2013, accessed

14.06.2018, https://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/hilary-aked/student-rights-claims-media-mistakes_b_3303703.html

¹²⁰ José M. Atiles Osoria (2012) ‘Pro-State Violence in Puerto Rico: Cuban and Puerto Rican Right-Wing Terrorism from the 1960s to the 1990s’. *Socialism and Democracy*, 26:1.

¹²¹ At least in north-western Europe.

blogosphere, it has publishing houses (eg. Encounter Books) and newspapers (eg. Dispatch International), produces films (eg. Fitna and Obsession), establishes foundations and even 'charities' (eg. Victims Of Islamic Cultural Extremism, or VOICE UK).” The combined effects of these top-down and bottom-up forces may prove extremely dangerous.

This wing of elites lends an element of respectability to the counter-jihad movement's grassroots and allowed it to carve out a niche within mainstream politics. For example:

- At least one counter-jihad event has been held in the European Parliament building, courtesy of an MEP from Belgium's far right Vlaams Belang party.
- Baroness Caroline Cox has hosted Anne Marie Waters of Sharia Watch UK in the House of Lords.
- Together with fellow British peer Lord Finkelstein and former US ambassador to the UN, John Bolton, Baroness Cox also sits on the board of the New York think-tank, the Gatestone Institute, which publishes many counter-jihad writers cited in Anders Breivik's manifesto.
- President Miloš Zeman of the Czech Republic spoke at a 'Bloc Against Islam' rally in November 2015.
- In 2016, Conservative MP Bob Blackman hosted in Parliament Tapan Ghosh, an Indian Hindu-nationalist who praised the genocide of Rohingya Muslims in Burma.
- Conservative MP Mike Payne shared a "Muslim parasites article on social media.
- Conservative MP Alexander van Terheyden called Islam a "violent political ideology".

Across Europe, parliamentarians with counter-jihadist allegiances or sympathies have advocated anti-Islam legislation, often in the name of security and counter-terrorism concerns. These policies and legislative developments are often related to sharia law, women's clothing or mosque construction.

In this manner, rather than opposing the state, the counter-jihad movement pursues its goals through official channels. Liz Fekete observes that the Islamophobia Industry is thus "using state power to...put into place legal and administrative structures that discriminate against Muslims".¹²²

Radical right parties with close links to the Islamophobia network and counter-jihadist ideologies have long been seeking to seize power via elections. Several have become significant players in European governments: for instance, the Danish People's Party became the country's second biggest party in 2015 and the PVV became the second largest party in the Dutch House of Representatives following elections in March 2017. In Germany, Alternative for Germany (AfD) boasts 97 seats in the Bundestag, 158 in State Parliaments, and a membership of over 30,000 people.

A Transnational Movement

Despite its strong association with nationalist politics, the counter-jihad movement is structurally organised through "dispersed, decentralised, non-hierarchical networks" of blogs, think tanks and protest groups, with "no set command and control hierarchy" and few leaders.¹²³ This versatility allows it to organise across borders and thus hugely increases its destructive potential. As Farid Hafez has argued:

"While the main focus on an exclusive identity politics in the frame of nation-states previously divided the far right and

¹²² Liz Fekete (2006) 'Enlightened fundamentalism? Immigration, feminism and the Right', *Race & Class*, 48:2, 2.

¹²³ Andreas Önnarfors, cited in Nigel Copsey, "Conference Report: Fascist Ideologies, Past and Present", *Fascism: Journal of Comparative Fascist Studies*, 2013, 2:2, 268.

complicated transnational cooperation, a shared Islamophobia has the potential to be a common ground for strengthening the transnational links of right-wing parties.”¹²⁴

Transnational organisation of the Islamophobia Industry frequently occurs at the grassroots as the same ideas are mobilised across borders under different names. For example:

- The Stop the Islamisation of Denmark movement has spawned SIO Europe, SIO Deutschland, SIO France, SIO England and Stop the Islamization of America, collectively known as Stop the Islamisation of Nations (SION)
- The English Defence League (EDL) was replicated in Scotland, Germany and Norway, amongst others, and a European Defence League was launched in Aarhus, Denmark in 2012, though without much success.
- The German movement PEGIDA has inspired copycat movements in many countries including Austria, Sweden and the UK.

A blueprint of the Islamophobia Industry

Aside from its considerable funding, the structure of the Islamophobia Industry makes it incredibly effective in delivering its message at all levels of society. The following section explores the primary elements of this structure; “experts” and think-tanks, reformed or “moderate” Muslims, politicians, media figures, and grassroots organisations.

“Experts” and think-tanks

Well-funded “experts” and think-tanks provide a “respectable face” to anti-Muslim agendas and discourses. It is through the pseudo-research of these organisations and through their prominent

connections to political and media institutions that the opinions of these so-called “experts” are capable of driving and influencing national policies and political agendas.

The Henry Jackson Society (HJS)

In the UK, arguably the most divisive think-tank is the Henry Jackson Society (HJS). The ideological framework underpinning the activities of HJS is best exemplified by Douglas Murray, the think tank’s associate director. Murray is the author of a book conveniently titled “Neoconservatism: Why We Need It”, in which he discussed at length the morality of neoconservatism and its value for Western societies. Neoconservatism, in his view, “is not a political party... but a way of looking at the world”, which frames his political orientation within the wider discourse on the global war on terror, the threat posed by Islam, and the need to protect “Us” from “Them”.

In this regard, particularly concerning is Murray’s opinion that “A Muslim immigrant into the United States who claims the same rights as those enjoyed by an American whose family have lived in the country for generations presents an even greater challenge”,¹²⁵ which unmistakably outlines his discriminatory views on immigration and inter-racial and inter-religious community relations. Murray was not new to controversial stances. During a speech in 2006, when he was director of the Centre for Social Cohesion (CSC – now part of HJS), Murray said that, “Conditions for Muslims in Europe must be made harder across the board: Europe must look like a less attractive proposition.”¹²⁶ Following the speech, the Conservative front bench was duly forced to sever all formal relations with both Murray and CSC.

¹²⁴ Farid Hafez (2014) ‘Shifting borders: Islamophobia as common ground for building Pan-European right-wing unity’, *Patterns of Prejudice*, 48:5, 479.

¹²⁵ Douglas Murray, *Neoconservatism: Why We Need It*, (New York: Encounter Books, 2006) p.105

¹²⁶ “Paul Goodman: Why the Conservative frontbench broke off relations with Douglas Murray – and what happened afterwards”, *Conservative Home*, October 17, 2011, accessed 03.11.2017, <https://www.conservativehome.com/thecolumnists/2011/10/by-paul-goodman-the-struggle-against-islamist-extremism-demands-from-the-start-the-separation-of-islam-a-complex-religion.html>

In 2015, he wrote: “The claim that Islam is a religion of peace is a nicety invented by Western politicians so as either not to offend their Muslim populations or simply lie to themselves that everything might yet turn out fine. In fact, since its beginning Islam has been pretty violent.”¹²⁷

Reformed or “moderate” Muslim validators

The views perpetuated by these well-funded think-tanks are then legitimised by Muslim or former Muslim activists and validators, who accept the idea of an inherently dangerous side of Islam and legitimise anti-Muslim discourses. In the US, these include figures such as Nonie Darwish, a Senior Fellow at the Center for Security Policy and founder and president of Arabs for Israel. She was raised in the Gaza Strip and grew up a Muslim. Her opinion is that Islam “should be annihilated” because “is a poison to a society. It’s divisive. It’s hateful. ... Islam is going to be brought down... because Islam is based on lies and it’s not based on the truth”.¹²⁸ Others include Tawfik Hamid – a self-described “Muslim reformer” and an alleged former member of the Egyptian terrorist organization al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya – who believes that Muslims “prefer this violent traditional teaching of Islam.”¹²⁹

Perhaps amongst the most widely known of these figures is Ayaan Hirsi Ali, a Somalia-born Dutch politician currently employed by the American Enterprise Institute, who wrote in her book *Infidel* that, “Islam was like a mental cage. At first, when you open the door, the caged bird stays inside: it is frightened. It has

internalized its imprisonment. It takes time for bird to escape, even after someone has opened the doors to its cage.”¹³⁰ In a 2015 interview for the New York Post, she went as far as saying: “The assumption is that, in Islam, there are a few rotten apples, not the entire basket... I’m saying it’s the entire basket.”¹³¹

In the UK, similar figures include Ed Husain and Maajid Nawaz, founders of the Quilliam Foundation – which now receives funds from neoconservative American organisations – Sara Khan of Inspire and now UK counter-extremism chief, Amina Lone, Co-Director of the Social Action and Research Foundation (SARF), Raheem Kassam, and Fiyaz Mughal, founder of Tell MAMA. To various degrees, they all shared opinions accepting that Islam has in fact a problematic face, or that interfaith and interracial relations are not working. For example, Nawaz openly declared that “multiculturalism has failed”;¹³² Mughal rejected the entire concept of Islamophobia;¹³³ and Khan is one of the strongest supporter of the highly controversial counter-terror strategy, PREVENT.¹³⁴

Meanwhile, Raheem Kassam, former editor-in-chief of Breitbart News London and former chief advisor to UKIP leader Nigel Farage, said white converts to Islam are “the nuttiest”.¹³⁵ A former Muslim who now holds a highly controversial stance on Islam, Kassam is the author of “No Go Zones: How Sharia Law Is Coming to a Neighborhood Near You”.

In recent times, Ed Husain, co-founder of the highly controversial Quilliam

¹²⁷ “‘Religion of peace’ is not a harmless platitude”, *The Spectator*, January 17, 2015, accessed 11.06.2018 <https://www.spectator.co.uk/2015/01/religion-of-peace-is-not-a-harmless-platitude/>

¹²⁸ “Video: Nonie Darwish Says Islam Should be ‘Annihilated’ (CAIR)”, accessed 29.05.2018, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Bv6TBnmc_vI

¹²⁹ “Tawfik Hamid”, *Islamophobia Network*, accessed 29.05.2018, <https://islamophobianetwork.com/echo-chamber/tawfik-hamid/>

¹³⁰ Ayaan Hirsi Ali, *Infidel*, (New York, London: Free Press, 2007)

¹³¹ “‘In Islam, they are all rotten apples’: Ex-Muslim’s call for religion’s reboot”, *New York Post*, March 22, 2015, accessed 14.06.2018, <https://nypost.com/2015/03/22/activist-argues-for-a-complete-reformation-of-islam/>

¹³² “Maajid Nawaz Says Multiculturalism Is Dead”, accessed 11.06.2018, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Mgm5XMZ3fwY>

¹³³ “Let’s not confuse anti-Muslim hate with Islamophobia”, *The Times*, May 14, 2018, <https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/let-s-not-confuse-anti-muslim-hate-with-islamophobia-85977vgcg>

¹³⁴ “The latest Prevent figures show why the strategy needs an independent review”, *The Guardian*, November 10, 2017, accessed 11.06.2018, <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/nov/10/prevent-strategy-statistics-independent-review-home-office-muslims>

¹³⁵ “Raheem Kassam: Meet The Right-Wing Ex-Muslim Who Wants To Save UKIP”, *Buzzfeed*, October 28, 2016, accessed 14.06.2018, https://www.buzzfeed.com/jimwaterson/raheem-kassam-ukip?utm_term=.jxnDP2Vpge#vzgvjKAlI

Foundation, has attracted criticism for an article published in *The Telegraph*, in which he dismissed legitimate concerns over Islamophobia in the Conservative Party calling it a “political card”. He further blamed Labour Leader Jeremy Corbyn for “pitting Britain's Muslims against Jews”.¹³⁶

Diversity in beliefs and practices in terms of faith is a natural characteristic of British Muslim communities and nothing to be concerned about. However, the problem emerges when individual Muslims are used and promoted for the purpose of justifying the stigmatisation and marginalisation of Muslims as a whole. Establishing themselves as spokespeople for “liberal Muslims”, individuals such as those mentioned above justify heightened scrutiny of Muslims and anti-Muslim policies “thus justifying, seemingly from a Muslim’s perspective, concerns about those Muslim communities who hold different views from theirs.”¹³⁷

Grassroots

The ideas pronounced by experts and justified by Muslim validators influence grassroots movements, media, and in turn politicians.

In the United Kingdom, grassroots organisations that subscribe to the views of the Islamophobia Network include the English Defence League (EDL), Britain First, PEGIDA UK, and the relatively recently emerged Football Lads Alliance (FLA). Largely through the leveraging of issues such as identity and British nationalism, the scope of these grassroots movements is to spread and perpetuate anxieties about Muslims among the general public. Finding consensus among the masses allows these groups to increase societal divide and potentially swaying

policies as politicians respond to societal influence.

The English Defence League (EDL)

The EDL is a far-right street protest movement which exists solely to oppose to Islam and what it considers to be a spread of Islamism and Sharia in the United Kingdom. It was founded by Tommy Robinson, a far-right activist who was repeatedly convicted for “breaching the peace” and a number of other offences.¹³⁸

The stated objectives of the EDL are:

- To act, lead and inspire in the struggle against global Islamification
- To stand for democracy and the rule of law by opposing sharia
- To stand for English cultural norms by opposing sharia
- To oppose the Islamic distinction between Muslims and non-Muslims
- To demand effective action against the threat of terrorism in the UK
- To educate the British public about Islam
- To reject politically correct depictions of Islam in Britain
- To promote an open debate about Islam in British life
- To promote a balanced depiction of Islam as a religion and ideology.¹³⁹

Several investigations have demonstrated the EDL’s tactics in perpetuating and amplifying the divide between Muslims and non-Muslims in Britain. In January 2010, an undercover investigation by *The Guardian*, revealed the group’s plan “to hit racially sensitive areas in attempt to provoke disorder over summer”.¹⁴⁰ More

¹³⁶ “Jeremy Corbyn is pitting Britain's Muslims against Jews”, *The Telegraph*, June 6, 2018, accessed 14.06.2018, <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/politics/2018/06/06/jeremy-corbyn-pitting-britains-muslims-against-jews/>

¹³⁷ “How the Islamophobia Industry Silences Voices of Dissent”, *Counterpunch*, March 30, 2018, accessed 29.05.2018, <https://www.counterpunch.org/2018/03/30/100867/>

¹³⁸ “Far-Right Criminals”, accessed 29.05.2018, <https://far-rightcriminals.com/category/tommy-robinson/>

¹³⁹ “About Us”, *English Defence League*, accessed 29.05.2018, <http://www.englishdefenceleague.org.uk/mission-statement/>

¹⁴⁰ “English Defence League: Inside the violent world of Britain's new far right”, *The Guardian*, May 28, 2010, accessed 11.06.2018,

recently, in June 2017, the EDL clashed with police officers during a march in Manchester, during which supporters brandished a pig's head – an act aimed at taunting Muslims.¹⁴¹

Together with marches and public demonstrations, the EDL maintains a strong presence on social media through which it galvanises support by fuelling anti-Muslim hatred online. On Twitter, several accounts continue to be associated with the EDL, despite ongoing efforts by the platform to shut down its leaders' pages.¹⁴² Similarly, the EDL has managed to maintain some presence on Facebook, with pages such as "English Defence League London Division II" attracting thousands of people.¹⁴³ These pages, which are filled with fake news, conspiracy theories and pseudo-nationalistic sentiments that depict Muslims as threatening enemies, also include potentially thousands of other accounts set up by EDL members privately.

Tommy Robinson

Tommy Robinson, one of the EDL founders and most charismatic leaders, was permanently banned from Twitter for "hateful conduct" in March 2018, after he wrote in a post: "Islam promotes killing people."¹⁴⁴ Robinson formed the EDL in 2009 with the aim of sheltering Luton – and by extension Britain – from the "Islamic threat". As he commented in an interview: "I always knew there was a hostility coming from that community, and I never really knew what it was. I didn't know anything about the religion. It's only when

I looked into the religion that I thought, this is what it is. It's got to do with Islam."¹⁴⁵

In 2012, Robinson left the EDL after a high profile "deradicalisation" that was attributed to the Quilliam Foundation. At the time, Robinson stated that he had decided to "counter Islamist ideology... not with violence but with better, democratic ideas".¹⁴⁶ It later emerged that the Quilliam Foundation had paid Tommy Robinson £2000 a month in order to take credit for his resignation from the EDL.¹⁴⁷

During this time, Robinson assumed a somewhat more conciliatory tone, apologising for the climate of anti-Muslim hatred he contributed to creating, and even agreed "with a vision of multiculturalism inclusive of a variety of ethnic and religious groups".¹⁴⁸

However, by 2015 this conciliatory period seems to have ended. That year, he took part in an anti-Islam rally in Holland organised by the Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamisation of the Occident (PEGIDA). During the speech, Robinson declared that "he was proud" to have set up the EDL, and that his aim is to "bring people together and we are going to enter into a new era in Europe where everyone is going to unite against the Islamisation of our countries."¹⁴⁹ In January 2016 Robinson duly set up PEGIDA UK, with the inaugural rally attended by roughly 200

<https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2010/may/28/english-defence-league-guardian-investigation>

¹⁴¹ "EDL protesters holding pig's head in anti-Muslim slur clash with police at counter-terror march in Manchester", *The Telegraph*, June 12, 2017, accessed 11.06.2018, <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/06/11/mayor-andy-burnham-condemns-manchester-protest-against-islamist/>

¹⁴² "Twitter suspends EDL's account in latest 'purge' of the far-right", *Metro*, December 18, 2017, accessed 11.06.2018, <https://metro.co.uk/2017/12/18/twitter-suspends-edls-account-latest-purge-far-right-7169683/>

¹⁴³ See <https://www.facebook.com/English-Defence-League-London-Division-II-408618569264988/>

¹⁴⁴ "Tommy Robinson permanently banned by Twitter", *The Guardian*, March 28, 2018, accessed 11.06.2018, <https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2018/mar/28/tommy-robinson-permanently-banned-twitter-violating-rules-hateful-conduct>

¹⁴⁵ "Who is the real Tommy Robinson?", *The Telegraph*, October 18, 2013, accessed 11.06.2018, <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/10389954/Who-is-the-real-Tommy-Robinson.html>

¹⁴⁶ "EDL leader Tommy Robinson quits group", *BBC*, October 8, 2013, accessed 11.06.2018, <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-24442953>

¹⁴⁷ "Tommy Robinson, Former EDL Leader, Claims Quilliam Paid Him To Quit Far-Right Group", *The Huffington Post*, December 10, 2015, accessed 11.06.2018, https://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/2015/12/03/tommy-robinson-claims-quilliam-paid-him-to-leave-edl_n_8710834.html

¹⁴⁸ "Ex-EDL leader Tommy Robinson says sorry for causing fear to Muslims", *The Guardian*, October 11, 2013, accessed 11.06.2018, <https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2013/oct/11/edl-tommy-robinson-sorry-fear-muslims>

¹⁴⁹ "EDL founder Tommy Robinson addresses Pegida anti-Islam rally in Holland", *The Independent*, October 12, 2015, accessed 11.06.2018, <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/edl-founder-tommy-robinson-addresses-pegida-anti-islam-rally-in-holland-a6691406.html>

people – half the number expected by the police.¹⁵⁰

Robinson was sentenced to 13 months in prison in May 2018 for contempt of court proceedings after he live streamed filming of defendants in an active criminal trial.

PEGIDA UK

PEGIDA UK was born with the same ideological objectives of the EDL, although it sought to distance itself from the “loutish behaviour and alcohol-fuelled violence” that characterises EDL’s activities.¹⁵¹ Through PEGIDA UK, Tommy Robinson hoped to attract the same demographic that PEGIDA had attracted in Germany: middle-class, educated individuals able to articulate a rational opposition to Islam, and organise themselves in a sophisticated group capable of legitimisation. As he commented: “We are taking the whole football culture, which was embedded in the EDL, out of it and we are trying to create a safe environment”, also adding “After going out to Germany, I felt ashamed of the way we’d conducted ourselves as Englishmen... I stood there in Dresden and spoke to 40,000 people. There was no aggression. They had discipline. There was unity.”¹⁵² PEGIDA UK does not have any official online presence, which possibly indicates the organisation has been dissolved.

The Football Lads Alliance (FLA)

The Football Lads Alliance (FLA) is a relatively new organisation which was founded by John Meighan in 2017. Following the attacks in Manchester and

London Bridge, Meighan “felt strongly that something needed to be done”.¹⁵³ The group was set up as an “anti-extremism” movement, but soon become associated with far-right activists. During a FLA march in Birmingham in March 2018, witnesses reported “threatening behaviour towards Asian bystanders and heard speeches attacking Muslims in Britain.” Interestingly, the march was attended by Tommy Robinson as well.¹⁵⁴

As reported by *The Guardian*, the FLA’s Facebook page is filled with posts “calling for Khan, London’s first Muslim mayor, to be “hanged” and for Abbott, Britain’s first black female MP, to be “run over”. There are also posts claiming mosque attacker Osborne is a “scapegoat” and suggesting he was right to plot to kill Labour leader Jeremy Corbyn.”¹⁵⁵ In April 2018, Meighan stepped down, justifying his decision by saying he needed to “re-focus my energies into my personal and professional life”.¹⁵⁶ Despite Meighan announced that the company would be dissolved after his resignation, FLA website and *GoFundMe* page remain active.¹⁵⁷

Britain First

Following the nationalistic tendencies of other anti-Muslim grassroots organisations, Britain First is a far-right group describing themselves as a “patriotic political movement”, which campaigns primarily against multiculturalism and against the Islamisation of the United Kingdom. Britain First’s leaders, Paul Golding and Jayda Fransen, were both convicted of religiously-aggravated harassment.¹⁵⁸ While having a broader

¹⁵⁰ “Pegida UK supporters stage anti-Islam silent march in Birmingham”, *The Guardian*, February 6, 2016, accessed 11.06.2018, <https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2016/feb/06/pegida-uk-supporters-stage-anti-islam-silent-march-birmingham>

¹⁵¹ “Tommy Robinson: The man behind the British version of Pegida”, *BBC*, January 29, 2016, accessed 12.06.2018, <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-35432074>

¹⁵² Ibid.

¹⁵³ “Meet the man behind Britain’s new street movement (with a difference)”, *Shy Society*, June 27, 2017, accessed 12.06.2018, <https://shysociety.co.uk/2017/06/27/meet-the-man-behind-britains-new-street-movement-with-a-difference/>

¹⁵⁴ “Premier League clubs warned over ‘far-right’ Football Lads Alliance”, *The Times*, March 30, 2018, accessed 12.06.2018, <https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/premier-league-clubs-warned-over-far-right-football-lads-alliance-0mgq2lppv>

¹⁵⁵ “Secret Facebook page reveals violence at heart of forum for ‘football fans’”, *The Guardian*, March 17, 2018, accessed 12.06.2018, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/mar/17/football-lads-alliance-secret-facebook-page-racism-violence-sexism>

¹⁵⁶ “Football Lads Alliance: ‘We could have a civil war in this country’”, *BBC*, May 9, 2018, accessed 12.06.2018, <https://www.bbc.co.uk/bbcthree/article/e5ee9e0a-18d7-49a4-a3c2-80b6b4222058>

¹⁵⁷ “Leader of Football Lads Alliance resigns amid charitable donations row”, *BBC*, April 30, 2018, accessed 12.06.2018, <https://www.bbc.co.uk/bbcthree/article/c92aa56d-bba1-4bcb-b717-9e3cb8f74847>

¹⁵⁸ “Britain First supporters launch tirade after leaders jailed”, *Far-Right Criminals*, accessed 29.05.2018, <https://far-rightcriminals.com/2018/03/07/britain-first-supporters-launch-tirade-after-leaders-jailed/>

political agenda, Britain First is as concerned with Islam as the EDL. Its goals include “the maintenance of British national sovereignty, independence and freedom”, preserving Britain’s “ancestral ethnic and cultural heritage, traditions, customs and values”, opposing political or religious doctrines including Marxism, Liberalism, Political Correctness, Euro Federalism and Islam.¹⁵⁹

These grassroots movements are particularly insidious for society. Their incessant campaign of misinformation and their operations at street level, combined with their social media presence, are capable of potentially influencing and mobilising thousands of individuals, while their divisive rhetoric has very real consequences leading to acts of violence. Indeed, Darren Osborne, the perpetrator of the terrorist attack on Finsbury Park last year, was reportedly radicalised to violence after watching a series of videos by Tommy Robinson, EDL and Britain First.¹⁶⁰

Media figures

The Islamophobia Industry’s ability to disseminate anti-Muslim sentiments is furthered by a network of journalists, media outlets, and commentators. These individuals and outlets offer an echo-chamber for these Islamophobic narratives. In the US, Fox News is one of the biggest and most influential anti-Muslim voices, with journalists such as Jeanine Pirro calling Islam a “cancer” and describing the Paris attacks as part of a “Christian genocide.”¹⁶¹

An important media outlet, which became world famous following the appointment of its chairman, Stephen Bannon, to the Trump administration, is Breitbart News, an American news, opinion and commentary website. The website showed just how far the far-right can go with anti-Islam hysteria. In 2016, it published an article in which it lied about President Obama being Muslim;¹⁶² one year later, it published another fake story about an alleged group of Muslims setting fire to a church in Dortmund, Germany.¹⁶³ As noted previously, Raheem Kassam served as chief editor for Breitbart’s UK branch, Breitbart London.

Considering the ideological positioning of Breitbart, it is perhaps unsurprising that the website is filled with references to Douglas Murray’s articles in *The Spectator*,¹⁶⁴ a conservative magazine that has been exposed for its “purple-faced, pro-fox-hunting, climate-change-denying, insidiously Islamophobic worldview”.¹⁶⁵ The magazine differs slightly from Breitbart in its ability to hide its Islamophobic agenda through seemingly erudite writings. However, it hosts a variety of controversial authors including, together with Murray, Melanie Phillips and Rod Liddle, author of several highly controversial pieces, including one in which he described Muslims as “savages”.¹⁶⁶ While continuing to write for *The Spectator*, Liddle went on to hosting equally controversial TV shows, such as *The New Fundamentalists* and *Immigration is a Time Bomb*.

Less mainstream media outlets include Rebel Media (known as The Rebel), an

¹⁵⁹ “Principles Of The Britain First Movement”, *Britain First*, accessed 29.05.2018, <https://www.britainfirst.org/principles>

¹⁶⁰ “Darren Osborne: How Finsbury Park terror attacker became ‘obsessed’ with Muslims in less than a month”, *The Independent*, February 1, 2018, accessed 29.05.2018, <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/darren-osborne-finsbury-park-attack-who-is-tommy-robinson-muslim-internet-britain-first-a8190316.html>

¹⁶¹ “Fox News Channel”, *The Islamophobia Network*, accessed 12.06.2018, <https://islamophobicnetwork.com/echo-chamber/fox-news-channel/>

¹⁶² “Alt-Right Gathering Exults in Trump Election With Nazi-Era Salute”, *The New York Times*, November 20, 2016, accessed 14.06.2018, <https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/21/us/alt-right-salutes-donald-trump.html>

¹⁶³ “German police quash Breitbart story of mob setting fire to Dortmund church”, *The Guardian*, January 7, 2017, accessed 14.06.2018,

<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jan/07/german-police-quash-breitbart-story-of-mob-setting-fire-to-dortmund-church>

¹⁶⁴ See “Spectator: Will the BBC go back to ignoring grooming gangs after Darren Osborne?”, *Breitbart News London*, February 4, 2018, accessed 15.06.2018, <http://www.breitbart.com/london/2018/02/04/spectator-will-the-bbc-go-back-to-ignoring-grooming-gangs-after-darren-osborne/>

¹⁶⁵ “Can a leftie read *The Spectator*”, *The Guardian*, April 3, 2008, accessed 15.06.2018, <https://www.theguardian.com/media/organgrinder/2008/apr/03/canaleftiereadthespectator>

¹⁶⁶ “Liddle under fire over ‘racist’ blog”, *The Independent*, December 7, 2009, accessed 15.06.2018 <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/media/press/liddle-under-fire-over-racist-blog-1835496.html>

online political and social commentary media website founded in February 2015 and which was described as “a global platform for an extreme anti-Muslim ideology”.¹⁶⁷

It is interesting to note that Rebel Media employs Tommy Robinson as well as Katie Hopkins, who has made a name for herself through her divisive, anti-refugee and Islamophobic remarks. Today, Hopkins boasts nearly 900,000 followers on Twitter.

In May 2017, Hopkins was fired from the British radio station LBC – with LBC staff breaking into “massive cheers and applause” – after her tweet called for a “final solution” in response to the Manchester bombing.¹⁶⁸ Shortly after, in November 2017, *Mail Online* refused to renew her contract after her defamatory remarks against a teacher forced the newspaper to pay substantial damages and legal costs.¹⁶⁹

Katie Hopkins is well-known for several articles appearing in tabloids such as *The Sun*, including one that prompted the UN to denounce it as resembling Nazi propaganda. In the article, later taken down by *The Sun*, Katie Hopkins described migrants escaping the wars in the Middle East as “cockroaches”.¹⁷⁰ In 2017, Hopkins took part in a far-right event organised by the David Horowitz Freedom Center, giving a speech, during which she attacked Muslims and urged the participants to “fight for their country”.¹⁷¹

Through her latest endeavour, an online blog called *Hopkins World*, Hopkins

continues to spread far-right, poisonous ideas against Muslims and liberals. In a recent blog entry about her speech given to a Tea Party group in Michigan, entitled “We are big and bad, and liberals should be afraid”, she said in reference to Muslims in the UK, “The second thing we can do is to arm ourselves...I have bullets inside my car... we must look for our own truth”.¹⁷²

Political parties and figures

Between the advice of the “experts”, the vocal pressure from far-right journalists, and the mass support of anti-Muslim grassroots movements, political representatives and policymakers are susceptible to influence from these anti-Muslim agendas.

However, political parties, such as the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) are also conversely capable of purposefully fuelling anti-Muslim sentiment in order to further garner political support and legitimacy.

At its core, UKIP maintains an anti-establishment, Euro-sceptic stance founded upon a strong national identity that resonates well with the British working-class.¹⁷³ UKIP was instrumental in the triumph of the Brexit vote of June 2016, with an incessant campaign targeting, among other things, Muslim migrants. Nigel Farage, UKIP former leader, capitalised on an anti-migrant poster showing Muslim migrants under the sign “Breaking Point” to spread the idea that Britain had to “take back control” of its borders.¹⁷⁴ What followed was the

¹⁶⁷ Richard Warnica, “INSIDE REBEL MEDIA: How Ezra Levant built an extreme media juggernaut, became a major player in the far-right movement – and watched it all begin to unravel”, *National Post*, accessed 12.06.2018, <http://nationalpost.com/features/inside-ezra-levants-rebel-media>

¹⁶⁸ “Katie Hopkins to leave LBC ‘immediately’: staff broke into ‘massive cheers and applause’ when news controversial radio presenter was out broke”, *The Independent*, May 26, 2017, accessed 12.06.2018, <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/katie-hopkins-sacked-lbc-radio-cheers-applause-presenter-fired-final-solution-manchester-attack-a7756961.html>

¹⁶⁹ “Mail Online to pay damages to teacher over Katie Hopkins column”, *The Guardian*, November 28, 2017, accessed 12.06.2018, <https://www.theguardian.com/media/2017/nov/28/mail-online-damages-teacher-katie-hopkins-column>

¹⁷⁰ “UN human rights chief denounces Sun over Katie Hopkins ‘cockroach’ column”, *The Guardian*, April 24, 2015, accessed 13.06.2018,

<https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2015/apr/24/katie-hopkins-cockroach-migrants-denounced-united-nations-human-rights-commissioner>

¹⁷¹ “Katie Hopkins gave speech attacking Muslims to far-right group days before leaving Mail Online by ‘mutual consent’”, *The Independent*, November 27, 2017, accessed 13.06.2018, <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/media/press/katie-hopkins-muslims-far-right-speech-mailonline-racism-islamophobia-david-horowitz-freedom-center-a8078356.html>

¹⁷² “(FULL SPEECH) Katie Hopkins: “We are big and bad, and liberals should be afraid”, *Hopkins World*, May 31, 2018, accessed 13.06.2018, <https://hopkinsworld.com/full-speech-katie-hopkins-we-are-big-and-bad-and-liberals-should-be-afraid/>

¹⁷³ Robert Ford, *Revolt on the Right: Explaining Support for the Radical Right in Britain*, (London: Routledge, 2014).

¹⁷⁴ “Nigel Farage’s anti-migrant poster reported to police”, *The Guardian*, June 16, 2016, accessed 13.06.2018, <https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/jun/16/nigel-farage-defends-ukip-breaking-point-poster-queue-of-migrants>

highest spike in racially and religiously motivated hate crimes, from 40,741 to 49,921 in the eleven months following the vote.¹⁷⁵

Although he left the party following the Brexit vote – even expressing concern about UKIP’s increasingly stronger far-right stance – Farage is in no way dislocated from Islamophobic sentiments. In 2015, for example, he stated that there was “an increasing level of concern because people do see a fifth column living within our country, who hate us and want to kill us”.¹⁷⁶

UKIP is currently headed by Gerard Batten, a renowned Islamophobe and Tommy Robinson’s supporter who described Islam as a “violent death cult”. In his speech, Batten argued that non-Muslims should have a “perfectly rational fear” of Islam, a “cult” that “propagates itself by intimidation, violence and conquest.”¹⁷⁷ UKIP currently holds one seat in the House of Commons.¹⁷⁸

As discussed in a later chapter on Public Exclusion, Integration, and Minority Rights, UKIP is also responsible for proposing severely anti-Muslim and discriminatory integration policies. For example, in an effort to rebrand itself as “an anti-Islam party”, and as part of its new post-referendum agenda, UKIP suggests, among other measures, a ban on full face veil.¹⁷⁹

Fuelling Islamophobia

Between its considerable funding and a structure incorporating all elements of society, the Islamophobia Industry is highly efficient in promoting and maintaining a perception of inter-group threat. Within this paradigm, Muslims

play the role of the insidious, backwards, and evil perpetrators of a degradation of Western physical security, economic wellbeing, identity, values, and norms. This collective network is therefore incredibly dangerous due to their ability to influence policy decisions and to drive political agendas to the detriment of innocent and vulnerable minority communities.

¹⁷⁵ “Brexit vote sees highest spike in religious and racial hate crimes ever recorded”, *The Independent*, July 7, 2017, accessed 13.06.2018, <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/racist-hate-crimes-surge-to-record-high-after-brexit-vote-new-figures-reveal-a7829551.html>

¹⁷⁶ “Farage’s Muslim ‘Fifth Column’ remarks must not go unchallenged”, *The Guardian*, March 12, 2015, accessed 13.06.2018, <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/mar/12/nigel-farage-muslim-fifth-column-ukip>

¹⁷⁷ “UKIP MEP’s ‘death cult’ remarks spark new Islamophobia row”, *The Guardian*, April 29, 2017, accessed 13.06.2018,

<https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2017/apr/29/ukip-new-islamophobia-row-death-cult-remarks-gerard-batten-paul-nuttall>

¹⁷⁸ “Current State of the Parties”, *Parliament UK*, accessed 13.06.2018, <https://www.parliament.uk/mps-lords-and-offices/mps/current-state-of-the-parties/>

¹⁷⁹ “UKIP leader Paul Nuttall hints he will not stand in election”, *The Guardian*, April 24, 2017, accessed 13.06.2018, <https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2017/apr/24/paul-nuttall-dodges-questions-on-whether-he-will-stand-in-election-ukip>

Moral Panic, Media, and Broadcasting

Moral panic

In an earlier chapter of this report, we discussed the concepts of collective prejudice and theories of integrated inter-group threat. As previously mentioned, in response to real and imagined threats, enemies are constructed to bear the guilt and responsibility for the conditions under which society finds itself. This construction of scapegoats involves inciting a moral panic.

Through the spreading of moral panic, individuals or groups emerge as a designated threat to societal values, norms, identities, security and interests. This moral panic is then disseminated and maintained by the mass media's promotion of stereotypical, stylised and distorted representations. Meanwhile, it is amplified and given credence by politicians, public figures and those considered experts. The result is overwhelming scrutiny and media negativity centred around the created "folk devils" of society.

According to Robin Richardson, the features of moral panics include:

- The construction of folk devils who become the metaphorical embodiment of evil and deviancy from societal values.
- Criticism of those who are accused of not understanding, appreciating or admitting the threats that society faces, in particular, officials, religious figures and activists (the "bleeding hearts and do-gooders"), and academics in their apparent ivory towers.
- The connecting of a series of unrelated threats, with the implication that they

are all symptomatic of the same underlying problem.

- The creation of a dichotomy between "us" vs "them" and the assertion that there are no shared interests, values or commonalities between the two.
- A strengthened sense of moral indignation being attributed to the dominant group (the idealised "us" vs a demonised "them").
- Media exaggeration, sensationalism and distortion.
- A pervasive sense of an almost apocalyptic "slippery slope" and the idea that cultural and societal change is out of control.
- A culminating call for restrictions, punitive laws, and the curtailment of the suspect community's civil liberties and freedoms.¹⁸⁰

It is difficult to examine the aforementioned elements of moral panics without acknowledging how all of them are salient features of the ways in which Muslims are presented, commented upon and evaluated within public, political and media discourses.

However, nowhere is this framework of discourse more acutely visible than in the media. Editors and journalists are under constant pressure to meet their commercial responsibilities. However, they should also be aware of their ethical responsibilities to report, explain, and inform the public without inflaming and pandering to public panic and social tensions.

The following section will examine the treatment of Muslims in the media and broadcasting and aims to explore the role of these institutions in the fuelling of Islamophobia.

¹⁸⁰ Robin Richardson, "Islamophobia or anti-Muslim racism – or what? Concepts and terms revisited", *Instead*, accessed 20.06.2018, <http://www.insted.co.uk/anti-muslim-racism.pdf>

Islamophobia and the British press

In conducting research for our submission to the House of Lords select committee inquiry into citizenship and civic engagement,¹⁸¹ MEND noted that one of the greatest barriers faced by Muslim communities was felt to be a toxic atmosphere of hatred that is fuelled and maintained by the moral panic whipped up print and online media.

Indeed, studies have shown that, with 21 negative references to Muslims within British media output for every single neutral or positive reference,¹⁸² the media plays an integral role in spreading prejudice, stereotypes and xenophobic views of vulnerable groups, including those portraying British Muslims as being backwards and illiberal. These negative representations of Muslims are incredibly important for community cohesion and the subsequent ability of British Muslims to fully participate and engage as equal members of society.

The consequences of misrepresentation on public understanding

In the fast-paced world we live in, the majority of the public lacks the time and resources to go out of their way to fully research, critically analyse, and evaluate every article they read. Therefore, the repetitive negative misrepresentation of a particular community by newspapers inevitably results in distorted understandings and, ultimately, the fostering of prejudices.

Indeed, a number of polls have shown that the British public in general are quite ill-informed about the Islamic faith and

Muslims and derive much of their information from the media. A YouGov poll conducted in 2018 by the Muslim Council of Britain (MCB) found that of the 1,629 Britons surveyed, 90% had not been inside a mosque, in recent years.¹⁸³ Another poll conducted by YouGov in 2002 found that of the Britons surveyed, 74% knew “nothing or next to nothing about Islam” and 64% stated that what they did know was “acquired through the media”.¹⁸⁴

Considering the overly negative representation of minorities and British Muslims within the British press (which will be discussed further below), the media’s monopoly on public understanding has detrimental impacts which are acutely felt by minority social, ethnic and religious communities, and Muslims in particular.

Evidence of Islamophobia in the British press

The prevalence of Islamophobia within the British press has been highlighted by several studies, including that of Paul Baker, Tony McEnery, and Costas Gabrielatos.¹⁸⁵ In conducting a discourse analysis on over 200,000 newspaper articles from 11 newspapers mentioning “Islam” or “Muslims”, this study highlighted the frequency with which Muslims and Islam were associated with conflict, with “Islam” and “terror” co-occurring in more than one-third (37.9%) of the texts analysed. This led to the authors concluding that, “[the] most salient finding is that the British Press most frequently positions Islam and Muslims in stories or contexts that relate to conflict”.

¹⁸¹ “MEND submission to the House of Lords Select Committee Hearing on Citizenship and Civil Engagement”, MEND, September 8, 2017, accessed 20.06.2018, https://mend.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/MEND-Submission-to-the-House-of-Lords-Select-Committee-Hearing-on-Citizenship-and-Civil-Engagement_v1.pdf

¹⁸² See Baker, Paul, Costas Gabrielatos, and Tony McEnery. *Discourse analysis and media attitudes: the representation of Islam in the British Press*. Cambridge: University Press, 2013.

¹⁸³ “90% of people haven’t been inside a mosque – change that this weekend!” *Muslim Council of Britain* (MCB), February 13, 2018, accessed 20.06.2018,

<http://www.mcb.org.uk/90-of-people-havent-been-inside-a-mosque-change-that-this-weekend/>

¹⁸⁴ Chris Allen, “A review of the evidence relating to the representation of Muslims and Islam in the British media”, *University of Birmingham*, October 24, 2012, accessed 20.06.2018, <https://www.birmingham.ac.uk/Documents/college-social-sciences/social-policy/IASS/news-events/MEDIA-ChrisAllen-APPGEvidence-Oct2012.pdf>

¹⁸⁵ Paul Baker, Costas Gabrielatos and Tony McEnery, *Discourse Analysis and Media Attitudes: The Representation of Islam in the British Press*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013).

Similarly, another study by Cardiff University¹⁸⁶ found that the bulk of coverage on British Muslims was focussed on “Muslims as a threat (in relation to terrorism), a problem (in terms of differences in values) or both (Muslim extremism in general)”. The study noted that in more than a quarter of the articles investigated, Islam was posed as being “dangerous, backward or irrational” and being in contrast to British Values.

This securitisation of Muslim identities will be further discussed in the later chapter on Securitising Muslim Identities: Security and Counter-Terror.

Studies have also demonstrated that within media discourse, Muslim men and women are consistently presented as homogenous and unitary groups to fit a particular narrative that portrays the former as misogynistic, angry and violent extremists and the latter as passive, oppressed victims. Referring once again to the study conducted by Baker, McEnery and Gabrielatos,¹⁸⁷ the authors made a number of interesting observations on the portrayal of Muslim women in the media. They found that the veil was the most frequent topic that was directly associated with Muslim women, with a total of 9,681 references to the word veil. According to the data, the most frequent construction is of Muslim women being forced to wear the veil. Issues surrounding Muslim women and veiling practices will be further discussed later in a chapter on Public Exclusion, Integration, and Minority Rights.

During the Salman Rushdie affair of the late 1980's, Muslim men acquired the image of violent, book burning youths rioting on Britain's streets. This representation has since been fuelled by

the high-profile terrorist attacks of Al-Qaeda, the ensuing “war on terror”, and more recently, the threat of ISIS. As such, there has been a marked popular fascination with - and fear of - media representations of “angry”, “fundamentalist” and “dangerous” Muslim masculinities. Examples of Muslim masculinity has thus centred on figures such as Saddam Hussain, Osama Bin Laden, Abu Hamza, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and Mohammed Emwazi. As Louise Archer observed in the early 2000s, “Balanced and positive images of ‘normal’ Muslim masculinity appear to be rather thin on the ground.”¹⁸⁸ Nearly two decades later, this situation has made little - if any - progress.

This media negativity creates a hostile image of British Muslims and minorities, thus sowing Islamophobia, xenophobia, and racism into the milieu of British society. Notable tabloid publications that have thus developed an infamous reputation for publishing controversial, xenophobic and Islamophobic stories including The Sun and The Daily Mail; both being singled out for criticism by name by the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI).¹⁸⁹ The ECRI accused the Daily Mail, of playing a “prominent role in encouraging prejudice” against vulnerable groups, whilst also reporting that both the Daily Mail and the Sun “are responsible for most of the offensive, discriminatory and provocative terminology”. Concluding that “hate speech in some traditional media continues to be a serious problem”,¹⁹⁰ the report highlighted articles such as the Sun's “Rescue boats? I'd use gunships to stop migrants”, in which the columnist, Katie Hopkins, likened migrants to cockroaches, and also

¹⁸⁶ Kerry Moore, Paul Mason and Justin Lewis, “Images of Islam in the UK: The Representation of British Muslims in the National Print News Media 2000-2008”, Cardiff University, July 7, 2008, accessed 20.06.2018, <http://orca.cf.ac.uk/53005/1/08channel4-dispatches.pdf>

¹⁸⁷ See Baker et al., *Discourse analysis and media attitudes*

¹⁸⁸ Louise Archer, *Race, Masculinity and Schooling: Muslim Boys and Education* (Maidenhead, Berkshire, England: Open University Press, 2003), 1.

¹⁸⁹ “ECRI Report On The United Kingdom”, *Council of Europe*, October 4, 2016, accessed 20.12.2017, https://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/ecri/country-by-country/united_kingdom/gbr-cbc-v-2016-038-eng.pdf

¹⁹⁰ “ECRI Report On The United Kingdom”, *Council of Europe*, October 4, 2016, accessed 20.12.2017, https://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/ecri/country-by-country/united_kingdom/gbr-cbc-v-2016-038-eng.pdf

highlighted The Sun's front-page headline "1 in 5 Brit Muslims' sympathy for jihadis" which was subsequently found to be wholly inaccurate and a forced retraction and apology was issued. Furthermore, in 2017, the Daily Mail was banned as a reliable source on Wikipedia due to its "reputation for poor fact checking and sensationalism".¹⁹¹

Highlighting the role of certain elements of the British press in fuelling moral panic, the United Nations Refugee Agency (UNHCR) pointed to the disturbing journalism of the Sun and the Daily Mail, arguing that, "The two right wing tabloids in our sample, the Daily Mail and Sun, were unlike anything else in our study... what really differentiated these two titles was their aggressive editorialising around threat themes, and in particular how they presented refugee and migrants as a burden on Britain's welfare state. Both papers also featured humanitarian themes at a much lower level than any other newspapers in our study. Overall, this meant that the Sun and the Daily Mail exhibited both a hostility, and a lack of empathy with refugees and migrants that was unique."¹⁹²

However, the Sun and the Daily Mail are reflective of a wider problem. Indeed, the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Zeid Ra'ad Al-Hussein, drew similar conclusions in 2015, when he noted that "decades of sustained and unrestrained anti-foreigner abuse, misinformation and distortion" were identified as a major problem in British press. He called on all European countries to take a firmer line on racism and xenophobia which "under the guise of freedom of expression, are being allowed to feed a vicious cycle of vilification, intolerance and politicization of migrants, as well as of marginalized European minorities".

The impacts of media negativity on Muslim communities

MEND's definition of Islamophobia focusses on processes that work (intentionally or otherwise) to exclude Muslims from enjoying the freedoms and rights that come with full participation in all spheres of public life. As such, the impact of Islamophobic narratives within the media needs to be fully examined.

Firstly, the level of bias, misinformation and distortion within reporting on British Muslims has fostered a sense of distrust in the media institutions amongst parts of the Muslim community, and for many individuals, has led to a disengagement from traditional media. This further compounds a lack of understanding of Muslim communities within the media as suspicion creates an unwillingness to engage even with journalists who do genuinely wish to honestly represent a nuanced understanding. Thus, even genuine journalists are deprived of the opportunity to represent diverse experiences.

Secondly, this Muslim disengagement is often accompanied by a sense of frustration and insecurity with regards to their perceived place and value in society. Thus, a sense of a lack of social value develops in reaction to accusations of Muslim incompatibility with a national identity.

Finally, the culmination of distorted images and the ultimate impact on public understanding of Muslims and Islam can only lead to severe damage to the relationships between Muslims and wider communities. Such misunderstanding has a variety of consequences, including, but not limited to:

Hate crime: The Home Affairs Select Committee on Hate Crime and its Violent Consequences has specifically looked into

¹⁹¹ Jackson, Jasper. "Wikipedia bans Daily Mail as 'unreliable' source." The Guardian. February 8, 2017. <https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/feb/08/wikipedia-bans-daily-mail-as-unreliable-source-for-website>.

¹⁹² "Press Coverage of the Refugee and Migrant Crisis in the EU: A Content Analysis of Five European Countries", UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR), accessed 20.12.2017, <http://www.unhcr.org/uk/protection/operations/56bb369c9/press-coverage-refugee-migrant-crisis-eu-content-analysis-five-european.html> p. 253.

the impact of media representation of minority communities and hate crime levels, recognising the unambiguous link. Rt Hon Baroness Warsi of Dewsbury, giving evidence on the impact of media representation on hate crime, noted "There is evidence to show that this does play into the way people react on the street, the kind of things people quote back when they engage in hate crime".¹⁹³

Discrimination: As a later chapter on economic exclusion will demonstrate, stereotypes of Muslims and resulting workplace discrimination has a vastly detrimental impact to Muslims ability to fully realise their potential in the labour market.

Marginalisation: As our previous discussion on moral panic suggests, the fuelling of public misunderstanding of Muslims often culminates in calls for restrictions, punitive laws, and the curtailment of their civil liberties and freedoms.¹⁹⁴ This can readily be seen in issues surrounding areas such as integration and security, both of which are discussed later in this report.

Lack of accountability and protection

With the aforementioned negativity and damaging impact on British Muslims and minorities, it is worthwhile to briefly examine the role of regulation in upholding accountability and protecting minorities from press abuses.

The Leveson Inquiry

In July 2011, following revelations about phone hacking and other illegal practices committed by News of The World, the Leveson Inquiry was established to look into the culture, practices and ethics of the press. During the course of the inquiry, it became evident that hacking had occurred at various Mirror Group titles, and that

data breaches occurred at a number of other titles.

Amongst other findings, Sir Brian Leveson concluded that the existing Press Complaints Commission (PCC) was unfit for purpose and complaints about the press were not being taken seriously enough. Meanwhile, even when an apology was agreed, newspapers pursued their own vengeance through "*high-volume, extremely personal attacks on those who challenge them*".¹⁹⁵ As such, Leveson recommended the establishment of a new regulatory body to hold the media to account which was independent and free from both government and press influence. He further stated that this regulator must have the following:

A group complaints position. Under the current regulator (which is now IPSO), only the individual affected by a published story can make a complaint about discrimination. In practice, this means that there is no protection against whole groups – such as Muslims or refugees – being demonised or stereotyped. Furthermore, in respect to accuracy and other code-breaches, the individual most-closely affected must bring the complaint. This means that a person cannot defend themselves against inaccurate reporting if they are in a coma, for example. Leveson recommended resolutions to these deficiencies.

The power to sufficiently remedy breaches to the editors' codes of practice and enforce sanctions where necessary. He recommended that the new regulator should have the power to decide on the placement and size of corrections, settled by an independent board, the power to require apologies to be published, and the power to fine newspapers up to £1m.

A whistle-blower hotline: Leveson further recommended that a whistle-blowing

¹⁹³ "Oral Evidence: Hate crime and its violent consequences", *Home Affairs Committee*, February 20, 2018, accessed 20.06.2018, <http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/home-affairs-committee/hate-crime-and-its-violent-consequences/oral/78630.pdf>

¹⁹⁴ Richardson, "Islamophobia or anti-Muslim racism..."

¹⁹⁵ Ibid.

hotline should be established for journalists who feel under pressure to do unethical things or to otherwise act against the editors' code.

IPSO failings

Despite Leveson's recommendations, the regulator which arose to replace the PCC was the Independent Press Standards Organisation (IPSO). IPSO fails to be Leveson-compliant and routinely fails to investigate articles, fails to demonstrate adequate professionalism in dealing with complaints, and fails to impose punishments that are proportionate to the significance of the story contested.

Pointless remedies: the corrections demanded by IPSO for breaches in the Editors' Code of Practice are typically severely delayed and far less prominent than the original inaccuracy. This is especially so where the whole story is false, or the headline is part of the breach. A case in point is that IPSO has never ordered a front-page correction for a front-page breach. Therefore, there is no real consequence for publishers who publish what is effectively "fake news".

An example of this can be found in IPSO's dealing with The Sun in 2015. In November 2015, The Sun published a front-page story with the misleading and inflammatory headline '1 in 5 Brit Muslims' sympathy for jihadis'. This article was run 10 days after the Bataclan terrorist attack, during a time when British and European Muslims were experiencing increased anti-Muslim suspicion and hostility. The Sun's article did not accurately report on the poll that it cited. The actual poll asked individuals whether they had sympathy with "young Muslims who leave the UK to join fighters in Syria". The Sun's reporting failed to point out that "sympathy" is not the same thing as "support" or "agreement" and that not all fighters in Syria are jihadis. The polling company itself stated, "Survation

do not support or endorse the way in which the poll's findings have been interpreted."¹⁹⁶ Four months after complaints were lodged to IPSO, they required the publication to print a short piece buried on page 2 with the vague title "Ipso ruling upheld", in which the nature of the complaint was obscured. Given the misleading and deeply damaging impact of the original headline, a more appropriate response would have been for IPSO to require a prompt front-page correction in The Sun. The failure to give the correction equal prominence in a timely fashion did nothing to limit the damage that this piece of fake news had already done.

Inaction: IPSO frequently fails to act upon complaints in a way that seems to defy both common sense and their duty to regulation. Indeed, in February, the Home Affairs Committee inquiry into hate crime and its violent consequences heard evidence that since IPSO's inception it had received around 18,666 complaints on claims of discrimination, of which only 7 have been upheld as being a breach of IPSO's Editors' Code of Practice.¹⁹⁷

By way of example, in August 2017, the *Times* printed a story headlined "Christian child forced into Muslim foster care". The article made a number of misleading statements and provided an inaccurate account of the situation. For example, the article falsely claimed that the child was fostered by a family who "don't speak English", while the London Borough of Tower Hamlets stated that the child was fostered by an "English-speaking family of mixed race in this temporary placement". In response, MEND submitted eight individual concerns to IPSO regarding the inaccurate and distorted content of the article under Clause 1 (Accuracy) of the Editors' Code. IPSO stated that it would not investigate any of these complaints due to its concern about the effect investigating

¹⁹⁶ "Statement on Survation's Poll of Muslims for The Sun", *Survation*, accessed 10.01.2017, <http://survation.com/statement-on-survations-poll-of-muslims-for-the-sun/>

¹⁹⁷ "Oral Evidence: Hate crime and its violent consequences..."

the facts of the case would have on the child. This justification for refusal to investigate is unreasonable, given that the Times had already published stories on the subject, and given the extensive wider public debate that had subsequently occurred. For IPSO, taking no action to verify the information published is an abdication of its responsibility and demonstrates inadequate commitment to upholding press standards and ethics.

Lack of impartiality: This is an issue that is well highlighted in the case of Fatima Manji. In July 2016, Fatima Manji reported on the Nice terror attacks for Channel Four. In response, Kelvin MacKenzie wrote a piece in the Sun attacking Channel Four for having a Muslim woman wearing hijab while reporting on a terrorist incident. When Manji and ITN filed an IPSO complaint on the basis of discrimination, harassment, and inaccuracy, IPSO rejected the complaint,¹⁹⁸ stating that MacKenzie's comment that Islam "was clearly a violent religion" was his opinion and could not, therefore, be deemed inaccurate. Furthermore, IPSO board member, Trevor Kavanagh, publicly defended MacKenzie and stated that Manji had "made a fool of herself."¹⁹⁹ A cross-party group of MPs and peers subsequently wrote to IPSO, expressing concern that Kavanagh made these comments while sitting on the regulator's board. IPSO responded that while Kavanagh sits on its board, he is not a member of the Complaints Committee that passes judgements and therefore "has no involvement in any rulings made by IPSO. The views expressed by Mr Kavanagh in his column following the IPSO ruling on Manji v The Sun were made in a personal capacity and do not represent the view of IPSO".²⁰⁰ This response from IPSO brings into question its ability to

function as a genuinely independent and effective regulatory body.

Leveson and the Government's failure to keep its promises to the victims of press abuse

Nathan Sparkes

Hacked Off Campaign

The Leveson Inquiry was established following revelations of widespread illegality at the News of the World, and since the report of Part One of the Inquiry, it has been revealed that the criminality included other newspaper groups.

But the inquiry exposed another scandal altogether: a breakdown in ethical standards, and a total absence of regulation across the British press.

So the Leveson Inquiry was about much more than illegality. It was also about coverage and newsgathering activities which are not illegal, and which no one is campaigning to make illegal, but which nonetheless are abusive, unethical, damaging to the public interest and which rightfully require remedy.

A leading example of this unethical conduct is the treatment of Muslims by some elements of the press. This consists of pejorative or abusive coverage based on race or religion, often combined with deliberate or reckless inaccuracy which goes wholly or mostly uncorrected.

Accuracy

Firstly, while innocent errors are made by journalists all the time (and no one is suggesting sanctions for every occasion some minor detail is misreported), where damaging inaccuracies are deliberate or reckless the fact of a standards breach must be recorded, and there ought to be consequences – whether that is steps taken

¹⁹⁸ Decision of the Complaints Committee 05935-16 Manji v The Sun, IPSO, accessed 10.01.2018, <https://www.ipso.co.uk/rulings-and-resolution-statements/ruling/?id=05935-16>

¹⁹⁹ "Gary Lineker forgets that we're not racist – we just don't like being conned", *The Sun*, October 24, 2016, accessed 20.06.2018,

<https://www.thesun.co.uk/news/2035066/gary-lineker-forgets-that-were-not-racist-we-just-dont-like-being-conned/>

²⁰⁰ "Response to Trevor Kavanagh's column in yesterday's Sun", IPSO, accessed 10.01.2018, <https://www.ipso.co.uk/news-press-releases/press-releases/response-to-trevor-kavanagh-s-column-in-yesterday-s-sun/>

to root out malice and incompetence, or educating those making editorial decisions.

Secondly, where inaccuracies or distortions are significant, they should be corrected with equivalent prominence and apologised for where appropriate.

Thirdly, when distortions, lies, misrepresentations or avoidable errors cause harm to a specific group of people, such as Muslims, then investigations should be initiated to address the systemic breaches of ethical standards.

Discrimination

The Standards Code covering newspapers needs to protect vulnerable groups from newspaper coverage which is equivalent to hate speech. The Code itself should be the responsibility of an independent regulator which is capable of crafting a rule that balances freedom to criticise ideas (including religions) and groups of people where there is a legitimate public interest (such as members of organisations which promote violent extremism), with the need for vulnerable groups to be protected from hate speech and discrimination.

Leveson recommended that an independent regulator be established for the press, which has;

- The power to require published apologies,
- Sufficient independence to order published corrections of equivalent prominence to the original breach,
- The ability to mount investigations where breaches of the regulator's code are serious or systemic,
- And control of the Code, so that it can be amended to meet the public interest (for example in protecting vulnerable groups from hate speech).

But most newspapers have rejected Leveson's recommendations, and instead joined the industry body IPSO, which fails Leveson's tests and does none of the above.

Lacking the necessary powers and independence, IPSO has never ordered an equivalent prominence frontpage correction against a national title. It has no power to require published apologies. Whereas Leveson insists that regulators have the power to launch investigations where code breaches are serious *or* systemic, IPSO allows them only where breaches are both serious *and* systemic, and it has never launched a single investigation in its four-year existence.

In terms of discriminatory and hateful articles, IPSO's rules and record are even worse.

Lumbered with an ethics code which it does not write – a code which instead is written almost exclusively by newspaper editors – IPSO is prevented from applying the discrimination clause in the code to groups of people. The effect is that an article which discriminates or is pejorative against an individual is subject to the code, yet an article which smears and abuses an entire group, such as Muslims, is not covered by the Code.

While there may be some cases where it is a close judgment between prejudicial and offensive coverage which may offend, but is justifiable in the public interest, and that which is not, there should be an independent regulator able to make that judgement as Leveson recommended.

For example, in August 2017 Trevor Kavanagh used the phrase "The Muslim Problem" in an article linking Muslims with child abuse. A clear reference to rhetoric used by the Nazi Party about Jewish people, this was not only offensive, it was abusive and discriminatory and should clearly have been subject to regulatory sanction.

Yet IPSO refused to uphold any complaint. It could do nothing because it is subject to a Code written by a group of editors who have always refused to outlaw unjustifiable hate speech, while IPSO itself has not been sufficiently independent to

request a change in the Code (this is not surprising as Kavanagh was on the board of IPSO at the time).

When the Leveson Inquiry was established, the Prime Minister of the time, David Cameron, promised to victims of press abuse, Parliament, and the public that reform would come. Yet six years on, most newspapers are members of the same complaints-handler as before the Inquiry began, albeit having been renamed. An absence of regulation for newspapers persists.

The consequences of this are not abstract or hypothetical. They are felt profoundly both by individuals who are targeted by the press, and by groups who suffer daily hostility from a powerful and unaccountable industry.

Instead of standing up to the press, this Government has conspired with press owners and executives to block reform. In a craven act of cover-up and supplication, the Government has cancelled the second half of the Leveson Inquiry, which - in addition to investigating the illegality which gave rise to Part One of the Inquiry and has emerged since - could have investigated the rise of Islamophobic press coverage.

The Government and press editors and executives should, in a democracy, be the worst of enemies. But on press regulation, they have operated in partnership to prevent reform at the expense of the public interest.

To protect the public, and to support working journalists - who can only benefit from the Leveson reforms - the Government should implement the Leveson recommendations and begin Part Two of the Inquiry immediately.

Broadcasting

Media broadcasting is crucial in nurturing a nation's sense of shared identity, history, and social norms. It is the mirror through which the nation recognises and continually evaluates itself. With the consequent potential for societal cohesive benefit being so tremendous and indelible, it is essential that we construct, develop and maintain popular images that are inclusive of our highly diverse and multicultural nation. The lack of inclusive images because of a lack of minority representation results in a vision which neglects segments of society and thus alienates and marginalises minority communities. The problem is exacerbated with the few BAME actors who do manage to break through the barriers being cast in stereotypical roles, with the BFI Creative Director, Heather Stewart, noting in 2016 that the "types of films in which they [BAME actors] have had leading roles suggests stereotyping. Colour-blind casting across genres does not really exist on the big screen..."²⁰¹ Therefore, the simultaneous absence of minority representation and normalised images of minority communities means there is a persistent development of a broadcast narrative which at worst excludes and at best stereotypes minority communities.

One historical example of this is the blockbuster 2017 film *Dunkirk*, "that told the story of the mass evacuation of Allied soldiers in World War II, contained no non-white actors. It has thus been criticised for whitewashing the brave contribution of Muslim and black soldiers".²⁰²

Various studies have shown that there is a considerable lack of minority representation in the British film industry, with high levels of discrimination experienced by BAME individuals attempting to enter the industry and those

²⁰¹ "New BFI research reveals representation of black actors in UK film over last 10 years". BFI. 06/10/2016. Accessed on: 12/06/2018. <http://www.bfi.org.uk/sites/bfi.org.uk/files/downloads/bfi-press-release-new-bfi-research-reveals-representation-of-black-actors-in-film-2016-10-06.pdf>.

²⁰² Robert Fisk, "When you watch *Dunkirk*, remember that it's a whitewashed version which ignores the bravery of black and Muslim soldiers", *The Independent*, August 3, 2017, accessed 20.06.2018, <http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/dunkirk-france-1940-french-soldiers-algeria-commonwealth-white-wash-a7874501.html>

within the industry. One study concerned with diversity within the British film industry and conducted by the CAMEO Research Institute at the University of Leicester,²⁰³ found that BAME workers comprised 4.4% of the broadcasting workforce, compared to 13% of the UK population. This figure was even lower when considering BAME directors which was limited to 3.5%. Another study, by Grugulis & Stoyanova (2012), found that “members of ethnic minorities or working class were less likely to secure jobs and were often restricted in the jobs they held”.²⁰⁴ Numerous other studies corroborate these findings, giving rise to the conclusion that BAME individuals are heavily underrepresented, restricted to particular jobs and denied progression within the field.

These findings are paralleled in studies which have investigated minority representation in the television industry, with significant concern arising from the failure of broadcasters to adequately monitor the diversity of their workforce. A study by Ofcom, the UK’s communication regulator, found that broadcasters surveyed were only able to provide ethnicity data on 81% of the industry’s employees and religious data for only 33% of employees.²⁰⁵ As there is a considerable lack of data monitoring on the contribution of minorities within the field, it is difficult to accurately analyse the diversity of the industry. Perhaps the only firm judgement one can make is that the procedures through which broadcasters are currently organising and collating data on diversity and minority representation are thoroughly inadequate. That said, there is still ample evidence to suggest that BAME groups are under-represented at particular

levels within the TV industry. The study by Directors UK (2015), noted that of the programmes sampled at the time only 1.5% were made by a BAME director.²⁰⁶ Furthermore, the study also added that “analysis at sub-genre level revealed there are a number of areas where 0% of episodes have been made by a BAME director”. This included genres such as sketch shows, children’s comedy, reality, and period drama, amongst others. Therefore, the question is not one of whether or not there is a problem, rather, it is an issue of how it is being monitored, investigated and tackled.

A study conducted from 2006-2016 found that of the British films produced in the period nearly 60% failed to cast a single Black actor.²⁰⁷ In 2014, a number of British BAME actors and writers who had left the UK for international markets wrote an open letter to the heads of the British TV industry calling for greater diversity, with signatories including the likes of Idris Elba and David Oyelowo, who had travelled to the US to make their major breaks.²⁰⁸

An excellent analysis of this lack of diversity has been produced by Campion who explores the reasons behind it based on interviews with over 100 media professionals and her own extensive experience in the industry. She argues that there are many factors underpinning the lack of cultural diversity in this area, including conservative commissioners leading to “safe” conservative commissioning and a lack of BAME faces at a senior level, especially in senior creative and editorial roles. She cites challenges at recruiting and then retaining talented BAME professionals, and the problem of them leaving due to

²⁰³ “Workforce Diversity in the UK Screen Sector: Evidence Review”, *Cameo Research Institute: Leicester*, 2018, accessed 20.06.2018, <http://www.bfi.org.uk/sites/bfi.org.uk/files/downloads/bfi-workforce-diversity-in-uk-screen-sector-evidence-review-2018-03.pdf>

²⁰⁴ Irena Grugulis and Dimitrinka Stoyanova, “Social Capital and Networks in Film and TV: Jobs for the Boys?”, *Organization Studies*, Vol. 33, Issue 10, 2012.

²⁰⁵ Diversity and Equal Opportunities in Television”, *Ofcom*, September 14, 2017, accessed 20.06.2018, <https://www.ofcom.org.uk/tv-radio-and-on-demand/information-for-industry/guidance/diversity/diversity-equal-opportunities-television>

²⁰⁶ “UK Television Adjusting the Colour Balance: Black, Asian and Minority Ethnic Directors in UK Television Production”, *Directors UK*, accessed 20.06.2018, <https://d29dpxe14uxvcr.cloudfront.net/uploads%2F1447243539508-os03d6qe4pmsra4i-7c96b125575ce06ca956559154962a0a%2FDirectors+UK+-+UK+Television%2C+Adjusting+the+Colour+Balance.pdf>

²⁰⁷ “New BFI research reveals representation of black...”

²⁰⁸ “Letter to BBC and other broadcasters: actors and writers call for action over diversity”, *The Guardian*, August 20, 2014, accessed 20.06.2018, <https://www.theguardian.com/media/2014/aug/20/bbc-broadcasters-open-letter-actors-writers-diversity-bame>

disillusionment, especially in large traditional organisations such as the BBC.

The solution to the problems, she argues, lies in embedding the concept of “cultural intelligence”, which is defined as a “way of valuing diverse cultural knowledge and experience in programme-making”, and which includes sensitive and intelligent the portrayal of marginalised groups, reflecting “authentic voices” from those groups, helping to understand others and therefore ourselves.

She states that cultural intelligence needs to be built into each stage of programme making, including commissioning, production, scheduling, and promotion. She also advocates the use of cultural intelligence master classes to promote such a dialogue and instil change.²⁰⁹

Taking into account the lack of minority representation in the industry, the problem of minority representation is worsened further by type-casting of BAME actors to stereotypical roles. Research conducted by BFI between 2006 and 2016 found that Black actors were highly unlikely to be casted into lead roles of dramas (255 out of 387 films failing to cast any black actor, 66%), comedies (178 out of 287, 62%) or thrillers (100 out of 169, 59%), but were very likely to be cast as lead in crime films (69 out of 107 films featured black actors, 65%), fantasy (24 out of 39, 61%) and musicals (8 out of 15, 53%).²¹⁰ The study stated that the most frequent themes of the productions in which Black actors were featured included “slavery, racism, colonialism, crime and gangs” and noted that this “suggests a pattern in which black actors are being cast mainly in stereotypical stories”. Another study by Sam Friedman and Dave O’Brien found that there was an “oversupply of leading roles for white, male, middle-class actors”

and BAME actors were restricted to “largely socially caricatured roles”.²¹¹

Though it may be tempting to treat these figures as abstract and inconsequential to society, there is significant evidence highlighting the very tangible impact of the underrepresentation of minorities and the systemic inequalities prevalent in broadcast media. Repercussions of underrepresentation include the disenfranchisement of viewers from minority communities and the departure of actors from minority backgrounds to international markets.

Research conducted by Webber, a specialist research and insight consultancy, in 2016²¹² found that audiences from minority communities were generally less likely to watch major TV channels compared to the general population, with the gap increasing if the particular channel demonstrates lower levels of on-screen diversity. The study found that BAME audiences were 14.1% less likely to watch BBC One’s News at Six compared to all individuals investigated and were 2.4% more likely to watch Channel Four’s News at Five compared to all individuals investigated. The difference between the two news channels being that the latter has introduced a number of BAME reporters including: Fatima Manji, Symeon Brown, Keme Nzerem, Jamal Osman, Assed Baig, as well as others.

These restricted roles available to BAME actors which represent highly varied minority communities means that harmful and prevalent stereotypes bias the way society perceives these communities and how the community members perceive themselves. In 2011, a study, “Media Representations and Impact on the Lives of

²⁰⁹ Mukti Jain Campion, “Look who’s Talking. Cultural Diversity, Public Service Broadcasting and the National Conversation”, *Nuffield College Oxford*, October 2005, accessed 20.06.2018, <http://www.nuff.ox.ac.uk/guardian/lookwhostalking.pdf>

²¹⁰ “New BFI research reveals representation of black...”

²¹¹ Sam Friedman and Dave O’Brien, “Resistance and resignation: responses to typecasting in British acting”, *Cultural Sociology*, 2017, 11 (3), accessed 20.06.2018, http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/84231/1/Friedman_Resistance%20and%20resignation.pdf

²¹² Trevor Phillips, “British media: not quite black and white”, *Open Democracy*, March 2, 2016, accessed 20.06.2018, <https://www.opendemocracy.net/ourbeeb/trevor-phillips/british-tv-not-quite-black-and-white>

Black Men and Boys”,²¹³ looked into the impact of stereotypical roles of Black males on “their actual life chances”. The results demonstrated that the portrayals reinforced general antagonism towards Black males, reduced attention to structural and other big-picture factors, and exaggerated views related to criminality and violence associated with BAME communities. They further noted that the images resulted in BAME community members being “demoralised” and having “reduce[d] self-esteem”.

Abstract from Riz Ahmed’s speech at Channel 4’s annual diversity lecture in Parliament²¹⁴

Now, as a lot of the politicians in the room might know, it’s sometimes the most fantastical and unrealistic stories that make the biggest impact. But even in those stories, what people are looking for is a message that they belong; they’re part of something; that they are seen and heard and that despite – or perhaps because – of the uniqueness of their experience they are valued.

They want to feel represented.

That’s really what we do, that’s what we have in common, that’s the game we’re in. We’re here to represent. It’s that simple.

And in that task, it pains me to say we have failed.

It’s been a noble failure, we’ve been taking large strides in the right direction, sometimes a bit slower than we’d like, sometimes a bit too incremental, sometimes not really seizing the bull by its horn but we have fallen short of the mark and when we fail to represent people switch off. They switch off on telly, they switch off at the ballot box and they retreat to other fringe narratives which are sometimes very dangerous.

Now everywhere the old order is in flames, right? Whether in film and television with the advent of streaming and a globalised marketplace or whether at the ballot box with the ascendance of populism, some people like to call it.

...We’re in search of a new national story. It needs updating. The old one stopped making sense to people, it stopped giving meaning to the complex reality and the new realities that they’re facing and I’m here to ask for your help. I’m here to ask for your help in finding a new national story that embraces and empowers as many of us as possible rather than excluding us and alienating large sections of the population. In this, like it or not, we need each other.

Now, what’s at stake? I just want to take a moment to kind of reframe what we’re talking about. What’s at stake here, I mean, in this age of populism it can sometimes seem like talking about diversity is kind of swimming against the current, going against the grain, “is political correctness gone mad?” and all that kind of thing, right?

It’s an added extra, it’s a frill, it’s a luxury. That’s what diversity can sound like. The very phrase actually turns me off a little bit. It sounds like there’s a call, a benchmark, against which everything is measured and then there’s a little bit of something you could sprinkle on top. A little bit of salt, a little bit of spice...it’s something you can live with, but you can also live without. And to me that really doesn’t put into focus how crucial what we are talking about really is.

We’re talking about representation, not diversity. Representation is not an added extra. It’s not a thrill. It’s absolutely fundamental to what people expect from culture and from politics.

²¹³ “Media Representations and Impact on the Lives of Black Men and Boys”, *The Opportunity Agenda*, October 2011, accessed 20.06.2018,

<http://racialequitytools.org/resourcefiles/Media-Impact-onLives-of-Black-Men-and-Boys-OpAgenda.pdf>

²¹⁴ Watch at <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=36bcxDVNr1s&t=2s>

What's at stake isn't just whether or not I get the next acting role I want (although that would be nice). *Audience member asks "what do you want?"*. Oh, it'd be nice to have a Star Wars prequel, actually.

What's really at stake here is much, much bigger than that.

After the Brexit vote hate crimes went up 41%, against Muslims it went up 326%. In the 1930s we had a very similar situation to what we have today: political polarization, economic disenfranchisement after a big financial crash, rising inequality, systematic scapegoating of certain minorities.

What's at stake here is whether or not we will move forward together or whether we will leave people behind. That's what's at stake if we don't step up and represent.

Now if we fail to represent, I think we're in danger of losing out in three ways, the three Es:

- One we're going to lost people to extremism.
- Second, we're going to lose out on an expansive idea of who we are as individuals and as a community.
- And thirdly, we're going to really lose out on the economic benefits that proper representation can bring to our economy.

Let me just start off this first point of extremism. I remember when, my mum and sister are here right now; I remember when they'd be watching TV downstairs in the lounge and I'd be upstairs you know, playing my Gameboy or whatever and all of a sudden, I'd hear one of them call out and they're watching TV: "Asiaaaaaan!"

And you quickly press pause on the Gameboy, turn it off and run downstairs just to go and look: Sanjeev Bhaskar in Goodness Gracious Me; Meera Syal, Bhaji on the Beach; Parminder Nagra, Bend it like Beckham; Jimi Mistry, "East is East". If you're used to seeing yourself reflected in culture, you really...I really want you to

just take a minute to kind of understand how much it means to someone who doesn't, to see themselves reflected back.

Every time you see yourself in a magazine, in a billboard, TV, film, it's a message that you matter, you're part of a national story, that you're valued, you feel represented.

Now if we fail to represent people in our mainstream narratives, they'll switch off, they'll retreat to fringe narratives to filter bubbles online and sometimes, even off to Syria. In the mind of the ISIS recruit, he's a version of James Bond, right? In their mind, everyone thinks they're the good guy. Have you seen some of these ISIS propaganda videos? They're cut like action movies. Where's the counter narrative? Where are we telling these kids that they can be heroes in our stories? That they're valued?

I saw an interesting survey recently. It was a Gallup poll, it was a survey of a billion Muslims, and it took years and years to get done. I'm citing Dalia Mogahed here. And it was really interesting, they asked a billion Muslims what are their key grievances with the "West". I've problems with that term, but what are the Key grievances? And number one... the disconnect between the West-stated values and their foreign policy. We'll talk about that another day (if you'd invite me back). But number two on the list of grievances was the depiction of Muslims in the media.

I mean that's massive. I mean, of a billion Muslims in the world that is a number two grievance.

This isn't just a signal to give me more acting work. It's something that should give us pause and realise how important it is to feel represented.

Now that's extremism, it's not just important to show people themselves and to send a signal that they are valued and worthwhile and represented. It's also really important, I think, to show people characters and stories that don't resemble

them at all. If we don't, we lose out on the second E, an expansive idea of who we are.

...The power of stories to allow us to relate to stories that don't resemble our own is phenomenal and every time we see those experiences, it reminds us than what unites us is far, far greater than what divides us.

Culture is a place where you can put yourself in someone else's shoes; and a one-size shoe shop just doesn't make any sense.

...Just a quick aside – I think some of this is about history. Looking up at this beautiful painting over here I'm going to assume its World War One? World War One, maybe? Over a million Indians fought and died for Great Britain in World War One. No one ever told me that at school, we never learned about the British Empire, we never learned about whose blood, sweat, tears, hopes and fears are baked into the bricks in this building. If we did learn about that, maybe we wouldn't think about diversity and throwing people crumbs out of politeness, maybe we'd think about giving people their due, and representing them.

It was only recently that I learnt the first Indian MP was in the 1850s, the first black footballer was in the 1860s, Edward the Seventh had a black trumpeter, ironically named John Blanke, and actually even our England's first border patrol force was a North African legion fighting for the Italian Roman army to keep the Scots on the other side of Hadrian's Wall. So even our anti-immigration movement has been really multicultural for thousands of years. That's how deep it goes, so we're missing out, we're losing people to extremism, we're losing an expansive idea of who we are. But most importantly, given the Brexit bill we're facing that we've got to pay, we're losing out on money!

We're losing out on my taxes. I can tell you from my own experience anecdotally and David Oyelowo spoke about this recently at Black Star symposium, Idris spoke about this last year. We end up going to America

to find work. I meet with producers here, meet with directors, I think they're being honest when they say they want to work with me, but they say "we just don't have anything for you, all our stories are set in Cornwall in the sixteen hundreds".

Never mind that Cornwall already had a really busy Indian takeaway at that point, you just don't want to tell that story. But it's weird because I mean, Asians are such a proportion of the population here, right? It's such a small comparative proportion of the population in America ... And yet, it takes American remakes of British shows to cast someone like me.

There was a report recently, I think that Ruby McGregor Smith turned in that Sajid Javid MP commissioned and it was about diversity in our economy as a whole. What it showed is that if black minority ethnic professional workers were afforded promotion at the same rate and with the same frequency as their white counterparts it could add 24 billion pounds to our economy each year. It's not a zero-sum game, there's room for everyone up there.

And if you look at the box office, a study recently by the Bunche Foundation showed that the most diversely cast and made films are the ones that do best in the American box office. It just taps into different markets.

...So those are the things we are missing out on if we fail to represent properly: we're losing people to extremism, we're losing out on an expansive idea of who we could be, and in the eyes of the world, and we're losing out on the economic benefits. So how are we doing?

We've heard some figures already, I'm not going to go into too much detail...I will say this: sometimes it's very easy to look at the screen and go "oh look, things are changing so much...Look there's Riz, there's Idris, there's Michaela Coel doing Chewing gum". These examples are often prominent because they are the exception

that proves the rule. Prominent successes can mask structural problems.

Obama was in the White House and you still needed the Black Lives Matter movement. I'm getting on a plane to LA to attend the Star Wars premiere and I still get that second search before I board the plane.

By the way, if you've never had the experience of being asked for a selfie by someone who's swabbing you for explosives...I'd recommend it. Really quite, quite thrilling. Do they love me? Do they hate me? Oooh not sure...

Gains are hard won and we have to fight hard to keep them.

Only 1-4.5% of directors of TV dramas are from black and minority ethnic backgrounds. For period drama which we love making so much of, and long may it continue, it's good for our economy as well, the figure is 0%. So it completely shuts out from helping to shape our national narrative and the history of who we are.

Meanwhile, the participation of people from private schools, such as myself, I got a government assisted place to attend a private school, is 14% when they're 7% of the population.

...if I look at my own journey two things jump out on me: one, we need to safeguard the opportunities and access to the creative industries amongst marginalised and underrepresented groups.

Yes, this is about mentorship, it's about skills, it's about training.

...We need to preserve the access and funding in community centres, we need to make sure that a hike in tuition fees doesn't stop people from going to drama school and pursuing careers in the creative industries, otherwise we'll all lose.

Now, that's the skills and training argument, but there's another argument. The other argument is that actually we've got enough people who are skilled and well trained to hire, it's just a hiring

problem. A lot of people, I'm hearing this from a lot of people anecdotally, what I've seen, is actually this is the case. We all have unconscious bias. Ruby McGregor Smith's report into our economy as a whole showed that unconscious bias is responsible for stopping career progression of minorities.

Now we can train against unconscious bias or even better I propose, if you'll humour me, tying public money to proper representation targets, so that decision-making rooms, the rooms in which decisions are made are representative of our community, of our nation, and tell a story that represents us all. So that when everyone ends up exercising their unconscious bias, somewhere in the wash it works out being kind of representative. It just makes sense.

Centre forwards are valued on how many goals the score, we are in the business of representation. If we don't represent, you've got to go. It's really that simple. That is what we're here to do.

I really think that Government has to step in. It's only Government that's going to have the long view and see the really, really big picture... People making television programmes often are trying to turn out a hit and worried about their jobs in a competitive industry. I get it. It's only when government steps in to set the rules of the game that you will foster true innovation, the same way that you do in the arms industry, the same way you do when you support the Olympics and it brings a massive boom to how we're seen around the world. They'll thank you for it in the long run; you won't be handcuffing them to anything, because what's at stake here is whether or not we can move forward together. We're really at a very critical moment in our nation's history.

We can feel it.

If we don't step up and tell a representative story, we're going to start losing people, we're going to start losing people to other

stories; we're going to start losing British teenagers to the story that the next chapter in their lives is written with ISIS in Syria. We're going to start losing MPs like Jo Cox, who are murdered in the street, because we've been sold a story that is so narrow about who we are and who we've been and who we should be...

We're at this critical moment, let's not allow future generations to look back and judge us when centrifugal forces were threatening to tear us apart, because they really are. I can feel it, I know a lot of you can too.

We need to step up decisively and act.

Let's do what's right: let's represent.

Part III: The Socio-Political and Personal Consequences of Islamophobia

Racial and Religious Hate Crime..... 83

NAZIR AFZAL, OBE CHALLENGING TIMES TO BE A MUSLIM..... 83

DR SHAZAD AMIN, CONSULTANT PSYCHIATRIST ISLAMOPHOBIA AND MENTAL HEALTH..... 90

Youth and Education..... 92

SHEREEN FERNANDEZ, QUEEN MARY UNIVERSITY ISLAMOPHOBIA AND EDUCATION 93

DR SADIA HABIB BRITISHNESS, BELONGING AND ISLAMOPHOBIA: REFLECTION AND DIALOGUE..... 95

PROFESSOR JOHN HOLMWOOD, UNIVERSITY OF NOTTINGHAM THE BIRMINGHAM TROJAN HORSE AFFAIR 97

Economic Exclusion: Islamophobia and the Labour Market..... 101

Securitising Muslim Identities: Security and Counter-Terror 104

PROFESSOR TODD GREEN, LUTHER COLLEGE USA ISLAMOPHOBIA AND THE PRESUMPTION OF MUSLIM GUILT IN TERRORISM 106

HAREEM GHANI AND ILYAS NAGDEE, NUS ISLAMOPHOBIA, PREVENT AND UNIVERSITY 117

ROB FAURE WALKER, UNIVERSITY COLLEGE LONDON INSTEAD OF BEING CAST AS A THREAT, MUSLIM SOLIDARITY COULD SHOW US ALL HOW TO LIVE TOGETHER 123

Crime, Policing and the Criminal Justice System..... 127

Political Representation and Exclusion.... 135

AMAN ALI, MEND HEAD OF COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT AND DEVELOPMENT DEVELOPING CIVIC SENSIBILITIES..... 135

DR JOE GREENWOOD, YouGov THE BENEFITS OF PARTICIPATION 140

Public Exclusion, Integration and Minority Rights.....142

DR JAN DOBBERNACK, NEWCASTLE UNIVERSITY ISLAMOPHOBIA AND THE MYTH OF MUSLIM DISTANCE 145

DR LASSE THOMASSEN, QUEEN MARY UNIVERSITY REPRESENTING MUSLIM WOMEN AND ISLAMOPHOBIA 151

DR AZEEZAT JOHNSON, QUEEN MARY UNIVERSITY CONTROVERSY AND MUSLIM WOMEN'S CLOTHING PRACTICES..... 159

Racial and Religious Hate Crime

Challenging times to be a Muslim

Nazir Afzal, OBE

Former Chief Prosecutor for North West England

Not a day goes by without some overt show of anti-Muslim hatred in parts of our society. Whether it's the conflating of the actions of one or more people who happen to be Muslims into a statement about all Muslims or somewhat sinister interpretations of Islamic culture and theology to generate fear or mistrust. Most often it's in the day to day experience of Muslims and people who "look" like Muslims – which can be violence, abuse or discrimination.

I look at my own experience. Nobody refers to me as the "Muslim" Pro-Chancellor of Brunel University or Patron of several NGOs or Chair of an FE college, but contrast that with my influential decision-making roles such as Chief Prosecutor or Chief Executive of Police & Crime Commissioners, where the word "Muslim" is often pre-fixed in the media.

Why is my faith relevant in some roles and not others? Why was I specifically targeted by Far-Right groups despite getting all the decisions right in the grooming gang cases and delivering justice when others failed to? Could it have anything to do with me damaging the Far-Right narrative, that all Muslims are the same?

Despite the immense contributions of Muslims to civic life, to our economy, to our communities, there is a knee-jerk reaction to attack Muslims whenever possible and inconsistently, to rarely mention their faith when they've done good.

Part of the problem is self-inflicted. There are issues with extremism, with perceived poor integration amongst some, with disproportionately being involved in drug crime, for example, which contributes heavily to the over-representation in prison. The Muslim communities are extraordinarily diverse but that also causes issues – in London, they come from more than 60 countries, whilst in the North they mostly come from two. Too often, the reluctance of community members to deal with these issues is because they feel it gives ammunition to the Muslim haters. That, in my view, is short-sighted – bigots don't need an excuse to hate.

The Hate Crime legislation does not help provide reassurance. Whilst Muslims are not considered a "race," victims have to rely on religious hate crime laws that require a higher threshold of intent and harm before prosecutions can follow. Only violence and threats of violence trigger the incitement to religious hate offence and I remember meeting with a British National Party lawyer a decade ago who informed me that they knew where the line was and always pushed up to it. That's continued with the advent of social media – though many haters don't care about the line anymore and rely upon perceived anonymity, bots, and limited police resources to just keep generating hate.

The noise is so loud that it radicalises the vulnerable far-right extremist but it also creates the atmosphere of grievance amongst many young Muslims that is often exploited by those who wish to radicalise them. Lose-Lose on both fronts.

This country's extraordinary tolerance and acceptance of diversity is our biggest weapon in minimising and ultimately eliminating hate.

Hate Crime

As MEND's definition of Islamophobia goes to great pains to enunciate, Islamophobia is in no way limited to hate

crime. It does, in fact, infiltrate all realms of public, political and economic life, resulting in the exclusion and marginalisation of Muslim communities from enjoying the freedoms to which they are entitled. Having said that, hate crime is by no means an area that can be ignored. It is in many ways the most overt, visible, and undeniable symptom of the Islamophobia prevalent across certain segments of society.

Over recent years, British Muslims have suffered from increasing levels of hate crime in conjunction with seemingly obsessive demonisation in the media and an increasing presence of online hate speech on social media platforms.

This has culminated in Muslims being abused and assaulted in the street, being thrown into the path of oncoming trains, places of worship being vandalised by arson and brick attacks, and Muslims being deliberately run over by far-right terrorists.

The statistics expose this increase in hate crime incidents. Islamophobic hate crimes recorded by the Metropolitan Police Force in London numbered 1,115 in 2015/16. The number of recorded incidents increased 13% to 1,266 in 2016/17, while the most recent year has seen an even larger increase of 32%. 1,665 Islamophobic hate crimes were recorded in London in 2017/18, meaning that Islamophobic hate crimes in the capital have risen 50% overall in just two years.²¹⁵

This picture is also seen at a national level, where the number of hate crimes increased by 29% between 2015/16 and 2016/17. There were 80,393 offences recorded by police forces in England and Wales in

2016/17. Three-quarters of these hate crimes were racially aggravated, while 7% were religiously aggravated.²¹⁶ The number of religiously aggravated offences numbered 5,949, a 35% increase from 4,400 religiously aggravated hate crimes recorded in 2015/16.²¹⁷

While racially or religiously aggravated offences were more likely to be dealt with via a charge or court summons than non-aggravated offences, the figures still indicate relatively low outcomes. Overall less than 20% of racially or religiously aggravated hate crimes result in suspects being charged or being summonsed to appear in court.²¹⁸

The number of racially and religiously aggravated cases referred by the police to the Crown Prosecution Service has also fallen over the past year, along with the number of completed prosecutions. Religiously aggravated crimes referred by the police to the CPS fell by 11% between 2015-16 and 2016-17, with the number of completed prosecutions down considerably by 20% over the same period.²¹⁹

A recent report from Citizens UK, focusing on the impact of hate crime in Nottingham, found that 3 in 5 of the city's Muslim population have been victims of hate crime, more than any other religious group in the city.²²⁰

The study "Still No Place for Hate" revealed that Muslim women in particular were often the targets of vulgar abuse and criminal acts.²²¹ Researchers revealed that one respondent had been told to take off her "f***** head scarf" in the city centre. Another Muslim woman said, "I wear the

²¹⁵ 'MPS FY 2016/17 Crime Statistics,' Tableau Public, accessed May 08, 2017, <https://public.tableau.com/profile/metropolitan.police.service#/vizhome/MPSFY-201617CrimeStatistics/NOTES>.

²¹⁶ Home Office, *Hate Crime, England and Wales, 2016/17*, by Aoife O'Neill, October 17, 2017, accessed May 10, 2018, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/652136/hate-crime-1617-hosb1717.pdf.

²¹⁷ Home Office, "Hate Crime, England and Wales, 2015 to 2016," GOV.UK, October 13, 2016, accessed June 20, 2018, <https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/hate-crime-england-and-wales-2015-to-2016>.

²¹⁸ Ibid.

²¹⁹ Crown Prosecution Service, "Hate Crime Annual Report 2016-17", report, GOV.UK, October 2017, accessed May 10, 2018, https://www.cps.gov.uk/sites/default/files/documents/publications/cps-hate-crime-report-2017_0.pdf.

²²⁰ Andy May, "Nottingham Citizens Hate Crime Study Reveals Surge in Verbal and Physical Harassment," Citizens UK, accessed June 20, 2018, http://www.citizensuk.org/hate_crime_study_reveals_surge_in_verbal_and_physical_harassment_in_public.

²²¹ Jason Pandya-Wood, "Still No Place for Hate: Analysis of the Findings of the Nottingham Citizen's Hate Crime Survey including Recommendations," Nottingham Citizens, May 10, 2018, accessed June 20, 2018, https://d3n8a8pro7vhnmx.cloudfront.net/newcitizens/pages/2982/attachments/original/1525939473/Still_No_Place_for_Hate_-_Final.pdf?1525939473.

Islamic dress and the perpetrator was shouting that I was hiding a bomb. On another incident whilst driving in my car, a passer-by was shouting and calling me Bin Laden.”²²²

Other victims reported being called a “terrorist s***” and being spat on their hijab. One woman described travelling on the bus with her sons, aged two and four, and being told by a fellow passenger that she was raising terrorists.²²³

The impacts of these hate crimes are long-lasting, with many victims left feeling anxious and fearful for their safety. One Muslim victim who wears a hijab said she had been left feeling “unsafe and unwelcomed and scared because of the way I dress” while another said she contemplated taking her hijab off as she feels “very anxious at times especially when a national terrorist incident happens”.

Victims also highlighted how being attacked led them to become acutely aware of the prejudice that exists around them, as well as feeling emboldened into tackling the injustice. One victim said, “I feel like something positive needs to be done to address the anger the white working-class [sic] men are feeling towards Muslim women. We know it’s deliberate targeting of a soft target.”

The overwhelming majority (79%) of hate crime victims in the study did not report the incident to the police. Reasons victims gave for not reporting the crime included believing it would be pointless and feeling too traumatised in the aftermath of the crime to report the incident.

Hate crime victims who did report crimes to the police presented a mixed picture as to whether this resulted in a positive outcome. A number of respondents had negative experiences with police and

criminal agencies, with some highlighting that the police did not take the incident seriously enough or failed to display a suitable level of empathy towards them. These responses highlight how poor police responses can exacerbate the level of suffering and trauma suffered by hate crime victims.

A number of wider contextual factors were given by participants as driving hate crime in the city, including media coverage of terrorist events and general media bias against minority communities. The most frequently cited factor, however, was Brexit.²²⁴

In the wake of the June 2016 referendum, in which the public narrowly voted to leave the European Union, there was a considerable increase in hate crimes nationally. Home Office statistics detailed a 44% rise in racially or religiously aggravated offences in the month following the referendum result compared to the same month the previous year.²²⁵

One survey respondent elucidated how the referendum result “led to people feeling more entitled to be open about their racism, religious hate, and hatred towards anyone who is different.” Survey respondents explained how the political context was embedding an “us versus them” dichotomy, with Brexit fuelling the ability for people to express views which may have been challenged previously.²²⁶

The second most common factor given for influencing hate crime was media coverage of terror attacks, with most respondents feeling that the reporting of events led to an increase in hate crime directed at Muslims. One participant stated that attacks “heightened people’s wariness of each other”, with the reporting of terrorist attacks making “ordinary Muslims feel blamed”.

²²² Ibid.

²²³ Ibid.

²²⁴ Ibid.

²²⁵ Full Fact Team, “Hate Crime in England and Wales,” Full Fact, October 17, 2017, accessed June 20, 2018, <https://fullfact.org/crime/hate-crime-england-and-wales/>.

²²⁶ “Still No Place for Hate: Analysis of the Findings of the Nottingham Citizen’s Hate Crime Survey including Recommendations”.

While the Home Office has highlighted several peaks in hate crime following events such as the Charlie Hebdo shooting in Paris and the Westminster Bridge attack in London, participants also explained that the sensationalised and biased coverage in newspapers led to Muslims being unfairly blamed for all terrorist attacks.

“Muslims are always portrayed as a problem to society by the media as terrorists, rapists or traffickers. If it’s an offence committed by a Muslim then the religion is always highlighted, yet anyone else committing such crimes never have their religion mentioned. The word terrorist gets quickly attached to Muslims and not non-Muslims committing terrorist acts. This media brainwashing of course causes hate towards Muslims.”

Participants mentioned how media coverage of Muslims creates resentment and frustrations which are then “meted out to Muslims women because they are perceived as soft targets.” This perception is borne out by the reports received by MEND’s Islamophobia Response Unit (IRU), amongst which the majority of Islamophobic hate crime victims are female.

While newspaper narratives around Islam and Muslims contribute to the negative way some people perceive Muslims, this narrative is expounded further online through hate speech perpetrated via an array of social media streams. Researchers at Demos catalogued 144,000 derogatory and anti-Islamic tweets sent from the UK between March 2016 and March 2017, a daily average of almost 400. Half of the tweets analysed were derogatory anti-Islamic slurs, often directed at a specific individual. Just under 2 in 5 of these tweets framed Muslims as the “enemy” dedicated towards cultural and social destruction of the West. Finally, around 1 in 5 of the tweets analysed related to derogatory

statements generally associating Muslims and Islam with terrorism.²²⁷

Inadequate legal protections

Current legislation that enables the prosecution of anti-Muslim hate crime is an extension of established race and relations legislation where ‘religiously aggravated’ crimes have been added to the existing racial motives for prosecuting offenders. Since Muslims do not form a racial group, race relations legislation which protects communities such as Jews and Sikhs, does not extend to Muslims.

Furthermore, the Racial and Religious Hate Crime Act 2006, contains a disparity between the protections afforded on grounds of race versus the protections afforded to religious groups. In terms of racial hatred, a person is protected against abusive, insulting, or threatening words or behaviour. However, the protections afforded on the basis of religion only extend to threatening words or behaviour. This specifically excludes the protection from abusive or insulting words or behaviour that is included under racial hatred.

Moreover, within the protections against religious hatred, there is an added condition that intent must be proven. In other words, it must be proven that the perpetrators intention was to stir up religious hatred. This differs from incitement to racial hatred, wherein the *likelihood* that the offence would have stirred up racial hatred is enough to prosecute; there is no need to prove that the perpetrator *intended* to stir up racial hatred.

This requirement of intent makes the burden of proof within this legislation almost unachievably heavy. Indeed, the intention of the perpetrator is virtually impossible to ever prove. The consequence is that, since the legislation was enacted in

²²⁷ “Anti-Islamic Content on Twitter - Demos,” Demos: False Stereotypes of Young People Holding Them Back from Getting Jobs - Demos, accessed June 20, 2018, <https://www.demos.co.uk/project/anti-islamic-content-on-twitter/>.

2006, only a small handful of successful prosecutions have occurred under incitement to religious hatred legislation.

Furthermore, social media offences and hate speech online is a growing area of concern as more and more people utilise the anonymity of the web to share or post hate messages online. As such, there remains a great deal of scope to ensure hate crime is efficiently tackled on social media.

Currently, due to the sheer scale of social media sites, the only way abusive posts are brought to the attention of social media companies is if users themselves report it. However, not all instances of online hate would be reported for their racist or Islamophobic content online. Therefore, much more needs to be done to tackle this issue head on.

In April 2017, the Metropolitan Police set up a new team of specialist police officers to investigate abuse on social media sites such as Facebook and Twitter. The team of five officers, who will support victims and identify online abuse, will cost £1.7 million and has received £452,000 from the Home Office.

More actions like these are required, and the Government needs to prioritise formulating a strategy that allows for a crackdown on hate speech, while continuing to ensure freedom of speech.

An update from the Islamophobia Response Unit (IRU)

Introducing the IRU

The Islamophobia Response Unit (IRU) was founded by MEND in response to rising anti-Muslim attacks across Europe and a growing tide of anti-Muslim sentiment. The IRU is a platform for victims to report and share their

experiences and where they can receive advice, support and referral services.

The IRU serves three main functions:

- Data collection and monitoring,
- The provision of free legal advice and police liaison,
- Provision of basic emotional support, and signposting to further professional sources of emotional support if required.

Exploring hate crime

Data collection and monitoring of hate crime is important as it allows us to map instances of Islamophobia. For example, by recording the location of attacks and the profiles of typical victims and perpetrators, we can come to an understanding of the national picture of Islamophobia and begin to develop successful and informed policies for tackling it.

Hate crime is perhaps the most overt manifestation of Islamophobia. According to the Government's definition, "The term 'hate crime' can be used to describe a range of criminal behaviour where the perpetrator is motivated by hostility or demonstrates hostility towards the victim's disability, race, religion, sexual orientation or transgender identity. These aspects of a person's identity are known as 'protected characteristics'. A hate crime can include verbal abuse, intimidation, threats, harassment, assault and bullying, as well as damage to property. The perpetrator can also be a friend, carer or acquaintance who exploits their relationship with the victim for financial gain or some other criminal purpose."²²⁸

In its first year since opening, the IRU has received almost 300 reports from victims of Islamophobic hate crime and discrimination. 70% of these reports are hate crime related. It is common for the IRU to experience a surge in reports

²²⁸ "Hate Crime," The Crown Prosecution Service, accessed June 20, 2018, <https://cps.gov.uk/hate-crime>.

following major incidents, such as last year's attacks in Manchester and London Bridge. For example, following the Manchester Arena attack, the IRU witnessed a 388% increase in reports. This demonstrates the vulnerability and backlash received by the Muslim community in periods following such events.

The data the IRU collects has revealed an interesting picture of hate crime in the UK. We have learned the following:

- Of all the hate crime reports the IRU has received, the majority involve acts of verbal abuse. This includes street harassment, where Muslims are publicly called racial slurs (P**i, terrorist, infidel scum, etc) or even receive death threats.
- The second largest form of our hate crime reports involve physical acts of aggression. Common forms are spitting, shoving, being thrown to the ground, slapping, and hijabs being pulled off women's heads.
- After terror attacks, the number of physical attack reports and mosque targeting reports rise sharply.
- Our data also shows that incidents on public transport and cases of harassment by a neighbour are common areas of abuse. Indeed, 40% of our hate crime reports involve incidents on public transport and 25% are from victims experiencing Islamophobic abuse by a neighbour.
- IRU victim and witness testimonies show that over 80% of Islamophobic hate crime perpetrators are white males and the perpetrators of Islamophobic hate crime are usually individual actors or private citizens.

The gendered dynamic of Islamophobia is also worth exploring. 75% of reports to the IRU come from Muslim women. This number rises to 80% when just looking at physical attacks alone - meaning that

Muslim women are overwhelmingly the targets of acts of violence and aggression. As the perpetrators are overwhelmingly males, it is clear how gender violence and hierarchical structures of gendered power are intrinsic to Islamophobic hate crime. Female victims are almost exclusively visibly Muslim, meaning they were wearing the hijab, niqab or abaya when they were targeted in public.

The emotional impacts of Islamophobia

The emotional impacts of hate crime on victims are vast but the effects of Islamophobia on mental health are largely unexplored in research. As such, the trauma associated with these types of crimes remain poorly understood. Testimonies from victims reporting to the IRU reveal a picture of social isolation, depression and anxiety. Many victims of Islamophobic hate crime report that they choose to stay indoors more, take time off work, and avoid public spaces - revealing how hate crime can impede their participation in public life. Many discuss how they avoid crowded spaces and public transport. Also reported is some female victims' desires to remove the hijab after being targeted. This points to a loss in confidence and an underlying fear that displaying a symbol of their faith in public will make them more prone to abuse. Panic attacks, flashbacks, sleeplessness, and anxiety are also commonly observed psychological impacts.

Victim Experiences

A Muslim Convert Experience,

Female 25, London

I have suffered to some degree with social anxiety for many years, but over the past few years having started wearing the headscarf, this has become worse. I have never suffered from what I would describe as a "hate crime," although I have been verbally abused. I've been told to "go back

to my own f***ing country," I've had "f*** Allah" being screamed out a car window amongst other types of religiously or racially motivated comments – such as a man muttering "terrorist" under his breath or another saying to me "I bet you speak Afghanistan". The above I have come to accept as normal.

I have good and bad days, but I generally am hyper-aware and alert when in public and I am quite often anticipating being verbally if not physically abused. Because of this anxiety I have started to change my behaviour or take "precautions".

Some of the minor behavioural changes I have adopted to deal with anticipated abuse is always having headphones in when I am out alone as not to hear any comments or abuse. I try my best not to travel alone in the evenings and I am much less inclined to leaving the house alone unless I have to – i.e. to go to work or pick up groceries. It really affects the way I feel in the public space. On particularly bad days, especially when there have been terrorist attacks I have swapped my headscarf for a beanie when travelling which gives me a bit of peace to some degree, but also makes me feel angry. I have occasionally thought about no longer wearing a headscarf.

I see my umbrella not just as something to protect me from the elements, but also something I could use to hit someone with if they were to attack me. (Much how many women think of their keys.) I started taking martial arts classes, and also prefer to wear trousers over skirts in case I am physically attacked and need to be able to better defend myself. I feel most alert and concerned when in train stations, or when I'm on the tube, or train.

On one occasion I travelled from Cardiff to London on the train (there was a football match with a London team that has a particularly bad reputation.) I got a train that was leaving before their match ended and hoped there wouldn't be too many fans – there were and they came into the

carriage I was in. I wore my scarf pulled back (some may describe this as a turban style) as I anticipated there might be some fans and wanted to look less "visibly Muslim." During the journey a man started ranting loudly about how Muslims were taking over our country, raping 'our' women, killing people and a whole host of other Islamophobic commentary. I was with my husband and I was terrified that he or I would be attacked. We contacted BTP who told us on arrival to London that nothing could be done as the man would say "he was just having a conversation with his mates."

I think the next behavioural change I will take to help with my anxiety is to learn how to drive.

Spitting incident victim,

Female, 32, Birmingham

"After the attack, I've been afraid to leave the house. I spend most of my time indoors. I don't even want to go out and do the shopping. I hate being out even in my own local area. I don't feel safe anymore."

Victim on public transport,

Female, 24, London

"I don't want to take the tube or buses anymore. I feel really anxious in public spaces after being targeted in this way. I just try to walk everywhere or get a lift from a family member."

Victim of physical assault,

Female 28, London

"I feel so paranoid walking the streets, I feel like everyone is out to attack me. I'm super self-conscious in public now."

Islamophobia and Mental Health

Dr Shazad Amin

Consultant Psychiatrist

The above examples of experiences reported to the MEND Islamophobia Response Unit show that hate crimes have considerable negative mental health consequences for victims. Research has shown that the psychological impacts of hate crime are greater than for non-hate crime offences. Reported data from the Crime Surveys of England and Wales showed that victims of hate crimes were almost three times as likely (36% versus 13%) to report being "very much" emotionally affected by the incident than victims overall and were twice as likely to experience symptoms such as difficulty sleeping, anxiety, depression, or panic attacks.²²⁹

Since the Muslim community is also the most likely to be victims of religiously motivated hate crimes compared to victims of other religious groups, this suggests that there is likely to be considerable psychiatric morbidity arising as a result.²³⁰

Whilst there is a considerable corpus of research on the impact of racism on mental health there is precious little on Islamophobia. However, in the first study of its kind, researchers at the University of Sussex examined the direct and indirect effects of hate crimes on both Muslim and LGBT communities.²³¹

Concerning the direct effects of hate crime, 71% of Muslim respondents said they had been victim of hate crimes, predominantly consisting of verbal and online abuse. More surprising was the numbers of people who were victims of repeat attacks – 45% had been verbally abused more than three times over the past three years and

29% physically attacked more than three times in the same period. In terms of impact, the survey found a variety of responses. For some people it made them feel more vulnerable, anxious, angry and led to social withdrawal, but for others it motivated them to take positive action through community engagement via specialist groups and charities. Certainly anecdotally, we have witnessed this in MEND, with several people joining our organisation as a direct result of adverse personal Islamophobic abuse or attacks.

Under indirect effects of hate crime, 83% of Muslim participants reported that they knew someone who had experienced hate crimes. The reactions were similar to those who had directly experienced hate crimes, with a cumulative effect of those who had experienced both. This suggests a degree of identification with victims by people who share the same characteristic.

One of the most worrying adverse community consequences of hate crimes is that of avoidance behaviour following an attack, e.g. avoiding certain roads or areas or stopping going out altogether. In a study of racial discrimination on mental health Wallace et al found high rates of avoidance behaviour after incidents of racial discrimination.²³² The rates of avoidance were highest in the Bangladeshi and Pakistani groups with rates of 10-20% reported. Whilst the research did not record the nature of the incidents, it is likely that some of this abuse was religiously rather than racially motivated, noting slightly lower rates in the Indian group. It is well recognised that perpetrators may conflate race with religion, (and indeed there may be dual motivations), hence in the absence of more religiously focussed research, ethnicity

²²⁹ Hannah Corcoran, Deborah Lader, and Kevin Smith, "Hate Crime, England and Wales, 2014/15," Home Office, October 13, 2015, accessed June 20, 2018, http://report-it.org.uk/files/ho_hate_crime_statistics_201415.pdf

²³⁰ Ibid.

²³¹ Jenny Paterson et al., "THE SUSSEX HATE CRIME PROJECT," University of Sussex, January 2018, accessed June 20, 2018,

<https://sussex.ac.uk/webteam/gateway/file.php?name=sussex-hate-crime-project-report.pdf&site=430>.

²³² Stephanie Wallace, James Nazroo, and Laia Bécarea, "Cumulative Effect of Racial Discrimination on the Mental Health of Ethnic Minorities in the United Kingdom," *American Journal of Public Health* 106, no. 7 (2016), doi:10.2105/ajph.2016.303121.

may serve as a proxy for religion in this respect.²³³

Avoidance behaviour is an important phenomenon since it shows how a hate crime against an individual can vicariously affect the mental health of a whole community. We witnessed this phenomenon recently with the tragic attempted murder of Zaynab Hussein, a Somali Muslim lady in Leicester in 2017, for which her attacker, Paul Moore, was sentenced earlier this year. He ran over Mrs Hussain twice in an attack that left the local community fearful of going out, a classic case of avoidance behaviour by the local community.

Islamophobia can thus also be viewed as a public health problem, and as such we have to look at wider factors to address it such as the toxic 'Islamophobic' political and media climate developing in recent years. The recent rise in the political far right across Europe and in the USA, with some political parties such as PEGIDA, AfD and UKIP espousing openly hostile policies towards Muslims and Islam, has led to a state of apprehension and fear across Muslim communities as a whole. In a qualitative study Ali (2017) found that marginalisation and "othering" of Muslims in the USA led to a variety of psychological symptoms including fear, stress, worry, and insecurity.²³⁴

It is clear that we desperately need more research into the impact of Islamophobia in all its forms on the mental health of individuals, families and communities. We can then begin to target interventions both at an individual level, but also at a community level to help build resilience amongst affected Muslim communities.

We are confident that a definitive understanding of what Islamophobia is, will provide a firm foundation for

stimulating mental health research in this neglected area.

²³³ Maureen McBride, "A Review of the Evidence on Hate Crime and Prejudice: Report for the Independent Advisory Group on Hate Crime, Prejudice and Community Cohesion," The Scottish Centre for Crime & Justice Research, September 2016, accessed June 20, 2018, <http://scjcr.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/A-Review-of-the-Evidence-on-Hate-Crime-and-Prejudice.pdf>.

²³⁴ Areeza Ali, "The impact of Islamophobia on the Muslim American community: accounts of psychological suffering, identity negotiation, and collective trauma" (2017). Theses, Dissertations, and Projects. 1879

Youth and Education

Islamophobia in the education system is a serious problem which impacts Muslim children and their development in a wide variety of ways. From being bullied explicitly in reference to their faith, to being stigmatised and reported for views they may hold, Muslim children are struggling to navigate this complex maze. The impacts of these experiences can be long-term, damaging their ability to achieve success in the employment sphere and inhibiting their participation in wider civic society and the political arena.

Bullying

Despite praiseworthy academic achievements, Muslim pupils frequently encounter worrying levels of religiously and racially motivated bullying. This is often particularly acute following episodes of violence and terrorist incidents such as the attack on Manchester Arena in May 2017. Childline have reported that it held over 2,500 counselling sessions for children concerned about race and faith-based bullying over the past three years.²³⁵ However, they noted a sharp increase in calls following attacks in London and Manchester in 2017. Children as young as nine reported being called terrorists and enduring abuse and threats of violence. Meanwhile, the charity also reported that girls who wear the hijab had frequently been victimised for their religious dress, with some expressing a desire to self-harm as a result of the cruel treatment they had received.²³⁶

Furthermore, a report compiled by Show Racism the Red Card on bullying in schools found that 83% of 48 teachers who completed a survey questionnaire said they had witnessed racist attitudes or

behaviour amongst students, including name calling and stereotyping. In addition, 31% of respondents admitted to witnessing racist attitudes or behaviour among teachers.²³⁷

Incidents of bullying, motivated by racism, are likely to stifle the potential of students in attainment and subsequently affect their life chances in the future. The capability of teachers to deal with bullying incidents is therefore of vital importance so that schools are environments in which children may flourish and prosper, not ones they fear or avoid.

Young people are shown to be more at ease with diversity and are less likely to hold views that are intolerant or prejudicial towards those of other backgrounds. As such, schools are an important place where diversity, difference and prejudice can be discussed, and young people may be made aware of the dangers of hatred of minorities. However, the low priority given to religious education in the national curriculum inhibits the ability of schools to create environments in which pupils can learn about other religions and cultures and appreciate their significance to fellow pupils and members of their local communities.

PREVENT

These sentiments are exacerbated via the Government's statutory implementation of the PREVENT duty, which has seen thousands of Muslim students unnecessarily referred to authorities on the erroneous basis of being at risk of "radicalisation" or "extremism".²³⁸

The levels of Muslim students attending university has risen significantly over the past decade, with Muslims constituting 10% of all first year UK university entrants in 2016.²³⁹ The PREVENT duty, however, is

²³⁵ May Bulman, "Muslim Children as Young as Nine Branded Terrorists in Wake of Recent Terror Attacks, Reveals Childline," The Independent, June 27, 2017, accessed May 10, 2018, <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/nine-year-old-children-terrorists-race-faith-hate-bullying-childline-manchester-arena-terror-attack-a7810051.html>.

²³⁶ Ibid.

²³⁷ The Barriers to Challenging Racism and Promoting Race Equality in England's Schools, report, Show Racism the Red Card, June 21, 2011, <https://www.teachers.org.uk/files/srtrc-barriers-final.PDF>.

²³⁸ Ibid.

²³⁹ "Religion and Belief," Higher Education Funding Council for England, accessed May 15, 2018, <http://www.helce.ac.uk/analysis/opthesa/religion/>.

having a tangible effect on students' abilities to engage whole-heartedly in their university experience, with an NUS study revealing that students are hesitant to participate in classroom debates on topical issues concerning counter-terrorism and foreign policy for fear of being referred to PREVENT by their lecturers or teachers.²⁴⁰

An overwhelming majority of respondents to a recent NUS survey disagreed that lecturers and education institutions should monitor and report students' attitudes, behaviours, prayer room activities and email or online activity. The report also describes the correlation of the visibility of Muslim women and how they are impacted by PREVENT as notable, with those wearing hijab or niqab more likely to have been affected. This gives weight to arguments that PREVENT magnifies a variety of existing biases and prejudice among staff who are obligated to exercise the duty.

Additionally, the research findings suggest that Muslim students who have been affected by PREVENT are significantly more likely than others to believe there is no safe space on campuses to discuss issues that affect them. These students are also significantly more likely to not be comfortable being involved in student debates around topical areas including racism, Islamophobia, Muslim student provision, terrorism, Palestine or PREVENT.

The impact of PREVENT is explored more fully later in the report chapter entitled *Securitising Muslim Identities: Security and Counter-Terror*.

Islamophobia and education

Shereen Fernandez

Queen Mary University

Our public education systems have transformed greatly over the last few

years. Teachers more so than ever have an incredible responsibility to not only deliver outstanding teaching and learning but are also responsible for dealing with societal pressures that young children and their families face. This article will draw on key instances where Islamophobia is perpetuated within the education sector and provide pragmatic solutions to tackle Islamophobia within the education sector and beyond.

The Prevent Duty

The revisions made to the Prevent Duty in 2015 meant that schools, along with other public institutions, are legally required to monitor signs of extremism and radicalisation amongst pupils and even staff members. In reality, this means that teachers, after receiving a few hours of training on the topic, are responsible for this task. The education sector alone has made the most referrals to Prevent, making up a third of all referrals in the year 2016-2017 (1976 out of 6093 referrals). This is largely due to the fact that Prevent in schools is embedded within broader statutory safeguarding duties as well as the recent escalation in terrorist attacks in the UK which inevitably heightened anxieties. The number of cases discussed at the Channel panel is much less, with only 386 cases examined and only 126 individuals subsequently receiving Channel support. My research so far indicates that many professionals within the education sector are approaching the Prevent Duty as a 'better safe than sorry attitude', much like other safeguarding measures.

It has already been widely reported through the media and various reports that Muslim students will be mostly effected by the Prevent Duty. The Prevent Duty is ultimately about power; it relies on teachers and other educational staff members to use their 'professional' discretion to make referrals. Considering that the bulk of referrals made to Prevent

²⁴⁰ The Experience of Muslim Students in 2017-18, report, National Union of Students, March 18, 2018, accessed May 10, 2018,

https://www.nusconnect.org.uk/resources/the-experience-of-muslim-students-in-2017-18/download_attachment.

via the education sector pertain to 'Islamist extremism', questions must be asked about the training provided and how they are evaluated. For example, does the Prevent Duty perpetuate an anti-Muslim climate in educational settings? What knowledge(s) are produced through the training materials and how do we ensure that students from certain backgrounds are not unfairly targeted because of their perceived culture or religion? This must be asked wherever Prevent operates within educational contexts.

Trojan Horse

The Trojan Horse affair in 2013, where a number of schools in Birmingham were alleged to be promoting Islamist ideologies, has left a lasting impact on the educational landscape. The subsequent media reporting of the affair (see figure 1 as an example) provoked an innate fear amongst the public that Muslim teachers were capable of an 'Islamist' takeover of schools, which inevitably cast suspicion on visible Muslims in particular, working within the education sector. For Muslim teachers that I interviewed for my research, the Trojan Horse affair has left many feeling paranoid about their Islamic identities in their workplace. Some spoke about having to downplay their Muslim identities whereas others felt that along with the Prevent Duty, they were being unfairly scrutinised and watched closely. The Prevent Duty outlines that schools and other educational institutions should be safe spaces but what is often ignored in discussions around Prevent and hyperbolic, sensationalised media reporting is the impact on Muslim teachers. There is already a teacher recruitment crisis in schools and hostile environments like this may contribute to such a decline.




Figure 1: Cartoons from The Daily Telegraph and The Sunday Times via Cartoon Archive

Ofsted Hijab Ban

In late 2017, Amanda Spielman announced that Ofsted inspectors will soon be tasked with questioning young girls in primary schools who wear the hijab. Her reasons for doing so was allegedly to ensure that Muslim girls were not being forced to wear the hijab and that they received equal opportunities when it came to teaching and learning. The lack of consultation with Muslim parents and branding those who opposed the measure as 'extremists' led to a national debate on the role of Ofsted in intervening on religious issues, particularly when those who are at the receiving end of such measures have been excluded from such conversations and antagonised.²⁴¹ Furthermore, such a measure could further alienate Muslim families from engaging with schools if they feel that their children are unfairly targeted. Developing solid relationships

²⁴¹ "What should the role of Ofsted be?", *The Guardian*, February 6, 2018, accessed 14.06.2018, <https://www.theguardian.com/education/2018/feb/06/what-should-the-role-of-ofsted-be>

with minority communities is essential and parents and carers must be treated as partners. Ultimately, families want their children to succeed and will work with whoever is able to do so, but implementing rash measures will further divide and isolate marginalised groups and achieve the opposite.

Possible Solutions

Increase the number of BME staff members: The Runnymede Trust has reported that in 2015, BME teachers made up 7.6% of the total teaching workforce in England which does not adequately reflect the BME student body.²⁴² Increasing the number of BME staff in schools across geographical areas should be a priority to reflect diversity of British society. Schools will also be better prepared in dealing with the diversity of cultures and religions in their schools if their staff body mirrors this.

Include anti-racist training as part of 'diversity and inclusion' training in schools: Anti-racism curriculums must be firmly embedded within schools to tackle racial prejudice. Schools have taken on Black History month and some have even adopted Islamophobia Awareness Month but such initiatives are reductive if the root causes of racism and discrimination are not addressed seriously. Schools in Wales have recently recognised the need to address Islamophobia in the classroom and similar programmes should be implemented nationally.²⁴³ Considering that the Prevent Duty has reportedly divided communities in recent years, anti-racist training for all staff members is essential in order to combat any preconceived ideas and to provide them with better understandings on race and religion.

Increase access participation programmes for hard to reach and minority groups:

Funding has been severely slashed in schools nationally and programmes aimed at increasing parental engagement in schools are struggling. By funding programmes and initiatives to incorporate hard to reach and marginalised communities in primary and secondary schools will not only help them develop skills and relationships, but will improve parental engagement and student wellbeing. If parents feel like they can access schools freely, this will only have a positive impact on their children's education. Schools should also be safe spaces for parents and carers.

Address hyperbolic and sensationalised media reporting: It is of utmost importance that media outlets are responsible in their reporting and news coverage. In the last few years, there have been a number of recorded incidents where journalists and writers have used their platforms to spread divisive messaging and increase intolerance towards minority communities.²⁴⁴ This is then reflected in schools and in the playground, where similar discourse is regurgitated. Schools should be places of change which are dedicated to improving the lives of younger generations and better society as a whole.

Britishness, belonging and Islamophobia: reflection and dialogue

Dr Sadia Habib

Times may have moved on since a teacher referred to an ethnic minority student as a 'wog',²⁴⁵ but today young Muslims are now in fear of being branded as 'terrorists' by their teachers.²⁴⁶ Yet it is concerning that

²⁴² "Visible Minorities, Invisible Teachers: BME Teachers in the Education System in England", *Runnymede Trust*, p. 9 accessed 14.06.2018, <https://www.runnymedetrust.org/uploads/Runnymede%20ReportNEW.pdf>

²⁴³ "Schools urged to help tackle Islamophobia", *BBC News*, January 15, 2018, accessed 14.06.2018, <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-wales-42650014>

²⁴⁴ Miqdaad Versi "Islamophobia not an issue in the British press? You've got to be kidding", *The Guardian*, April 27, 2018, accessed 14.06.2018

<https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/apr/27/islamophobia-not-british-press-issue-got-to-be-kidding>

²⁴⁵ Muhammad Anwar, "Between Cultures Continuity and Change in the Lives of Young Asians" (Florence: Taylor and Francis, 2002).

²⁴⁶ Tom Pettifor, "Teacher Sacked 'for Calling Muslim Schoolboy Terrorist after He Complained about Detention'", *Mirror*, January 28, 2016, accessed June 20, 2018,

teacher training and school professional development courses, in the UK, fail to give issues of multiculturalism and diversity due time and attention.²⁴⁷ A big challenge for schools and teacher education institutions then is how to respond to trainee teachers and existing classroom teachers consistently reporting that they are inadequately guided or trained to teach young people about multiculturalism and social inequalities.²⁴⁸ Hostile racial examples, like 'It's our country meant for white people' or 'p**i', that feature in young people's discourses of belonging to Britain, highlight the urgency of anti-racist and anti-Islamophobia education.²⁴⁹

Islamophobia is not a new phenomenon, and not a new racism. It is important for young people to explore how Islamophobia has existed for hundreds of years. To begin with, classroom activities can, for example, focus upon historical examples of Islamophobia. For example, the ways in which Islamophobia infiltrated narratives surrounding the crusades during the medieval period, or the impact of European colonisation on Muslims throughout the world.²⁵⁰ By examining the historical dimensions of Islamophobia and placing emphasis on its existence pre-9/11 and pre-7/7, young people can better understand that Islamophobia has been used ideologically for centuries. Young

people could examine how over time 'Islamophobic representations have been constructed as ideological tools to legitimate campaigns of political, social, economic, and military domination'.²⁵¹

After investigating historical Islamophobia, young people and teachers can move onto drawing connections between what they have learned about the past and how this impacts the present lived experiences of young Muslims. How do young people express a sense of belonging to contemporary Britain? Belonging refers to acceptance and recognition within a group or society. Its multiple layers are illustrated by 'the interplay of the subjective self, collective agency and structural positioning', while its multiple facets mean we can 'belong to a community, a locality or a nation', but also experience 'a transnational sense of belonging'.²⁵² How do young people negotiate these multiple belongings and what support do they require from societal institutions?

By applying a critical perspective, young people from all backgrounds can use the safe spaces of their classrooms to challenge 'monovocals, master narratives, standard stories, or majoritarian stories' by contributing counter-narratives about Islamophobia and racism in contemporary

<https://www.mirror.co.uk/news/uk-news/teacher-sacked-for-calling-muslim-7266677>.

Rachael Revesz New York, "A Teacher Told Her Muslim Pupil He Was a 'terrorist' after He Laughed during a Film," *The Independent*, April 04, 2016, accessed June 20, 2018, <https://independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/teacher-calls-12-year-old-muslim-pupil-a-terrorist-as-he-laughs-watching-bend-it-like-beckham-a6966886.html>.

John Shammass, "Muslim Student Claims Teacher Told Him: 'Stop Talking, You Terrorist' as Council Launches Investigation," *Mirror*, December 08, 2015, accessed June 20, 2018, <https://www.mirror.co.uk/news/uk-news/muslim-student-claims-teacher-told-6973738>.

²⁴⁷ Kalwant Bhopal and Jasmine Rhamie, "Initial Teacher Training: Understanding 'race,' Diversity and Inclusion," *Race Ethnicity and Education* 17, no. 3 (2013): doi:10.1080/13613324.2013.832920.

Bruce Carrington et al., "Recruitment of New Teachers from Minority Ethnic Groups," *International Studies in Sociology of Education* 10, no. 1 (2000): doi:10.1080/0962021000200001.

Richard Race, *Advancing Race and Ethnicity in Education* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016).

Alistair Ross, *Citizenship Education: Europe and the World*; Proceedings of the Eighth Conference of the Children's Identity and Citizenship in Europe Thematic Network (London: CiCe, 2006).

Sarah Pearce, "Confronting Dominant Whiteness in the Primary Classroom: Progressive Student Teachers Dilemmas and Constraints," *Oxford Review of Education* 38, no. 4 (2012): doi:10.1080/03054985.2012.710546.

Eleanor Stokes and Barbara Nea, "Shaping the Future: Getting the Best for Black, Asian and Minority Ethnic Children and Young People," *Race on the Agenda*, December 2013, accessed June 20, 2018, https://www.rota.org.uk/sites/default/files/webfm/researchpublications/shaping_the_future_getting_the_best_for_bame_children_and_young_people_f.pdf.

²⁴⁸ Sadia Habib, *Learning and Teaching British Values Policies and Perspectives on British Identities* (Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2018).

²⁴⁹ Peter Sanderson and Paul Thomas, "Troubling Identities: Race, Place and Positionality among Young People in Two Towns in Northern England," *Journal of Youth Studies* 17, no. 9 (2014): doi:10.1080/13676261.2014.901491.

²⁵⁰ Jasmine Zine, "Anti-Islamophobia Education as Transformative Pedagogy: Reflections from the Educational Front Lines," *American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences* 21, no. 3 (June 2004): 110.

²⁵¹ *Ibid.*

²⁵² Ellie Vasta, "Do We Need Social Cohesion in the 21st Century? Multiple Languages of Belonging in the Metropolis," *Journal of Intercultural Studies* 34, no. 2 (2013): doi:10.1080/07256868.2013.781983.

Britain.²⁵³ What are young people's own experiences of Islamophobia and racism in British society? What are their everyday lived experiences? What institutional and structural policies and practices do they deem to impact upon their identities as Muslims? How do they respond to racist and Islamophobic discourses they encounter through different forms of social media? These are some of the critical questions that need to be urgently explored in anti-Islamophobia education.

My own research into Britishness and British values found that young people from a range of cultural, religious and ethnic backgrounds are keen to explore British identities and belongings. Teachers and students benefit from using the principles of critical pedagogy²⁵⁴ in the classroom to critically analyse what it means to belong to contemporary Britain.²⁵⁵ Critical pedagogy is also practised as liberatory, empowering, or radical pedagogy.²⁵⁶ Critical pedagogy empowers teachers and students to collaborate; they can work together to create a schooling space that emboldens students' voices, stimulates dialogue, and recommends reflection and action to attain goals of social justice. Such potentially powerful outcomes make critical pedagogy a significant approach to become embedded in anti-Islamophobia education.

Islamic schools

Since the first wave of Muslim migrants began bringing their wives and children to the UK, Muslims have invested in

education as a means of raising the aspirations and opportunities for their families and wider community. The first Muslim school, Darul Uloom Al-Arabiya Al-Islamia was opened in Lancashire in 1979, but it took another 18 years for the first state funded Muslim school, Islamia Primary School, to open in London in 1997.²⁵⁷

The progress of Muslim schools in recent years has been noteworthy, with a number of schools achieving excellent results and nationwide accolades. Tauheedul Islam Boys and Girls Schools in Blackburn, run by the Tauheedul Educational Trust, were ranked 1st and 2nd in the country in 2016 by the Government's Progress 8 measures. This means the schools were the highest rated for improving pupils' attainment across the whole country.²⁵⁸

Despite the overwhelming achievements of many of these schools, Islamic schools have frequently been the topic of intense scrutiny. This has intensified in the wake of the infamous Trojan Horse affair.

The Birmingham Trojan Horse Affair

Professor John Holmwood

University of Nottingham

The Birmingham Trojan Horse affair began in early 2014 with sensationalist media reporting of a supposed Islamic plot to take over schools in Birmingham, Bradford and Manchester. This was apparently evidenced by a leaked letter and document sent to Birmingham City Council naming 3

²⁵³ "Critical Race Methodology: Counter-Storytelling as an Analytical Framework for Education Research," *Philosophy of the Social Sciences*, accessed June 20, 2018, <http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/107780040200800103>.

²⁵⁴ Paulo Freire, *The Politics of Education: Culture, Power, and Liberation* (South Hadley, MA: Bergin & Garvey, 1985).

Paul Freire, "Reading the World and Reading the Word: An Interview with Paulo Freire," *Language Arts* 62, no. 1 (January 1985): 15-21.

Paulo Freire et al., *Pedagogy of the Oppressed* (New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2018).

Paulo Freire, *Pedagogy of Freedom: Ethics, Democracy, and Civic Courage* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2001).

Paulo Freire, Ana Maria Araujo Freire, and Paulo Freire, *Pedagogy of Hope: Reliving Pedagogy of the Oppressed* (Vancouver, B.C.: Langara College, 2016).

²⁵⁵ "Learning and Teaching British Values Policies and Perspectives on British Identities"

²⁵⁶ Gary Tate et al., *A Guide to Composition Pedagogies* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014).

²⁵⁷ *Serving Muslim Schools | Serving Future Generations*, report, Association of Muslim Schools UK, December 2013, accessed May 10, 2018, <http://ams-uk.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/AMS-Brochure.pdf>.

²⁵⁸ Richard Adams, "Two Blackburn Faith Schools Top Charts for GCSE Progress," *The Guardian*, October 13, 2016, accessed May 10, 2018, <https://www.theguardian.com/education/2016/oct/13/two-blackburn-faith-schools-top-charts-gcse-progress-tauheedul-islam>.

schools.²⁵⁹ This gave rise to the Secretary of State at the Department for Education (DfE) ordering Ofsted reports on 21 schools in Birmingham all with a high proportion of pupils from Muslim backgrounds. An Education Funding Agency review was instigated into Park View Educational Trust (and its 3 schools) and two reports were commissioned, one reporting to Birmingham City Council (Kershaw Report), the other to Parliament through the Secretary of State (Clarke Report).²⁶⁰ These reports investigated 14 schools and claimed to find evidence of undue religious influence, with the Clarke Report claiming evidence of extremism and actions to undermine British values.

The latter recommended that professional misconduct cases be brought against teachers. In the event, proceedings were brought against 12 teachers in 4 separate hearings by the National College of Teaching and Leadership (NCTL), the agency of the DfE responsible for teacher standards. The teachers were all connected to Park View Academy which had emerged as the school at the centre of the plot, although by now its tentacles were considerably retracted. The case against the leaders of Park View Education Trust collapsed in May 2017 when serious improprieties were discovered in the conduct of the case by NCTL, including giving misleading statements and failing to disclose exculpatory evidence that had

been gathered by the Clarke inquiry but not reported by him.²⁶¹

The background to the affair was Prime Minister David Cameron's speech to the Munich security conference in 2011 when he declared that 'multiculturalism had failed' and that the country had tolerated the growth of "segregated communities behaving in ways that run completely counter to our values".²⁶² No evidence for this claim was provided – indeed there was and is none – and, under the constraints of the then coalition government, no legislative action was taken to modify regulatory requirements on schools.²⁶³ However, schools had been required to teach shared values under a Duty to Promote Community Cohesion (effective from 2008).²⁶⁴ The Clarke Report, however, treated the Munich speech as providing the context of its inquiry and regarded a concern with community cohesion not as a regulatory requirement but as a form of political correctness which had prevented Birmingham City Council from intervening (as it should have done, or so Clarke believed).

In 2015, under a Conservative-majority Government, a new Counter Extremism strategy was outlined where the only example of the problem it was to address was that of the Birmingham Trojan Horse affair.²⁶⁵ In addition, a new requirement on schools to promote 'fundamental British values' was introduced.²⁶⁶ The most

²⁵⁹ A detailed account is provided by John Holmwood and Therese O'Toole, *Countering Extremism in British Schools? The Truth about the Trojan Horse Affair* (Bristol, Policy Press, 2018). The introduction is available free online: <http://policypress.co.uk/asset/4402/countering-extremism-in-british-schools-introduction.pdf>.

²⁶⁰ Education Funding Agency, Review of Park View Education Trust, (9 June 2014). Available at: www.gov.uk/government/publications/review-of-park-view-educational-trust; Ian Kershaw, 'Investigation Report: Trojan Horse Letter. Prepared for Birmingham City Council', (Published by Eversheds LLP, July 2014). Available at: www.birmingham.gov.uk/downloads/file/1579/investigation-report-trojan-horse-letter-the-kershaw-report; Peter Clarke, 'Report into Allegations concerning Birmingham Schools arising from the 'Trojan Horse' Letter', (London, House of Commons HC576 July 2014). Available at: www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/340526/HC_576_accessible_.pdf.

²⁶¹ Professional conduct panel outcome: Panel decision and reasons on behalf of the Secretary of State for Education in respect of applications for the proceedings to be discontinued', (May 2017). Available at: www.gov.uk/government/publications/teacher-misconduct-panel-outcome-mr-monzoor-hussain-mr-harddeep-saini-mr-arshad-hussain-mr-razwan-faraz-ms-lyndsey-clark.

²⁶² David Cameron, 'PM's speech at Munich Security Conference', (5 February 2011). Available at: www.gov.uk/government/speeches/pmsspeech-at-munich-security-conference.

²⁶³ See, for example, Saffron Karlsen, and James Y. Nazroo, 'Ethnic and religious differences in the attitudes of people towards being "British"', (*Sociological Review*, 63(4) 2015). The Government uses evidence from the Casey Review. See, Dame Louise Casey, 'The Casey Review: a review into opportunity and integration. An independent report for the Department of Communities and Local Government', (5 December 2016). Available at: www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-casey-review-a-review-into-opportunity-and-integration. This Review has been widely discredited. See, Stephen Crossley, 'Telling it Like it Is? A critical perspective on the Casey Review into Opportunity and Integration', (*Discover Society*, no 56, May 2018). Available at: <https://discoversociety.org/2018/05/01/telling-it-like-it-is-a-critical-perspective-on-the-casey-review-into-opportunity-and-integration/>.

²⁶⁴ Department for Schools, Children and the Families, 'Guidance on the duty to promote community cohesion', (London, 2007). Available at: <http://www.tedcandle.co.uk/publications/029%20Guidance%20on%20duty%20to%20promote%20community%20cohesion%20in%20school.pdf>.

²⁶⁵ Home Office, Counter-Extremism Strategy, (19 October 2015). Available at: www.gov.uk/government/publications/counter-extremism-strategy.

²⁶⁶ Department for Education, 'Promoting fundamental British values as part of SMSC in schools. Departmental advice for maintained schools', (London: Department for Education, November 2015). Available at:

significant aspect of the affair, however, was that there was neither fire nor smoke and no basis to the claims made against the teachers and the schools, all of which were hearsay.

The Clarke Report was deeply and self-evidently flawed, yet no media outlet addressed those flaws, not even after the cases against the teachers had collapsed. Nor did the Parliamentary select committee that reviewed the Trojan Horse affair.²⁶⁷ For example, there was no discussion in the report of the statutory requirements on schools for religious education and compulsory daily acts of collective worship. While the latter is required to be Christian in character it can be varied under a determination provided by the local Standing Advisory Committee on Religious Education (SACRE). Park View had had such a determination since 1996, which had lapsed in 2012 (they are renewable every five year) at the time it became an academy, when responsibility passed to the DfE. It made no provisions for this part of its duties toward academy and free schools. The school had also continued to teach the locally agreed religious education curriculum.

Nor did the Clarke Report establish what the responsibilities of schools were under Prevent (there were none), yet Ipsos Mori had conducted a review of schools for the DfE which showed that most schools understood it as part of their duty to promote community cohesion.²⁶⁸ Indeed, if Clarke – or his advisers from the DfE – had referred to this review they would have discovered that Park View was doing more, and had more teachers trained in Prevent, than was typical for schools in England.

Finally, the shrinking nature of the ‘plot’ from 21 to 14 to 4 schools, all associated

with Park View Academy is significant to understanding what had in fact been taking place. The school was a failing school in 1996 (the beginning of the plot’s timeline according to Clarke) yet by 2012 it was in the top 14% of all schools in England for academic achievement, notwithstanding that 72.7% of pupils were in receipt of free school meals, just 7.5% had English as a first language and its pupil intake was below the national average in academic performance on entry. It is for this reason, that it was asked by the DfE working together with the school improvement team at BCC to takeover two other schools, to become a multi-academy trust and ultimately incorporate other failing schools.

The ‘takeover plot’ that Clarke discovers, then, was at the behest of the DfE and directly under its supervision to extend its good practices to other schools. Evidence associated with the involvement of DfE officials and evidence provided by Birmingham SACRE was not presented in the report, but it was its disclosure that caused the NCTL hearing to collapse. The ‘Islamic plot’ to takeover schools in Birmingham, then, is better described as a moral panic engendered by the Government’s attack on multiculturalism and its promotion of unevidenced claims that British Muslims are at odds with British values. It also indicates a failure by media and Parliament to discover the truth behind an injustice visited on teachers and a calumny against a community, its values and the success of its local school.

The current HM Chief Inspector of Schools, Amanda Spielman, continues the hostility toward schools with an Islamic ethos (reflecting their communities). In a recent speech,²⁶⁹ she praised the religious ethos of Church of England (and Catholic) schools

www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/380595/SMSC_Guidance_Maintained_Schools.pdf.

²⁶⁷ House of Commons Education Select Committee, ‘Seventh Report, Extremism in Schools: the Trojan Horse Affair’, (11 March, 2015). Available at: <https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201415/cmselect/cmeduc/473/47302.htm>.

²⁶⁸ Chris Phillips, Daniel Tse, Daniel and Fiona Johnson, ‘Community Cohesion and PREVENT’. (Ipsos Mori Research Report 0085 for the Department for Education, 2011). Available at: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/182300/DFE-RR085.pdf.

²⁶⁹ Amanda Spielman, ‘Speech at the Church of England Foundation for Education Leadership’, (1 February 2018). Available at:

writing that one of 'British values' is, "“mutual respect for and tolerance of those with different faiths and beliefs and for those without faith’. It is a happy fact that almost every Church of England school we visit takes that value seriously.” However, she went on, “tolerance and respect does not mean that we should privilege all belief above criticism. Ofsted inspectors are increasingly brought into contact with those who want to actively pervert the purpose of education. Under the pretext of religious belief, they use education institutions, legal and illegal, to narrow young people’s horizons, to isolate and segregate, and in the worst cases to indoctrinate impressionable minds with extremist ideology.” Finally, she stated, “there should not, indeed cannot, be a trade-off between school ethos and school outcomes... Sadly, I am afraid that it does not match with the reality in all of our schools today.”

The real lesson of the Birmingham Trojan Horse affair is that Park View School was undermined despite its successful outcomes because of hostility to its Islamic ethos. Yet it is precisely those outcomes that served the integration of its pupils.

Economic Exclusion: Islamophobia and the Labour Market

Numerous studies in recent years have researched the failure of Muslims to progress and reach levels of success in the workplace which their non-Muslim counterparts enjoy. These studies have pointed to a combination of Islamophobia, racism and discrimination as reasons for Muslims to be less likely to be in work, less likely to be in skilled and professional occupations, and less likely to break through the glass ceiling to access top level executive positions. Indeed, only 6% of Muslims in the workplace were in higher managerial, administrative and professional occupations, compared to 10% of the overall population.²⁷⁰

Studies also show that Muslims have been disproportionately confined to unskilled professions or those jobs with limited opportunities for progression.²⁷¹ Census data shows that, while a fifth of people are employed in the highest category of socio-economic classifications, such as higher managerial and higher professional occupations, this proportion falls to just 1 in 8 for Muslims. More jarringly, while only 4% of the adult population had never worked, this figure was five times higher for Muslims, with 21.3% of Muslim adults having never worked.

The Government's Social Mobility Commission, chaired by former Labour minister Alan Milburn, cited a number of barriers to success for Muslims in the employment sphere, including ethnic minority sounding names being less likely to be offered interviews and Muslims

feeling forced to work "10 times as hard" as their white counterparts in order to achieve equivalent levels of success.²⁷² Employer attitudes have also been given as a reason for failure to progress in the workplace in research by BBC "Inside Out", which found that CVs submitted under a non-Muslim name were three times more likely to be offered an interview than those with a Muslim name.²⁷³

The findings are particularly galling given that academics found a strong work ethic and high resilience among Muslims which "resulted in impressive results in education". These achievements are not translated into the workplace unfortunately, with previous data showing that only 20% of Muslim adults were in full-time employment, compared to 35% of the general population.²⁷⁴

Research has also found that Muslim women face greater difficulty in being accepted in the workplace. The Social Mobility Commission noted how this adversity was amplified for Muslim women wearing headscarves. Researchers found that women were confronted with situations ranging from "assumptions they were forced to wear the headscarf to jokes and casual comments in the workplace about Muslims". Muslim workers were also hit with "a feeling of a need to apologise and explain" every time a terror attack occurred.²⁷⁵

In 2016, the House of Commons Women and Equalities Committee stated that Muslim women face a *triple penalty* in the employment sphere, due to being women, being from an ethnic minority background and for being Muslim. Another study found that 1 in 4 employers admitted to being reluctant to hire Muslim women, due

²⁷⁰ "Young Muslims in the UK Face Enormous Social Mobility Barriers," GOV.UK, accessed June 20, 2018, <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/young-muslims-in-the-uk-face-enormous-social-mobility-barriers>.

²⁷¹ Roger Dobson, British Muslims face worst job discrimination of any minority group, according to research", Independent, November 30, 2014, accessed June 12, 2018, <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/british-muslims-face-worst-job-discrimination-of-any-minority-group-9893211.html>.

²⁷² Anushka Asthana, "Islamophobia Holding Back UK Muslims in Workplace, Study Finds," The Guardian, September 07, 2017, accessed May 10, 2018,

<https://www.theguardian.com/society/2017/sep/07/islamophobia-holding-back-uk-muslims-in-workplace-study-finds>.

²⁷³ Zack Adesina and Oana Marocico, "Is It Easier to Get a Job If You're Adam or Mohamed?" BBC News, February 06, 2017, accessed May 10, 2018, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-london-38751307>.

²⁷⁴ Ibid.

²⁷⁵ Ibid.

to concerns they would prioritise their family commitments above professional duties.²⁷⁶

One of the more disturbing revelations from research into the difficulties ethnic minority women face in entering employment was that 1 in 8 Pakistani women had been illegally asked about marriage and family aspirations in job interviews, compared to 1 in 30 White women, demonstrating the levels of preconceived bias and racially and religiously shaped assumptions that Muslim women face.²⁷⁷

Discrimination for Muslim women also continues once they enter the workplace. Research conducted by MEND in 2016 revealed that more than 60% of Muslim women who wear a hijab felt they had been treated differently at work due to religious discrimination.²⁷⁸

The Government published its Race Equality Audit in late 2017, amalgamating research and data from various sectors to shine a light on the disparities ethnic minorities face in the UK. The employment audit showed that people of Pakistani and Bangladeshi ethnicity suffered the most with regards to unemployment and low pay.²⁷⁹

Amongst all minorities, Pakistani and Bangladeshi workers were more likely to be concentrated in the three lowest-skilled occupation groups, with more than 2 in 5 Pakistani and Bangladeshi workers in these lower-skilled occupations, compared to 1 in 4 of White workers. Bangladeshi and Pakistani employees also earned the lowest average hourly pay, £11.42, compared to £13.75 per hour received by their White counterparts. Finally, Pakistani

and Bangladeshi people were also the most likely to be unemployed. Indeed, 11% of Pakistani and Bangladeshi people were unemployed in 2016, almost three times the rate (4%) of unemployment amongst White British people.²⁸⁰

Alongside this, the National Equality Panel previously found that Muslims receive, on average, 13-21% less pay than their White Christian counterparts with equivalent qualifications.²⁸¹

The Race Audit showed that while 74% of people from White ethnic groups were employed in 2016, only 64% of those from other ethnic groups were similarly employed. This means that the difference in the employment rate for ethnic minorities compared with the overall population, also known as the “employment rate gap”, was 10 percentage points.²⁸² This represents a slow improvement from the 15-percentage point gap recorded over ten years previously, in 2004, but highlights how much intervention is still required to give people from BME backgrounds the opportunity to both enter and then succeed in fulfilling their potential in the workplace.

Given the younger age profile of the BAME and Muslim demographic than the wider population, there are serious opportunities for Government and businesses to harness the growth in the BAME population and tap into the high levels of talent available. With more BAME students going to university, there should be no tolerance for employers excluding people based on their religion or the colour of their skin rather than on their merits and achievements.

The EU Agency for Fundamental Rights published a survey in 2017, in which 10,000

²⁷⁶ Siobhan Fenton, “6 Charts Which Show the Employment Barriers Faced by British Muslims,” *The Independent*, August 11, 2016, accessed May 10, 2018, <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/muslims-more-likely-to-be-unemployed-than-any-other-social-group-in-the-uk-mps-warn-a7185451.html>.

²⁷⁷ Ibid.

²⁷⁸ *Tackling Racism and Employment Discrimination in the UK*, Presentation, MEND (2016).

²⁷⁹ Cabinet Office, *Race Disparity Audit*, October 2017, accessed June 12, 2018, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/686071/Revised_RDA_report_March_2018.pdf.

²⁸⁰ “Findings of ‘Race Disparity Audit’ Call for Action against Racial Inequality in Britain,” Muslim Engagement and Development, November 17, 2017. Accessed June 12, 2018. <https://mend.org.uk/news/findings-race-disparity-audit-call-action-racial-inequality-britain/>.

²⁸¹ John Hills et al, *An Anatomy of Economic Inequality in the UK*, report, National Equality Panel, January 2010, accessed May 10, 2018, <https://eprints.lse.ac.uk/28344/1/CASEREport60.pdf>.

²⁸² “Employment,” GOV.UK Ethnicity Facts and Figures, accessed June 20, 2018, <https://www.ethnicity-facts-figures.service.gov.uk/work-pay-and-benefits/employment/employment/latest>.

Muslims in Europe were questioned on how religious discrimination impacts their everyday lives. Workplace discrimination had the largest impact, but plenty of other forms of discrimination emerged from the survey, including: access to public and private services, housing, accessing healthcare, being turned away from school for wearing the niqab and being asked to remove the niqab for meetings and when dropping children off to school.²⁸³

An update from the Islamophobia Response Unit (IRU)

MEND's Islamophobia Response Unit (IRU) deals with not only hate crime, but discrimination as well. The unit is fortunate to benefit from the invaluable skills and experience of a team of dedicated legal professionals from leading law firms across London who offer pro-bono legal advice and support to those affected by Islamophobic discrimination. This team of talent provides the IRU with the intellectual capital it needs to challenge those institutions who oppress and discriminate against Muslims.

Employment based discrimination is the largest area of our discrimination work at the IRU. 60% of our Islamophobic discrimination reports are from those who have been mistreated at work because of their faith.

In the IRU's data monitoring of reports we have discovered that, while 60% of our hate crime reports come from Muslim women, the data we have collected on the discrimination side reveals that over 70% of our discrimination reports come from Muslim men.

We have received a variety of employment discrimination reports at the IRU. Some include:

- A Muslim teacher who was falsely accused of gender segregating a classroom.
- A Muslim candidate in a job interview is asked "How he feels working under women."
- A Muslim woman who was asked to remove the face veil in an interview.

The IRU has played an active role in many of these cases. We have participated in many employment tribunals where we have won thousands of pounds worth of settlements for employment discrimination victims.

For example, in one case dealt with by the IRU a Muslim teacher was unfairly dismissed from his role after being falsely accused of introducing gender segregation into the classroom. The IRU supported him and helped him take the case to an employment tribunal. We helped prove that the allegations were wholly incorrect and secured him £5,000 as a settlement.

The impacts of this form of discrimination on victims can be long lasting. Many victims report to us that they suffer a loss of confidence in the workplace, poorer job prospects, and a desire to work in more diverse work settings.

It appears clear that in order for Muslims, and Muslim women in particular, to progress with their careers, clear changes are required at both employer and government levels in order to remove barriers and give Muslims the opportunities to achieve their career aspirations.

²⁸³ Second European Union Minorities and Discrimination Survey (EU-MIDIS II): Muslims - Selected Findings, report, European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, September 2017, accessed May 16, 2018,

http://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/fra-2017-eu-minorities-survey-muslims-selected-findings_en.pdf.

Securitising Muslim Identities: Security and Counter-Terror

MEND has no intention of undermining the severity of security threats that our nation currently faces and wholeheartedly commend those who dedicate their lives to ensuring the safety and security of each and every citizen.

However, we also believe that the lens through which Muslims are repeatedly and forcefully portrayed as security threats is a narrative desperately in need of recalibration. The damaging consequences that result from misguided policies predicated upon Islamophobic assumptions and discourses is an area that is in need of immediate address. Therefore, this chapter focusses on the process of securitisation and resulting legislation that serves to marginalise and demonise British Muslims.

Labelling the threat

It is difficult to ignore the level to which Muslim communities and individuals have come to be seen through the lens of security and counter-terror. It is not uncommon to hear the wildly inaccurate adage that “not all Muslims are terrorists, but all terrorists are Muslim”. Such public misconceptions create the impression that security concerns are solely in the domain of Muslim aggression, while other forms of violence are frequently overlooked, minimalised or at least framed in a very different and de-prioritised manner.

Perhaps a reason for this should be seen in an amalgamation of identity and intent. Recalling earlier discussions surrounding race, ethnicity, and identity, it is not uncommon for xenophobic sentiments to (consciously or unconsciously) influence the public evaluation of a Muslim

perpetrator, resulting in an attitude of “us” vs “them”. The intent of religiously motivated attacks further reinforces the mindset of a division between the believer and the dominant non-believing population.²⁸⁴

The act, as a consequence, is not only an act of violence but is also assault on the dominant group identity. However, when it comes to incidents such as the murder of Jo Cox (which was also designated an act of terrorism), the identity of the attacker means that he was already part of the “us” of the dominant group and the intent was not an overt assault upon the interests of this dominant group.

Therefore, within the above framework, religiously inspired terrorism is an attack on society and state and, by extension, an attack on freedom and a way of life. Meanwhile far-right, white-supremacist, or ultra-nationalist terrorism is an attack on a minority and not society as a whole. Within the public (and often political) imagination, this leads to a perception that religiously inspired terrorism is a matter of security, while far-right, white-supremacist, or ultra-nationalist terrorism is a public order concern.

It is also worth remembering previous discussions of moral panic. As mentioned, the perpetuation of moral panic leads to calls for restrictions, punitive laws, and the curtailment of the suspect community’s civil liberties and freedoms. The culminating effect is a process of securitisation wherein Muslims become transformed into subjects of security.

Processes of securitisation

Securitisation is the process through which state actors transform subjects into matters of security. In the case of British Muslims, this is the way in which politicians, policymakers and public figures (state actors) construct public narratives,

²⁸⁴ Following the logics of Islamophobia, in instances where this perpetrator is Muslim, the rest of the Muslim population is also tainted with this assumption of difference by proxy.

legislative recommendations, and policies which permanently frame Muslims within the lens of counter-terror (thus, transforming them into matters of security).

Due to the emotive nature of *security*, the result of an individual or group being predominantly framed and referenced within debates of security is that they receive disproportionate amounts of attention and resources. For example, terrorism committed by Muslims affects far fewer people than the numbers killed by car accidents, heart disease, breast cancer, smoking, or alcohol. Indeed, studies in the US have shown that you are more likely to be killed by brain-eating parasites, texting whilst driving, toddlers, lightning, furniture, falling out of bed, alcoholism, food poisoning, choking on food, prescription medication, a financial crash, obesity, medical errors or autoerotic asphyxiation than by Muslim terrorists.²⁸⁵

While security threats are a real and crucial concern, the attention given to the dangers presented by Muslims in the Western context, particularly the attention afforded by the media, far outweighs that of any of the aforementioned issues that pose equal, if not greater threats. Reflecting back to the mechanics of the media industry and the dynamics of moral panics, perhaps a reason that the above dangers are not afforded the same emotive reaction is because they are not considered as newsworthy as terrorism committed by Muslims. Consequently, the level of media coverage affects the average member of the public's perception of levels of importance. Thus, they become unable to accurately weigh relative risks, and therefore overinflate the risk of terrorism compared to other threats.

A case in point is that a recent study of the New York Times revealed that Muslims are presented more negatively than cancer

or cocaine. One really must question how much positive coverage is being given to cancer and cocaine to make them be seen more positively than Muslims.²⁸⁶

Once a subject has been securitised within public, political, and media discourses, it becomes necessary for policies to be created to mitigate the security risk they are claimed to pose. In the UK landscape, this has led to a series of questionable counter-terror legislation, including the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 and the Terrorism Act 2006.

However, such securitised rhetoric is not limited to counter-terror strategies, it has also infiltrated the Government's approach to integration and community cohesion as well. Indeed, the Ministry of Housing, Communities, and Local Government's "Integrated Communities Strategy Green Paper; Building Stronger, More United Communities" is littered with references and allusions reminiscent of counter-terror strategies. This conflation between integration and security is then furthered within the Home Office's updated counter-terror strategy "CONTEST: The United Kingdom's Strategy for Countering Terrorism", which explicitly mentions this Green Paper in outlining its strategy. It is imperative that strategies of community integration and of counter-terrorism do not overlap, as this can only result in the further securitisation of an already problematic tripartite relationship between government, society, and minorities. The Government's integration strategy will be discussed further in a later chapter on Public Exclusion, Integration, and Minority Rights.

²⁸⁵ "You're 55 Times More Likely to be Killed by a Police Officer than a Terrorist," Washington's Blog, accessed April 12, 2017, <http://www.washingtonsblog.com/2015/03/youre-55-times-likely-killed-police-officer-terrorist.html>.

²⁸⁶ "Study: 'NYT' Portrays Islam More Negatively than Alcohol, Cancer, and Cocaine," Mondoweiss, March 06, 2016, accessed June 20, 2018, <http://mondoweiss.net/2016/03/study-nyt-portrays-islam-more-negatively-than-alcohol-cancer-and-cocaine/>.

Islamophobia and the Presumption of Muslim Guilt in Terrorism

Dr Todd Green, PhD

Luther College (USA)

In a BBC One television interview in 2015, then Business Secretary Sajid Javid insisted British Muslims have a special responsibility to “combat the poisonous ideology” fuelling Islamist terrorism. Refusal to do so, insisted Javid, would be equivalent to leading Muslim children “to the door” of terrorists.²⁸⁷ That same year, Prime Minister David Cameron accused some British Muslims of “quietly condoning” an extremist ideology that helped the Islamic State to recruit and spread its message.²⁸⁸

Asking Muslims to condemn terrorism, or insinuating Muslims are guilty of condoning terrorism unless they prove otherwise, has become a permanent fixture in public and political discourse. But there are three important reasons why we should avoid calling out Muslims and asking them to condemn terrorism.

The first reason is that the question wrongly assumes Islam is the driving force behind terrorism. Most social scientists argue that politics factors heavily into the motives behind Islamist terrorist organizations, from the Islamic State to al-Qaeda to Hamas. Most of these organizations are responding to Western imperialism or to the real or perceived occupation of territory by foreign powers.²⁸⁹

What we also know from scholarly examinations of young people in Britain and other Western nations who end up joining terrorist organizations is that few of them are literate in Islam. In Britain, this religious illiteracy was first brought to the public’s attention after a classified study from MI5’s Behavioural Science Unit was leaked. This study found most terrorist recruits were novices concerning Islam and were not observant practitioners.²⁹⁰ The Oxford scholar, Lydia Wilson, had similar findings in her study of imprisoned Islamic State fighters in Iraq.²⁹¹ We’ve even seen evidence of this in the news. When two young men from Birmingham, Yusuf Sarwar and Mohammed Ahmed, made plans to travel to Syria to join a terrorist organization in 2013, they logged on to Amazon and ordered books to help them prepare for the ensuing jihad, including *Islam for Dummies* and *The Koran for Dummies*.²⁹² Their choice of literature speaks volumes about what little they knew about Islam even after they had made their decision to travel to Syria.

A second reason to stop asking Muslims to condemn terrorism is that Muslims condemn terrorism all the time, in word and in deed. A simple Google search yields countless links to news releases, videos, and social media posts with Muslims speaking out against terrorism. From the 7/7 and London bridge attacks in the UK, to 9/11 in the US, to the Paris attacks of 2015, Muslim individuals and organizations have routinely condemned terrorist attacks.

Muslims go beyond making public statements. Plenty of Muslims have taken the fight to terrorists abroad by serving in the armed forces of Western nations and

²⁸⁷ Peter Dominiczak, “Sajid Javid: British Muslims Who Don’t Condemn Terrorists Are ‘Taking Children to the Door,’” *The Telegraph*, July 12, 2015, <https://tinyurl.com/yc3pzlos>.

²⁸⁸ Nigel Morris, “David Cameron: Some Muslim Communities ‘Quietly Condoning’ Extremist Ideology – Instead of Confronting It,” *Independent*, June 18, 2015, <https://tinyurl.com/yb2gmpk3>.

²⁸⁹ Robert Pape, *Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism* (New York: Random House, 2005); Jessica Stern and J.M. Berger, *ISIS: The State of Terror* (New York: Ecco, 2015); John Horgan, *Walking Away from Terrorism: Accounts of Disengagement from Radical and Extremist Movements* (New York: Routledge, 2009); Donatella della Porta, *Social Movement Studies and Political Violence* (Aarhus, Denmark: Centre for Studies in Islamism and Radicalisation, 2009); Marc Sageman, *Leaderless*

Jihad: Terror Networks in the Twenty-First Century (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008).

²⁹⁰ Alan Travis, “MI5 Report Challenges Views on Terrorism in Britain,” *The Guardian*, August 20, 2008, <https://tinyurl.com/hhyq2ft>.

²⁹¹ Lydia Wilson, “What I Discovered from Interviewing Imprisoned ISIS Fighters,” *The Nation*, October 21, 2015, <https://tinyurl.com/y92frkdp>.

²⁹² Vikram Dodd, “Two British Men Admit to Linking Up with Extremist Group in Syria,” *The Guardian*, July 8, 2014, <https://tinyurl.com/yb9dy7yp>.

dying in the line of duty for this cause. This was the case with Lance Corporal Jabron Hashmi, a British Muslim soldier who died at the hands of the Taliban in Afghanistan in 2006.²⁹³

Muslims have also become police officers charged with protecting their nations against terrorist threats. Some 2,000 Muslims constitute Britain's National Association of Muslim Police. Ordinary Muslim citizens help the police and other intelligence agencies in their work against terrorism. In the years leading up to the 2017 Manchester attack, members of the Muslim community reported the future perpetrator, Salman Abedi, to law enforcement on multiple occasions, while the Didsbury Mosque banned Abedi from attending the mosque because of his extremist views.²⁹⁴

Muslims have raised money for victims of terrorist attacks. Muslims United for London raised over £25,000 in 48 hours for victims of the Westminster Bridge attack in 2017.²⁹⁵ Similar fundraising efforts took place after the Orlando and Manchester attacks.²⁹⁶

The evidence is overwhelming. Muslims are speaking out and taking action against terrorism all the time. Why so many politicians and journalists are unaware of these actions is perhaps a more relevant question to ask.

The final reason to stop asking Muslims to condemn terrorism is that the question is a distraction. It puts Muslims on the defensive so that Western nations need not come to terms both with their violent past and their ongoing complicity in a violent world order.

Pretty much every category of violence attributed to the Islamic State – persecution of religious minorities, rape, torture,

genocide – has characterized Western nations. The Crusades, the Inquisition, the European witch trials, slavery, lynchings, Jim Crow, colonial violence, torture, genocide – all of this is a part of “our” history, and much of it has been justified within a Christian framework. Some of these episodes, moreover, are not stuck in the distant past but are very much a part of the present. During the war on terror, for example, Amnesty International documented instances in which the UK was complicit in the torture of suspects held abroad.²⁹⁷

What ties these three reasons together is the presumption of guilt. Muslims as a whole are presumed guilty of harboring terrorist sympathies until they prove otherwise (if that's even possible). Asking Muslims to condemn terrorism is a form of racist scapegoating that allows Western nations to avoid coming face to face with the complicated political factors driving terrorism and the need to recognize and make amends for their own record of unjust violence. As a manifestation of Islamophobia, the question ultimately says more about the questioners than Muslims themselves.

Understanding the terminology of security

It is important to clarify certain terminologies used within security discourses. Much of the terminology used has the potential to become politicised or applied incorrectly thus disadvantaging, victimising or stigmatising individuals if it is not used in a critical and reflexive manner. This is especially concerning when certain words, such as “extremist” become absorbed in the public imagination as being exclusively applicable to Muslims.

²⁹³ Jacqueline Maley and Sam Jones, “Jabron Hashmi, the British Muslim Soldier Killed Fighting the Taliban,” *The Guardian*, July 3, 2006, <https://tinyurl.com/yctyuafg>.

²⁹⁴ Aine Fox and Beth Abbit, “Manchester Bomber Salman Abedi Was Banned from a Mosque and Reported to Authorities for His Extremist Views,” *Manchester Evening News*, May 25, 2017, <https://tinyurl.com/yxsp33pv>.

²⁹⁵ Lotifa Begum, “How British Muslims United for London,” *Huffington Post* (UK), March 28, 2017, <https://tinyurl.com/y7jbb8w>.

²⁹⁶ MEND itself raised £38,000 for the victims and families of the Manchester Arena attack.

²⁹⁷ “Annual Report: United Kingdom 2013,” Amnesty International, <https://tinyurl.com/ybs82yuj>.

Such a unilateral positioning serves to distort and misrepresent vital issues of security, whilst simultaneously marginalising and demonising Muslim communities within discussions.

Extremism and “fundamental British values”

Turning to dictionary definitions, extremism means “the quality or state of being extreme” or “advocacy of extreme measures or views”. In the context of the current discussion, the term is mostly used in a political or a religious sense, usually referring to an ideological stance that is deemed outside of the currently accepted mainstream attitudes of society.

Since extremism is a relational concept, in discussing and defining what it is to be “extreme”, one needs a benchmark, something that is more “ordinary”, “centrist”, “mainstream” or “normal” for relative comparison. As such, the labelling of activities, people, and groups as “extremist”, and the defining of what is “ordinary” in any setting is always a subjective and political matter. Therefore, while the term “extremist” can be used in a purely descriptive, academic and non-condemning way, it is usually used pejoratively and with the intention of expressing great disapproval.

Indeed, we all have a tendency to overestimate the extent that others think like we do; this is a social bias known as the “false consensus” effect.²⁹⁸ We therefore have a tendency to assume that others should also think like we do and, therefore, tend to assume that our own position is shared by the majority of other “reasonable” individuals. However, what one person considers to be “reasonable” will substantially differ from others depending on the observer's values, politics, moral scope, and the nature of

their relationship with the issue under examination.

It is also useful to remember that various points in history have seen different positions labelled as “extremist” depending upon the majority social sentiment of the time. For example, those who advocated for women's and LGBTQ rights were once considered outside the mainstream and “extreme”. In this way, while some may regard choosing to wear a hijab and religious dress as an indicator of “extremism”, others view it as a mainstream religious norm.

Since 2011, the Government has defined extremism as: “vocal or active opposition to fundamental British values, including democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty and mutual respect and tolerance of different faiths and beliefs. We also include in our definition of extremism calls for the death of members of our armed forces, whether in this country or overseas.”²⁹⁹

Within this framework for extremism, “fundamental British values” become the yardstick against which views are measured and evaluated. The obvious problem with this is that “fundamental British values” remains ill-defined and open to interpretation. With no explicit guidance on what constitutes “British values”, the terminology implies that it is the Government's prerogative to set a threshold for acceptable cultural, religious, and social values. This raises questions surrounding how one measures and identifies ideologies relative to British values, particularly considering that the concept appears to be a nebulous and elastic yardstick. For example, aside from religious dress, how does religious slaughter, personal sexual ethics, or fasting fit into this evaluation?

In absence of reliable guidance on which values are to be supported and which are to be deemed at odds with the views of

²⁹⁸ Marks, Gary; Miller, Norman (1987). “Ten years of research on the false-consensus effect: An empirical and theoretical review”. *Psychological Bulletin. American Psychological Association*. 102 (1): 72–90. doi:10.1037/0033-2909.102.1.72.

²⁹⁹ UK, HM Government, The Prime Minister's Task Force on Tackling Radicalisation and Extremism, *Tackling extremism in the UK* (2013).

mainstream society, this approach ultimately exposes minority communities, and Muslims specifically, to the risk of being subject to increasing scrutiny and marginalisation, not for potentially violent behaviour, but for not conforming to the Government's views on what should be mainstream society's values.

Radicalism and non-violent extremism

Another clarification to be made is the difference is between "extremist" and "radical". These two terms are often used interchangeably, particularly by politicians, but even by political scientists who should know better. It is tempting to define radicals as "non-violent extremists" under the banner of "extreme by goal but not by method" – "acceptable" extremists, as it were. However, a more accurate distinction between "extremism" and "radicalism" can be gleaned through examining the history of ideas surrounding these terms. From this point of view, extremists tend to be closed-minded supremacists and radicals tend to be open-minded egalitarians.³⁰⁰

The term violence is often a taken for granted category, therefore, we often assume non-violence to be simply the absence of violence. However, violence itself is by no means a clear-cut terminology. Violence by organs of the state may be labelled as "force", thus constituting a "defensive" form of violence and ascribing an aura of legitimacy to the infliction of physical harm. A closer look at violence reveals a multitude of nuances and meanings, especially in combination with adjectives like physical, psychological, structural, cultural, direct or indirect, criminal, political, non-lethal and lethal.³⁰¹

Non-violence in the Gandhian tradition refers to an activist and at times even militant mode of conflict waging, based on

sanctions other than the threat of violence. Such non-violence as an activist strategy goes beyond passive, peaceful resistance: it involves an array of direct individual and collective political actions, such as hunger-strikes, demonstrations, sit-ins, blockades, acts of civil disobedience and other persuasive and even coercive tactics (such as non-cooperation in the form of strikes) – but all falling short of the use of violence against persons or objects (other than one's self). Both means and ends of adherents of this political philosophy are non-violent.

In the sense of the above, "non-violent extremism" is, therefore, a misleading term. Gandhian non-violence is radical but not extreme. However, even such a statement hinges on where we draw the line between the concepts of "radicalism" and "extremism", which many use interchangeably – particularly in the manner in which such terms are used in political discourse, as both terminologies indicate a position at some distance from "centrist", "mainstream" or "moderate" positions.

Correct appreciation for the nuances contained in terms such as "non-violent extremism" is, therefore, of vital importance. Acts such as letter writing, petitioning, organising or participating in peaceful demonstrations, and various other forms of campaigning are integral strategies within peaceful activism for social change within democratic systems. However, for many, a problem occurs when Muslim individuals and organisations use these "non-violent" methods to advocate for causes considered "outside" of mainstream views.

A particularly acute example of this can be seen in the treatment of Muslim organisations that criticise elements of counter-terror strategies. A great deal of campaigning has been undertaken by both Muslim and non-Muslim organisations

³⁰⁰ For more information, see "Radicals and Radicalism." Dictionary of American History. Accessed March 6, 2017. <http://www.encyclopedia.com/history/dictionaries-the-sauruses-pictures-and-press-releases/radicals-and-radicalism>.

³⁰¹ Schmid, Alex P. *Violent and Non-Violent Extremism: Two Sides of the Same Coin*. The Hague: International Centre for Counter-Terrorism (2014).

and individuals to highlight problems within the UK's stance on counter-terror. However, Muslims who do engage with peaceful advocacy work in this area are frequently labelled as "non-violent extremists" because their views are at odds with the current status-quo, but their methods are within the realms of democratic engagement.

This has culminated in the Government's disengagement policy with Muslim organisations that it considers "non-violent extremists". The ultimate consequence is that Muslims who wish to fully participate in the democratic system are stigmatised and excluded from having their views and interests heard.

The political exclusion of Muslims (as discussed in a later chapter of this report) is a fundamental consequence of Islamophobia. Therefore, it is imperative that the terminologies of security are fully understood in both their meaning, usage, and their implications.

Radicalisation

One of the issues with defining radicalisation is the importance of context in determining what is perceived as radicalisation. Therefore, radicalisation can mean different things to different people. As such, there is no universally accepted definition of radicalisation in academia or Government.

On a basic level, radicalisation may be considered to be the process by which an individual or group comes to adopt increasingly extreme political, social, or religious ideals and aspirations that reject or undermine the socio-political status quo. In other words, it is the process through which individuals are drawn to extremist ideologies and methodologies.

Within discussions on counter-terrorism, the UK Government defines radicalisation as "The process by which people come to

support terrorism and violent extremism and, in some cases, then join terrorist groups."³⁰²

Although most political discourse and academic literature focus on radicalisation to "violent extremism", radicalisation can be both violent and non-violent. As previously discussed, attempting to restrict progression to non-violent extremism has potentially problematic applications and consequences. Specifically, there is a danger that focussing on "non-violent extremism" could be used as a tool to restrict legitimate debates and criticism within democratic engagement which could disrupt current status quos. Once again, the Islamophobic implications of excluding Muslim political engagement are of great concern.

The impacts of counter-terror legislation on Muslim communities

Current counter-terror legislation is centred upon the idea that, because the magnitude of the terrorist threat is too great to rely on traditional post-crime jurisprudence, measures and policies need to exist that pre-empt violent acts of terror and criminalise individuals who are believed to be in the process of committing such acts. This transition was one of the key consequences of the War on Terror, which has effectively resulted in the implementation of legislative systems that blur "the boundary between foreign and domestic and between law enforcement and military action."³⁰³ However, due to the inherent difficulty in preventing and pre-empting crime, the application of pre-criminal legislation results in an often arbitrary and over-conjectural application of the law, whereby individuals perceived to belong to a community at risk are increasingly problematised and even criminalised on the basis of acts that would

³⁰² House of Commons. "Communities and Local Government Committee, Sixth Report: Preventing Violent Extremism." (2010).

³⁰³ Jude McCulloch and Dean Wilson, *Pre-crime: Pre-emption, Precaution and the Future*, (London, New York: Routledge, 2016), p. 631.

not be considered criminal in different circumstances.

In other words, attempts to predict crime inherently involve subjective judgements and hypotheses, ultimately culminating in issues of racial profiling and overt scrutiny on one “suspect” community – Muslims. Within this subjective framework, it is, therefore, inevitable that innocent individuals will become suspect and caught up in the apparatus of security measures, purely on the basis of their religious, cultural, or ethnic identities.

The following discussion examines the impacts of two elements of counter-terror legislation on Muslim communities – PREVENT and Schedule 7.

PREVENT

What is Prevent?

PREVENT is one part of CONTEST, which is the UK’s overarching counter-terror strategy involving intelligence agencies and counter-terrorism policing. It is built upon four pillars:

Pursue: Stopping terrorist attacks by detecting, prosecuting and otherwise disrupting those who plot to carry out attacks against the UK or its overseas interests through intelligence gathering and surveillance.

PREVENT: Stopping people becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism by detecting those vulnerable to radicalisation.

Protect: Focusing on areas such as border security, the transport system, national infrastructure and public places in order to protect them and reduce their vulnerability to terrorist attack.

Prepare: Mitigating the impact of a terrorist attack where that attack cannot be stopped. This includes work to bring a terrorist attack to an end, and to increase

resilience in order to help with effective recovery in its aftermath.

PREVENT is delivered nationwide with a particular focus on areas considered to be at greatest risk, such as Newham, Redbridge, Tower Hamlets, Birmingham, Cardiff, and Manchester.³⁰⁴ Each priority area then receives funding for a PREVENT co-ordinator, who is supported by the Home Office to develop delivery plans relating to PREVENT objectives. Work includes disrupting extremist speakers, removing material online, intervening to stop people being radicalised, and dissuading people from travelling to Syria and Iraq and intervening when they return.³⁰⁵

What does PREVENT mean in practice?

Ultimately, PREVENT enforces a statutory duty on certain public bodies to have due regard to signs of potential radicalisation. In other words, staff within schools, universities, the police, the NHS, probation services, local authorities, councils, prisons, colleges and other public institutions have a compulsory duty to report anyone they suspect may be vulnerable to becoming radicalised.

Once individuals have been identified by staff within these public bodies, they are referred to a program called CHANNEL and a support plan is created if it is deemed necessary.

Guidance is provided by the Home Office on how each body should implement the PREVENT duty. For example:

Local authorities should ensure that publicly owned premises are not used to disseminate extremist views.

Frontline school staff should understand PREVENT, be able to recognise vulnerability to radicalisation, and know where to go to seek further help.

³⁰⁴ Home Office, “Response to Freedom of Information request from M Norris”, September 11, 2014, accessed 11.06.2018, https://www.london.gov.uk/sites/default/files/preventing_extremism_in_london_report.pdf

³⁰⁵ “Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill – Factsheet”, Home Office, accessed February 01, 2018, https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/540540/CTS_Bill_-_Factsheet_7_-_Prevent.pdf

Universities should have policies and procedures in place for the management of events on campus, and the use of all university premises, that apply to all staff, students, and visitors.

Police should support individuals vulnerable to radicalisation, for example through the CHANNEL programme, and support partner organisations to deliver PREVENT objectives.

Prisons should offer support to individuals vulnerable to radicalisation or move them away from other individuals of concern. Those who are at risk of radicalising others should face the removal of privileges and segregation from others.³⁰⁶

Problems with PREVENT

PREVENT has been heavily criticised by experts, academics, activists, and politicians across all sectors of public life. The concerns primarily centre around its lack of evidentiary basis leading to inadequate training, discriminatory application and the marginalisation of Muslims. Ultimately, many have condemned the strategy as counterproductive, with the ineffectiveness of de-radicalisation programmes being illustrated by a 2018 study conducted by the Behavioural Insights Team (BIT), which found that 95% of these programmes were ineffective and counter-productive.³⁰⁷

PREVENT has no evidentiary basis

The list of characteristics that PREVENT requires practitioners to look out for is called the ERG22+ risk factors. The research underpinning the ERG22+ risk factors was research conducted on a small group of prisoners convicted of terrorism offences. The use of this tiny sample of people – criminals who are unrepresentative of British Muslims – in order to draw conclusions about the

general Muslim population in the UK has been repeatedly criticised and has not undergone the standard independent peer-review process to give the research any validity.

The PREVENT strategy focuses heavily on ideology without consideration of other factors influencing radicalisation

There is wide agreement amongst experts and academics that people are drawn into terrorism for a huge variety of reasons. However, PREVENT's heavy focus on ideology does not properly account for the impact of mental health issues, foreign policy, individual isolation, unemployment, socio-economic deprivation or a whole host of other factors that could lead an individual to become radicalised.

PREVENT has no workable definitions

As explored earlier in this chapter, the Government presently has no clear working definitions of extremism, non-violent extremism, British Values nor radicalisation. With roughly 600,000 WRAP-trained staff attempting to identify radicalisation with a view to tackling extremism, this lack of objective understanding causes confusion in PREVENT's application. If a person doesn't know exactly what extremism or radicalisation are, how can they identify them?

PREVENT officers must rely on inadequate training

Considering that counter-terror is such an important component of public safety and that it possesses a potential to impact people in severe ways if not applied correctly, it is imperative that the training provided is of the highest quality. However, at present, PREVENT delivery officers receive only 45-60 minutes of training to identify signs of radicalisation (which, as previously mentioned, are

³⁰⁶ "Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill - Factsheet"... https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/540540/CTS_Bill_-_Factsheet_7_-_Prevent.pdf

³⁰⁷ "Most programmes to stop radicalisation are failing", *The Times*, June 6, 2018, accessed 11.06.2018, <https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/most-programmes-to-stop-radicalisation-are-failing-0bwh9pbtld>

based on flawed science in themselves). Such basic training is only capable of a generic overview of what radicalisation at best. This, in turn, creates a misleading framework through which nurses, teachers, and other public body employees are required to attempt to identify radicalisation.³⁰⁸

Indeed, this lack of effective training was highlighted by the Home Affairs Committee who noted “We are concerned about a lack of sufficient and appropriate training in an area that is complex and unfamiliar to many education and other professionals, compounded by a lack of clarity about what is required of them.”³⁰⁹

Equally worrying is the fact that there appears to be no formative examination nor on-going assessment for PREVENT officers. Such a lack of unregulated quality assurance for procedures would never be tolerated as good practice in any other workspace.

Taking the NHS as an example, research conducted by Warwick University has found that 70% of the respondents “were ‘likely’, or ‘very likely’” to refer someone for the “possession of Islamic/Anarchist philosophy books”. This is important as the PREVENT training programme does not indicate this as a factor indicative of radicalisation. The authors of the research, in line with the overarching concerns surrounding the PREVENT duty, conclude that “respondents are drawing their attitude from popular culture rather than official training or academic research”.³¹⁰ Such findings are therefore concerning as they are demonstrative of the lack of standardisation and reinforcement of

correct practice across the PREVENT training.

Unacceptable levels of collateral damage

The lack of an evidentiary basis combined with poor training has led to a situation where, everyday normative practices of the Islamic faith (for example, wearing the hijab) or taking an interest in politics (criticising foreign policy) can be seen as a sign of radicalisation. Indeed, there have been numerous to dozens of cases where individuals have been falsely implicated as being at risk of radicalisation. Indeed, of the 7,361 individuals referred to PREVENT in 2015/16, 4,997 were referred for “Islamist extremism”, but only 5% went on to receive CHANNEL support for de-radicalisation – meaning that the remaining 95% were eventually not considered to be at risk of radicalisation.³¹¹ In 2016/17, of the 6,093 individuals referred, 3,704 (61%) were again referred for Islamist extremism, but only 184 (4.9%) went on to receive CHANNEL support.³¹² Some of these case studies will be discussed further below.

There is a paucity of research on the effects of a false referral on these individuals, but it is likely that the stigmatising effects of being flagged as a “security risk” will be adverse, and affect individuals from a psychological, social, educational, and employment perspective.

Targeting Muslims as a suspect community

Home Office data indicates that 5,000 individuals were referred to PREVENT for “Islamist extremism” in 2015-16. Assuming all of those referred for “Islamist extremism” were Muslim, this means that roughly 1 in 500 Muslims were referred to

³⁰⁸ “E-learning – Prevent”, Home Office, accessed 01.02.2018, <https://www.elearning.prevent.homeoffice.gov.uk/>

³⁰⁹ House of Commons, “Radicalisation: the counter-narrative and identifying the tipping point – Eighth report of Session 2016-17”, August 25, 2016, accessed June 20, 2018, <https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201617/cmselect/cmha/135/135.pdf>

³¹⁰ Charlotte Heath-Kelly and Erzsébet Strausz “Counter-terrorism in the NHS: EVALUATING PREVENT DUTY SAFEGUARDING IN THE NHS”, accessed 29.05.2018, https://warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/pais/research/researchcentres/irs/counterterrorism/minthenhs/project_report_draft_60pp.pdf

³¹¹ “Individuals referred to and supported through the Prevent Programme, April 2015 to March 2016”, Home Office, Statistical Bulletin 23/17, November 9, 2017, accessed 17.04.2018,

https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/677646/individuals-referred-supported-prevent-programme-apr2015-mar2016.pdf

³¹² “Individuals referred to and supported through the Prevent Programme, April 2016 to March 2017”, Statistical Bulletin 06/18, Home Office, March 27, 2018, accessed 17.04.2018,

https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/694002/individuals-referred-supported-prevent-programme-apr2016-mar2017.pdf

PREVENT during the year. A conservative estimate of the proportion of the White population referred for far-right concerns is less than 1 in 60,000, making the likelihood of a Muslim being referred for “Islamist extremism” more than 110 times the likelihood of a White individual being referred for ‘far-right extremism’ to the programme.

As a consequence, numerous critics have condemned the PREVENT strategy as being inherently discriminatory. Beyond issues of equality and social justice, such a discriminatory application may also prove to be counterproductive. Indeed, MI5 has concluded that “experiences of inequality, marginalisation, or victimisation, particularly racial or religious attacks, both physical and verbal” play a direct role in the radicalisation of individuals.³¹³ PREVENT, unfortunately, seems to do exactly that.

Indeed, Andy Burnham has described the PREVENT strategy as contributing to “creating a feeling in the Muslim community that it is being spied upon and unfairly targeted. It is building a climate of mutual suspicion and distrust. Far from tackling extremism, it risks creating the very conditions for it to flourish”.³¹⁴

Regarding PREVENT in the NHS, a senior NHS whistleblower recently revealed that “I have never, ever had a concern raised to me about a white, non-Muslim or far-right person,” said the whistleblower. “Concerns have only ever been raised about Muslims. This is a shockingly bad and damaging piece of legislation and in my view it has no place in an advanced democratic country.”³¹⁵

Conflicts with safeguarding

PREVENT causes grey areas in safeguarding. Ordinarily within safeguarding, it is the welfare of the individual person in question that is of concern because you're trying to protect that person; whereas, with PREVENT, you're protecting the state from that person. This creates confusion in how to approach safeguarding needs.

As concluded by the civil rights campaigners, Liberty, “while everyone in society has moral and ethical obligations to report suspected criminality, requiring teachers and others in sensitive positions of trust to report those with dissenting views risks undermining professional obligations of confidentiality, sowing mistrust and pushing those with grievances further underground.”³¹⁶

The Impact of PREVENT

Within the confines of this report, space does not allow a full examination of the impact of PREVENT in every area in which it operates. However, the following discussion seeks to briefly highlight some of the key concerns arising from the application of PREVENT in three key areas – schools, universities, and the NHS.

In Schools

With the majority of referrals to PREVENT coming from the education sector (32% of all referrals in 2016/17),³¹⁷ the impact of PREVENT in schools and on the learning and development of children is of primary concern.

A lack of trust in the classroom: The classroom environment is predicated upon trust. If students feel that they are being spied upon by their teachers, this destroys

³¹³ “The making of an extremist”, *The Guardian*, August 20, 2008, accessed 30.11.2017, <https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2008/aug/20/uksecurityterrorism>

³¹⁴ “Andy Burnham calls for ‘toxic’ Prevent strategy to be scrapped”, *The Guardian*, June 9, 2016, accessed 01.02.2018, <https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/jun/09/andy-burnham-calls-for-toxic-prevent-strategy-to-be-scrapped>

³¹⁵ Diane Taylor, “Hospice Staff ‘trained to Report Dying Patients as Part of Terror Strategy’”, *The Guardian*, June 11, 2018, accessed June 20, 2018, <https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2018/jun/11/nhs-staff-trained-to-signs-of-radicalisation-in-terminally-ill-says-whistleblower>

³¹⁶ “Liberty’s Second Reading briefing on the Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill...” p. 25.

³¹⁷ “Individuals referred to and supported through the Prevent Programme, April 2016 to March 2017”, *Home Office*, Statistical Bulletin 06/18, March 27, 2018, accessed 11.06.2018, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/694002/individuals-referred-supported-prevent-programme-apr2016-mar2017.pdf

the relationship of trust that is so important. Aside from the obvious damage this has upon the student's ability to learn, if students do not feel that they can ask questions to their teachers, there is a danger that they may resort to finding answers online, where any kind of distorted information can be found.

Creating a pre-criminal space: Children require encouragement and nurturing to flourish and achieve their potential. However, the pre-criminal space that is created by PREVENT stigmatises students, thereby potentially damaging their self-confidence and their confidence in societal structures and institutions.

Schoolyard bullying: The previous chapter in this report on Youth and Education outlined the levels of racially and religiously motivated bullying that Muslim children are confronted by. Schools should not enact policies that serve to further securitise and stigmatise students. Counter-terror strategies infiltrating the school environment can only result in furthering the bullying narratives of “bomber” and “terrorist”.

Hindrance to learning and development: Schools should be environments where students feel safe, confident and supported. Therefore, the aforementioned concerns obviously have a great potential to severely impact the way in which children perceive and interact with their education.

In Universities

In 2017, the National Union of Students (NUS) launched a report into the experience of Muslim students in British universities.³¹⁸ The report concluded that

“Prevent is a key issue for respondents’ ability to engage meaningfully with the structures of their institutions, unions and NUS, in particular around democratic engagement. It is particularly notable that being affected by Prevent has a negative impact on respondents’ engagement with political debates. This negative impact persists whether or not respondents articulated that fear around Prevent was the cause. This correlation demonstrates the chilling effect of Prevent, and that being affected by Prevent accompanies an erosion in trust of institutions who have responsibility to combat Islamophobia.”³¹⁹

Thus, this highlights several key problems with the implementation of PREVENT in university settings:

Impact on free-speech: Universities are intended to be centres of critical debate and learning. As such, the freedom to express ideas and explore arguments is integral to this mission. Indeed, universities’ duties with respect to free speech are reflected in the Education Act 1986,³²⁰ the Education Reform Act 1988,³²¹ the Human Rights Act 1998,³²² and the Equality Act 2010.³²³ However, the requisites of the PREVENT duty undermines these principles as speakers and topics of discussion become regulated. Moreover, Muslim students have reported a reluctance to engage with certain discussions due to a fear they will be referred to PREVENT. According to the NUS report, one-third of surveyed students reported being negatively affected by PREVENT. This included having been referred to authorities under the scheme, having organised events that were cancelled or significantly changed because of it (30 percent of those affected) or having disengaged from political debate

³¹⁸ “The experience of Muslim students in 2017-18”, NUS, accessed 29.05.2018, [https://nusdigital.s3-eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/document/documents/41267/29d43267ae2f2f0906450a27487fcd36/The Experience of Muslim Students in 2017-18.pdf?AWSAccessKeyId=AKIAJKEA56ZWKFU6MHNQ&Expires=1527604654&Signature=5loqW0HKBdTFvtkJCeSaU85FpA%3D](https://nusdigital.s3-eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/document/documents/41267/29d43267ae2f2f0906450a27487fcd36/The%20Experience%20of%20Muslim%20Students%20in%202017-18.pdf?AWSAccessKeyId=AKIAJKEA56ZWKFU6MHNQ&Expires=1527604654&Signature=5loqW0HKBdTFvtkJCeSaU85FpA%3D)

³¹⁹ “The experience of Muslim students in 2017-18”, NUS, accessed 29.05.2018, [https://nusdigital.s3-eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/document/documents/41267/29d43267ae2f2f0906450a27487fcd36/The Experience of Muslim Students in 2017-18.pdf?AWSAccessKeyId=AKIAJKEA56ZWKFU6MHNQ&Expires=1527604654&Signature=5loqW0HKBdTFvtkJCeSaU85FpA%3D](https://nusdigital.s3-eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/document/documents/41267/29d43267ae2f2f0906450a27487fcd36/The%20Experience%20of%20Muslim%20Students%20in%202017-18.pdf?AWSAccessKeyId=AKIAJKEA56ZWKFU6MHNQ&Expires=1527604654&Signature=5loqW0HKBdTFvtkJCeSaU85FpA%3D)

³²⁰ “Education Act 1986”, available at <http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1986/40>

³²¹ “Education Reform Act 1988”, available at <http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1988/40/contents>

³²² “Human Rights Act 1998”, available at <http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1998/42>

³²³ “Equality Act 2010”, available at <http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2010/15/contents>

specifically due to concerns around being reported under PREVENT.³²⁴

Limiting political engagement: The NUS report noted the potential of PREVENT to deter students from political engagement. According to the findings, 43% of those who reported being affected by PREVENT felt unable to express their views or be themselves and 30% do not feel comfortable attending NUS events. Islamophobia as a mechanism of political exclusion is a topic that will be returned to in a following chapter on Political Representation and Exclusion.

Being used as a tool to shut down opposing voices: According to the Department of Education at the University of Oxford, "Criticising government policy, expression of support for specific groups, identifying causal relations between policies, processes and events, subjecting public arguments to evaluation and critique – these are all legitimate aspects of academic work. They also contribute to public and political debate."³²⁵ Therefore, it is clear by all academic standards that, in voicing and debating concerns, students perform their duty both as academics and as engaged members of civic society.

However, there are organisations such as Student Rights (incidentally, a project of the Henry Jackson Society),³²⁶ who present the criticisms of Muslim students – especially those in connection with counter-terror or Palestinian rights – as threats to security. Furthermore, Student Rights has been accused of performing "witch hunts" against Islamic societies and using the arguments of PREVENT to attack societies and events that host speakers with whom they disagree and subsequently label as "extremist". At the same time, Student Rights have

simultaneously opposed no-platforming policies directed at far-right speakers, such as the BNP. Again, the role of Student Rights in excluding Muslim voices from legitimate debates will be discussed further in the later chapter on Political and Public Exclusion.

In the NHS

Alongside schools, the NHS comes into contact with some of society's most vulnerable citizens. Therefore, they have a duty of care towards all patients. The pressures of PREVENT, therefore, put undue strains on this duty of care, particularly in terms of safeguarding. Indeed, the research conducted by the University of Warwick also noted that there is "evidence to suggest that the mentally ill are being inappropriately stigmatised as terrorism risks".³²⁷ This revelation has been further compounded by the use of PREVENT to monitor terminally ill people and dementia patients in hospices and palliative care units.³²⁸

Unclear guidelines: The unclear guidelines laid out create a risk of 'intuitive reporting' and unconscious bias. Ultimately, it is unavoidable that popular culture stereotypes will influence staff perception of radicalisation.

Conflicts with safeguarding: PREVENT causes grey areas in safeguarding. It is not transparent, there is no audit, and no clinical governance. Ordinarily within safeguarding, it is the welfare of the individual person in question that is of concern because you are trying to protect that person; whereas, with PREVENT, you are primarily protecting the state from that person. This creates confusion in how to approach safeguarding needs. As previously mentioned, an NHS

³²⁴ "The experience of Muslim students in 2017-18", NUS, accessed 29.05.2018, https://nusdigital.s3-eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/document/documents/41267/29d43267ae2f2f0906450a27487fcd36/The_Experience_of_Muslim_Students_in_2017-18.pdf?AWSAccessKeyId=AKIAJKEA56ZWKFU6MHNQ&Expires=1527604654&Signature=5loqW0HKBdTFvtkJCeSaU85FjpA%3D

³²⁵ "Academic Freedom and Values," Oxford University Department of Education, accessed June 20, 2018, <http://www.education.ox.ac.uk/about-us/academic-freedom-and-values/>.

³²⁶ The Henry Jackson Society are discussed in the chapter on the Islamophobia Industry of this report.

³²⁷ Charlotte Heath-Kelly and Erzsébet Strausz "Counter-terrorism in the NHS: EVALUATING PREVENT DUTY SAFEGUARDING IN THE NHS", accessed 29.05.2018, https://warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/pais/research/researchcentres/irs/counterterrorism/minthenhs/project_report_draft_60pp.pdf

³²⁸ "Hospice staff 'trained to report dying patients as part of terror strategy'"

whistleblower recently condemned the use of PREVENT in the NHS, accusing the Home Office of hijacking the term “safeguarding” and redefining it in the context of PREVENT. Safeguarding duties only apply to adults deemed vulnerable, with care and support needs, who are experiencing, or are at risk of, abuse or neglect and are unable to protect themselves against such treatment. The whistleblower stated that, “Local authorities will dismiss a safeguarding concern if the individual does not meet those criteria...What is happening here is ‘thought police’; concerns are usually raised about people who have made comments about ongoing politics such as overseas wars.”³²⁹

There is little doubt that repackaging or framing PREVENT as an issue of safeguarding has stifled dissent in the public sector, since very few professionals would dare to question the notion of safeguarding.

No place in healthcare: the majority of NHS staff (52%) do not think PREVENT belongs in healthcare.³³⁰ Criticising PREVENT’s operation in the NHS the recent whistleblower stated that “Patients who don’t trust their doctor or nurse may not seek advice from them, which could be potentially life threatening. Prevent moves people’s focus away from care, treatment and support into areas that are police business: counter-terrorism and surveillance... This is a system that is designed and run by the Home Office, which oversees it and to which organisations are accountable. My belief is that the Home Office has no place being involved in day-to-day NHS work, or indeed education. In essence, this is ‘soft’ surveillance.”³³¹

³²⁹ Ibid.

³³⁰ Charlotte Heath-Kelly and Erzsébet Strausz “Counter-terrorism in the NHS: EVALUATING PREVENT DUTY SAFEGUARDING IN THE NHS”, accessed 29.05.2018,

Islamophobia, Prevent and University

Hareem Ghani

NUS Women’s Officer 2016 – 2018

Ilyas Nagdee

NUS Black Students Officer 2017 – 2019

Hareem Ghani and Ilyas Nagdee are also coordinators of the Students Not Suspects Campaign

Earlier this year, the NUS Black Students and NUS Womens’ Campaign released the Muslims in Education Report which looked at the experiences of Muslim Students in Education. It was the first report of its kind and some of the headline results are below.

- One in 3 Muslim Students felt negatively affected by Prevent and half of those felt unable to express political opinions and/or disengaged from political discussion altogether
- One in three respondents reported having experienced some type of abuse or crime at their place of study and over a half experienced some form of online abuse.
- The responses were heavily gendered; women who wear a traditional Islamic garment (e.g. a hijab, niqab or jilbab) were significantly more likely to be very worried about being abused or attacked.

We will expand on some of the findings around Prevent below.

One-third of survey respondents felt negatively affected by the Prevent strategy. This included participating less in political activity or debate; having events they have organised being restricted or cancelled; or being reported through Prevent. Whether a Muslim student has been affected by Prevent is a significant indicator of

https://warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/pais/research/researchcentres/irs/counterterrorism/minthenhs/project_report_draft_60pp.pdf

³³¹ “Hospice staff ‘trained to report dying patients as part of terror strategy’”

whether they are involved in a wide variety of student activities and their opinions on a variety of matters. As such we noted throughout the survey where these answers significantly differed from the rest of the respondents, had they been affected by Prevent.

Students affected by Prevent highlighted that their experience of Prevent has led to them taking part in less political activity. Muslim students feel strongly about what Prevent entails. An overwhelming majority of respondents disagreed that lecturers and education institutions should monitor and report students' attitudes and behaviours, prayer room activities and email/online activity. Three in five respondents disagreed that lecturers should report on their views and opinions. Having personal experience of the impact of Prevent heightens these responses.

Significantly more women who wore religious coverings disagreed with facets of the duty compared with those who do not. For example, women wearing religious garments are more likely to disagree that lecturers should be reporting to the government on their students' views and opinions (69 per cent of women who wear a garment versus 53 per cent for those who did not), or that institutions should be monitoring recording student emails and internet/web usage (72 per cent versus 56 per cent respectively).

Two out of five respondents (43 per cent) who reported having been affected by Prevent told us that this experience made it harder to express their opinions or views. Nearly a third of students (30 per cent) who have been affected by Prevent reported experiencing barriers to organising speakers and events on campus.

"In lessons I found myself not speaking my true opinion because of fear of being misreported as a result, just for saying my opinion, and I worry that others will just

comment." (Woman, aged 22–23, Master's student)

"[When I was] getting a certain speaker for an event, Prevent were involved and had to be present for the talk, in addition to police as well, shockingly." (Man, aged 22–23, higher education student)

Muslim students most likely not to have been affected by Prevent include those not involved with their students' union, international students and women who do not wear religious garments (eg hijab or niqab). Muslim women who wear a covering are significantly more likely to be affected by Prevent during their time in education than those who do not; 40 per cent compared with 26 per cent. This kind of correlation may raise further questions regarding how the Prevent duty functions to highlight specific Muslim students relating to their demographics, rather than their behaviour, and in turn amplifies existing biases and stereotypes of Muslims.

Our research findings suggest that Muslim students follow a similar pattern to other students in terms of their general levels of participation (both passive and active) in student union activities, including a small percentage who have no involvement whatsoever. Respondents who reported a complete lack of involvement in these activities are more likely to have reported being unaffected by Prevent. Conversely, students who reported an acute awareness of their students' union's work are more likely to have reported being affected by Prevent. Muslim students affected by Prevent are more likely to disagree that their students' union understands their needs or reflects their views.

PREVENT Case Studies

Prevent Watch³³² and Rights Watch UK³³³ have detailed a number of cases where PREVENT has been used to identify and

³³² "Cases," PREVENT Watch, accessed March 20, 2017, <http://www.preventwatch.org/cases/>.

³³³ *Preventing Education? Human Rights and UK Counter-Terrorism Policy in Schools*, publication, July 2016, <http://rwuk.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/preventing-education-final-to-print-3.compressed-1.pdf>.

question students outside of standard protocols and in unwarranted circumstances.

Staffordshire Textbook case – March 2015³³⁴

Mohammed Umar Farooq was a 33-year-old postgraduate student enrolled on the Terrorism, Crime and Global Security Master's program at Staffordshire University.³³⁵ On 23 March 2015, he was approached by two female staff while in the library (Farooq initially assumed these staff members to be fellow students). According to Farooq, he was questioned about attitudes to homosexuality, ISIS, and al-Qaida. He said his replies were "largely academic but he stressed his personal opposition to extremist views". The tense conversation ended, and after a short while, a security guard approached Farooq, confirming that he had received a complaint from staff members. The staff told the security guard that "there is a man, who is Asian and with a beard, who is not a student and is reading a book on terrorism". The staff went further to say, "check him out", as she suspected he is a "radical terrorist". The security guard approached and recognised Farooq and did not take any further action.

Farooq filed an internal complaint for discrimination; he asked why the staff had chosen to question him, the only Muslim with a beard, holding books on terrorism. The teachers refused to answer any of the questions.

In response to the complaint, the Academic Registrar and Director of Student Experience responded by acknowledging that the university has "a commitment to secure freedom of speech and to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism." They further described the PREVENT duty as "very broad, devoid of detail" and

containing "insufficient detail to provide clear practical direction in an environment such as the University's."

Farooq received a letter of apology from the teacher that wrongfully questioned him. The teacher said, "I do not possess any particular knowledge or experience of terrorism and radicalisation, and I have only attended a short training session on how to identify students who might be at risk of being radicalised." She further asserted that a "combination of the content of our discussion and my lack of experience in this arena caused me to consider whether this was something that may fall within the 'Prevent agenda'."³³⁶

The incident resulted in Farooq being so unsettled that he chose not to return to the course, stating that he had been "*looking over his shoulder*" ever since.

There are many stories like this one where the individual was not referred to a PREVENT officer and, therefore, it is not technically recorded as a PREVENT intervention. However, the strategy itself and the training of those charged with enforcing it has led to a situation where individuals like Farooq are at risk of stigmatisation.

The Eco-Warrior (May 2015)

A Muslim pupil was investigated by PREVENT officers for discussing deforestation campaigners, eco-warriors, and their tactics during a class debate about deforestation. The entire class partook in a debate about eco-warriors, which was a topic they had researched for the debating society at school. During the investigation, the pupil explained the context in which he used the word "eco-terrorism", but things took a turn for the worse when the PREVENT officers asked the pupil if he was affiliated with ISIS. Following the event, the young pupil

³³⁴ "Postgraduate Student on Terrorism," Prevent Watch, October 19, 2015, <http://www.preventwatch.org/incident-postgraduate-student-on-terrorism/>.

³³⁵ Randeep Ramesh and Josh Halliday, "Student accused of being a terrorist for reading book on terrorism," The Guardian, September 24, 2015,

<https://www.theguardian.com/education/2015/sep/24/student-accused-being-terrorist-reading-book-terrorism>.

³³⁶ "CAGE releases exclusive video interview with student accused of terrorism," CAGE, September 29, 2015, <https://cage.ngo/article/cage-releases-exclusive-video-interview-student-accused-terrorism/>.

became concerned that he could be separated from his family and became reluctant to participate in class debates or express his opinions.³³⁷

Free Palestine (February 2016)

16-year old Rahmaan Mohammadi was questioned by anti-terrorism police at home for wearing a "Free Palestine" badge to school and for trying to raise money for humanitarian aid for Palestinians. Bedfordshire police visited Mohammadi's house with a folder of information about his activities at school, and after consulting with the young student and his parents, concluded there was no sign of radicalisation.³³⁸ Mohammadi alleges that the police warned him "not to talk about Palestine in school", and that school staff approached his brother and pressured him to tell Rahmaan to "stop being radical".³³⁹ "My education was being ruined", recalled Mohammadi some months later, "PREVENT is doing more harm than good."³⁴⁰

The cucumber cooker bomb (March 2016)

A four-year-old child drew a picture of his father cutting a cucumber and was referred to PREVENT by the nursery staff who, on questioning the child about what he had drawn misheard "cucumber" as "cuker-bum", thus believing the picture showed his father making a "cooker bomb". Eventually, no referral was made, but the child's mother recalled how tragic the experience was: "Initially I was so upset and distraught that I told him not to do any more drawings ... God bless him, he said: 'I won't draw anything ... I'll just draw a

house, or the remote control. And I said: 'Don't draw the remote!'"³⁴¹

Trip to Saudi Arabia (Undated)

A recent study conducted by Warwick University over the application of the PREVENT duty in the NHS revealed misguided referrals made purely on a conjectural basis. One referral involved "an Asian man" who was considered a risk because he was planning a "future trip to Saudi Arabia", which was interpreted by a healthcare as a cause for concern. In truth, the "Asian man" was planning a Hajj trip to the holy city of Mecca, a pillar of Islam which all capable Muslims are expected to complete at least once during their lifetime.³⁴²

Watching Arabic news (Undated)

Another referral highlighted by the Warwick University research was made when a healthcare professional considered a child watching an "Arabic televised news channel" at risk of radicalisation. On a home visit to the patient, a healthcare professional noticed a child watching TV in Arabic, as well as Arabic literature lying on the floor. The family was "reported to social care as a potential case of radicalisation".³⁴³

Critics of PREVENT

PREVENT has been criticised by Muslims and non-Muslims alike. These critics include (but are not limited to) three special rapporteurs to the UN, the NUT, the NUS, the former Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, Rights Watch UK, the Open Society Justice Initiative, and more than 140 academics,

³³⁷ "The Eco-Warrior", *Prevent Watch*, accessed 11.06.2018, <https://www.preventwatch.org/incident-the-eco-warrior/>

³³⁸ Prevent Strategy 'Used To Target Young Muslims', *Sky News*, March 25, 2016, accessed 18.04.2018, <https://news.sky.com/story/prevent-strategy-used-to-target-young-muslims-10217460>

³³⁹ "Anti-terror police question schoolboy for wearing pro-Palestine badge", *The Independent*, February 14, 2016, accessed 11.06.2018, <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/anti-terror-police-question-schoolboy-for-wearing-pro-palestine-badge-a6873656.html>

³⁴⁰ "The problem with Prevent: 'I was investigated by the government's anti-radicalisation programme' - video", *The Guardian*, August 26, 2016, accessed

11.06.2018, <https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/video/2016/aug/26/prevent-anti-radicalisation-muslims-london-video>

³⁴¹ "Nursery 'raised fears of radicalisation over boy's cucumber drawing'", *The Guardian*, March 11, 2016, accessed 11.06.2018, <https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2016/mar/11/nursery-radicalisation-fears-boys-cucumber-drawing-cooker-bomb>

³⁴² Charlotte Heath-Kelly and Erzsébet Strausz "Counter-terrorism in the NHS EVALUATING PREVENT DUTY SAFEGUARDING IN THE NHS", *Warwick University*, p. 26, accessed 11.06.2018, https://warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/pais/research/researchcentres/irs/counterterrorism/minthenhs/project_report_draft_60pp.pdf

³⁴³ Ibid, p. 25

politicians and experts in a single letter alone.

The National Union of Teachers (now the NEU)

The NUT voted overwhelmingly to reject PREVENT because it causes “suspicion in the classroom and confusion in the staffroom.”³⁴⁴ The NUT claims that the best role schools can play in countering extremism is by encouraging discussion, which is in fact inhibited by some aspects of the Prevent strategy. Consequently, the NUT has called for a review of the strategy.³⁴⁵

Maina Kiai, UN Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of assembly and association

Maina Kiai stated that PREVENT has “created unease and uncertainty around what can be legitimately discussed in public”.³⁴⁶ He goes on to argue that “the spectre of Big Brother is so large, in fact, that I was informed that some families are afraid of discussing the negative effects of terrorism in their own homes, fearing their children would talk about it at school and have their intentions misconstrued.”³⁴⁷ Furthermore, he concluded that “by dividing, stigmatising and alienating segments of the population, Prevent could end up promoting extremism rather than countering it.”³⁴⁸

Ben Emmerson, UN Special Rapporteur on the protection and promotion of human rights while countering terrorism

Ben Emmerson, has previously said, speaking on domestic counter-terrorism strategies, “some states have misused these poorly defined concepts to suppress

political opposition or ideological dissent from mainstream values...legislation against extremism has in some instances been used against journalists, religious groups or critics of state policy and this is not acceptable”.³⁴⁹

Tendayi Achiume, UN Special Rapporteur on Contemporary Forms of Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance

Concluding her recent visit to the UK, Prof. Tendayi Achiume, singled out PREVENT, slamming it as being “inherently flawed” and noting that there was “no evidence that PREVENT actually prevents extremism”. She added that the “vague criteria” to identify individuals or groups that are somehow “predisposed to terrorist ideology and violence” and the “lack of a clear, workable definitions of “extremism” and “British values”” had led to “horrific consequences”.³⁵⁰

Diane Abbott, Shadow Home Secretary

The Shadow Home Secretary, Diane Abbott, recently condemned the use of PREVENT.

Speaking about its use in hospices and dementia wards, she stated that, “The public will not understand what business a counter-terror programme has monitoring dementia patients or people dying in a hospice... Ministers wax lyrical about how Prevent is focused on a need for ‘safeguarding’... If the government has finally realised woeful inadequacies in social work and social care provisions, they need look no further than their own scathing cuts. The Prevent strategy is losing credibility and is not making the

³⁴⁴ Richard Adams. “Teachers back motion calling for Prevent strategy to be scrapped.” The Guardian. March 28, 2016. Accessed March 17, 2017. <https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/mar/28/teachers-nut-back-motion-calling-prevent-strategy-radicalisation-scrapped>.

³⁴⁵ “Prevent Strategy.” National Union of Teachers. March 28, 2016. Accessed March 17, 2017. <https://www.teachers.org.uk/news-events/conference-2016/prevent-strategy>.

³⁴⁶ Damien Gayle. “Prevent strategy ‘could end up promoting extremism’” The Guardian. April 21, 2016. Accessed March 17, 2017. <https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/apr/21/government-prevent-strategy-promoting-extremism-maina-kiai>.

³⁴⁷ Ibid.

³⁴⁸ “Prevent strategy ‘could end up promoting extremism’”

³⁴⁹ United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner. “Do not criminalise extreme views – UN Special Rapporteur on counterterrorism”. Accessed June 11, 2018. <http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=17229#>.

³⁵⁰ Tendayi Achiume. “End of Mission Statement of the Special Rapporteur on Contemporary Forms of Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance at the Conclusion of Her Mission to the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland”. United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner. Accessed on June 11, 2018. <http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=23073&LangID=E>.

public any safer. It urgently needs a fundamental rethink and a complete review."

Rights Watch UK

A report from Rights Watch UK states that "Muslim children across the United Kingdom are self-censoring for fear of being reported under Prevent. Their fear is not unwarranted. We have uncovered a number of instances where children have been referred to Prevent for legitimately exercising their right to freedom of expression in situations where they pose no threat to society whatsoever."³⁵¹

The Justice Initiative

According to The Justice Initiative report "Eroding Trust", the PREVENT strategy risks human rights violations, including the right against discrimination, as well as the right to freedom of expression.³⁵² It concludes that "Being wrongly targeted under Prevent has led some Muslims to question their place in British society."³⁵³

David Anderson QC, the former independent reviewer of terrorism legislation

Prevent has been heavily criticised for sowing mistrust and fear in Muslim communities. While he is not anti-PREVENT per se, the former independent reviewer of terrorism legislation, David Anderson, QC did stipulate that the duty on schools to identify radicalisation has become a "significant source of grievance" among British Muslims, encouraging "mistrust to spread and to fester".³⁵⁴

The National Union of Student (NUS)

The NUS claims that their opposition to PREVENT rooted in the fact that the strategy is "fundamentally racist and Islamophobic, targeting the Muslim community whilst eroding civil liberties for all as part of a clampdown on political dissent and undermining the space for critical discussion in our universities, colleges and schools."³⁵⁵

Andy Burnham, Mayor of Greater Manchester

Andy Burnham has described the PREVENT strategy as contributing to "creating a feeling in the Muslim community that it is being spied upon and unfairly targeted. It is building a climate of mutual suspicion and distrust. Far from tackling extremism, it risks creating the very conditions for it to flourish".³⁵⁶

Hundreds of academics and experts

The Vice-Chancellor of Oxford University, Louise Richardson has stated that the Government strategy is "wrong-headed" because it prevents freedom of speech on university campuses and inhibits students from confronting speech they may find objectionable.³⁵⁷ Similarly, numerous academics signed an open letter criticising the ERG22+ and for PREVENT's focus on Islamist extremism and fixation on religion as the primary driver of terrorism, which has led to overwhelming attention on religious observance as an indicator of radicalisation.³⁵⁸ More recently, over 140 experts and academics signed an open letter criticising the PREVENT programme. Amongst those voicing concerns are prominent academics

³⁵¹ Owen Bowcott and Richard Adams, "Human rights group condemns Prevent anti-radicalisation strategy," The Guardian, July 12, 2016. Accessed March 17, 2017. <https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/jul/13/human-rights-group-condemns-prevent-anti-radicalisation-strategy>.

³⁵² "Eroding Trust: The UK's Prevent Counter-Extremism Strategy in Health and Education," Open Society Foundations, October 2016. Accessed March 17, 2017. <https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/reports/eroding-trust-uk-s-prevent-counter-extremism-strategy-health-and-education>.

³⁵³ "Eroding Trust: The UK's Prevent Counter-Extremism Strategy in Health and Education."

³⁵⁴ David Batty, "Prevent strategy 'sowing mistrust and fear in Muslim communities'" The Guardian, February 03, 2016. Accessed March 17, 2017. <https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2016/feb/03/prevent-strategy-sowing-mistrust-fear-muslim-communities>.

³⁵⁵ "Preventing Prevent - We are Students Not Suspects @ NUS connect." NUS Connect. Accessed March 17, 2017. <http://www.nusconnect.org.uk/campaigns/preventing-prevent-we-are-students-not-suspects>.

³⁵⁶ "Andy Burnham calls for 'toxic' Prevent strategy to be scrapped", The Guardian, June 9, 2016, accessed 01.02.2018, <https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/jun/09/andy-burnham-calls-for-toxic-prevent-strategy-to-be-scrapped>

³⁵⁷ Rob Merrick, "Oxford University vice-chancellor says Prevent strategy 'wrong-headed'" The Independent, September 22, 2016. Accessed March 17, 2017. <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/oxford-university-vice-chancellor-says-prevent-strategy-wrong-headed-a7323916.html>.

³⁵⁸ "PREVENT will have a chilling effect on open debate, free speech and political dissent." The Independent, July 10, 2015. Accessed March 17, 2017. <http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/letters/prevent-will-have-a-chilling-effect-on-open-debate-free-speech-and-political-dissent-10381491.html>.

including Professor Noam Chomsky, Professor Humayun Ansari, and Professor Tariq Ramadan, as well as numerous psychiatry experts.³⁵⁹

Instead of being cast as a threat,
Muslim solidarity could show us
all how to live together

Rob Faure Walker

PhD candidate at UCL Institute of Education

I became aware that there was a problem one morning in March 2014. As the children in my classroom sat down for morning registration, gasps rose across the room as some of them noticed that the girls sitting in front of them had saliva on the backs of their headscarves. This was the morning that the since discredited allegations that the schools in Birmingham had been taken over by so-called 'Islamic extremists' were on the front page of every national newspaper. This supposed 'scandal' that became known as the 'Trojan Horse' would more recently be confirmed as unfounded by a Parliamentary Committee who reported that 'no evidence of extremism or radicalisation, apart from a single isolated incident, was found by any of the inquiries and there was no evidence of a sustained plot nor of a similar situation pertaining elsewhere in the country'.³⁶⁰ After the girls had washed their Hijabs and returned to class, the children told me that being Muslim made them feel unsafe. They told me that this was in part because headlines like 'City

fights new Trojan Horse Islamic schools plot'³⁶¹ made them feel judged for their faith.

I had always tried to make the kids feel welcome in our classroom. Working in a predominantly Muslim community, this meant discussing the importance that the children placed on fasting, prayer and pilgrimage. I did my best to accommodate religious practice by supervising the school's prayer room and had even read some Muslim teen fiction³⁶² at the behest of my students. After all, as Riley has explored in her book of the same name, whose school is it anyway? ³⁶³ Though I had previously tried to understand my students' experience, this was the first time I learned that the children felt unsafe because of their faith. The concerns that the children expressed led me to carry out research into the 'Trojan Horse' and the policy that has emanated from it.³⁶⁴ Like others, I have seen how the Government have contributed to the fear that my students described and how the situation has since become worse. Many more Muslims now feel unsafe, not only on the street, but in their schools, doctor's surgeries and homes.³⁶⁵ This means that, at a time of austerity, Muslims are being disproportionately denied access to social and civic activities, blocking them from political engagement. Muslim students in schools and universities report withdrawing from political debate³⁶⁶ and barriers to mental health services for Muslims have been shown in recent

³⁵⁹ "Anti-radicalisation strategy lacks evidence base in science | Letters," *The Guardian*, September 28, 2016. Accessed March 17, 2017. <https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/sep/29/anti-radicalisation-strategy-lacks-evidence-base-in-science>.

³⁶⁰ "Extremism in schools: the Trojan Horse affair Seventh Report of Session 2014–15", *House of Commons Education Select Committee*, (London: The Stationary Office, 2015), accessed 21.06.2018, <http://dera.ioc.ac.uk/22429/>.

³⁶¹ Andrew Gilligan, "City fights new Trojan Horse Islamic schools plot," *The Telegraph*, May 3, 2014, accessed 21.06.2018, <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/education/10806862/City-fights-new-Trojan-Horse-Islamic-schools-plot.html>.

³⁶² Abdel-Fattah, *Does My Head Look Big in This?*

³⁶³ Kathryn Riley, *Whose School Is It Anyway?*, (London: Falmer, 1998).

³⁶⁴ Rob Faure Walker, "By casting teachers as informants, British counter-extremism policy is promoting violence," *The Conversation*, December 20, 2017, accessed 21.06.2018, <http://theconversation.com/by-casting-teachers-as-informants-british-counter-extremism-policy-is-promoting-violence-85474>; Faure Walker, "How Preventing Terror is Promoting Violence," *Discover Society* (41), February 1, 2017,

accessed 21.06.2018, <https://discoversociety.org/2017/02/01/how-preventing-terror-is-promoting-violence/>; Faure Walker, "Use of the word 'radicalisation' is ballooning - and it's hiding the real causes of violence," *The Conversation*, March 8, 2018, accessed 21.06.2018, <http://theconversation.com/use-of-the-word-radicalisation-is-ballooning-and-its-hiding-the-real-causes-of-violence-92900>.

³⁶⁵ "Preventing Education? Human Rights and UK Counter-Terrorism Policy in Schools", *Rights Watch UK*, July 2016, accessed 21.06.2018, <http://rwuk.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/preventing-education-final-to-print-3.compressed-1.pdf>; "Eroding Trust: The UK's Prevent Counter-Extremism Strategy in Health and Education", *Open Society Justice Initiative*, October 2016, accessed 21.06.2018, <https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/reports/eroding-trust-uk-s-prevent-counter-extremism-strategy-health-and-education>

³⁶⁶ "Joint Committee on Human Rights: Freedom of Speech in Universities", *House of Commons: Joint Committee on Human Rights*, March 27, 2018, accessed 21.06.2018, <https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/jt201719/jtselect/jtrights/589/589.pdf>; Hareem Ghani and Ilyas Nagdee, "#MuslimsInEducation", *National Union of Students*, March 18, 2018, accessed 21.06.2018, <https://www.nusconnect.org.uk/resources/the-experience-of-muslim-students-in-2017-18>

academic research.³⁶⁷ Both of these situations have been fuelled by the PREVENT Counter-Terrorism Strategy,³⁶⁸ a strategy that is based on flawed evidence that is no less racist than early theories of criminology that tried to identify criminals from the shape of their heads.³⁶⁹




Figure 1: Early attempts to classify criminals (Lombroso [1876] 2006)

While this targeting of Muslim communities is unacceptable, the Home Office's recent focus on Far-Right groups does not obfuscate the harm done by PREVENT. As stated by the UN Special Rapporteur on racism, "The Prevent duty is inherently flawed, and expansion of a flawed program to cover more groups is by no means curative".³⁷⁰ In spite of the continued criticism of PREVENT from the

UN, Parliamentary committees,³⁷¹ NGOs,³⁷² and civil liberties organisations,³⁷³ the Government continues to expand the policy.

The earlier mentioned anti-Muslim stories in the media are not solitary incidents, they represent a continuing Islamophobic narrative; recently the Times has been criticised by the Independent Press Standards Organisation (IPSO) for presenting a "misleading" and "distorted" picture of a Muslim foster family³⁷⁴ and the editor of the Daily Express told a Parliamentary committee that his newspaper had created "Islamophobic sentiment".³⁷⁵ These observations suggest that the media has contributed to Islamophobia. At a time when the Government are mired in the Windrush scandal over immigration targets and the deportation of legal immigrants to former British colonies, we might surmise that they care more about looking tough than in effective policy. And, this might explain why the Government continue to roll out strategy that alienates Muslims of all ages.³⁷⁶

PREVENT's efforts to look tough are demonstrated by the strategy's targeting of political activism in young Muslims, Rights Watch (UK) reporting the case of Rahmaan Mohammadi who became a subject of the counter-terrorism strategy when he wore a Palestinian scarf to school.³⁷⁷ In my own professional life as a

³⁶⁷ Charlotte Heath-Kelly and Erzsébet Strausz, "Counterterrorism in the NHS: Evaluating Prevent Duty Safeguarding", University of Warwick and Wellcome Trust, 2018, accessed 21.06.2018, https://warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/pais/research/researchcentres/irs/counterterrorism/minthenhs/project_report_60pp.pdf

³⁶⁸ Prevent strategy 2011. HM Government, (The Stationary Office Limited, 2011), accessed 21.06.2018, <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/prevent-strategy-2011>

³⁶⁹ Katy Sian, Katy. "Born radicals? Prevent, positivism, and 'race-thinking'." *Palgrave Communications* 3 (1):6.

³⁷⁰ "End of Mission Statement of the Special Rapporteur on Contemporary Forms of Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance at the Conclusion of Her Mission to the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland", *United Nations Human Rights, Office of the High Commissioner*, accessed 21.06.2018, <https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=23073&LangID=E>

³⁷¹ "Counter-Extremism: Joint Committee on Human Rights: Second Report of Session 2016-17", *House of Lords and House of Commons*, July 20, 2016, accessed 21.06.2018, <https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/jt201617/jtselect/jtrights/105/105.pdf>
³⁷² "Home Affairs Committee: Hate crime and its violent consequences", *House of Commons*, October 23, 2017, accessed 21.06.2018,

<https://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/commons-select/home-affairs-committee/inquiries/parliament-2017/inquiry3/>

³⁷³ "Islamophobia: Still a challenge for us all", *Runnymede Trust*, 2017, accessed 21.06.2018, <https://www.runnymedetrust.org/uploads/Islamophobia%20Report%202018%20FINAL.pdf> ; Asim Qureshi, "The 'science' of pre-crime: The secret 'radicalisation' study underpinning PREVENT", *CAGE*, accessed 21.06.2018, <https://cage.ngo/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/CAGE-Science-Pre-Crime-Report.pdf>

³⁷⁴ "Prevent duty must be scrapped: LEA admits discrimination after teachers call police over seven-year-old boy's toy gun", *Liberty*, January 27, 2017, accessed 21.06.2018, <https://www.libertyhumanrights.org.uk/news/press-releases-and-statements/prevent-duty-must-be-scrapped-lea-admits-discrimination-after> ; "Preventing Education? Human Rights and UK Counter-Terrorism..."

³⁷⁵ "Ruling 20480-17 Tower Hamlets Borough Council v The Times", edited by Independent Press Standards Organisation (IPSO), 2018, accessed 21.06.2018, <https://www.ipso.co.uk/rulings-and-resolution-statements/ruling/?id=20480-17>

³⁷⁶ "Joint Committee on Human Rights: Freedom of Speech..."

³⁷⁷ "Eroding Trust: The UK's Prevent Counter-Extremism Strategy..."

³⁷⁸ "Preventing Education? Human Rights and UK Counter-Terrorism..."

secondary school teacher, I have also seen Muslim children steered away from political activism by school authorities when they have not been allowed to collect money for Muslim Aid to support Syrian refugees and I have heard other Muslims school children criticised for raising money and awareness of the plight of the Rohingya in Myanmar, years before the mainstream media caught up with this tragedy.

As scenes from Gaza, Syria and the vast camps for Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh are beamed live to us via our TVs and phones, the global solidarity demonstrated by Muslims could show us how we should respond with compassion and affirmative action. Though this solidarity might point the way to a more harmonious future, Muslims who express a concern for recent British foreign policy and for the plight of Muslims abroad are often represented as a threat to Western values, resulting in referrals via controversial strategies like PREVENT, or in more insipid self-censoring of school children and university students.³⁷⁸ Such oppression of any community should not be tolerated. It is a bitter irony that the compassion that Muslims show for one another is being cast as a threat, rather than as a model for how we could all be living.

Schedule 7

Schedule 7 of the Terrorism Act and the powers to stop and search at ports and airports without “reasonable suspicion” have been another major source of antagonism in minority communities with the issues of racial profiling and disproportionality resurfacing in studies assessing the impact of the powers on Muslims.

An experimental analysis conducted by the EHRC on Schedule 7 powers assessing the prevalence of racial disproportionality in stops and examinations found that Asians and individuals of “other” ethnic groups were 11.3 times more likely than White people to be stopped and questioned. Comparatively, Black people were 6.3 times more likely and those of mixed ethnicity were 3.6 times more likely to be stopped and searched.³⁷⁹ The study further concluded that although the total proportion of examinations of Asians or “other” ethnic minorities at all ports and airports was 46.6% in 2010/11, an analysis of airports indicated that 63.5% of total examinations were of Asians and “other” ethnic minorities. Meanwhile, 65.2% of all port and airport examinations and detentions lasting over an hour were of Asians or other ethnic minorities.

This level of disproportionality in Schedule 7 stops has continued to grow over recent years. While the overall number of Schedule 7 examinations has fallen since 2011/12, the proportion of those stopped who are from Asian or “other” ethnic backgrounds continues to grow. Despite individuals of Asian ethnicity comprising of just 8% of the overall population, 2015/16 marked the first year where those stopped of Asian ethnicity (30%) outnumbered those stopped of White ethnicity (27%), with those of Asian or Asian British ethnicity being most likely to be detained under Schedule 7 powers.³⁸⁰

The former Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, David Anderson QC previously said that the use of Schedule 7 powers has “given rise to resentment among some Muslim groups who feel they are being singled out” by authorities.³⁸¹ He further noted that

³⁷⁸ Ibid; “Eroding Trust: The UK’s Prevent Counter-Extremism Strategy...”; Ghani and Nagdee, “#MuslimsInEducation”.

³⁷⁹ Karen Hurrell, An Experimental Analysis of Examinations and Detentions under Schedule 7 of the Terrorism Act 2000, report, Equality and Human Rights Commission, Winter 2013, accessed May 29, 2018, <https://www.equalityhumanrights.com/sites/default/files/briefing-paper-8-an-experimental-analysis-of-examinations-and-detentions-under-s7-of-the-terrorism-act-2000.pdf>

³⁸⁰ Operation of police powers under the Terrorism Act 2000, financial year ending March 2016, accessed 29.05.2018, <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/operation-of-police-powers-under-the-terrorism-act-2000-financial-year-ending-march-2016/operation-of-police-powers-under-the-terrorism-act-2000-and-subsequent-legislation-arrests-outcomes-and-stop-and-search-great-britain-financial-y>

³⁸¹ Rowena Mason, ‘UK terror law watchdog calls for end to detention at borders without suspicion,’ The Guardian, December 01, 2013, accessed 29.05.2018,

Schedule 7 detentions and examinations were imposed upon members of ethnic minority groups to a greater extent than “their presence in the travelling population would seem to warrant”,³⁸² suggesting evidence of disproportionate use. However, in his December 2016 report, Anderson concluded that as Schedule 7 is not supposed to be a randomly-exercised power, the continuing disproportions of Asians being stopped “do not constitute evidence that Schedule 7 powers are being used in a racially discriminatory manner”.³⁸³

Following consultation, Schedule 7 powers were amended in the Anti-Social Behaviour, Crime, and Policing Act 2014. Changes included reducing the maximum examination period in detention from 9 to 6 hours; granting individuals detained access to legal counsel; and repealing powers to take ‘intimate samples’ of biometric data. The Independent Reviewer further called for the introduction of a “suspicion threshold” in the exercise of the powers, along with a statutory bar rendering answers given under Schedule 7 questioning inadmissible in criminal trials.

While changes introduced in the 2014 Act are a positive step towards addressing the encroachment on the civil liberties of minority communities, the changes do not go far enough. For example, recommendations by the Joint Committee on Human Rights to collate data on the self-declared religious identity of individuals stopped have yet to be adopted. With the broadening of powers at the disposal of border officials, including passport seizure powers, collecting data that enables evaluation of compliance with equalities legislation is of paramount importance, as is the proper training of officers to ensure racial and religious stereotyping is avoided at all cost.

Islamophobia, securitisation, PREVENT, and Schedule 7

As our definition of Islamophobia argues, Islamophobia may be articulated and maintained through policies, legislation, and structures which serve to exclude, restrict, or discriminate against Muslims, and which have the effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal footing, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural or any other field of public life.

As this chapter attests, processes of securitisation have the natural effect of excluding, restricting, and discriminating against Muslims in every area of public life. Meanwhile, this securitisation has culminated in legislation which, through its application, specifically targets Muslims on the basis of their ethnocultural and religious identities, and thus impairs their abilities to fully enjoy their fundamental freedoms on an equal footing with other members of society.

It is for this reason, that MEND urges for the immediate need to conduct an independent review of PREVENT and all counter-terrorism legislation enacted since 2000 with a particular attention afforded to the manifestations of Islamophobia within their development, scope, training procedures, and application.

<https://www.theguardian.com/law/2013/dec/01/uk-terror-law-watchdog-detention-borders-schedule-7>

³⁸² David Anderson, QC, The Terrorism Acts in 2011, June 27, 2012, <https://terrorismlegislationreviewer.independent.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/report-terrorism-acts-2011.pdf>

³⁸³ David Anderson, QC, The Terrorism Acts in 2015, December 1, 2016, <https://terrorismlegislationreviewer.independent.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/TERRORISM-ACTS-REPORT-1-Dec-2016-1.pdf>

Crime, Policing and the Criminal Justice System

While Islamophobia is often associated with blatant acts of violence or aggression against Muslims, its manifestations can be much more subtle and difficult to detect and include institutionalised practices of discrimination and structural racism. Institutional Islamophobia relating to discriminatory practices ingrained within the Criminal Justice System is particularly significant because of both its disruption to the lives of many Muslims and for its long-term consequences to their future social engagement as equal members of society.

Institutional racism is not a new concept in the analysis of the modus operandi of the Criminal Justice System. The 1999 Macpherson Inquiry, which was established to scrutinise the Metropolitan Police Service's investigation into Stephen Lawrence's murder, produced a critical report accusing the Metropolitan Police Service of "institutional racism" and advanced 49 recommendations to improve policing and its impact on racial minorities. The Macpherson report found that ethnic minorities were "over policed... and under protected"³⁸⁴ with encounters between race groups and police forces influenced by a high incidence of stop and search. The Macpherson report proposed priority measures to "increase trust and confidence in policing among minority ethnic communities" through policy directives regulating the use of stop and search procedures and improvements in the recruitment and retention of ethnic minority officers in the police force.³⁸⁵

While noteworthy and commendable steps have been made to improve equalities in the Criminal Justice System since the publication of the Macpherson report, Muslims and ethnic minorities remain over-represented. Therefore, Islamophobia must be examined as a mechanism potentially maintaining inequalities at all levels of the Criminal Justice System.

Overrepresentation of Muslims and minorities in the Criminal Justice System

In 2016, the Lammy Review exposed a high level of discrimination and disproportionate representation of British Muslims in the Criminal Justice System. Indeed, despite making up just 14% of the population, BAME individuals constitute 25% of prisoners, while over 40% of young people in custody are from BAME backgrounds. Over the past decade, the number of Muslims in prison increased by nearly 50%, from 8,900 to 13,200. As such, Muslims make up 15% of the total prison population, while only amounting to 5% of the general population.³⁸⁶ Interestingly, as Lammy pointed out, this dramatic rise in the number of prisoners is not linked to terrorism offences, as only 175 Muslims were convicted of terrorism-related offences between 2001 and 2012.³⁸⁷

Today, ethnic minorities are disproportionately more likely to be stopped and searched than at the time of the Macpherson report, with the ratio of Black to White stops increasing from 5 to 1 in 1999 to 8 to 1 in 2002.³⁸⁸ Meanwhile, figures published by the Equalities and Human Rights Commission in separate reports in 2010 and 2013 found that the ratios steadily increased, demonstrating a growth in the degree of disproportionality.

³⁸⁴ William MacPherson, 'The Stephen Lawrence Inquiry, report, February 24, 1999, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/277111/4262.pdf

³⁸⁵ Ibid.

³⁸⁶ "The Lammy Review: final report", Gov.uk, September 8, 2017, p. 3, accessed 23.10.2017 <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/lammy-review-final-report>

³⁸⁷ Ibid.

³⁸⁸ Ben Bowling, Alpa Parmar, and Coretta Phillips, 'Policing ethnic minority communities,' Handbook of Policing, 2003, <http://thinkethnic.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/Policing%20ethnic%20minority%20communities.pdf>

In its 2010 “Stop and Think!” report, the EHRC found that Black people were at least six times as likely to be stopped and searched as a White person and an Asian almost twice as likely to be stopped and searched.³⁸⁹ In 2013, the EHRC concluded that during 2010/11 and 2011/12 Black people were 29 times more likely to be stopped and searched in some areas when stops and search were assessed by police force area and the respective size of the BAME population. Similar findings were seen in 2015/16, with Black people being over six times more likely to be stopped than White people. Overall, those from BAME groups were three times more likely to be stopped and searched than those who are White. Figures showed that just 16% of stops led to an arrest, with 76% of stops resulting in “no further action”.³⁹⁰

The detrimental impact of the stop and search powers can be observed in their effect on Muslim males. As the EHRC noted in a report in 2011, “For many young Muslim men on the streets, stop and search under Section 44 of the Terrorism Act (s44) has become their most frequent and regular contact with the police... Such measures were seen to add to perceptions of racial and religious profiling and discrimination.”³⁹¹ Meanwhile, a survey by the HMIC of 391 BAME people revealed that police officers may not be following stop and search procedure in all cases: 44% of respondents said the police did not treat them with respect; 42% said they did not understand why they were stopped and searched; 47% felt they were not treated with respect; and 37% said they were not told the reason why there were stopped and searched.³⁹²

Explaining overrepresentation

As noted above, the current political climate that identifies Muslims as individuals belonging to a community ‘at risk’ contributes significantly in their high level of representation in the Criminal Justice System. However, there are a number of structural issues that also contribute towards creating the conditions for Muslims, and the BAME population more generally, to suffer from disproportionate representation in the Criminal Justice System.

Cultural stereotypes

According to Dr Zubaida Haque, a researcher on race disparity for the equalities think-tank, the Runnymede Trust, the increase in the representation of Muslims in the Criminal Justice System can only be explained as a result of “cultural stereotypes” and poverty. Indeed, she suggests that the widespread Islamophobia that has developed throughout the 21st Century has had an impact on the Criminal Justice System and the unconscious bias against Muslims across the whole spectrum of the justice system.

The stigmatisation of Muslims further contributes to widening the divide between Muslim and non-Muslim communities, whilst having a profound impact on the Criminal Justice System and its approach to Muslim individuals. Indeed, over the past decade, the public discourse on Muslim has been almost exclusively associated with crime, terrorism and issues of integration, which creates the impression that young Muslims are less integrated, have less in common with their non-Muslim peers, and possess ambivalent loyalties.

³⁸⁹ Stop and think: A critical review of the use of stop and search powers in England and Wales, report, Equality and Human Rights Commission, March 2010, https://www.equalityhumanrights.com/sites/default/files/ehrc_stop_and_search_report.pdf.

³⁹⁰ Home Office, Police powers and procedures England and Wales year ending 31 March 2016, October 27, 2016, https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/562977/police-powers-procedures-hosb1516.pdf.

³⁹¹ Tufyal Choudhury and Helen Fenwick, The impact of counter-terrorism measures on Muslim communities, report, Equality and Human Rights Commission, May 12, 2011, <https://www.equalityhumanrights.com/sites/default/files/research-report-72-the-impact-of-counter-terrorismmeasures-on-muslim-communities.pdf>.

³⁹² “Stop and Search Powers: Are the police using them effectively and fairly?” HMIC, 2013, accessed 19.07.2017, <https://www.justiceinspectorates.gov.uk/hmic/media/stop-and-search-powers-20130709.pdf>

Furthermore, there is an issue of discrimination occurring in the Criminal Justice System, with harsher sentences, or at the very least a different judgement, being passed on the basis of an individual ethnicity/religiosity. Indeed, the last major study published on the subject and covering decisions made in five Crown Court Centres in the West Midlands in 1989, showed that substantially longer sentences were given to both Black and Asian offenders than White offenders. A more recent study published in 2005 also showed that Asian males, were more likely to receive a custodial sentence.³⁹³

Socio-economic challenges

Considering the severe economic deprivation experienced by Muslims (with nearly half living in the 10% of the poorest areas in England and Wales), the increase of Muslim inmates should in fact be seen as the result of discrimination, both socio-economic and within the justice system itself.³⁹⁴ Indeed, the Race Disparity Audit showed that 31% (or around 343,000) of the Pakistani population and 28% (or roughly 113,000) of the Bangladeshi population lived in the most deprived 10% of neighbourhoods in England. All Black ethnic groups were also disproportionately likely to live in the most deprived neighbourhoods.³⁹⁵ Research has further demonstrated that living in deprived neighbours has a negative spill-over effect on multiple aspects of life, including general well-being, education, employment, and crime.³⁹⁶

The socio-economic issues faced by BAME individuals, and Muslims particularly, are critical to understand and tackle criminality, but are also pivotal in an effort

to provide a fair and less discriminatory justice service.

Homogeneity in the Criminal Justice System

Another issue affecting the treatment and judgement of BAME individuals within the Criminal Justice System is a potential lack of understanding of the experiences of minorities. At the core of this problem is homogeneity and a lack of diversity within the system itself.

Although the judiciary are independent office holders, they provide a significant public service and were, therefore, included within the Government's recent Race Disparity Audit. In 2016, 6% of court judges who declared their ethnicity were from non-White ethnic groups. Representation of those from non-White ethnic groups was more than twice as high among tribunal judges and non-legal members of tribunals combined, at 14%. Asian people made up the largest non-White ethnic group in these roles, with around 3% of court judges and 8% of tribunal judges and non-legal members. Around 16% of court judges and 12% of tribunal judges and non-legal members did not disclose their ethnic group.³⁹⁷

As pointed out by the research conducted by T2A Alliance, a senior probation officer emphasised the importance of accounting for the background of magistrates: "I would argue whether you could even say a magistrate has been through any type of formal training. They are people from a particular background who won't understand the needs of ethnic minority communities."³⁹⁸

³⁹³ "Section 95 Criminal Justice Act 1991 Race and the Criminal Justice System: An overview to the complete statistics 2003–2004", *Criminal Justice System*, February 2005, accessed 15.02.2018, <http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20110218141305/http://rds.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs05/s95overview.pdf>

³⁹⁴ "The Muslim Prison Population Has Surged, Here's Why The 'Stereotypes And Myths' Are Wrong", *Huffington Post*, September 8, 2017, accessed 24.10.2017 http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/entry/lammy-review-muslim-prisoners_uk_59afcaa0e4b05e531022f26

³⁹⁵ "Race Disparity Audit Summary Findings from the Ethnicity Facts and Figures website", *Cabinet Office*, October 2017 (revised February 2018), accessed June 21,

2018, <https://www.ethnicity-facts-figures.service.gov.uk/static/race-disparity-audit-summary-findings.pdf>

³⁹⁶ "Communities in recession: the impact on deprived neighbourhoods", *Joseph Rowntree Foundation*, October 2009, accessed 05.03.2018, <https://www.jrf.org.uk/sites/default/files/jrf/migrated/files/communities-recession-impact-neighbourhoods.pdf>

³⁹⁷ "Race Disparity Audit Summary Findings from the Ethnicity Facts and Figures website."

³⁹⁸ "Young Muslims on Trial", *Maslaha*, March 2016, accessed May 29, 2018, https://www.t2a.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/Young_Muslims_on_Trial.pdf

Lack of understanding of British Muslim diversity

Another issue concerns the fact that Muslims are often perceived as having a homogenous identity. Those within the Criminal Justice System lack the understanding of the different Muslim communities, whether they are Somali or Pakistani, Shia or Sunni, or how their lives are affected if they live in different areas in the country. It is in fact crucial to understand the rich diversity within Muslim communities if appropriate services are to be provided. As pointed out by the Runnymede Trust, "Muslim communities are constructed as 'suspect' through the frequent implicit and explicit juxtaposition of the terms 'law-abiding majority' and 'extremist minority' when discussing both sets of communities".³⁹⁹

The issue of the Criminal Justice System's perceived homogeneity of British Muslims is significant for a number of reasons. Firstly, because it frames Muslims within the war on terror narrative, thus making the simplistic distinction between "bad" and "good". In the Criminal Justice System, this can result in discrimination occurring on the simple basis of prejudice deriving from the mainstream interpretation of what constitutes an acceptable interpretation of Islam.⁴⁰⁰

Moreover, such a simplistic characterisation disregards other key factors that can lead to a more equitable understandings and just conclusions within the Criminal Justice System, such as ethnicity, education, class, place, gender and political outlook. The failure to acknowledge the inherent difference among the many Muslim communities

thus results in the inability to understand the proclivities and aspirations of young Muslims living in the UK. This not only results in a broad-brush application of the law, but also in difficulties in addressing the root cause for criminality among these communities.⁴⁰¹

In addition, and as mentioned earlier in this report, simplistic characterisations inherently contain the seeds of Islamophobia. Indeed "when others assume all Muslim individuals share the same experiences, religious practices, or behaviours, they make a judgment that there are no differences between members of a certain group, that an entire religious group is completely homogenous."⁴⁰² This results in the belief that there is no flexibility to the practice or tradition and that every single person of the group must engage in such a behaviour. Therefore, a homogeneous view of Muslims through the lens of counter-terror has the unavoidable consequence of pre-criminalising all Muslims.

In short, "to ensure that everyone receives fair and equal treatment, it is critical to understand the needs of equality and minority groups and identify what separate provision may be required. *This is likely to be different not just across different protected characteristics but within them.* Indeed, one of the key things highlighted... was the importance of not assuming homogeneity amongst the needs of all individuals from a particular group."⁴⁰³

Mistrust

These issues create a mutual feeling of mistrust that has a profound impact on the lives of Muslims,⁴⁰⁴ and has unavoidable repercussions in the relations between

³⁹⁹ Kjartan Páll Sveinsson, "Criminal Justice v. Racial Justice Minority ethnic overrepresentation in the criminal justice system", *Runnymede*, accessed 15.02.2018 <https://www.runnymedetrust.org/uploads/publications/pdfs/CriminalJusticeVRacialJustice-2012.pdf>

⁴⁰⁰ Scott Poynting and Victoria Mason, "Tolerance, Freedom, Justice and Peace?": Britain, Australia and Anti-Muslim Racism since 11 September 2001", *Journal of Intercultural Studies*, Volume 27, 2006 - Issue 4.

⁴⁰¹ Gabe Mythen and Fatima Khan, "Futurity, Governance and the Terrorist Risk: Exploring the Impacts of Pre-emptive Modes of Regulation on Young Muslims in the UK", accessed 20.02.2018 <https://www.kent.ac.uk/scarr/events/beijingpapers/Mythenppr.pdf>

⁴⁰² Kevin L. Nadal et al., "Subtle and Overt Forms of Islamophobia: Microaggressions toward Muslim Americans", *Journal of Muslim Mental Health*, Volume 6, Issue 2, 2012.

⁴⁰³ "Tackling inequality in the Criminal Justice System", *Clinks*, May 2015, accessed 20.02.2018, http://www.recoop.org.uk/dbfiles/news/246/Tackling_Inequality_within_CJS_Clinks_Report.pdf

⁴⁰⁴ "Young, Muslim and British: Between rhetoric and realities", *LSE Blog*, accessed 24.10.2017, <http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/religionpublicsphere/2017/04/young-muslim-and-british-between-rhetoric-and-realities/>

Muslims and the Criminal Justice System. For example, the justice system provides incentives for those who have committed crimes to admit guilt, such as potential reductions of sentences or access to interventions that keep them out of prison altogether. Yet, pleading “guilty” implies a level of trust between the accuser and the accused that BAME individuals simply do not have, due to a real or perceived disparity in the way they are treated.

As the Lammy Review suggested, “Many BAME defendants neither trust the advice that they are given, nor believe they will receive a fair hearing from magistrates” and are thus instinctively more prone to plea “not guilty” than their White counterparts.⁴⁰⁵ However, this means that BAME defendants face harsher sentences if found guilty. The punitive treatment reserved to BAME individuals who plea “not guilty” cannot be addressed overnight but is critical nonetheless. While a concerted and durative effort to build up trust between BAME groups and the Criminal Justice System needs to become a priority, the Criminal Justice System also needs to put in place a system that allows interventions to be set up prior to the plea.⁴⁰⁶

Furthermore, the climate of mistrust that has characterised the relationships between Muslim and non-Muslim communities in British society has produced a spill-over effect in the way Muslims are judged within the Criminal Justice System at virtually every stage. Several Muslims who took part in interviews conducted by the T2A Alliance, a charity organisation that deals with discrimination and fair treatment in the Criminal Justice System, lamented the existence of prejudice in the way their criminality (whether it being alleged or

real) is perceived in the Criminal Justice System.⁴⁰⁷

Some, for example, felt they had been discriminated against by judges on the basis of the records of their brothers, older cousins, or even uncles. One man reported that, “I don’t know what it is about our family but we never seem to get bail – you get people nicked on big conspiracy charges who get bail.” Others went as far as saying: “they give excuses and say things like oh we think you’re going to commit further offences”.⁴⁰⁸ Overall, the research showed a high degree of mistrust of British Muslims in relation to the way they are sentenced. One example of this is the testimony of a young man, who said: “We know a lot of it has to do with our religion. I’ve met people in jail who have been scared to grow a beard because they’re worried they will get a high-end sentence.”⁴⁰⁹

A study published by *The European Journal of Psychology Applied to Legal Context* showed that White individuals had a higher degree of satisfaction with the outcomes received from the justice system, as well as with the legal processes and procedures. Conversely, citizens belonging to ethnic minorities perceived more unfairness in both cases.⁴¹⁰ This is due to the fact that societal discrimination and even more so, discrimination within any area of the Criminal Justice System, reduces the level of confidence that individuals have in the Criminal Justice System. Finally, the underrepresentation of minorities groups can lead to a lesser degree of sympathy for the complexities and diversity of the BAME individual, particularly for individuals belonging to communities already considered “at risk”, or communities often misunderstood and

⁴⁰⁵ “The Lammy Review: final report”, p6.

⁴⁰⁶ Ibid, p27-28.

⁴⁰⁷ “Young Muslims on Trial.”

⁴⁰⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁰⁹ Ibid.

⁴¹⁰ Estefanía Estévez, Marina Rachitskiy, and Carla Rodríguez, “Is perception of the mainstream legal system homogeneous across ethnic groups?”, *The European Journal of Psychology Applied to Legal Context*, 5 (2013), pp. 155-161, accessed June 21, 2018, https://ac.els-cdn.com/S1889186113700052/1-s2.0-S1889186113700052-main.pdf?_tid=spdf-03747654-b1a3-4bcd-9374-3ace337938bd&acdnat=1518710571_1338a41fbbd1369ef42ab7f9d421fa57

misrepresented across broader segments of British society.

The issue of trust in the Criminal Justice System is important because people can accept decisions and outcomes from the justice system more willingly when they believe that the authorities are using fair procedures based on trustworthy motivations.⁴¹¹

Recruitment of BAME in the Police Force

For many people, the police form the most visible representation of the state. As such, it is incredibly important that the relationship between minority communities and their local police are characterised by trust and understanding. Therefore, recruitment and adequate representation of minorities within the force is an important asset in nurturing understanding, trust, and a feeling of representation within this relationship.

The “Police Diversity” report prepared by the House of Commons found that while there has been a steady increase in the overall proportion of officers and staff who are of a BAME background, particularly since this issue was brought to the attention of the Government in 2013. However, progress remains somewhat slow and there is wide variation between forces and increased numbers of BAME police officers remain overwhelmingly in the most junior rank. Even allowing for appropriate career progression, the number of BME officers above the rank of Inspector remains very low. These results were thus deemed “unacceptable” by the committee.⁴¹²

The issue of BAME representation at junior levels is particularly problematic. Indeed, the lack of senior BAME representation in the police service affects its leadership, culture and understanding of the

community it serves. People of a BAME background wishing to develop their careers within the police service often lack role models, encounter barriers when trying to access necessary training and face selection panels which are almost always lacking in diversity.⁴¹³

It is crucial that steps are taken to ensure that police forces are representative of the many segments of British society and the communities they serve. This need is evidenced by the recent Race Disparity Audit, published by the Government in late 2017, which found a significant disparity in the representation of minorities in both the police force and the wider Criminal Justice System. In 2016, 94% of prison officers in England and Wales who disclosed their ethnicity were White. The same year, around 1 police officer in every 17 was from a non-White ethnic minority group. While this ratio differed greatly according to rank, type of work and geography, there has been a slight increase in the proportion of officers from a non-White background over the last 10 years, indicating promise.

It is crucial that police forces are equipped with the necessary tools to understand the cultural intricacies of the communities they serve. This can not only result in a more nuanced understanding of the incidents they investigate, but can also help the building of a more positive relationship between them and the communities they serve. Indeed, police forces are seen as a representation of the state, and a positive relationship with them can result in an increased sense of belonging of communities that often find themselves at the outskirts of society.

⁴¹¹ Ibid.

⁴¹² “Police diversity First Report of Session 2016–17”, *House of Commons Home Affairs Committee*, accessed 20.02.2018, <https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201617/cmselect/cmhaff/27/27.pdf>

⁴¹³ Ibid.

Case study: Bijan Ebrahimi, victim of institutional racism in the police force

Bijan Ebrahimi was murdered on July 14, 2013 by his neighbour Lee James, who punched and kicked him to death, before setting fire to his body outside his house in Bristol. It emerged that, prior to his death, Mr Ebrahimi had contacted the police several times in light of Lee James's behaviour, but the force had regarded him as a nuisance. Following the incident, a report was prepared by the Independent Police Complaints Commission (IPCC), revealing that police officers may have been biased against Mr Ebrahimi and failed to protect him. A total of seventeen officers and staff were interviewed, and IPCC Commissioner Williams determined to refer the files concerning three police officers, a control room supervisor, a call taker, and a police community support officer to the Crown Prosecution Service, for consideration of offences of misconduct in public office. It was additionally determined to refer the offence of perverting the course of justice for consideration against the police community support officer.

Mr Ebrahimi, 44, was born in Iran in 1969 and lived there during his formative years. His parents both died when he was a young man and he was their full-time carer for some time before their death. He had moved to a new neighbourhood in Bristol after his previous home was set on fire by his neighbours.

The report prepared by the IPCC reveals that Mr Ebrahimi was a vulnerable man, whose first language was not English and who was subject to numerous unfounded allegations against him. He had turned to the police for help several times in the months leading to his death. Mr Ebrahimi's final call to a police officer occurred just one hour before he was murdered.

Between 2007 and 2013, Mr Ebrahimi experienced a number of issues with

neighbours, who repeatedly accused him of being a paedophile and threatened to kill him. On one occasion, Mr James saw Mr Ebrahimi filming him and his children as they were walking around the estate and believed him to be a paedophile. However, the IPCC report revealed that Ebrahimi told police officers that he had taken the photographs as evidence that Mr James was drinking in the public areas of the estate whilst in charge of children. He said that this was a regular occurrence, which resulted in "a mess".

Indeed, the report reads, "There was evidence, not least from Mr James himself, of Mr Ebrahimi taking a great deal of trouble over the appearance of his flat, by cultivating plants and flowers in pots outside. He plainly considered the behaviour of Mr James and his associates, drinking in the public areas and discarding cans, to be anti-social behaviour, with which many people may agree. It was possible, even likely that as a result of previous complaints, and he had been advised to take photographs or video to evidence this behaviour."

In the days before his death, Ebrahimi called the police to say his neighbour Lee James had barged into his home and attacked him by punching him in the face. Rather than arresting Mr James, the police officers handcuffed Mr Ebrahimi, who was escorted into the police car before a crowd of cheering neighbours.

A neighbour said that she saw Mr James stood by the washing line and heard him shout either "I'll f*****g kill you" or "I'll f*****g get you" towards Mr Ebrahimi. She saw that both female police officers were present but neither reacted or did anything in response to these shouted threats. The IPCC also found that one of the officers, PC Helen Harris, approached Mr James and told him "off the record I would have done the same thing". She also told him that they were going to arrest Mr Ebrahimi for breach of the peace.

The IPCC noted that by arresting Mr Ebrahimi and not Mr James, PC Harris and PC Winter undoubtedly “discriminated” between them. Indeed, the officers could have been in no doubt about the danger that Mr Ebrahimi was in, having heard the remarks about “firebombing” him out and Mr Ebrahimi being labelled as a “paedophile”. PS Hill’s remark that the “pitch fork and burning torch brigade are after him”, provided an indication of how serious they knew the situation to be. However, instead of protecting Mr Ebrahimi, they mistreated him, humiliated him, and even intimidated him before releasing him back “without any meaningful risk assessment”.

The evidence from CCTV in the Custody Suite showed PC Harris’ treatment of Mr Ebrahimi to have been rude and unprofessional, including striking him on the back of his hand with the folded sheets of paper, an action which can only be described as indicative of contempt.

Mr David McCallum, independent chair of the review process, accused Bristol City Council and Avon and Somerset police officers of institutional racism, intended as “The collective failure of an organisation to provide an appropriate and professional service to people because of their colour, culture, or ethnic origin. It can be seen or detected in processes, attitudes and behaviour which amount to discrimination through unwitting prejudice, ignorance, thoughtlessness and racist stereotyping which disadvantage minority ethnic people”.⁴¹⁴

Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) places an obligation on the state not to take life, except in very limited and defined circumstances, and to take reasonable steps to protect life where there is a real and immediate risk. If there is an indication that a death may be the result of police

action, or failure to act, Article 2 requires there to be an independent and effective investigation to determine the circumstances and causes of the death. The IPCC found that “from the outset, there were serious breaches of Avon and Somerset Constabulary hate crime policy.”

Two men, beat manager PC Kevin Duffy, and community support officer Andrew Passmore, were both jailed over how they dealt with Ebrahimi after being found guilty of misconduct in a public office. They and two other constables, Leanne Winter, 38, and Helen Harris, 40, who arrested Ebrahimi, have been dismissed from the force.⁴¹⁵ In all, 18 police staff and officers, including sergeants and inspectors, face disciplinary proceedings.

⁴¹⁴ “Safer Bristol Partnership Multi-Agency Learning Review Following The Murder of Bijan Ebrahimi”, accessed 29.05.2018, <https://www.bristol.gov.uk/documents/20182/35136/Multi-agency+learning+review+following+the+murder+of+Bijan+Ebrahimi>

⁴¹⁵ “Police officers jailed over Bijan Ebrahimi murder case”, *The Guardian*, February 9, 2016, accessed 29.05.2018, <https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2016/feb/09/bijan-ebrahimi-murder-bristol-police-sentenced>

Political Representation and Exclusion

Developing Civic Sensibilities

Aman Ali

*Head of Community and Development,
MEND*

Growing up as a teenager living in London, I gave very little thought to my civic responsibilities in my early adolescence. I guess, like most people my age back then, I had my own individual plan that I hoped to follow, which included typical things like getting a good education, a good job and having a family one day.

Being a British Muslim of Bangladeshi origin, I went through life not seeing myself represented very much in society. I didn't see other British Muslims of Bangladeshi origin feature prominently in public life. Whether that be on the news, watching sports or going about my daily life such as going to school or to the hospital.

Hence, I guess, I just went through my teenage years with my head down and got on with life. It was only after having had my eyes opened up to certain realities around me, that I began lifting my head up and taking notice of the world around me.

Often it can be a tragic incident that forces a person to take notice. For me, the first eye opener was in college when the Gaza War broke out in 2008. Witnessing the massacre that was inflicted upon the Palestinians left me enraged and fuming. I took to the streets like many others and joined protests calling for the end of the massacre of the Palestinian people.

But something within my conscience told me I hadn't done enough by just marching on the streets. I wanted to do more. So, I approached the Head of the college and

asked her permission to raise money for charities assisting Palestinian children affected by the conflict. She gave me the go ahead and told me I could bucket collect in the college for an entire week. With the help of some friends, we raised over £1000.

The point I want to focus on, however, is not the achievement but more so on the decision made by the teacher. She could have easily decided otherwise, citing reasons such as it would distract me from my upcoming exams, or let the teachers organise something you don't worry about it, or any number of logistical concerns. But she didn't. She heard me out, saw that I had a plan and let me run with it.

The morale of the story being always give young people a chance to make a difference.

Many young people I am sure have had the urge to change something around them but may have never had the right person around them to enable them or encourage them. Our collective failure to provide support to young change makers risks excluding them from being civically engaged in the future, thereby losing their contribution to society.

A second significant incident took place during my time at University. I was in a guest lecture where a speaker made a very profound point that really reshaped my outlook on civic responsibility. Addressing what was a very diverse audience which included people from various walks of life, young and old, and various ethnic backgrounds. Pointing to everyone in the audience he said **"You have just as much right to shape the future of this country as any other person living in the UK. That responsibility is not reserved for a privileged few but a right that should be exercised by every citizen, including you!"**

It was such a powerful point the speaker made. Never had I thought about my personal responsibility towards society in such a manner. Never for a moment had I thought this responsibility was even mine

in the first place. Never did I think such a responsibility was meant for people like me.

Remember, I grew up not seeing myself represented much in public life. So, for someone to tell me I had such a big responsibility was very much a cognitive paradigm shift.

After that speech, I went searching for further opportunities to try and be more active. I took part in more charitable initiatives, got involved with local campaigning and came across this organisation called MEND one day. They were addressing an issue which was close to me, the issue of Islamophobia. Having had unfortunate experiences involving myself or family members in the past, I wanted to play an active role in combatting Islamophobia in the UK.

Alongside the work of tackling Islamophobia, I came to realise MEND were actively encouraging greater civic involvement on the part of the Muslim community in the UK. They provided training courses on how to engage effectively with politics and media and had a big focus on empowering communities to become active citizens through their working groups set up across the country.

I've been with MEND now for a number of years and my work revolves around reaching into communities and finding like-minded people who have realised their civic responsibility and want to make a difference.

Together we are creating a movement in the UK of British Muslims who are playing a vital role in promoting active citizenship amongst Muslims in the UK. Our desire is to see a UK very different to the unrepresentative one most people in my generation grew up in. And, finally our aspiration is to shape society where

discrimination based upon ethnicity, religion, sexual orientation, and gender no longer plagues our society.

Political representation and exclusion

Islamophobia should be understood as a mechanism which marginalises and excludes Muslims from being able to fully participate in social, political and civic life. While data shows a growing trend of Muslim engagement in the field of politics, this chapter addresses the challenges Muslims face when operating within the political sphere and the barriers to engagement that still exist.

It concludes that our political institutions need to reflect the communities they serve and encourage Muslim representation within Parliament. In these efforts, political parties need to address structural barriers that exclude Muslims and other minority groups.

Moreover, it is essential that the Government's policy of disengagement with credible mainstream Muslim organisations and leaders be urgently reversed so that the relationship between Government and Muslim communities may be recalibrated.

Muslim representation

Forming one of the most diverse Muslim communities in the world, British Muslims are an integral part of the social fabric of the nation through their significant contribution to the economy (valued at £31 billion) and their presence across a wide range of professions in the public and private sectors, most notably the NHS.⁴¹⁶ According to Lucy Michael, the "integration of minority groups in equality terms" can be measured by engagement in party politics and governance.⁴¹⁷ To some

⁴¹⁶ Esmat Jeraj, ed., *The Missing Muslims: Unlocking British Muslim Potential For The Benefit Of All*, Report by the Citizens Commission on Islam, Participation and Public Life, 2017, p46, <https://www.barrowcadbury.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/Missing-Muslims-Report-full-report.pdf>

⁴¹⁷ Michael, Lucy. 2009. "Securing civic relations in the multicultural city". 164-186, in Krause, W. (Ed.) *Citizenship, Security and Democracy: Muslim Engagement with the*

West, Surrey: Association of Muslim Social Scientists (UK) and Foundation for Political, Economic and Social Research, 177 – 197. Cited in p.22 of Mustafa, Anisa. 2015. *"Active Citizenship, Dissent And Power: The Cultural Politics Of Young Adult British Muslims."* Ph.D, University of Nottingham.

extent, this can be demonstrated by the election of the first Muslim MP, Mohammad Sarwar, in 1997. In two decades since this historic landmark, the number of Muslim MPs has risen to 15, eight of whom are women. Also, politicians who identify as Muslim or are of Muslim heritage have served as ministers in the past three governments under Gordon Brown, David Cameron and now Theresa May - with Baroness Warsi becoming the first Muslim female minister under the Cameron administration in 2010.

While barriers have been broken by individuals such as Mohammad Sarwar, Sayeeda Warsi, Naz Shah, Yasmin Qureshi, Shabana Mahmood and Rushanara Ali, to name but a few, Muslim representation of 2% of the House of Commons still lags far behind what is proportional considering the population of British Muslims, which stands at 4.4% according to the 2011 census. This highlights the lack of equitable representation of Muslims in public life and, therefore, according to Michael's assessment of integration and equality, one may argue that Muslims are far from equal. The reasons for this underrepresentation ranges from political parties fearing a backlash for fielding more Muslim candidates, discrimination against Muslims within political party structures, the centralised nature of the party system and Muslims feeling alienated from the democratic system.⁴¹⁸

Barriers to political engagement

Experiences of discrimination and Islamophobia are rife at all levels of political engagement. Baroness Warsi, for example, remarked that "being a Muslim

in public life has been brutal", adding that "Muslims who engage with politics or any other institutions are to be viewed as suspicious and Muslims who don't engage are to be treated as suspicious for being separatist".⁴¹⁹ Adding to this notion of suspicion, Muslim MPs, Rupa Huq and Tulip Siddiq, recently spoke out about being disproportionately stopped by security staff within Parliament and having their credentials questioned, with Huq stating that "[b]ecause of our pigmentation we are treated differently".⁴²⁰

Scepticism towards Muslims engaging within the political realm is further evidenced in the fact that 14 out of 15 constituency Labour parties (CLPs) placed under "special measures" have sizeable Muslim populations, varying from 11% (Brentford & Isleworth) to 50% (Birmingham Hodge Hill).⁴²¹ "Special measures" refers to the administrative mechanism introduced first in the 1980s to prevent "hostile takeovers of constituency parties and local councils".⁴²² When imposed on constituency groups, members are vetted and selection processes are centrally controlled. While special measures may be the appropriate cause of action in a few extreme situations, it is only meant to be a short term measure, as highlighted by the Chakrabarti Report into anti-Semitism and other forms of racism within the Labour Party.⁴²³ However some CLPs had been under special measures for more than two decades before being reinstated under Jeremy Corbyn's leadership.⁴²⁴ Craig, in a piece about Birmingham Hall Green CLP, points out that the four Birmingham CLPs in special measures are in areas with a high

⁴¹⁸ Anisa Mustafa, "Active Citizenship, Dissent and Civic Consciousness: Young Muslims Redefining Citizenship on Their Own Terms," *Identities* 23, no. 4 (2015): 22, doi:10.1080/1070289x.2015.1024127.

⁴¹⁹ Homa Khaleeli, "Sayeeda Warsi: 'Where Are My Grandkids Going to Call Home? What World Will They Grow up In?'" *The Guardian*, March 25, 2017, <https://www.theguardian.com/lifeandstyle/2017/mar/25/sayeeda-warsi-where-are-my-grandkids-going-to-call-home-what-world-will-they-grow-up-in>.

⁴²⁰ "The Londoner: Rupa and Tulip in Racist Security Row," *Evening Standard*, May 24, 2018, <https://www.standard.co.uk/news/londoners-diary/the-londoner-rupa-and-tulip-in-racist-security-row-a3847451.html>.

⁴²¹ Mark Ferguson, "The Kafkaesque Farce of the Labour Party 'special measures' Revisited...", *LabourList*, July 03, 2013, <https://labourlist.org/2013/07/the-kafkaesque-farce-of-the-labour-party-special-measures-revisited>.

⁴²² Radhika Sanghani, "Labour Reveal Constituencies Under Central Control," *The Telegraph*, July 03, 2013, <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/labour/10156596/Labour-reveal-constituencies-under-central-control.html>.

⁴²³ Hattie Craig, "23 Years in 'special measures'," *The Clarion*, October 01, 2016, <https://theclarionmag.org/2016/10/01/23-years-in-special-measures/>.

⁴²⁴ "Labour Reveal Constituencies Under Central Control."

Muslim or Pakistani population, and emphasises that there is “a feeling of injustice from members of these groups that they are under suspicion, that having lots of members from these communities in the party is regarded as a bad thing”.⁴²⁵

Islamophobia in politics is also characterised by discourse which is divisive, fuels hate and promotes hatred and fear of Muslims. The dog-whistle politics displayed during the London mayoral election against Sadiq Khan, where he was branded an “extremist” by opponent Zac Goldsmith was arguably the most high-profile example of what is a regular experience for Muslims participating in electoral politics. Coming from the political establishment and being led by senior CCHQ officials gave the episode an added gravity. In the eyes of Muslims, it translated fundamentally into a message that the Muslim community may be accomplished in their education and professional careers, but they will never be fully accepted into mainstream society. Seeing high-profile Muslim politicians being subjected to a vilification campaign with racial and Islamophobic undertones reaffirmed the feeling of disillusionment with the political process that many Muslims felt, and has undoubtedly negatively impacted the aspirations of young Muslims in pursuing public office.

Obstructing political engagement in universities

The fear of being labelled “extremist” is pervasive within the context of Muslim students at British universities. What should be spaces of empowerment for young Muslims have become more heavily securitised under the PREVENT duty, particularly impacting the work of Islamic societies and pro-Palestine societies.

Student events have become subject to increased bureaucratisation, and at times even shut down outright. We note that the findings of a recent report by the NUS Black Students’ and Women’s Campaign, echoed these concerns and experiences, identifying PREVENT as contributing towards a deficit in civic engagement for Muslim students; impacting their ability to engage in certain discussions and deterring them from running for elected positions.⁴²⁶

The Henry Jackson Society and Student Rights

An organisation that exemplifies the attempts to shut down the voices of Muslim students is the Henry Jackson Society, through the guise of its project Student Rights. Student Rights claims to support “equality, democracy and freedom from extremism on university campuses”.⁴²⁷ However, despite these claims to equality, it is striking that Student Rights appears to focus almost exclusively on Muslim students and student groups and has repeatedly used the language of counter-extremism to demonise Muslim students and societies. It has especially targeted students who are vocal about their support for the Palestinian cause and those critical of counter-terror strategies.

Furthermore, far from living up to its name, Student Rights has no basis as a representative body for students and has no affiliation with any student union and has frequently attracted severe and widespread criticism for its agenda-driven narratives and activities.⁴²⁸

Student Rights has been accused of seeking to pressure universities to “impose restrictive measures on Muslim students that would, in effect, institutionalise Islamophobia” and its work has been described as seeking “to narrow the space for all radical political dissent on

⁴²⁵ “23 Years in “special measures””.

⁴²⁶ “Our Research into the Experiences of #MuslimsInEducation” NUS Connect, March 18, 2018, <https://www.nusconnect.org.uk/articles/our-research-into-the-experiences-of-muslimsineducation>.

⁴²⁷ “Student Rights - About Us,” Student Rights, accessed June 21, 2018, http://www.studentrights.org.uk/about_us.

⁴²⁸ Hilary Aked, “Muslim and LGBTQ Students Unite Against ‘Student Rights’ in Run Up to NUS Conference,” HuffPost UK, May 19, 2014, https://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/hilary-aked/nus-conference_b_4986437.html.

campus.”⁴²⁹ Student Rights has also been condemned by the NUS for its use of flawed methodologies and has subsequently been widely criticised for its “dishonest pseudo-science in support of a toxic narrative”.⁴³⁰ Meanwhile, the conclusions of Student Rights’ reports have been discredited and labelled as “a witch-hunt which makes sweeping judgments about student Islamic societies”.⁴³¹

Interestingly, Student Rights claims to protect free speech and has expressed opposition to student unions’ no-platform policy for the BNP.⁴³² However, it has simultaneously severely criticised speakers it sees as “extremists” who have been invited by Islamic and Palestinian societies,⁴³³ as well as Muslim students who criticise the current PREVENT strategy.⁴³⁴

Moreover, the Institute of Race Relations has noted with concern that Student Rights’ work and reporting has been used by far-right groups to target Muslim student events.⁴³⁵ Indeed, several British universities have been forced to cancel events after material from SR has resulted in threats of violence from far-right groups, including the EDL.⁴³⁶

This group represents just one in a network that seeks to monitor and police Muslim political engagement, going far beyond the realm of legitimate critique into brazen discrimination.

Policies of disengagement

At the heart of Islamophobic rhetoric, what we see is a concerted effort to regulate,

exclude, and marginalise Muslims within civil society and political life. Indeed, Muslim organisations have been progressively isolated and excluded from the realm of legitimate political discussion, as highlighted by the Government’s current policy of non-engagement with organisations such as the Muslim Council of Britain.

Levied against such organisations are accusations of “extremism” that are frequently baseless but accompanied by long-lasting stigma. In turn, accusations of “segregation” and “refusal to integrate” are used as justification to enact increased surveillance and securitisation of Muslim communities.

Meanwhile, attempts to engage with political life lead to smears and suspicion, thus creating a damaging and inescapable cycle. As demonstrated by Sayeeda Warsi’s earlier quote,⁴³⁷ Muslims become restricted between two very uncomfortable positions of “isolationism” and “entryism”.

Rather than engaging with a broad spectrum of Muslim organisations and voices, the Government has traditionally insisted in dealing with a handpicked minority who already support their policy positions, particularly on issues such as counter-terror, media regulation and Palestine. Consequently, think-tanks and NGOs which do not possess the confidence of British Muslims have exercised considerable influence in shaping public policies, thus resulting in widespread feelings of alienation and frustration amongst Muslim communities. As

⁴²⁹ *Critical Perspectives on Counter-terrorism*, p.192.

⁴³⁰ Hilary Aked, “Student Rights ‘Campus Extremism’ Study: Dishonest Pseudo-Science in Support Of a Toxic Narrative,” HuffPost UK, July 15, 2013, https://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/hilary-aked/student-rights-campus-extremism-study_b_3277503.html?utm_hp_ref=uk-student-rights.

⁴³¹ “‘Extremists’ preaching to UK student societies,” *BBC News*, May 13, 2013, accessed 07.11.2017, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/education-22509757>.

⁴³² “London Student issue 10 (March 1st 2010),” Yudu - Your Digital editions, accessed July 27, 2017, <http://content.yudu.com/Library/A1nkg/LondonStudentissue10/resources/index.htm>.

⁴³³ “Student Rights - Tackling Extremism on Campuses,” Student Rights - Tackling Extremism on Campuses, accessed July 27, 2017, <http://www.studentrights.org.uk/>. Also see Asa Winstanley, “How front group ‘Student Rights’ undermines Palestine solidarity,” *The Electronic Intifada*, February 11, 2017, <https://electronicintifada.net/content/how-front-group-student-rights-undermines-palestine-solidarity/12991>.

⁴³⁴ “Salford Student President who opposes Prevent reveals troubling views on social media,” Student Rights, accessed August 08, 2017, <http://www.studentrights.org.uk/article/2466/salford-student-president-who-opposes-prevent-reveals-troubling-views-on-social-media>.

⁴³⁵ “Far Right targets Islamic events,” Institute of Race Relations RSS, accessed July 28, 2017, <http://www.irr.org.uk/news/far-right-targets-islamic-events/>.

Also see UniofReading, “Statement on Discover Islam Week events at the University of Reading – University of Reading,” University of Reading, accessed July 28, 2017, <http://www.reading.ac.uk/news-and-events/releases/PR490014.aspx>.

⁴³⁶ “EXPOSED: Quilliam leadership directly involved with neocon Douglas Murray’s Henry Jackson Society,” Loonwatch.com, August 20, 2016, <http://www.loonwatch.com/2013/12/exposed-quilliam-leadership-directly-involved-with-neocon-douglas-murrays-henry-jackson-society/>.

⁴³⁷ “Sayeeda Warsi: ‘Where Are My Grandkids Going to Call Home? What World Will They Grow up In?’”

recommended by the 2017 Citizens UK report entitled “Missing Muslims”,⁴³⁸ it is of pressing urgency that the Government reassesses its engagement with Muslim communities and seeks to mend the “broken relationship” by taking steps to end this impasse. The Government must, therefore, urgently reconsider its policy of disengagement with credible Muslim organisations that have the trust and support of mainstream British Muslim communities. Engagement does not mean agreement on every issue but facilitating the exchange of ideas and perspectives is an integral component of a democratic society.

However, far from seeking to mend the broken relationship, it appears that the Government is set on continuing to distance itself from segments of the British Muslim population. This was recently illustrated by the Home Secretary, Sajid Javid, when he dismissed allegations of Islamophobia in the Conservative Party and reiterated the Government position that it would not enter into a dialogue with the Muslim Council of Britain, the biggest Muslim umbrella group in the UK, with over 500 affiliates.⁴³⁹ The fact that the Conservative Party Chair subsequently met with the “moderate” Muslim group Tell MAMA, reiterates the Government’s intention to maintain the “good Muslim”, “bad Muslim” dichotomy. This dichotomous narrative is, in itself, a good example of institutional Islamophobia in that it seeks to regulate Muslims and exclude those who disrupt the institutional status-quo.

Moreover, discourse that seeks to dehumanise, stigmatise and spread hatred of Muslims must be called out by politicians across the party spectrum. In doing so, political parties should conduct

independent investigations into claims of institutional Islamophobia – as recently demanded of the Conservative Party by the Muslim Council of Britain. The fact that such a call has gone unheeded contrasts sharply with the vociferous calls for an inquiry into anti-Semitism in the Labour Party. Such a refusal creates the perception of a hierarchy of acceptable intolerances. In reality, hatred against all minorities should be confronted with equal vigour.

The Benefits of Participation

Dr Joe Greenwood

Barriers to political participation restrict who can get involved, and this places limits on both the individual and societal benefits of participation, which take at least three forms. First, participation contributes to the quality of representation and policy outcomes; second, it helps overcome divisions between groups; and third, it offers personal rewards to individuals. Together, these benefits have the capacity to contribute to individual happiness, community integration, and improved societal outcomes

In the first case, research has shown that limits on participation can reduce both descriptive and substantive representation.⁴⁴⁰ This means that if certain social groups face barriers to participation then, concomitantly, they are likely to be underrepresented at various levels of government.⁴⁴¹ This can create a divide in which excluded social groups see elected representatives as distant and disconnected from them, and has implications for the quality of policy outcomes. Indeed, research has shown that elected representatives tend to reflect the views of the groups that are represented and are able to participate.⁴⁴² This means that, counter to the principle of an open

⁴³⁸ *The Missing Muslims: Unlocking British Muslim Potential For The Benefit Of All*, p46.

⁴³⁹ Greg Heffer, “Sajid Javid in Muslim Council of Britain Spat over Islamophobia Claims,” Sky News, June 03, 2018, <https://news.sky.com/story/sajid-javid-in-muslim-council-of-britain-spat-over-islamophobia-claims-11393750>.

⁴⁴⁰ Sidney Verba, Kay Lehman Schlozman and Henry E. Brady, *Voice and Equality: Civic Voluntarism in American Politics* (Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1995).

⁴⁴¹ Richard L. Fox and Jennifer L. Lawless, ‘If Only They’d Ask: Gender, Recruitment, and Political Ambition’, *The Journal of Politics*, Vol. 72, No. 2 (Apr., 2010), pp. 310-326.

⁴⁴² Larry M. Bartels, *Unequal Democracy: The Political Economy of the New Gilded Age* (Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 2008).

democratic discourse, the policy-making process is not based on a diverse set of views and the resulting policy outcomes may be sub-optimal.

The representation of diverse views in the policy-making process is also indicative of the capacity for participation to build bonds between groups. There is classic academic work showing the ease with which humans form group identities, and subsequent research has developed these findings by showing that group identity can be context-specific and thus primed.⁴⁴³ This means that if contexts are created in which people from various social groups can all participate in then it is possible to build more inclusive group identities. Thus, an inclusive participatory system can not only increase the diversity of voices that contribute to policy making but can also create bridging social capital between communities.

Increased social capital can also be an important individual benefit that results from participation, which enables people to make new acquaintances. As such, it constitutes a selective incentive for participation alongside motivations such as the desire to seek office and rewards such as reduced prices for other services. Selective incentives are one of three sets of reasons for political participation that are identified by the general incentives model.⁴⁴⁴ Collective goods are the second motivation for participation, and offer the opportunity to help a party or organisation achieve particular policy outcomes. Finally, there are the expressive benefits of participation, in the form of the opportunity to support a cause that one believes in. Taking all of these potential benefits together, we can see political participation as an opportunity for individuals meet new people and achieve personal goals, influence policy-making,

and gain the psychological reward of standing up for what they believe in.

In light of the above, an inclusive participatory system has the capacity to reduce divides between groups and their representatives, and to ensure diverse voices are reflected in policy-making. Further, open participatory contexts allow communities to meet each other, construct new group identities, and bridge divides. Finally, participation offers an array of personal, collective, and expressive benefits to those who get involved. Thus, the many benefits of participation can be felt by both individuals and society.

⁴⁴³ Henri Tajfel and John C. Turner, 'The Social Identity Theory of Intergroup Behavior', in J. T. Jost and J. Sidanius (eds.), *Key readings in social psychology* (New York, NY, Psychology Press, 2004), pp. 276-293; Naomi Ellemers and S. Alexander Haslam, 'Social Identity Theory', in Paul A. M. Van Lange, Arie W. Kruglanski, and E. Tory Higgins (eds.), *Handbook of Theories of Social Psychology* (Volume 2, London, Sage Publications, 2012), pp. 379-393.

⁴⁴⁴ Paul F. Whiteley, Patrick Seyd, Jeremy Richardson, and Paul Bissell, 'Explaining Party Activism: The Case of the British Conservative Party', *British Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 47, No. 1 (Jul., 1984), pp. 5-16.

Public Exclusion, Integration and Minority Rights

As MEND's definition of Islamophobia highlights, Islamophobia incorporates any exclusion, restriction, or preference against Muslims that has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal footing, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural or any other field of public life.

As such, this chapter seeks to examine the ways in which Muslims become discriminated against or excluded from public life. It pays particular attention to the Islamophobic discourses present within discussions surrounding integration and the rights of minority communities in public life.

Assimilation, Integration and Multiculturalism

For decades, fierce debates have raged surrounding the best strategies and frameworks through which to manage the differences between dominant and minority groups, the most cited frameworks for which are assimilation, integration and multiculturalism.

Despite their common usage within political and social discourse, the differences between these three concepts are often only vaguely understood. This imprecise understanding is due largely to the fact that the strict application of one or the other strategy is practically impossible, and governments have frequently used a combination of both assimilation and integration methods in their social policies. For the large part, the difference between these three methods lies in the scope individuals possess to manifest their socio-

cultural differences in the private and the public sphere.

Assimilation

Assimilationist policies attempt to erode the cultural differences between groups, both in the public and the private sphere. The ultimate goal is to make the newcomer or minority community indistinguishable from the dominant or host society. Under assimilationist strategies, people are required to manifest themselves according to the dominant culture in public spaces. The result of well-enforced assimilation is acculturation, that is to say that the newcomers or the minority assume the culture of the dominant group. As Laura Coello and Baukje Prins observe, although assimilation was widely used throughout the 20th century in the United States, Australia and France, it is increasingly seen as an unfeasible and unfair practice.⁴⁴⁵

The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)

In 1976, the UK adopted the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). The ICCPR demands that all member states must commit themselves to ensuring for "all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the Covenant, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status."⁴⁴⁶

There are three particularly relevant articles within the covenant in need of mention at this stage; Articles 1, 18, and 21

Article 1

All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.

⁴⁴⁵ Laura Coello and Baukje Prins, *Significant Difference?: A Comparative Analysis of Multicultural Policies in the United Kingdom and the Netherlands* (Amsterdam University Press, 2010).

⁴⁴⁶ "International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights," The United Nations, Office of the High Commissioner, accessed May 18, 2017, <http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CCPR.aspx>.

Article 18

- Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. This right shall include freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice, and freedom, either individually or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in worship, observance, practice and teaching.
- No one shall be subject to coercion which would impair his freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice.
- Freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs may be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary to protect public safety, order, health, or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others.
- The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to have respect for the liberty of parents and, when applicable, legal guardians to ensure the religious and moral education of their children in conformity with their own convictions.

Article 27

In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with the other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practise their own religion, or to use their own language.⁴⁴⁷

By adhering to the ICCPR, the UK limits its choice of strategies to integration and multiculturalism. In light of the protections afforded within the covenant to religious, linguistic and cultural identities, assimilationist policies aimed at

acculturation of minority groups is clearly in direct contradiction to the commitments in the ICCPR.

Integration

Policies based on integration seek to join people of various ethnic backgrounds closer by asserting one, common public identity or culture, yet allowing or tolerating manifestations of differences in the private sphere. As Coello and Prins explain: “[w]hen the host community welcomes or allows the manifestations of differences, it can lead to fusion: the creation of a new identity emerging from the contact with elements from the various groups, but without purposely eliminating cultural differences.”

Castles et. al define integration thus;

“Integration is a two-way process: it requires adaptation on the part of the newcomer but also by the host society. Successful integration can only take place if the host society provides access to jobs and services, and acceptance of the immigrants in social interaction. Above all, integration in a democracy presupposes acquisition of legal and political rights by the new members of society, so that they can become equal partners. Indeed, it is possible to argue that, in a multicultural society, integration may be understood as a process through which the whole population acquires civil, social, political, human and cultural rights, which creates the conditions for greater equality. In this approach, integration can also mean that minority groups should be supported in maintaining their cultural and social identities, since the right to cultural choices is intrinsic to democracy.”⁴⁴⁸

Ultimately, integration is a two-way process, while assimilation is a one-way process. This is clearly misunderstood by some political commentators and advisors. Dame Louise Casey is a particularly

⁴⁴⁷ "International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights."

⁴⁴⁸ Stephen Castles et al., *Integration: Mapping the Field*, report, Centre for Migration and Policy Research and Refugee Studies Centre for the Home Office, University of Oxford, December 2002,

<http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20110218135832/http://rds.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs2/rdsolr2803.doc>.

worrying example of this confusion after she famously stated that integration should not be a two-way street.⁴⁴⁹ The reason for special concern over Dame Louise Casey's misunderstanding is the fact that the Government's currently proposed integration strategy relies heavily on the Casey Review. As such, the distortions present in Dame Louise Casey's review have infiltrated and informed current strategies. This will be discussed further below.

Multiculturalism

Multiculturalism can be considered as an idea, political theory, pursuit of policies, or enactment of civil society initiatives that establish and foster a society composed of several groups of individuals that prescribe to different cultures co-existing at the socioeconomic and political level.

However, the concept does not limit this ideal to individuals restricted to one culture, rather it suggests that whilst the cultures are discreet, the individuals may prescribe to different cultures for different aspects of their lives. For example, one may wear western clothing whilst simultaneously enjoying cultural cuisine or participating in a multitude of religious festivals. Therefore, individuals have the freedom to adopt chosen aspects of their respective cultures to enrich their lives.

This adoption of multi-faceted cultural identities can be fostered or regulated through integrative or assimilative policies pursued at a governmental level. The pursuit of such policies thus affects the relationship between the majority and minority cultures, either resulting in the dominance of the former over the latter or allowing individuals to pursue either without restriction.

Government integration strategies and Muslims

Britain has always claimed to embody a proud history of supporting multiculturalist principles advocating respect and celebration of the multitude of diverse ethnic and religious identities that have led themselves to a British identity built upon pluralism and collaboration. However, recent years have seen simmering resentments and debates surrounding national identity and a perceived "ghettoisation" of minorities.

In line with the development and consequences of moral panic, these fears have culminated in calls for the UK to reassess its policies towards multiculturalist principles. The result is an increasingly restrictive integration strategy, within which examples of Islamophobic assumptions and institutional racism can be readily witnessed regarding the treatment of Muslim communities.

The Government recently closed its consultation on its "Integrated Communities Strategy Green Paper; Building Stronger, More United Communities". This green paper sets out the Government strategy and approach towards integration. As a starting point, the Green Paper heavily relies on the highly criticised 2016 Casey Review. As a consequence, its analysis and suggested strategies are inherently tainted by the same flawed evidence and lack of understanding that has guided the Government's policies on community cohesion and integration in the past.

The scope of this current report on Islamophobia does not allow for a full analysis of the Green Paper.⁴⁵⁰ However, there are several key areas wherein the infiltration of Islamophobic narratives and assumptions have directed the development of this strategy, and

⁴⁴⁹ "Louise Casey: Integration 'not a Two-way Street'," BBC, January 09, 2017, <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/av/uk-politics-38563877/louise-casey-integration-not-a-two-way-street>.

⁴⁵⁰ Indeed, MEND's submission to the consultation process exceeds 40 pages and can be found at <https://mend.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/MEND-Submission-to-the-Green-Paper-on-Integration-V1.pdf>

therefore, limit its potential to make a positive difference.

Overlap with counter-terror

The Green Paper is littered with references and allusions reminiscent of counter-terror strategies that have previously been condemned as hugely damaging to cohesion and inclusion of minorities. This fear has been heightened with the publication of the Home Office's updated counter-terror strategy "CONTEST: The United Kingdom's Strategy for Countering Terrorism", which explicitly mentions the Green Paper in outlining its strategy. It is imperative that strategies of community integration and of counter-terrorism do not overlap, as this can only result in the further securitisation of an already problematic tripartite relationship between government, society and minorities.

Prescribed views of "acceptable Islam"

The call for a "clearer interpretation of Islam for life in the UK" is extremely worrying for the Muslim community and needs to be clarified. The concern is that a certain liberal interpretation of "acceptable Islam" will be championed by consultation with Government selected Muslim representatives, whilst mainstream conservative views will be marginalised as "extremist". Furthermore, it is concerning that Islam has been singled out without references to any other faith groups.

De-contextualising challenges and an absence of introspection

The overall approach of the Green Paper is highly problematic. By unilaterally shifting the responsibility and blame for a lack of social inclusion almost entirely onto minority communities, it de-contextualises barriers to inclusion and examines them in a vacuum. While there are brief mentions of hate crimes contributing to isolation, there is a concerning lack of analysis of institutionalised and systematic racism in Britain. Similarly, there is no mention of the way developments, such as the Government's "hostile environment"

policy, the PREVENT strategy, and Brexit, have further contributed to creating a climate of fear, mistrust and disillusionment that prevents BAME individuals from fully and actively participating in British society.

Moreover, the absence of any form of introspection and self-criticism results in a very limited understanding of some of the key causes that contribute to limiting integration between minorities and broader society. For example, there is no mention of the impact of the Government's policy of austerity and cuts to public service affect minorities' access to health services, nor is there mention of severely reduced police budgets at a time in which hate crime against minorities is on the rise. Furthermore, there is an absence of commentary on how elements of the British media contribute to spreading harmful narratives surrounding minorities, as well as a lack of analysis regarding the Government's recent cancellation of the second part of the Leveson inquiry.

Without a stronger focus on the broader issues and mechanisms of socio-economic discrimination and exclusion, the Green Paper will be confined to be a collection of half measures that will be insufficient to bring about positive change.

Islamophobia and the myth of Muslim distance

Dr Jan Dobbernack,

Newcastle University

The idea that Muslims lead "separate lives" is yet again in the news. Breathless stories about urban ghettos and dangerous no-go areas have long had a presence in the British press. In a series of policy reports, Theresa May's government now presents its own view on Muslims' spatial and cultural distance. The Casey

Review⁴⁵¹ and Government's Integrated Communities Green Paper identify segregation as the main obstacle towards improving the national condition.⁴⁵² The remedy that both reports envisage is contact. Both parts of the equation, contact and segregation, need to be unpacked to examine the understanding of Muslim "difference" that informs Government's current policy offer.

Casey's apocalyptic perspective on British Muslims speaks of a "downward spiral with a growth in regressive religious and cultural ideologies"⁴⁵³ and also underpins the more policy-minded approach in the recently published Green Paper. Both documents proceed from the assumption that things go well when there is contact – when "meaningful interaction" takes place – and that the absence of contact needs to be understood as a critical failure of integration. This is despite the fact that contact is an ambivalent remedy. There is no sociological evidence that heightened interaction – that is, contact without due attention to socio-economic circumstances, political environments and local geographies that structure the relationship between social-cultural groups – would improve anything, much less resolve the problems of multicultural Britain.⁴⁵⁴

It is perplexing that UK policy-making, despite some lip service to the contrary, continues to present contact as a comprehensive solution to urgent social problems.⁴⁵⁵ Among the reasons is that the remedy is cheap. Policies that target "segregated" populations for deficient attitudes, not for their socio-economic circumstances, require fewer resources than any material investment in the good society. At the same time, initiatives that do valuable work in fostering local

conviviality – youth centres, inter-faith and outreach initiatives – face chronic underfunding. How can "libraries and other community hubs", as the Green Paper requests, "maximise their contribution to building integrated communities"⁴⁵⁶ when they cannot even maintain reasonable opening hours in the face of cuts? In light of Government's defunding of ESOL instruction, its emphasis on the importance of language for integration rings hollow.⁴⁵⁷

It is tempting to disregard the new agenda of "meaningful contact" and "integrated communities" altogether, and not just because the concerned policies lack funding. Their excessive emphasis on contact only makes sense against the background of dominant myths about Muslim separation. Government responds to manufactured anxieties about Muslim distance, which explain its direction of political travel much better than any positive definition of "integration". Echo-chamber bureaucrats, such as Casey, single out political, residential and educational choices by Muslim citizens, whom she blames for the lack of cross-cultural contact in British society. Her understanding of Muslim separation isn't gleaned from any evidence-based approach. It reflects alluring myths that persist despite a wealth of readily available counterevidence, suggesting that Muslims are as much part of British society as any other social group.⁴⁵⁸

The myth of separation doesn't need to be backed up by facts. It brings long-standing anxieties about Muslim difference into play. The idea that British Muslims lead "separate lives" draws on cultured understandings of "the Muslim world" as irredeemably different, anti-modern and

⁴⁵¹ *The Casey Review: a review into opportunity and integration*.

⁴⁵² *Integrated Communities Strategy Green Paper*, HM Government, March 2018, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/696993/Integrated_Communities_Strategy.pdf.

⁴⁵³ *The Casey Review: a review into opportunity and integration*, p15.

⁴⁵⁴ James Laurence, "Reconciling the Contact and Threat Hypotheses: Does Ethnic Diversity Strengthen or Weaken Community Inter-ethnic Relations?" *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 37, no. 8 (2013): doi:10.1080/01419870.2013.788727.

⁴⁵⁵ *Integrated Communities Strategy Green Paper*, p12.

⁴⁵⁶ *Integrated Communities Strategy Green Paper*, p15.

⁴⁵⁷ Maya Goodfellow, "English Language and Integration," Discover Society, May 01, 2018, <https://discoversociety.org/2018/05/01/english-language-and-integration/>.

⁴⁵⁸ Farah Elahi and Omar Khan, eds., *Islamophobia: Still a Challenge for Us All*, report, The Runnymede Trust, 2017, <https://www.runnymedetrust.org/uploads/Islamophobia%20Report%202018%20FINAL.pdf>

engulfed in a civilizational crisis. There is an entire genre of contributions that speaks of a Muslim “rebellion” against modernity which, as one commentator suggests, finds expression in “aimless and formless resentment and anger of the Muslim masses at the forces that have devalued their traditional values and loyalties”.⁴⁵⁹ The description of Muslim life in Casey’s report is not materially different. It is informed by the civilizational understanding that Muslims are dangerously distant, which it re-describes in the spatial terms of “segregation”. Such distance is slippery and attempts by Muslim organisations, including MEND and the Muslim Council of Britain, to defeat the myth by demonstrating proximity, or by highlighting the civic “normality” of Muslim concerns, are always subject to evasive manoeuvres.

When a recent report by Policy Exchange found very little difference between Muslim and non-Muslim priorities in housing, education, values and national identity, David Goodhart – one of the report’s authors – decided to downplay such findings and underline the one remaining marker of difference that conveniently remained (here: a somewhat more pronounced tendency to embrace conspiracy theories about foreign policy).⁴⁶⁰ In his private writings, Goodhart is committed to reinforcing the idea of Muslims’ radical otherness.⁴⁶¹ Available counterevidence, including from the think tank that employs Goodhart, does very little to change such views. For British Muslims findings of proximity never seem to stick. Distance always does.

The myth of distance extends to social and political agency. Where British Muslim organisations refuse to buy into Prevent, the problematic agenda of counter-

extremism, this is registered as evidence of dangerous distance. The new counter-terrorism tsar, Sara Khan, alleges that organisations that do not proactively engage with the policy belong to a “Salafi-Islamist line-up”.⁴⁶² Campaigns for civil liberties and against Islamophobia do not reflect a welcome commitment to the common good, but underscore the alleged self-centredness of Muslim political agency, which is often portrayed as a politics of grievance.⁴⁶³

The myth of distance draws on a continuity of ideas about Muslim otherness. It is not possible to discuss here if available understanding of Islamophobia capture this continuity and provide a good basis for pushing back against such myths. But there is no doubt that the idea that Muslims are dangerously distant – for the stigma that this idea entails and for its invulnerability to counterevidence – constitutes a form of cultural racism that is both common and widely acceptable in British society.

Protecting Minority Rights

When considering Islamophobia and its infiltration into discussions surrounding the rights of minority communities and the place of Muslims in society, it is important to briefly acknowledge the national and international legislative commitments that the United Kingdom observes with regards to protecting civil rights, minority rights and human rights more broadly. Important pieces of legislation include: the 1950 European Convention on Human Rights and the 1998 Human Rights Act; and the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

⁴⁵⁹ Bernard Lewis, “The Roots of Muslim Rage,” *The Atlantic*, September 1990, accessed June 20, 2018, <https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1990/09/the-roots-of-muslim-rage/304643/>.

⁴⁶⁰ Martyn Frampton, David Goodhart, and Khalid Mahmood, *Unsettled Belonging: A Survey of Britain’s Muslim Communities*, report, Policy Exchange, December 2016, https://policyexchange.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/PEX15037_Muslim_Communities_FINAL.pdf.

⁴⁶¹ David Goodhart, *The Road to Somewhere: The Populist Revolt and the Future of Politics* (London: Hurst & Company, 2017).

⁴⁶² Sara Khan, *The Battle for British Islam: Reclaiming Muslim Identity from Extremism* (London: Saqi Books, 2016), 68.

⁴⁶³ Jan Dobbernack, Nasar Meer, and Tariq Modood, “Misrecognition and Political Agency. The Case of Muslim Organisations in a General Election,” *The British Journal of Politics and International Relations* 17, no. 2 (2014): doi:10.1111/1467-856x.12033.

The European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)

The European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), originally drafted in 1950, is an international treaty that protects fundamental freedoms and human rights in Europe that all the 47 Council of Europe member states must observe. The treaty provides a number of legal provisions that protect the British Muslim community. Amongst these protections is Article 9, freedom of thought, conscience and religion.

Article 9 states:

“Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice and observance.

Freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs shall be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of public safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.”

The unambiguous consequence of the article is the provision of legal protection for British Muslims (and other religious minorities) to be able to hold, observe, and practice their faith.

Human Rights Act, 1998

The UK strengthened the provisions outlined in the ECHR by introducing them into domestic law as part of the 1998 Human Rights Act. The intention of this act was to provide remedies for human rights breaches within the UK court system and, therefore, not requiring an individual to go through the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg.

Specifically, the Human Rights Act makes it unlawful for any public body to act in a

way which is incompatible with the ECHR, unless to do so would contravene any other primary legislation. The Human Rights Act requires judiciary bodies to take any decisions, judgment or opinion of the European Court of Human Rights into account, and to interpret legislation, as far as possible, in a way which is compatible with the protections afforded by ECHR.

The practice of religious rights

Despite the protections afforded by the ICCPR, the ECHR and the Human Rights Act, 1998, recent years have witnessed numerous controversies, scandals, and vicious public debates that have challenged Muslim religious practice and observance in the UK context. Particular public controversy has surrounded the right to halal meat, the building of mosques, and the right to religious dress, amongst other topics of public interest. Such debates demonstrate how religious practices, whilst protected by national and international legislation, can still be contested and the discourse around them used as a proxy argument to marginalise minority communities and Muslims specifically.

Halal Hysteria

Animal welfare should rightfully be of primary concern, particularly considering today’s industrialised meat industry. Indeed, all citizens have a responsibility to confront issues such as cruelty, overproduction, and inhumane conditions that have notoriously characterised certain segments of the industry. To give a general picture of some of the controversies surrounding meat production:

- Between July 2014 and 2016, a total of 9,511 breaches of animal welfare were reported to the Food Standards Agency, nearly half of which were classed as category 4, the most severe category, and caused “avoidable pain,

distress or suffering".⁴⁶⁴ Cases included chickens and pigs being immersed in boiling hot water while still being alive in order to "soften the skin".

- The Bureau of Investigative Journalism (BIJ) in 2017 noted that there are around 800 "megafarms" which house more than a "million chickens, 20,000 pigs or 2,000 dairy cows" with around 15 chickens per square metre; or as BIJ illustratively noted, around an area "about the size of an A4 sheet of paper for each bird".⁴⁶⁵
- A 2003 report by the Farm Animal Welfare Council noted that 1/3 of pigs slaughtered were killed using gas chambers in which carbon dioxide is pumped into the rooms, resulting in suffocation.⁴⁶⁶

However, in the face of these numerous and highly problematic practices and outcomes, Muslims are frequently singled out for special and aggressive scrutiny.

The debate on religious slaughter has been ongoing in the UK for almost a decade. In 2009, a blog post on the PETA (People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals) website was published entitled "The Cruelty Behind Muslim Ritual Slaughter."⁴⁶⁷ This blog post effectively initiated the "halal hysteria" that would characterise much of the discussion surrounding halal meat ever since. It did not take long for various newspapers to latch on to the moral panic and produce typically fear driven and divisive headlines, such as "Now halal school dinners," from the Daily Star in 2010 which claimed that schools will give pupils "no option but to eat meat slaughtered following Islamic teachings specifically for Muslims".⁴⁶⁸

This has led to calls for all animals to be stunned before slaughter, with the assumption that stunning leads to a morally acceptable "pain-free" method of meat production. However, this is not always the case. A study by the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) looked at conventional slaughter methods employing pre-stunning, including the use of the penetrative captive bolt (PCB) method, whereby a bolt of 7-11cm is fired into the animal's brain to render it unconscious and the non-PCB method whereby a bolt is fired at the head of the animal but does not enter the brain. The study found that the failure rate for stunning in cattle for PCB method was around 4%, and between 20-30% for the non-PCB method. Therefore, 20-30% of animals undergoing non-PCB have to be re-stunned. Obviously, a bolt being fired at an animal's head that fails to render them unconscious is clearly going to be a painful and distressing experience. In fact, research has found that in some animals the non-PCB method causes skull fractures. Hence to advocate that stunning is always pain free is not supported by research.⁴⁶⁹

Furthermore, these studies highlight the need for serious analysis of animal welfare and the advocating of responsible farming and slaughter across all strands of the meat industry.

One of the first people to bring the topic of religious slaughter to the attention of Parliament is Philip Davies, Conservative MP for Shipley. In 2010, Davies stated that numerous retailers sell halal food without informing customers. Consequently, he urged the Leader of the House to ensure that the issue of food labelling would be

⁴⁶⁴ Andrew Wasley, "FSA: 4,000 Major Breaches of Animal Welfare Laws at UK Abattoirs in Two Years," The Guardian, August 28, 2016, <https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2016/aug/28/isa-4000-breaches-animal-welfare-laws-uk-abattoirs-two-years>.

⁴⁶⁵ Andrew Wasley and Madlen Davies, "The Rise of the 'megafarm': How British Meat Is Made," The Bureau of Investigative Journalism, July 17, 2017, <https://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/stories/2017-07-17/megafarms-uk-intensive-farming-meat>.

⁴⁶⁶ Report on the Welfare of Farmed Animals at Slaughter or Killing, report, Farm Animal Welfare Council, June 2003, accessed June 20, 2018, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/325241/FAWC_report_on_the_welfare_of_farmed_animals_at_slaughter_or_killing_part_one_red_meat_animals.pdf.

⁴⁶⁷ "The Cruelty Behind Muslim Ritual Slaughter," PETA, December 08, 2009, accessed May 11, 2017, <http://www.peta.org/blog/cruelty-behind-muslim-ritual-slaughter/>.

⁴⁶⁸ Gary Nicks, "NOW HALAL SCHOOL DINNERS," Daily Star, August 05, 2010, accessed May 11, 2017, <http://www.dailystar.co.uk/news/latest-news/147870/NOW-HALAL-SCHOOL-DINNERS>.

⁴⁶⁹ "Opinion on BSE Risk from Dissemination of Brain Particles in Blood and Carcass following Stunning," EFSA Journal 2, no. 12 (2004): 1-4, doi:10.2903/j.efsa.2004.123.

debated in Parliament.⁴⁷⁰ The topic of food labelling was thus debated in April 2012, when Davies proposed a bill requiring all food to be labelled, so that consumers would be better able to make informed decisions on what to buy.

Muslim and Jewish communities have subsequently supported policies which are seen to promote good practice in animal slaughter, such as the installation of CCTV in slaughterhouses and calls for clearer food labelling. However, they have argued that a wide framework of labelling be adopted, including labels for electrocution, strangling, and other methods used in non-religious stunned slaughter as well. Thus, the aim is to avoid discriminatory treatment or burdens on Muslim and Jewish producers and consumers.

The welfare of animals is in fact a major concern in both the Islamic and Jewish faiths, with the requirements of halal and Kosher slaughter dictating the requirements for humane treatment and respect for the animal, not just in the process of its death, but also in the conditions of its life, including requirements such as providing ample space, adequate nourishment, and avoiding pain, suffering and distress.

The media's preoccupation with halal slaughter has allowed far-right groups to capitalise on anti-Muslim sentiment to further their own anti-immigrant and anti-Muslim agendas. UKIP is a prominent example of this rhetoric. Having called for the banning of non-stunned slaughter in their 2015 manifesto, UKIP became the first party willing to back such a ban. Their stance attempted to draw on the moral aspect of the debate, claiming that religious slaughter is overriding "the UK's

compassionate traditions of animal welfare,"⁴⁷¹ ostensibly appearing to be centring their policies around prioritising the "ethical treatment of animals".

However, the reality behind their proposals was a specific targeting of Muslim communities and the party was repeatedly accused of using divisive language to enflame anti-Muslim sentiment.⁴⁷² This is evident as the agricultural spokesman himself, Stuart Agnew, stated that the policy was not meant to target Jews, but rather it was "aimed at others" implying that the policy was addressing halal meat and Muslims, and the impact on Jews would be "collateral damage".⁴⁷³ He also clarified that this move was made distinctly to win votes ahead of the general election.⁴⁷⁴ The topic of religious slaughter even reached the UKIP leadership elections in August 2016, where one candidate, Bill Etheridge, claimed that he would call for a ban on religious slaughter if he became the party leader, stating that he is "highly concerned" that these practices cause "unnecessary suffering" to animals.⁴⁷⁵

As previously mentioned, a genuine concern for animal welfare should be encouraged and commended, it is in fact central to the practice of religious slaughter. However, UKIP's sudden stand for animal welfare is somewhat surprising and would appear disingenuous given their history of policy positions that run contrary to the welfare of animals. For example, UKIP have committed to bringing back fox hunting in the UK, their MEPs voted against measures to protect elephants and crack down on the illegal ivory trade, and they also voted against an EU ban on importing seal fur, with one MEP, Roget Helmer, claiming that "it's

⁴⁷⁰ "Business of the House," Hansard Online, accessed May 11, 2017, <https://goo.gl/Qvc9L5>.

⁴⁷¹ "Should religious slaughter be banned in the UK?"

⁴⁷² Catherine Bearder, "Ukip's position on halal and kosher meat is about stoking division, not animal welfare," *New Statesman*, February 10, 2015, <http://www.newstatesman.com/politics/2015/02/ukips-position-halal-and-kosher-meat-about-stoking-division-not-animal-welfare>.

⁴⁷³ John Stevens, "Farage accused of driving Jews from Britain after Ukip pledge to ban religious slaughter of animals," *Daily Mail Online*, February 04, 2015,

<http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2938362/Farage-accused-wanting-drive-Jews-Britain-Ukip-pledge-ban-religious-slaughter-animals.html>.

⁴⁷⁴ Christopher Hope, "Ukip bans non-stun slaughtering in abattoirs," *The Telegraph*, February 03, 2015, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/11388345/Ukip-bans-non-stun-slaughtering-in-abattoirs.html>.

⁴⁷⁵ Jonathan Walker, "UKIP leadership candidate to ban kosher and halal slaughter," *Birmingham Mail*, August 03, 2016, <http://www.birminghammail.co.uk/news/midlands-news/ukip-leadership-candidate-wants-ban-11691868>.

mawkish, sentimental and unhelpful to adopt a Bambi attitude to animals".⁴⁷⁶

Therefore, regarding halal slaughter, debates have frequently been characterised by an aggressive (while often superficial) adoption of animal rights concerns combined with the perpetuation of Islamophobic tropes and misinformation, aimed at stigmatising and marginalising British Muslim communities. Such rhetoric leads to both a failure to properly address legitimate and urgent animal welfare concerns and to a furthering of anti-Muslim discourses and agendas.

Representing Muslim women and Islamophobia

Dr Lasse Thomassen

Queen Mary University

A terrorist attack on Westminster Bridge. A woman walks past an injured person on the pavement. She is looking at her mobile and seems to be in a hurry. The woman is wearing a headscarf. Because terrorism is associated with Islam, the woman is seen as a Muslim. The woman on the bridge is now a Muslim woman ignoring a victim of Islamist terrorism.

People commenting on the photo of her on social media do not know that the woman is a Muslim. They take her headscarf as a transparent sign of her Muslim-ness. It is a familiar pattern: the more covered a woman is, the more transparent is her identity to others. The woman becomes yet another Muslim woman who is identified by her hijab, and by that alone. She is reduced to her Muslim-ness. Like other Muslims, she can only speak and act as a Muslim. She becomes bound to, and by, this identity.

The photo of the woman on Westminster Bridge becomes yet another way of talking about Islam and Muslims by talking about a woman in a hijab. This is possible

because, as a group, Muslims are homogenised. We get a homogenous image of Muslims where one can stand in for the rest: if they are all the same, we can simply substitute one for another. What's more, if one is a terrorist, then the rest must be too – or at least they must sympathise with the terrorists. This is also why, when the media need to illustrate a story about anything involving Islam or Muslims, they pull out a picture of women in hijab or a picture of angry young men. These are the images that Islam and Muslims have become reduced to. The story about the woman on Westminster Bridge draws upon, and reproduces, these wider representations of Islam. Islamophobia is nourished by this homogenisation of Muslims ('they are all the same') and this reduction of them to a particular image ('they are all like this').

The cloth of the hijab becomes part of a big cloth that envelops all Muslim women wearing the hijab, creating a homogeneous mass out of them. At the same time, different degrees of covering are taken as reflections of different degrees of autonomy: the more covered you are, the less free you must be. Take, for instance, the case of Shabina Begum. Her school had a shalwar kameeze version of the school uniform, but she wanted to wear a jilbab. The whole case concerned the significance of the sartorial difference between the two forms of the hijab. This had to do with much more than the physical cloth: it precisely had to do with the significance – the meaning – of the shalwar kameeze and the jilbab. In the debate about the case, the jilbab was taken as a sign of extremism, but it also became a sign of Shabina Begum's lack of autonomy: she cannot have chosen to wear the jilbab herself, she must have been under the influence of her brother, and so on and so forth. One version of the hijab (the shalwar kameeze) becomes the version worn by moderate and reasonable girls who can choose themselves; the other

⁴⁷⁶ "Ukip's position on halal and kosher meat is about stoking division, not animal welfare".

version of the hijab becomes what a girl under the influence of darker forces would choose to wear.

The misrepresentation of Islam and Muslims in the media and by government agencies is a common theme, and complaint, in both public and academic debates about Islamophobia. It is particularly important in the context of Muslim women. Their clothing and their bodies have become the primary sites for debates about the place of Islam in society (and not just what we usually refer to as 'Western' societies, but also in the so-called 'Muslim world').

Women's clothing and bodies have become the real and metaphorical sites for discussions of 'the Muslim question'. This makes it all the more important that we ask which and whose representations of Islam dominate not just public debate but also the conversations we have at work, at home and on social media. In those debates and conversations, how can we let Muslim women speak for themselves? In answering that question, we must remember that a woman can cover and uncover but can never completely control how others interpret this. What we say and what we do as individuals draw upon existing structures of meaning. For instance, we could not follow a religion, if our actions were not recognisably 'Muslim', say. And this is precisely why it is so important who gets to define what it means to be a 'Muslim' and the associations people make. It is why it is important that we pay attention to the representations of Islam and Muslims that have become dominant in our society.

Hijab, veiling, and the niqab debate

MEND's working definition of Islamophobia includes "applying ethnocentric approaches to the treatment

of Muslims (judging another culture solely by the values and standards of one's own culture). For example, evaluating Muslim women's choice of dress exclusively through the speaker's expectations and without reference to the personal cultural norms and values of the women in question."

Women's dress is an area that is repeatedly highlighted within media, political, and public discourses as a mechanism for stigmatising Muslim communities as backwards, oppressive, and incompatible with Western societies. However, it is rare that Muslim hijabi or niqabi women are themselves afforded platforms or recognised agency within the debate.

As Todd Green observes, "The stereotypical Muslim woman in the Western media is depicted as a victim of either violence or sexism (or both) at the hands of angry and misogynist Muslim men".⁴⁷⁷ Within these narratives, Muslim women are consistently represented as voiceless, submissive, oppressed, and passive victims and there is a serious lack of representation of Muslim women as creative, successful and powerful leaders. Meanwhile, Muslim women's achievements are overlooked, particularly women who do not fit into the stereotype of the veiled and the victimised.

As such, the following discussion attempts to explore some of the ways in which Islamophobic narratives infiltrate the debates surrounding Muslim women's dress.

Focus on Muslim women's dress

The media, and society in general, are obsessed with the way women look. What women wear frequently overshadows any other achievement or endeavour in a way that is undeniably distinct to the way men's dress is approached. A good example of this is when, in an attempt to expose the sexism directed at his female

⁴⁷⁷ Todd H. Green, *The Fear of Islam: an Introduction to Islamophobia in the West* (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2015), 240-241.

colleagues, the Australian TV anchor Karl Stefanovic wore the same blue suit on his show every day for a year.⁴⁷⁸ While his female co-host received regular unsolicited appraisals on her wardrobe choice from viewers, not a single viewer noticed that the man sitting next to her had been wearing the same cheap suit for months.

In many ways, Muslim women are victims of this particular strain of sexism not only in terms of their adherence to fashion sensibilities, but also through accusations that they are in some way socially deviant and refusing to integrate and adhere to British cultural norms and values. Newspaper articles that talk of “shroud-swishing zombies”⁴⁷⁹ and dressing “like a Dalek”⁴⁸⁰ constitute completely dysphemistic⁴⁸¹ representations with the expressed purpose of condemning Muslim women for their choice of dress, and directly link this choice of dress to a lack of social morality.

Ethnocentric approaches to Muslim women

Many scholars have observed that Muslim women are frequently considered to be victims of their religious and/or cultural heritage without having actually been consulted on the matter.⁴⁸² As has often been the case throughout the history of feminism, usually educated, Western, White men and women have spoken on behalf of their non-Western and non-White counterparts. This paints a generalised and incomplete picture, whilst simultaneously presenting solutions and approaches that do not resonate with the women that they are intended to help.

It is imperative that Muslim women are recognised, not as a monolithic group, but

as a diverse collection of voices, experiences, and values. Moreover, the damaging tendency to examine issues facing Muslim women purely through and ethnocentric lens, and without wider consultation with these women themselves, is uncomfortably reminiscent of the age old imperialist paradigm of “White men saving Brown women from Brown men”.

This ethnocentric lens was recently applied when Ofsted announced proposed plans to question Muslim girls who wear the hijab in schools. In November 2017, Amanda Spielman, Ofsted’s Chief Inspector of Education, raised concerns surrounding young Muslim girls being “sexualised” by wearing the hijab at a young age. For many Muslims, this accusation is confusing, as sexualisation is directionally oppositional to the purpose of the hijab. It is possible that the assumption of the hijab sexualising young girls actually stems from a much more convoluted set of misunderstandings.

In reality, the issue is one of the comparative tastes and normative behaviours of differing cultural or religious traditions. In the United Kingdom today, the dominant cultural norms of women’s dress dictate that the head remains uncovered. There is no value judgement to be made in this respect – it is simply a cultural norm and tradition; no better or worse than any other. However, this cultural norm is in contrast to the norms of many British Muslims – regardless of whether these norms derive from cultural, religious or ethnic understandings.

Those that accuse the hijab of “sexualising” a girl or a woman have taken the dominant

⁴⁷⁸ See Michael Lallo, “Karl Stefanovic’s sexism experiment: Today presenter wears same suit for a year,” *The Sydney Morning Herald*, November 14, 2014, <http://www.smh.com.au/entertainment/tv-and-radio/karl-stefanovics-sexism-experiment-today-presenter-wears-same-suit-for-a-year-20141115-11ncdz.html> and Bim Adewunmi, “Male TV presenter wears same suit for a year – does anyone notice?,” *The Guardian*, November 17, 2014, <https://www.theguardian.com/lifeandstyle/womens-blog/2014/nov/17/male-tv-presenter-same-suit-year-female-colleagues-judged>.

⁴⁷⁹ *The Sun*, 24th June 2009. See Paul Baker, Tony McNery, and Costas Gabrielatos, *Discourse analysis and media attitudes: the representation of Islam in the British press* (Cambridge: University press, 2013), 216.

⁴⁸⁰ *The Sun*, 20th June 2008. See Paul Baker, Tony McNery, and Costas Gabrielatos, *Discourse analysis and media attitudes: the representation of Islam in the British press* (Cambridge: University press, 2013), 215.

⁴⁸¹ Intentionally employing derogatory or offensive terminologies and phraseologies over terms that are more innocuous and neutral.

⁴⁸² See Moosavi, “Orientalism at home.”

norms of Western dress as the standard benchmark of normality. From this perspective, the hijab is something additional which is thus in need of explanation. The conclusion of some in searching for this explanation is that of a “backwards culture” which oppresses women. This explanation overlooks the actual lived experience of millions of women that choose to wear the hijab globally.

Amanda Spielman’s concerns surrounding young girls supporting religious dress is not a new topic of public discussion. Indeed, debates have been raging for several years across Europe surrounding the idea that veiling practices hinder educational development or that it is a symbol of the oppression that young girls face at the hands of their parents and male relatives.⁴⁸³

However, as Marjane Satrapi has argued, “I passionately believe that the young women who have been expelled from school for wearing a veil should have the freedom to choose. It is surely a basic human right that someone can choose what she wears without interference from the state. Critics argue that it is not the girls themselves who want to wear the veil, rather they are forced to do so by their parents. But if that is the case, if these are the kind of parents who will force their daughters to wear a veil, they are probably the kind of parents who will be happy to withdraw them from school and then to marry them off to a distant cousin at 15 with whom they will bear five children. If we want to give these girls any chance of emancipation, any chance that one day they will decide for themselves that they don't want to wear the veil, it will come from education. It will certainly not come from being withdrawn by their families.”⁴⁸⁴

MEND’s definition of Islamophobia includes measures that seek to or result in restricting or excluding Muslims from enjoying and accessing fundamental freedoms in public life. Restricting a Muslim women’s right to choose what to wear will do nothing to encourage participation in the economic, social, political, and public spheres. In reality, and as our definition of Islamophobia suggests, the consequence will be to exclude them and marginalise them further.

Furthermore, while British Muslim women’s lives are framed within their ethno-cultural and religious circumstances, the challenges they face cannot and should not be completely dislocated from structural disadvantages that all British women face more generally. Moreover, political and media discourses that serve only to perpetuate stereotypes of Muslim women can only ever be counterproductive for all women by misrepresenting the nature - or worse, completely distracting from - the issues that they actually face. Therefore, while cultural practices should be examined, women’s issues do not exist in a vacuum and need to be confronted with appropriate honesty and nuance.

It is, therefore, essential that ethnocentric limitations are removed and that Muslim women are fully consulted, heard, and respected in discussions surrounding issues that innately affect them.

The Façade of Women’s Liberation

The history of Western (and often male) politicians supposed support of women’s advancement and liberation is largely one of general hypocrisy and insincerity. The Egyptian American feminist, Leila Ahmed, points to Evelyn Baring, the Earl of Cromer, who served as Britain’s first consul general of Egypt between 1883 and 1907. Cromer is an emblematic proponent

⁴⁸³ Jess Staufenberg, “Muslim Teenager Forbidden from Wearing Face Niqab by German Court,” *The Independent*, August 23, 2016, <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/germany-muslim-student-banned-niqab-face-veil-school-islam-a7204671.html>.

⁴⁸⁴ Marjane Satrapi, “Veiled threat,” *The Guardian*, December 12, 2003, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2003/dec/12/gender.uk>.

of the "White man's burden" mentality – the need for White men to save Brown women from Brown men that has been pushed in every imperialist and colonialist project even to this day.⁴⁸⁵ Cromer believed Islam degraded women and that it was essential that Egyptians "be persuaded or forced" into abandoning the veil, which he described as a "fatal obstacle" to the Egyptians' "mental and moral development".

However, back in Britain, as Ahmed observes, "this champion of the unveiling of Egyptian women" was the "founding member and some-time president of the Men's League for Opposing Woman Suffrage". She therefore concludes that "[f]eminism on the home front and feminism directed against white men was to be resisted and suppressed; but taken abroad and directed against the cultures of colonised peoples, it could be promoted in ways that admirably served and furthered the project of the dominance of the white man."

In following this tradition, politicians advocating a niqab ban, for example, frequently use it as a vehicle for garnering political support and legitimacy through the façade of supporting women's rights. If this were the case in reality, equal concern would be shown for major social issues such as rape, gendered violence, employment discrimination, harassment, sexual objectification and a whole host of other issues that obstruct women's equality on a far greater scale across Europe than does the choice of a tiny minority of Muslim women to cover their faces with a niqab.

Likewise, if genuine concern was given to oppression through women's dress, there would be equal prominence given to company policies and dress codes that demand women to wear makeup and high

heels. This oppression is also seen in the damage caused by media representation and advertising that serves to objectify women's bodies.

As Satrapi notes, "I have been incredibly surprised by the reaction of French feminists, who have publicly campaigned for the banning of 'this visible symbol of the submission of women'. The western woman is so entranced by the idea that her emancipation comes from the miniskirt that she is convinced that if you have something on your head you are nothing. The women who are forced to wear the veil, and the women who are portrayed naked to sell everything from car tyres to orange juice, are both facing a form of oppression."⁴⁸⁶

As the Moroccan-American academic Laila Lalami has noted, "[t]he societies that already have coercive laws - Iran and Saudi Arabia, for example, which force women to wear headscarves, Turkey and Tunisia, which forbid women to wear face veils - are not known for their respect of human rights."⁴⁸⁷ Therefore, in European countries which pride themselves on tolerance, freedom and respect for human rights, it seems paradoxical that there is so much impetus afforded to restricting Muslim Women's dress.

According to François Hollande, the former head of the French Socialist Party, "the tactic is clear. It's about getting back a hold of a part of the electorate which has in part retreated into abstention or voting for the far right."⁴⁸⁸ Ultimately, it is about scoring political points.

Indeed, throughout Europe, support for a niqab ban cuts across the left-right divide. While it is seen on the right as a threat to "European" culture and values and a symbol of a "foreign, belligerent faith community, the 'other'", it is seen on the

⁴⁸⁵ One of the advertised reasons for Western intervention in both Iraq and Afghanistan was the need to liberate Iraqi and Afghani women.

⁴⁸⁶ "Veiled threat."

⁴⁸⁷ Mehdi Hasan, "Thinly Veiled Threat: Mehdi Hasan on the Niqab," *New Statesman*, May 28, 2010, <http://www.newstatesman.com/religion/2010/05/face-veil-muslim-women-ban>.

⁴⁸⁸ Ibid.

left as a form of oppression that subjugates women and violates their rights.

However, this seems to ignore the fact that not every Muslim woman is forced, under threat of violence, to wear the veil by her male relatives. In reality, many wear the niqab or burqa as a matter of personal choice.

As Mehdi Hasan has observed "[t]he irony of using the threat of prison to freewomen from the so-called prison of the burqa is not lost on Muslim commentators, either." This irony is noted by British Muslim writer and activist Myriam François-Cerrah; "[t]he Belgians have a funny idea of liberation... criminalising women in order to free them." She also points out that the individuals and organisations who support the ban on face veils as a matter of women's liberation largely have seriously troubling attitudes to women's rights: "[b]ut what else do we expect from the likes of Sarkozy in France or Silvio Berlusconi in Italy? Their co-opting of feminist rhetoric and the language of human rights cannot hide their abysmal form on gender issues - from Sarkozy's ex-wife Cécilia branding him a "stingy philanderer" to Berlusconi's string of alleged affairs with very young women. In the UK, Nick Griffin and Malcolm Pearson, leaders of the BNP and UKIP respectively - the only political parties advocating an outright ban on the veil in this country - have similarly questionable attitudes to the advancement of women's rights."⁴⁸⁹

Islamophobic sentiments within nationalist discourse

A major accusation levied against veiling is that it is a visible rejection of British values, and that the niqab specifically is an alleged barrier to integration. In 2006, the Member of Parliament for Blackburn in Lancashire,

Jack Straw, wrote in his local paper about a Muslim woman wearing a niqab. The woman in question had come to Mr. Straw's office accompanied by her husband to discuss a problem. Despite being impressed with her "entirely English accent" and the couple's completely UK based education, Jack Straw had serious reservations about her choice of dress.⁴⁹⁰ In the article he described the veil as a "visible statement of separation and of difference."⁴⁹¹ This is significant as one could argue the same thing about Scottish kilts, Jewish kippahs, Japanese kimonos, Sikh turbans, and Indian saris which are worn as much as (if not more than) niqabs are worn in Britain.⁴⁹²

There are several key issues with this strain of integration discourse. As discussed earlier in this chapter, the first is a clear misunderstanding of what the term "integration" actually means. In reality, while many proponents of restricting Muslim women's dress (most often seen in calls for a niqab ban) refer to "integration", they are actually describing assimilation. As Professor Tariq Modood⁴⁹³ has observed, assimilation involves the 'newcomers' becoming as much like their hosts as possible while not disturbing the host society, with the least change in the attitudes of the latter.⁴⁹⁴

This is in direct contrast to integration which relies upon mutual understanding and accommodations:

"Integration is a two-way process: it requires adaptation on the part of the newcomer but also by the host society. Successful integration can only take place if the host society provides access to jobs and services, and acceptance of the immigrants in social interaction. Above all, integration in a democracy presupposes

⁴⁸⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁹⁰ Nahid Afrose Kabir, *Young British Muslims: identity, culture, politics and the media* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2010), 144.

⁴⁹¹ "UK | UK Politics | In quotes: Jack Straw on the veil," BBC News, October 06, 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/5413470.stm.

⁴⁹² L. Moosavi, "Orientalism at home: Islamophobia in the representations of Islam and Muslims by the New Labour Government," *Ethnicities* 15, no. 5 (2014): 655.

⁴⁹³ Whose own contribution to this report can be found in the earlier chapter on Islamophobia, Racism, Xenophobia, anti-Semitism and Othering.

⁴⁹⁴ Tariq Modood, "Remaking Multiculturalism after 7/7," OpenDemocracy, September 29, 2005, https://www.opendemocracy.net/conflict-terrorism/multiculturalism_2879.jsp.

acquisition of legal and political rights by the new members of society, so that they can become equal partners. Indeed, it is possible to argue that, in a multicultural society, integration may be understood as a process through which the whole population acquires civil, social, political, human and cultural rights, which creates the conditions for greater equality. In this approach, integration can also mean that minority groups should be supported in maintaining their cultural and social identities, since the right to cultural choices is intrinsic to democracy.”⁴⁹⁵

In Moosavi’s study on Labour Cabinet Ministers’ speeches between 2001 and 2007, he observed that politicians frequently argued for increasing patriotism by emphasising “British values”. However, in so doing, they constructed ideas of Britishness as something directly opposed to what it means to be Muslim.⁴⁹⁶ Consider the following two quotes from the then Prime Minister, Tony Blair, and cabinet minister Ruth Kelly:

“[W]e expect all our citizens to conform to [“our common values”]... not optional for British citizens. They are what British is about. Being British carries rights. It also carries duties. And those duties take clear precedence over any cultural or religious practice.” (Blair, 2006)

“making [British values] resonate with some people, including a small group of younger Muslims, is a genuine challenge.” (Kelly, 2007)⁴⁹⁷

Kelly and Blair were not alone in these kinds of statements, and in making such statements advertise to wider society that Muslims are making a conscious decision to reject British values. Ultimately, it suggests that Muslims need to be “taught morality, a trope of the white man’s burden, a trope which singles Muslims out

as inferior and in need of being civilised.”⁴⁹⁸ Moreover, it implies that Muslims are unwilling to engage in dialogue.

Ultimately, this discussion of “British values” and Muslims’ supposed rejection of these values is symptomatic of underlying fears surrounding national identity and Muslims as an “invading threat” to this identity.

Discourses surrounding gender are central to self-definition of social groups. Throughout history, men have been equated to rationality and social agency, while women have been equated to familial belonging and cultural authenticity. At its most basic level, a woman’s body is the source of future citizens, and as the mothers of the nation, it is women that are considered the nurturers of that identity. Therefore, it is women’s bodies that are representative of what these future citizens should become. Consequently, it is upon the bodies of women that displays of national identity are played out and negotiated.

Furthermore, Muslim women’s bodies have become the territory over which the imagined “clash of civilisations” has frequently been fought. If we look at the history of Western images of Muslim women, colonialist logic traditionally centred upon veiling and the seclusion of women as the emblem of women’s oppression and cultural backwardness. As such, it was the colonial regime’s duty to educate and liberate women. This stigma against veiling leads to the public perception of veiling as an inferior practice that has no place in the construction of a modern society. Needless to say, such a perception stems from the deep vacuum of understanding within Western discourse surrounding veiling and the meaning that

⁴⁹⁵ *Integration: Mapping the Field*.

⁴⁹⁶ Moosavi, “Orientalism at home: Islamophobia in the representations of Islam and Muslims by the New Labour Government,” *Ethnicities* 15, no. 5 (2014): 659.

⁴⁹⁷ Quoted in Moosavi, “Orientalism at home,” 660.

⁴⁹⁸ Moosavi, “Orientalism at home,” 660.

it holds for the women whom choose to practice it.

These attitudes towards the “backwardness” of veiling are emphasised in media discourses. In 2006, the News of the World attested that “95% of Britain’s Muslims do not wear the veil. They are normal people who want to integrate.”⁴⁹⁹ Similarly, in 2007, the Times stated that “many Indian women still wear headscarves and veils.”⁵⁰⁰ Firstly, the use of the word “normal” implies that women who do choose to veil are in some way deviant. Secondly, the use of the term “still” positions veiling as something irrational, inferior and backward that should be “grown out of” and abandoned. Consequently, hijab, niqab, burqa or any other kind of veil is frequently portrayed within public, political, and media discourses as a signifier of a lack of social progress.

Thus, women themselves have become the physical embodiment of both a society’s civilizational progression and its adherence to cultural identity. It is in this way that veiling has become seen as a physical representation of deviation from the British national identity. Women are the culturally authentic and, in Britain, (in theory) women are deemed to be empowered, progressive and bestowed with sexual liberation and freedom. This is in stark contrast to the Islamophobic stereotypes that are prevalent in the media surrounding veiled, oppressed, backward and victimised Muslim women.

Veiling as extremism and a security risk

The burqa and niqab specifically, but hijabs more generally, are often viewed as symbols of extremism. Across the West, politicians and public figures have repeatedly pointed to the potential security threats posed by the practice of face veiling. In 2014, the Australian Reverend

Fred Nile argued that criminals and terrorists can use face coverings such as the burqa and niqab to hide their identities.⁵⁰¹ At the same time, Australian Government Senator Cory Bernardi linked recent raids on suspected terrorists to face veils, claiming that burqa wearers had been found in several of the houses raided.⁵⁰² Many UK politicians and public figures, such as Nigel Farage, have echoed these security concerns and argued that face veils obstruct counter-terrorism efforts.

Indeed, referring once again to Ofsted’s concerns surrounding the hijab in schools, according to The Guardian, Ms Spielman referenced “fundamentalist groups influencing school policy” in her proposal to question Muslim girls in hijab. The consequence of directly linking the hijab to fundamentalism is to imply that those who chose to wear the hijab must do so out of extremist tendencies. For many Muslim women who choose to wear the hijab, it is simply part of a cultural or religious norm of dress and, therefore, it has no more correlation with extremism than a crucifix, skull cap or turban. The danger of influential public figures making such connections is to malign practicing Muslims and marginalise them within public life.

As discussed in a previous chapter regarding Securitising Muslim Identities: Security and Counter-Terror, this connection between Muslim women’s dress and extremism is another example of the ways in which Muslim identities have become securitised to such a level that even religious clothing is deemed to be a heightened risk to security.

This heightened level of securitisation and concern must be examined thoroughly so that counter-terror measures may be expounded in a proportional manner. For example, a blanket ban on the niqab/burka

⁴⁹⁹ The News of the World 22nd October 2006

⁵⁰⁰ The Times 20th June 2007

⁵⁰¹ Renae Barker, “Banning the Burqa Is Not the Answer to Fears about Public Safety,” The Conversation, September 22, 2014, <http://theconversation.com/banning-the-burqa-is-not-the-answer-to-fears-about-public-safety-31628>.

⁵⁰² Ibid.

on the grounds of security (as some have suggested) is a disproportionate response to the potential for a terrorist attack to be committed using a niqab or burqa to obscure the attacker's identity. In practice, police already possess the power to request a person remove their face covering in front of a female officer for the purposes of checking their identity. This is a far more proportionate and sensible approach. Furthermore, as the lecturer of law, Renae Barker, argues, "[f]ace veils can, in certain circumstances, impede identification and pose a security risk. However, there is no security threat from women wearing the burqa while having coffee at their favourite café."⁵⁰³

Furthermore, the security risk from women generally is incredibly low. Indeed, in the UK, women make up only around five per cent of the prison population, of which 81 per cent are serving a sentence for a non-violent crime.⁵⁰⁴ Furthermore, even considering the tiny number of terrorist incidents in the UK, these too, are overwhelmingly carried out by men.

In response to UKIP's announcement of the inclusion of a niqab ban in their proposed "Integration Agenda", Kirsty Strickland of the Independent made an important point in her article "Paul Nuttall's burqa ban seems to forget that the public are more at risk from white men than Muslim women". She argues that men in general (regardless of ethnicity or religion) are the perpetrators of violent crime in far greater numbers than similar crimes committed by women. Yet, as a group, men are not characterised as a risk to public safety nor placed under restrictions.

She notes that "[i]f you pick up a newspaper today you will see examples of white men harming women, children, minority ethnic groups and each other. It is

unlikely that this week you will read any reports of a UK terrorist incident. Even less likely that a Muslim woman in a veil would be the culprit."⁵⁰⁵ As such, the argument that restricting the freedoms of Muslim women will mitigate security risks completely ignores the reality of violent crimes.

Furthermore, while the niqab may receive a lot of attention due to its visibility, the numbers of women who actually choose to wear them remains incredibly low. According to the co-director of the Belgian Institute for Equal Opportunities, Edouard Delruelle, only around 215 women "at most" in Belgium wore the veil before the ban. Others estimated the number to be as low as 30, in a Muslim population of just over 600,000 and a total Belgian population of 10.8 million. Consequently, the majority of Belgians would never have met a niqabi woman. Likewise, the French security services estimated that 2,000 of approximately two million adult Muslim women in France - 0.1 per cent - wore the full-face veil. In discussions surrounding Belgium's banning of the face veil in 2011, Green MP, Fouad Lahssaini, described passing a ban on the face veil as "taking out a bazooka to kill a fly".⁵⁰⁶

Ultimately, these debates merely serve to highlight the infiltration of processes of securitisation into the lives of innocent Muslim women. These processes of securitisation, as previously discussed, thereby result in the stigmatisation, demonization, and marginalisation of Muslim communities.

Controversy and Muslim women's clothing practices

Dr Azeezat Johnson
Queen Mary University

⁵⁰³ Ibid.

⁵⁰⁴ Kirsty Strickland, "Paul Nuttall's Burqa Ban Seems to Forget That the Public Are More at Risk from Men than Muslim Women," The Independent, April 24, 2017, <https://www.independent.co.uk/voices/paul-nuttall-ukip-manifesto-burqa-ban-male-violence-muslim-women-a7698771.html>.

⁵⁰⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁰⁶ "Thinly Veiled Threat: Mehdi Hasan on the Niqab."

We all wear clothes that we think reflect how we want to present ourselves (or how we think we should present ourselves) as we learn to negotiate different people, schools, homes, workplaces, etc. Yet Muslim women's clothing practices are often the source of much public (and academic) debate and controversy: after all, the Casey Review posited a connection between the "adherence to Muslim dress" and a "pull[ing] further away from mainstream society".⁵⁰⁷ Such connections work to stereotype Muslim women and fix them into specific garments as representative of "the Muslim woman", instead of thinking about the diversity of clothing practices that different Muslim women engage with across different spaces. More importantly, by associating "Muslim dress" with a lack of integration, Muslim women are represented as a potentially transgressive and threatening presence within public spaces.

The rhetoric surrounding Muslim women is not particularly new, but reflects a long colonial history of positioning these clothing practices as a source of oppression that Muslim women had to be "liberated" from by European colonisers.^{508 509} Rather than focusing on discrimination against Muslim women within the employment, housing and education sectors, "Muslim dress" appear to overshadow the woman that is wearing it. Muslim women's own words or experiences are silenced and ignored: rather, "Muslim dress" is solely understood through the ways in which other (non-Muslim) people might view or interact with their clothing practices.

The focus around whether Muslim women "choose" to wear specific clothing is ultimately used to avoid addressing the ways in which Muslim women's bodies are

objectified within Islamophobic rhetoric. A number of feminist scholars have already pointed to the social conditioning that informs all of our clothing practices, whether Muslim or not:^{510 511} after all, 'nobody is born knowing how to walk in high heels'.⁵¹² This language of "choice" is used to position Muslim women's clothing practices as deviant from the norm of Western liberal societies.

By positioning these specific garments as a symbol of Muslim women's lack of integration, Muslim women are forced into a defence of their clothing practices as either empowering and feminist (i.e. white liberal feminist), or oppressive and barbaric (i.e. Muslim). Jasbir Puar highlights how this logic of gender exceptionalism works to position the experiences and behaviours of Muslim women as subordinate to that of the white, non-Muslim Western woman:

Gender exceptionalism works as a missionary discourse to rescue Muslim women from their oppressive male counterparts. It also works to suggest that, in contrast to women in the [West], Muslim women are, at the end of the day, unsavable. More insidiously, these discourses of exceptionalism allude to the unsalvageable nature of Muslim women even by their own feminists, positioning the [Western] feminist as the feminist subject par excellence.⁵¹³

When Muslim women continue to wear the headscarf or burqa and refuse the gift of liberty presented through this white saviour narrative, she then becomes a threat, a representation of one's unwillingness to conform to these supposedly tolerant Western societies. And this double role as both victim and threat is what feeds the objectification of

⁵⁰⁷ *The Casey Review: a review into opportunity and integration*, p123.

⁵⁰⁸ Malek Alloula, *The Colonial Harem* (Minneapolis: Univ. of Minnesota Press, 2008).

⁵⁰⁹ Prasenjit Duara, *Decolonization: Perspectives from Now and Then* (London: Routledge, 2008).

⁵¹⁰ Rose Weitz and Samantha Kwan, *The Politics of Womens Bodies: Sexuality, Appearance, and Behavior* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014).

⁵¹¹ Beverley Skeggs, *Formations of Class and Gender: Becoming Respectable* (London: SAGE, 2012).

⁵¹² Richard Phillips, *Muslim Spaces of Hope: Geographies of Possibility in Britain and the West* (London: Zed Books, 2009), p73.

⁵¹³ Jasbir K. Puar, *Terrorist Assemblages: Homonationalism in Queer times* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2008).

Muslim women within racist discourse. It is of little surprise that one of the activities of the now infamous “Punish a Muslim Day” included “pulling the headscarf off a Muslim ‘woman’”. This illustrates the way visibly Muslim women have become central objects of Islamophobic language and action.

Part IV: Approaches to Tackling Islamophobia

MEND's Model To Tackling Islamophobia	163
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MEND's Model to Tackling Islamophobia

What processes are allowing Islamophobia to continue?

Media negativity

The media is a key driving force behind how minority groups, including Muslims, are received and understood within public perception. However, mainstream media in the UK is falling desperately short of its ethical responsibilities not to incite moral panic against vulnerable and innocent communities.

In fact, newspapers such as The Sun and The Daily Mail have repeatedly demonstrated discriminatory, misrepresentative, distorted, exaggerated and inaccurate reporting of Muslims. Indeed, the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) recently highlighted discriminatory reporting in both The Daily Mail and The Sun, claiming that they “are responsible for most of the offensive, discriminatory and provocative terminology”. The commission further concluded that “hate speech in some traditional media continues to be a serious problem”.⁵¹⁴

Considering the media promotion of stereotypical, stylised and distorted representations of Muslims, it cannot be surprising that sections of the public would hold negative and prejudicial understandings of British Muslim communities.

It is thus imperative that proper regulation of newspapers is enforced, in order to ensure that newspapers are held accountable for inaccurate, discriminatory and distortive reporting on vulnerable minorities.

Weakness of incitement to hatred legislation

The Racial and Religious Hate Crime Act, 2006, contains a disparity between the protections afforded on grounds of race vs the protections afforded to religious groups. In terms of racial hatred, a person is protected against abusive, insulting, or threatening words or behaviour. However, the protections afforded on the basis of religion only extends to threatening words or behaviour. This specifically excludes the protection from abusive or insulting words or behaviour that is included under racial hatred.

Furthermore, within the protections against religious hatred, there is an added condition that intent must be proven. In other words, it must be proven that the perpetrators intention was to stir up religious hatred. This differs from incitement to racial hatred, wherein the *likelihood* that the offence would have stirred up racial hatred is enough to prosecute; there is no need to prove that the perpetrator *intended* to stir up racial hatred.

The primary result of this disparity in legislation, is that Muslim communities are often not protected against comparable abuse against which groups such as Jews and Sikhs are protected on the grounds of race.

Secondly, the requirement of intent makes the burden of proof within this legislation almost unachievably heavy. Indeed, the intention of the perpetrator is virtually impossible to ever prove. The consequence is that, since the legislation was enacted in 2006, only a small handful of successful prosecutions have occurred under incitement to religious hatred legislation.

Social media legislation

As Nazir Afzal stated in his article earlier in this report when discussing protections

⁵¹⁴ “ECRI Report On The United Kingdom”, Council of Europe, October 4, 2016, https://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/ecri/country-by-country/united_kingdom/gbr-cbc-v-2016-038-eng.pdf

from hatred, “many haters don’t care about the line anymore and rely upon perceived anonymity, bots, and limited police resources to just keep generating hate.” Anonymity combined with a lack of protection from online abuse has resulted in an almost toxic atmosphere of anti-Muslim racism across a variety of social media platforms.

Indeed, between March 2016 and March 2017, almost 144,000 Tweets were sent from the UK that are considered to be derogatory and anti-Islamic – this amounts to roughly 400 a day.⁵¹⁵ Meanwhile, Facebook and Twitter accounts of leading far-right and anti-Muslim groups can attract several thousands of followers.

As such, there is a clear need for changes to be made in order to regulate hate speech online whilst also protecting freedom of speech within a legal framework. As has often been argued, what is illegal offline should be illegal online as well.

Lack of Muslim political engagement

British Muslims remain woefully underrepresented within the political sphere. Considering the size of the British Muslim population relative to the general population, one would expect to find approximately 31 Muslim MPs in Parliament. In reality, the figure is 15.⁵¹⁶ Likewise, within the senior Civil Service, there is also a general underrepresentation of BAME communities, including Muslims. Encouraging British Muslim engagement in political and media institutions is MEND’s *raison d’être* and we firmly believe that empowerment within politics is essential to ensure equality for all.

⁵¹⁵ Miller and Smith, Anti-Islamic Content on Twitter – Demos.

⁵¹⁶ “Record number of Muslim MPs elected”, *Muslim News*, accessed 04.06.2018, <http://muslimnews.co.uk/newspaper/home-news/record-number-muslim-mps-elected/>

⁵¹⁷ “The Missing Muslims: Unlocking British Muslim Potential for the Benefit of All.”

Furthermore, the Government’s policy of disengagement is hugely damaging to its relationship with Muslim communities. It can only fix this currently “broken relationship” through honest and open engagement with a representative spectrum of British Muslims.⁵¹⁷

Lack of Muslim engagement within media and broadcasting

The underrepresentation of Muslims in politics is mirrored in mainstream media and broadcasting outlets. Media and broadcasting institutions have often been criticised for their embedded lack of representation in terms of ethnicity, religion, sexuality, and often gender as well. Within these institutions, there are still very few Muslim journalists, editors, producers and directors, meanwhile there is a crucial dearth of normalised and representative images of British Muslims and minorities more generally. Appropriate representation is essential for equality and creating a shared national identity. Therefore, it is imperative that British Muslim communities are actively engaged in the fields of politics and media in order to ensure that Muslims have the platforms necessary to present the reality behind their lived experiences.

Barriers to Muslim economic engagement

Muslims experience the highest levels of disadvantage in the labour market⁵¹⁸ and, according to the National Equality Panel, also suffer the greatest “ethnic penalty”.⁵¹⁹ This ethnic penalty is especially felt by Muslim women, who often suffer multi-level discrimination that is compounded by religion, gender, skin colour, and ethnicity.⁵²⁰ Studies have also shown that CVs submitted under a non-Muslim name are three times more likely to be offered an interview than those with a Muslim name

⁵¹⁸ “Employment opportunities for Muslims in the UK”, report, House of Commons Women and Equalities Committee, August 11, 2016, 6, <https://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201617/cmselect/cmwomeq/89/89.pdf>.

⁵¹⁹ *An anatomy of economic inequality in the UK*.

⁵²⁰ “Women Are the First to Pay the Price of Islamophobia in Europe,” European Network Against Racism, May 26, 2016, <http://www.enar-eu.org/Women-are-the-first-to-pay-the-price-of-Islamophobia-in-Europe>.

attached.⁵²¹ Meanwhile, Muslims are heavily concentrated in unskilled and semi-skilled professions with limited career progression and are frequently victims of frustrated ambitions as they remain under-represented in the higher positions within their professions.⁵²²

At the same time, Muslim communities are characterised by a younger age demographic than any other social group. With 48% of British Muslims aged 24 or under⁵²³ this is a dynamic and innovative population whose potential should be encouraged. Considering the obvious frustrations hindering Muslims' success in the labour market and the huge potential for businesses to benefit from young Muslim talent, it is essential that barriers of discrimination are challenged through governmental and industry initiatives.

Wider community engagement

As discussed in the previous chapter on Political and Public Exclusion, debates on integration frequently and incorrectly portray demands for Muslims to assimilate as a lack of integration. Choosing to maintain ethno-cultural and religious identities, for example by wearing religious dress, is not an indication of a lack of integration or "Britishness".

Furthermore, integration is a two-way process which also requires interaction from the dominant group. With the overwhelming negativity stemming from popular mainstream media representations, it cannot be surprising that large sections of the non-Muslim community may hold distorted impressions of their Muslim neighbours. Inter-community engagement is necessary to overcome these barriers to interaction and community cohesion. Meanwhile, there needs to be greater emphasis on promoting our nation's shared history and

the role of minority communities in building this country.

Flawed counter-terror strategies

Prof. Tendayi Achiume is the third UN special rapporteur to criticise the PREVENT strategy and its damaging and discriminatory impact on British Muslims. While security is a real and necessary concern, strategies must be evidence-based and developed through cooperation and engagement with all stakeholders. Furthermore, security strategies must be carefully balanced with the rights, civil liberties, and values upon which Britain is founded.

The model to tackle Islamophobia

To solve a society-wide problem, a combination of legislative change, Government and industry initiatives, Muslim community empowerment, and wider community engagement is required. As such, MEND humbly proposes the following initiatives and policy changes to tackle the causes, driving forces, and impacts of Islamophobia,

Legislative changes

Press regulation: With the recent Government decision to cancel Leveson Part II, the current future of press regulation remains uncertain. However, it is imperative that the press is held accountable in order to protect minorities from the damaging impacts of sensationalist, distorted, and misrepresentative narratives. Therefore, we call on policy makers to ensure a full implementation of the Leveson system, including aspects such as the enforcement of an independent press regulator and ensuring the commencement of the second part of the Leveson inquiry. Furthermore, Leveson II should place explicit emphasis on including an investigation of

⁵²¹ "Is it easier to get a job if you're Adam or Mohamed?"

⁵²² "Muslims in employment: prejudice and discrimination in wider society examined - News from Parliament," UK Parliament, April 12, 2016, [http://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/commons-](http://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/commons-select/women-and-equalities-committee/news-parliament-2015/employment-opportunities-for-muslims-evidence-15-16/)

[select/women-and-equalities-committee/news-parliament-2015/employment-opportunities-for-muslims-evidence-15-16/](http://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/commons-select/women-and-equalities-committee/news-parliament-2015/employment-opportunities-for-muslims-evidence-15-16/).

⁵²³ "British Muslims in Numbers,"

Islamophobia in the press as a mandatory requirement.

Counter-Terror legislation: In light of the PREVENT strategy's lack of empirical grounding and the disproportionate impact of Schedule 7 on Muslims, it is imperative that the Government commits to an independent review of PREVENT and all counter-terrorism legislation enacted since 2000 with a view to curbing the encroachment of counter-terrorism policies on civil liberties. Strategies must be developed that work to foster social cohesion and community resilience to all forms of violence and criminality through programmes in which all communities are active stakeholders.

Incitement to Religious Hatred legislation: Considering the disparities between the protections afforded for racial and religious hatred, it is essential to review the Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2006 with a view to strengthening legal protection afforded to religion and equalise it with those granted to race.

Primary legislation to deal with social media offences and online hate speech: In order to deal with the large swathes of hate filled rhetoric that thrives online, the Government should consider primary legislation to deal with social media offences and work with social media companies to protect free speech while developing an efficient strategy to tackle online hate speech online.

Government and industry initiatives

Racial and religious equality: In addition to reviewing legislation and in the context of current Brexit negotiations, attention needs to be given to supporting the principles of the EU Equal Treatment Directive to advance protection against discrimination on the grounds of religion to education, healthcare, housing, access to goods and services and social protection, within UK law post-Brexit.

Employment: The barriers to Muslim economic empowerment is an area that

needs to be tackled by both governmental and industry initiatives designed to address religious, racial and gendered discrimination in the workplace through targeted interventions at all stages of recruitment, retention and promotion, including through the use of name-blind applications. Indeed, these already exist in parts of the public sector, for example, in the NHS.

Particular attention needs to be given to Muslim women's experiences of the triple ethnic penalty and improving their access to employment. Furthermore, there needs to be greater focus within the civil service and within industry to improve ethnic diversity in all sectors through schemes designed to encourage BAME recruitment, mentoring and promotion. Considering the disproportional representation of Muslims within the higher echelons of their professions, one area for potential development is schemes designed to promote and facilitate careers progression and advice services.

As well as the special attention that needs to be given to the barriers facing Muslim women, the young age demographics of Muslim communities singles out young people as also needing increased support in achieving their career aspirations. Therefore, programs are needed that aim to improve young people's access to the labour market, for example, through funding apprenticeships, internships and alternative routes into employment.

Finally, employers need to be supported in developing widely accessible inclusion strategies within the workplace, such as recognising and accommodating religious festivals and religious observance within the workplace.

Media and broadcasting: The overwhelming negativity of mainstream media representations of Muslims is an area in need of immediate attention. This can only be countered by promoting positive (and perhaps more importantly) normalised images of Muslims within

media and broadcasting. Considering this need and the necessity of encouraging more sensitivity when it comes to stories and narratives affecting British Muslims, it is essential that support is given to educative and industry initiatives designed to attract Muslim and BAME individuals into the spheres of journalism and broadcasting.

Public exclusion: It is the responsibility of political figures to educate themselves and understand the meanings behind and inherent requirements of terminologies such as “integration”. In understanding the requirements of integration, it is imperative that public figures show greater maturity and responsibility when discussing integration debates and take care not to cause hysteria for the sake of political popularity and agendas. Meanwhile, especially considering the unclear status of Human Rights commitments within Brexit negotiations, we must ensure that the tenants of the European Convention on Human Rights and the Human Rights Act are preserved within UK law post-Brexit.

Crime and policing: The relationship between Muslim communities and their local police and their experiences of the Criminal Justice System is key to the way in which British Muslims relate to and feel valued by the state. Considering the inequalities and issues discussed in the earlier chapter on Crime, Policing and the Criminal Justice System, changes need to be made to counter the impacts these inequalities have on Muslim communities. Areas in need of Government support include:

- Tackling the high number of Muslim prisoners through schemes to facilitate rehabilitation, cut re-offending and develop pathways for social inclusion.
- Launching research into the underlying reasons for the disproportionately high numbers of Muslim prisoners, including issues of socio-economic deprivation and structural issues within the judicial system.

- Supporting educative and industry initiatives to attract BAME individuals into the police force.

Muslim community empowerment

The Government’s current disengagement policy is a clear barrier to British Muslim’s participation in social and political life. It is essential that the Government mends its broken relationship with Muslim communities by committing to engaging with and listen to a wider spectrum of representative Muslim grassroots organisations, such as MEND and MCB. Engagement does not mean agreement on every level. However, it is only through engagement that the Government will be better equipped to understand structural barriers affecting British Muslims and implement meaningful policies to tackle them.

However, the responsibility for tackling issues of socio-economic discrimination and exclusion is in no way limited to wider society. Muslims themselves have a responsibility to ensure that they are engaging with processes of democracy to overcome the challenges they face. After all, one cannot be helped if they refuse to help themselves. Moreover, as British citizens, everyone has a right, a responsibility, and a duty to work towards the betterment of our society as a whole.

As such, there are a number of ways in which British Muslim communities may be empowered to play their full role as civic actors. Strategies to achieve this include:

- Supporting educative and industry initiatives designed to attract Muslims and BAME individuals into the spheres of politics, the civil service, media, and broadcasting.
- Placing greater emphasis on educational programmes aimed at empowering minority communities to be actively engaged within politics and media. This is one of the strategies in which MEND has invested a great deal of attention. As but a few examples of our work, our politics and

media training courses, our toolkits, factsheets, manifesto summaries, and our Get Out And Vote campaign have empowered and encouraged thousands of British Muslims to take a greater role in active civic engagement.

- Encouraging grassroots and community led movements to overcome barriers to reporting hate crime and encouraging maximum reporting of Islamophobic incidents to the police.

Wider community engagement

Struggles for equality are never limited to those directly experiencing discrimination. Anti-Semitism, sexism and homophobia are not issues that should be limited to Jews, women, or LGBTQ communities. They are problems for which the solutions are the responsibility of the whole of society. The same should be said of Islamophobia. Islamophobia, like all forms of hatred, is an issue of social justice, and therefore, it is inherent upon every member of society to contribute towards ending it. As such, there are certain areas than MEND feels should be addressed:

Promoting a greater awareness of Islam:

The distorted images of Islam and Muslims needs to be countered through programs aimed at combatting stereotypes and raising greater awareness amongst the non-Muslim population. Islamophobia Awareness Month (IAM) is a month-long campaign that MEND and its local partners coordinate every November. The campaign is designed to highlight not only the challenges facing British Muslims, but also the contributions that Muslims make to British society.

Promoting greater inter-community engagement:

Local communities need to play a proactive role in events, activities and programs designed to bring together diverse neighbours, friends and work colleagues. Relationship building is key to encouraging understanding of differing experiences and is thus integral to overcoming narratives of hate.

Developing diversity, citizenship, and engagement in education: Schools play a vital role in educating children on how to be members of a diverse and pluralistic society. Therefore, schools need to be supported in this role by being given greater support in terms of curriculum and teacher training. Areas to address this include:

- Prioritising PSHE and PSRE in the national curriculum to prepare young people for life in a diverse and pluralistic society.
- Developing training programmes and resources for teachers focussed on tackling bullying based on race, religion, disability or sexuality.
- Developing teaching materials to educate young people on the dangers of Islamophobia, racism, anti-Semitism, homophobia and other forms of hatred.
- Supporting community and school-led programmes that encourage cultural exchange between pupils of different racial, religious, ethnic and other backgrounds.
- Supporting academic freedoms and initiatives to decolonise education, whilst giving greater emphasis within the national curriculum to shared histories and the contributions of minority communities in building our society.